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Home My WebLink About2007/02/12 - Agenda Packet - Spec. Mtg. (R.C. General Plan, Dev. Strat. for West R.C. , Hillside Dev.)AGENDA CITY OF RANCHO CUCAMONGA CITY COUNCIL AND PLANNING COMMISSION SPECIAL JOINT MEETING Monday, February 12, 2007 ~ 6:00 p.m. Rancho Cucamonga Civic Center-Tri Communities Room 10500 Civic Center Drive ~ Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 A. CALL TO ORDER 1. Pledge of Allegiance 2. Roll Call: Mayor Kurth Mayor Pro Tem Williams Councilmembers Gutierrez, Michael and Spagnolo Chairman Stewart Vice Chairman Fletcher Commissioners Macias, McPhail, Munoz B. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS This is the time and place for the general public to address the City Council and Planning Commission on any item listed on the agenda. State law prohibits the City Council and Planning Commission from addressing any issue not previously included on the Agenda. The City Council and Planning Commission may receive testimony and set the matter for a subsequent meeting. Comments are to be limited to five minutes per individual. C. ITEM(S) OF BUSINESS 1. Rancho Cucamonga General Plan Update and Vision 2. Development Strategy for West Rancho Cucamonga 3. Hillside Development 4. Fire District Standards Regulating High Rise Develoament 5. Workforce Housing Zoning D. ADJOURNMENT MEETING TO ADJOURN TO CLOSED SESSION FOR CONFERENCE WITH PROPERTY NEGOTIATORS PER GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 54956.8 FOR PROPERTY GENERALLY LOCATED NORTH OF FOOTHILL BOULEVARD, WEST OF I-15 FREEWAY, FOREST CITY DEVELOPMENT CA, INC., & LEWIS INVESTMENT CO., LLC; LINDA D. DANIELS, RDA DIRECTOR, NEGOTIATING PARTY, REGARDING TERMS OF AGREEMENT -RDA I, Debra J. Adams, City Clerk of the City of Rancho Cucamonga, hereby certify that a true, accurate copy of the foregoing agenda was posted on February 8, 2007, per Government Code 54954.2 at 10500 Civic Center Drive, Rancho Cucamonga, California. STAFF REPORT PLANNING DEPART\fENT Date: February 12, 2007 To: Mayor and Members of the City Council Chairperson and Members of the Planning Commission Jack Lam AICP, City Manager From: James Troyer AICP, Planning Director Subject: 2008 General Plan Vision and Update `i~ ~ ~~ iJ RANCHO CUCAb90NGA BACKGROUND: The General Plan is, in effect, the "Constitution" for development in our community. Consequently, it is used as the basic frame of reference in making development and conservation decisions within our planning area, whether they involve public or private lands. All policies within our plan are important. The City has, as a matter of policy, always believed in regular and timely updates to the General Plan. In this case, a technical update is contemplated since it has been 5 years from our last comprehensive update, and a 5 to 6 year period should only be needed given the maturing nature of our City. Also each city and county is required by law to revise its housing element at least every 5 years (§65588(6)). Deadlines for housing element revisions are defined in statute. In our case the State and the Southern California Association of Governments have provided an extension that will require our update to be completed by July 1, 2008; therefore, the technidal update will be able to incorporate and integrate this mandatory element as was accomplished with the 2001 General Plan update: . In order to get the planning update process on track, a work program has been established with realistic milestones for completion of its various stages (i.e., data gathering, workshops, drab plan completion, environmental documentation, etc.). The draft work program has set a projected completion date of August, 2008. A Draft Work Program is outlined as follows: BASIC COMPONENTS: 1.0 General Plan Update Program Initiation 2.0 Public Participation Process 3.0 General Plan Update Preparations 3.1 Land Use and any target areas previously identified • Land Use ?008 GENERAL PLAN VISION AND UYDA'I~ FEBRUARI'12, ?007 PAGE2 • Circulation • Housing • Public Facilities • Community Design • Economic Development 3.2 Environmental Resources • Land Resources • Water Resources • Plant and Animal Resources • Open Space • Energy • Implementation 3.3 Public Health and Safety • Geological Hazards • Seismicity • Flood Hazards • Fire hazards • Noise • Air Quality • Crime Prevention • Emergency Services • Miscellaneous Hazards (Wind, Eucalyptus Windrows, Etc.) 3.4 Implementation 4.0 Environmental Review 5.0 General Plan Adoption Process 6.0 Program Administration 7.0 Special Studies 2008 GLN P.RAL PLAN VISION AND tJhDA"fE FEBRUARY 12.2007 Special studies may include, but not necessarily limited to: • Fire Services Master Plan Update • Police Services Master Plan Update • Hazardous Materials Analysis • Library Services Master Plan Update • Parks and Recreation Master Plan Update • Utilities Analysis • Flood Hazards Analysis • Public Opinion Survey CONCLUSION: PAGC3 The timeline for completion of the General Plan update is not static; Based on input and interaction from the City Council, Planning Commission and the community, it is possible that the completion of the General Plan update could extend beyond August 2008. The housing section of the plan will be completed by July 1, 2008, in full compliance with the law. December 12, 2002 Thomas Hannigan. Director California Department of Water Resources 1416 9th Street, 11th Floor Sacramento, California 95814 Dear Director Hannigan Attached is the final California Floodplain Management Task Force "California Floodplain Management Report. "These consensus recommendations reflect the members' commitment to public safety and the State's agricultural, economic, and environmental resources. Implementing these recommendations will help California residents live and work in a safer, healthier, and more productive State. Task Force members represented local and State jurisdictions. agriculture, building and real estate industries. environmental and emergency management organizations, and Native Americans. Our diverse interests included /food protection. ecosystem health. economic development, conservation of agricultural lands. housing, local land-use authority, public trust, and private property rights. Representatives of federal agencies provided insight and advice to the group. The Task Force had available to it recommendations from 39 previous reports, including the Flood Emergency Action Team Report (FEAT Report), Sharing the Challenge -Floodplain Management into [he 21st Century ([he °Galloway Repot["), government agency publications, books, published papers. Web sites, and specific recommendations from Task Force members. Over 30 Task Force small work group meetings and six public plenary sessions were held between April and December of 2002 to achieve consensus on the recommendations presented in the attached report. Our recommendations are focused on floodplain management and are organized into three categories: Better Understanding of and Reducing Risks from Reasonably Foreseeable Flooding; Multi-Objective Management Approach for Floodplains; and Local Assistance, Funding, and Legislation. The Task Force also recognized that Floodplain management measures interrelate. frequently overlap, and often rely on other floodwater management measures to reduce losses within the floodplain. This is especially pressing within the context of the growing understanding of climate change and the ramifications for location. amount, and temporal impact to California's snowpack and snowmelt. History shows that pursuing Floodplain management or floodwater management without melding the two in a multi-objective context maybe less eRective and ultimately more costly with respect to achieving public safety and ecosystem health. The Task Force took note of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) concerns about California's compliance status with FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). recognized that there may be risks to the State if FEMA finds the State out of compliance, and makes a number of recommendations to the State and its political subdivisions aimed at addressing NFIP standards. We believe [hat proper funding sources will be essential to implementing the recommendations addressed in this report. The State should examine and use all available resources and consider what resources will be available in the future. While the Task Force completed a remarkable amount of work in a short time, several issues remain for further discussion. We believe there is an ongoing role for our group, or a group similar to ours, to provide advice beyond what we have accomplished. We encourage the Department to explore new funding sources to continue efforts similar to those performed by this Task Force. As a final note, we want to thank you for your leadership as chair and the excellent staff. consultant, and facilitator support you provided to this process. We hope to provide continuing support to the Department and look forward to your next steps as you consider our recommendations. - Sincerely, The California. Floodplain Management Task Force SIGNATORIES Hon. Gregory Zlotnick, Co-Vice Chair Association of California bVater Agencies; Director of Santa Clara Valley Water District ~`t~, Adams, Christopher_Office of Emergency Services G~° ~~e_ Cole, Linda Community Alliance with Family Farmers WSZSL~P,.w 1'1 ~ ~.~~~ Edgar, William The Reclamation Board Hardesty, T. Michael California Central Valley Flood Control Association ~~~ Hill, Reggie Lower San Joaquin Levee District Jacobs, Diana Department of Fish and Game ~^~~~L/ Jones, Dallas Office~of E,meergency Services ~~ v ~ Lee, Vicki Sierra Club o~~~~-_- Leslie Friedman-Johnson, Co-Vice Chair The Nature Conservancy Coglianese, Hon. Marci League of California Cities - City of Rio Vista Davis, Tom Agua Caliente Tribe ~~ Finney, Tal Governors Office of Planning and Research ~,~x- Hauck, Frank Office of Emergency Services k~w J~-'~ Hop~kins/, J/o4h,,n Institut~e.,for Ecological Health 1 \>ti/W V . Javor, Ronald Department of Housing and Community Development Keene, Karen California State Association of Counties ~'-" v ~ Longville, Hon. Susan City Council -San Bernardino; Southern California Associated Governments ~"~" M~arrtin, Jennifer The Nature Conservancy :; ~?~~~ Parker, Michael Floodplain Management Association ~~~ Ramirez, Frank Governors Office of Planning and Research ~~ Ray, Jim California Building Industry Association ~L.~ ,PrGt-~-~ Roberts, Terry Governor's Office of Planning and Research ~~ ~~~~ /Sha~ffer, St~ev~e Depar-tmD,entof Food and Agriculture Wehri, Thomas California Association of Resource Conservation Districts White, Christopher California Central Irrigation District ~%/: Moriyama, Clifford California Business Properties Association ~~ [ ~P~ Rabbon, Pete The Reclamation Board ~~,_. Ramirez, Tim The Resources Agency ~~ ~'~ Reynolds, Eileen California Association of REALTORS® /Yi,,,~ ~'~,~ Schmitt, Monty Natural Resources Defense Council ~~ ~ Stork Ronald Friends of the River _~-~ White, Brian California Building Industry Association J 6J T C ABLE OF ONTENTS Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... .. 9 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 18 Floodplain Management -Key Issues ............................................................................................. 24 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................... . 30 Recommendations for Better Understanding of and Reducing Risks from Reasonably Foreseeable Flooding ...............................................................................:..... .31 Recommendations for Multi-Objective-Management Approach for Floodplains .............. . 36 Recommendations for Local Assistance, Funding, and Legislation .................................. .42 APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................. . 4 8 APPENDIX A -Glossary ...................................................................................................... . 50 APPENDIX B -Proposed Comments on the California State General Plan Guidelines ...... . 61 APPENDIX C -Executive Order Options ............................................................................ . 74 APPENDIX D -Proposed Comments on the CEQA Appendix G, Environmental Checklist . 80 APPENDIX E -Staff and Consultants ...............................:.................................................. . 90 APPENDIX F -Bibliography ................................................................................................ . 91 Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................................................................... . 96 'J CALIFORNIA FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP LIST Thomas Hannigan The Department of Water Resources Task Force Chair Hon. Gregory Zlotnick Association of California Water Agencies; Director of Santa Clara Task Force Co-Vice Chair Valley Water District Leslie Friedman Johnson The Nature Conservancy Task Force Co-Viice Chair Adams, Christopher Office of Emergency Services Bornstein, Julie Department of Housing and Community Development Callahan, Michael California State Association of Counties -County of San Joaquin Coglianese, Hon. Marci League of California Cities -City of Rio Vista Cole, Linda Community Alliance with Family Farmers Davis, Tom Agua Caliente Tribe Edgar, William The Reclamation Board Finney, Ta] Governor's Office of Planning and Research Hardesty, T. Michael California Central Valley Flood Control Association Hauck, Frank Office of Emergency Services Hight, Robert Department of Fish and Game Hill, Reggie Lower San Joaquin Levee District Hopkins, John Institute for Ecological Health Jacobs, Diana Department of Fish and Game Javor, Ronald Department of Housing and Community Development Jones, Dallas Office of Emergency Services Keene, Karen California State Association of Counties Lee, Vicki Sierra Club Longville, Hon. Susan City Council -San Bernardino; Southern California Associated Governments Lyons, Jr. William Department of Food and Agriculture Martin, Jennifer The Nature Conservancy Moriyama; Clifford California Business Properties Association Nichols, Mary The Resources Agency CALIFORNIA FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP LIST Parker, Michael Floodplain Managemen[ Association Rabbon, Pete The Reclamation Board Ramirez, Frank Governor's Office of Planning and Research Ramirez, Tim The Resources Agency Ray, Jim California Building Industry Association Reynolds, Eileen California Association of REALTORS® Roberts, Terry Governor's Office of Planning and Research Schmitt, Monty Natural Resources Defense Council Shaffer, Steve Department of Food and Agriculture Stork, Ronald Friends of the River Thomas Wehri California Association of Resource Conservation Districts White, Brian California Building Industry Association White, Christopher California Central Irrigation District ?to FEDERAL AGENCIES THAT PROVIDED INSIGHT AND ADVICE Butterwick, Mary U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9 Charlton, Mark U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Draheim, Shanna U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9 Eldridge, Jack Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX Hoover, Michael- U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Lenaburg, Ray Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX Lent, Rebecca National Marine Fisheries Service McKenzie, Cynthia Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX Nastri, Wayne U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9 it ~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ~ In 2000, Governor Gray Davis signed Assembly Bill 1147, which recommended the creation of the California Floodplain Management Task Force (Task Force). In February 2002, the Governor delegated authority to the. Department of Water Resources (DWR) to convene a Floodplain Management Task Force. The Task Force focused on the intent of Assembly Bill (AB) 1147. In this bill "The Legislature finds and declares that the impacts of flooding can be reduced through better coordi- nation of floodplain management decisions. It is the intent of the Legislature that the Governor establish a floodplain management task force with broad membership from the local, state, and federal government and stakeholders with an interest in flood control If the task force is established, it is the intent of the Legislature that it examine specific issues related to state and local floodplain management, including, but not limited to, features that substantially reduce potential flood damages, and make recommen- dations far more effective statewide floodplain management policies." The newly formed Task Force sought to recom- mend floodplain management strategies de- signed to reduce flood losses and maximize the benefits of floodplains. The Task Force found that existing programs are inadequate to accom- plish these goals and that time is of the essence. They moved forward with an understanding that failure [o take action may result in loss of life, increased economic, agricultural, and property losses, continued environmental decline, and the need for ecosystem restoration. The Task Force identified the need for the State of California to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). It also developed recommendations for improving floodplain FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT Floodplain management includes'actions to Uie Floodplain to reduce'losses to human resources , within the floodplain and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with flbodplaihs and flooding.. Sample actions include: 1. Minimizing impacts of flown' 2:. Maintaining~or mstdring natural floodplain Processes; '3. Removing obstacles within the floodplain volun[arily~pr with, jusrcompensation; 4. Keeping obstacles'dut of the floodplain ' 5. Educating and planning for emergency preparedness; and ' 6. Ensuring that operations of floodwater'. ~. management system's are not'compromised '~ by activities thatinterfere with, or are damaged by, design floods of thesesystems'~. management by adopting Best Management Practices (BMPs) and integrating multi-objective- management (M-O-M) approaches. In developing its recommendations, the Task Force considered an array of previously. identi- fied options drawn from thirty nine reports on the subject, including the Flood Emergency Action Team Report (FEAT Report) (Resources Agency of California, 1997) and Sharing the Challenge -Floodplain Management into the 21st Century ("Galloway Report") (Interagency Flood- plain Management Review Committee, 1994), and from government agency publications, books, published papers, Web sites, and specific recommendations from stakeholders. Recom- mendations developed along three basic themes: "ii REASONABLY FORESEEABLE FLOOD A reasonably 7oreseeable flood is a flood event thatis realistically probable for a`particular area: In mahy cases, this event coind exceed a 'predicted "100-year" flood. It is important to note that the determination of a reasonably foreseeable flood can vary, depending dri its use and application for any given area. Soiirces,of. , informatlori on reasonably. foreseeable floods may include historic floods; paleo-floods? : hydmlogicmodeling using [ranspbsition;~ - historical flood.damage data, and.hydinlogic models. Communities suchas Sacramento, West Sacramento, Yuba City, Marysville, Los Angeles, and Orange County are all working toward protection against floods that exceed the "100-year flood."It is up to each community ~to consider all information on reasonably. foreseeable floods in making land-use and: flood management decisions. `. Better Understanding of and Reducing Risks from Reasonably Foreseeable Flood- ing -Local, State and federal agencies should consider the risk to life and property from reasonably foreseeable floods when making their land use and floodplain management decisions. To accomplish this objective, decision makers need better information and improved tools. In addiCion, better tools are needed to comply with the federal National Flood Insurance Program. ^ Multi-Objective-Management Approach Far Floodplains -State, local, and federal agencies should implement multi-objective floodplain management on a watershed basis. Where feasible, projects should provide adequate protection for natural, recreational, residential, business, economic, agricultural, and cultural resources and for water quality and supply. ^ Local Assistance, Funding, and Legislation - DWR should identify and actively pursue funding oppbrtunities, technical assistance to local governments and other organizations, and legislative proposals to implement Task Force recommendations and ensure success- ful floodplain management, recognizing that local governments have the primary responsi- bility and authority for land use decisions. An additional but key element was to establish a common understanding of the issues, terms, and definitions associated with floodplain manage- ment. The language associated with floodplain management often varies among different profes- sional disciplines and governmental bodies. Defining terms became a critical element of Task Force discussion. Table 1 of the introduction includes the working terms and definitions used by the group for this process. The Task Force's consensus recommendations are not in priority order and are summarized hereafter. BETTER UNDERSTANDING-OF AND' REDUCING RISKS-.FROM REASONABLY;.;-- FORESEEABLE FLOODING-` "~~°-` 1. Awareness Floodplain Mapping -The State should expand its Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program for use by local govern- menu and the public. 2. Future Build-Out Mapping -Local and State agencies preparing floodplain maps should consider current and future planned development. s13 3. Watershed-Based Mapping -Wherever practical, floodplain maps should be prepared on a watershed basis. 4. Geographic Information System (GIS)- Based Flood Maps -Local, State, and federal agencies should create, develop, produce, and disseminate compatible GIS-based flood maps. 5. Alluvial Fan Floodplains -Priority for alluvial fan floodplain mapping should be given to those alluvial fan Ooodplains being considered for development. The State should convene an alluvial fan task force to review information on alluvial fan flood- plains, determine future research needs, and develop recommendations specific to alluvial fan floodplain management. 6. Stream Gaging and Monitoring -DWR and other agencies should sponsor projects in cooperation with the United States Geologi- cal Survey (USGS) to install real-time gages in priority locations throughout California. 7: -Repetitive Losses -Local agencies should work witty the Governors Office of Emer- gency Services (OES) and DWR to identify repeatedly flooded structures and inform qualifying residents of voluntary programs to prevent future flood losses. 8. Flood Warning and Local Community Flood Response Programs -The State should increase assistance to local agencies to improve flood-warning programs specific to each watershed. 9. Flood Insurance Rate Map Issues - Deci- sion-makers should gather information and data beyond Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS) to better assess reasonably foresee- able floods. 10. Exceeding NFIP Floodplain Management Requirements -Local communities should be encouraged to require new and substan- tially improved buildings to have their lowest floor elevations to be at ]east one foot above the NFIP's base flood elevation, factoring in the effect of full build out of the watershed. The effects of new or additional flood man- agement measures should be reflected in an updated base flood elevation. 11. Executive Order -The Governor's 1977 Executive Order for Floodplain Management should be updated. 12. State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan -DWR, OES, and other agencies should incorporate into the State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan floodplain management measures that will meet Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requirements. 13. Multi-Hazard Mapping - OES should coordinate with other hazard mapping efforts to develop GIS-based multi-hazard advisory maps and distribute them to local govern- ments and the public. 14. State Building Codes -Ensure that the California Building Standards Code meets. at minimum, NFIP requirements. Ensure that other State codes applicable to public build- ings meet, at a minimum, NFIP requirements. Ensure that any local code adoptions or amendments and any development approvals meet, at a minimum, NFIP requirements. MULTI, OBJECTIVE ~MANAGEMBNT APPROACH FOR FLOODPLAINS ' 15. Multi-Objective-Management - A M-O-M approach to flood management projects should be promoted. .j 16. Flood Management Approaches to Ecosystem Restoration and Agricultural Conservation -Flood management programs and projects, while providing for public safety, should maximize opportunities for agricultural conservation and ecosystem protection and restoration, where feasible. 17. Nonstructural Approaches, Restoration, and Conservation of Agriculture and Natural Lands - In planning new or up- graded floodwater management programs and projects, including structural projects, local and state agencies should encourage as part of the design, where appropriate, non- structural approaches and the conservation of beneficial uses and functions of the floodplain. 18. Tools for Protection of Flood Compatible Land Uses -The State should identify, develop, and support tools to protect flood- compatible land uses. coring of flood management projects on a watershed level. 23. Proactive and Adaptive Management of Floodplains -State and local agencies should manage Floodplains proactively and adaptively by periodically adjusting to cur- rent physical and biological conditions, new scientific information, and knowledge. 24. Best Management Practices - DWR should work with stakeholders to identify, monitor, and update voluntary BMPs for multi-objec- tive floodplain management. 25. Training, Education, and Professional CertiFication for Multi-Objective Flood- plain Management -The State should encourage the inclusion of multi-objective floodplain management curricula in college and university degree programs. 26. Coordination among Agencies and Groups - The State should encourage and create 19. Protection of Floodplain Groundwater Recharge Areas -Permitting agencies should consider the impacts of land-use 27 decisions on the capacity of the floodplain to recharge groundwater. 20. Vector Control -During the planning and development of ecosystem restoration projects, the costs and impacts involved with vector control and with monitoring related to mosquito-transmitted diseases should be considered. 21.Multi-Jurisdictional Partnerships -The State should encourage multi jurisdictional partnerships when floodplain management projects are planned and implemented. 22. Watershed Monitoring -The State and others should financially support [he moni- incentives for additional coordination among stakeholders. State General Plan Guidelines -The State General Plan Guidelines should be updated to reflect the California Floodplain Manage- ment Task Force recommendations, as applicable, and to reflect other programs, policies, and standards, including the NFIP, for floodplain management. LOCAL ASSISTANCE, FUNDING, AND LEGISLATION ,. 28. New and Existing Funding Sources -The State and local governments should encourage federal, State, local, nongovernmental, and other private cost sharing to achieve equitable and fair financing of multi-objective floodplain management actions and planning. ~ls 29. Task Force Recommendation Priorities - DWR and The Reclamation Board should lead the development of a consensus process, involving appropriate stakeholders, to iden- tify criteria and prioritize the implementation of Task Force recommendations, given the expected 2xp2nditures, using existing and new funding sources. 30. Department of Water Resources Outreach Programs -DWR should expand outreach programs to include public service an- nouncements to increase public awareness of floodplain values, flooding hazards, public safety, and hazard mitigation measures. 31. Designated Floodways -DWR and The Reclamation Board should include, in the Community Assistance Workshops, informa- tion on the Reclamation Board's current authority to adopt and update designated floodways in the Central Valley. The Reclama- tion Board should work with stakeholders to identify, if any, a list of Reclamation Board regulations that are impediments to flood- compatible uses within the floodway and recommend specific revisions. 32. State Floodplain Management Assistance to Local Governments -The State should provide additional resources to continue and expand implementation of the State's flood- plain management programs, including full support of the Community Assistance Con- tact program. 33. National Flood Insurance Program Com- pliance Encouragement -Public agencies not subject to local government floodplain management requirements or the Governor's Executive Order on Floodplain Management should comply with NFIP requirements. 34. Community Rating System - DWR should educate local officials and the public about the elements and benefits of the Community Rating System (CRS) insurance-rate adjusting program. 35. State Community Rating System Program Coordinator -DWR should designate a Slate level CRS Program Coordinator familiar with State agencies and total governments that use the CRS program. 36. Interagency Barriers -The Reclamation Board should work with the Corps of Engineers, State agencies, local sponsors and interested parties to identify interagency barriers to efficient implementation of multi-objective flood management projects and to develop options to overcome those interagency barriers. 37. California Environmental Quality Act Local Analysis Improvement -DWR should provide technical assistance to local agencies and practitioners with a practical, step-by-step CEQA flood hazard and impacts assessment guide. The CEQA Guidelines, Appendix G, should be modified to include the changes shown in Appendix D of this report. 38. Establishment of a California Floodplain Management Advisory Committee -DWR should sponsor a floodplain management advisory committee composed of local and State government representatives, floodplain managers, and other stakeholders, to develop additional recommendations to improve floodplain management practices. The Task Force worked with and considered diverse and conflicting interests and developed many consensus recommendations. None of the is Task Force recommendations in the report preclude Task Force organizations or their members from raising issues that differ from items in the report. Due [o the time, nature, and format of the Task Force and.the numerous issues related to floodplain management, it was not reasonably possible to form recommendations on all of the issues identified as important by the Task Force members. In some cases, issues were not discussed; others were discussed, but no consensus emerged; and more definitive resolu- tion of some issues vas deferred to subsequent analysis and discussion processes recommended by the Task Force. Examples of these three types of remaining issues include: coastal floodplain management, some elements of alluvia] fan floodplain manage- ment, elements of the effort to ensure that the State isjudged to be in full compliance with the NFIP, floodwater management, floodwater storage, floodplain management programs in protected floodplains still subject to flooding, certification of the competence of floodwater management systems for floodplain management purposes, life-cycle costing, disclosure and map availability, actions to conserve agriculture and rural floodplains, urbanization of floodplains, benefits and risks to floodplains from structural flood control, and methods needed to address adverse impacts to adjacent properly. These topics are important and worthy of discus- sion by future State task forces, appropriate State and local agencies, and the Legislature. ,i7. ~ CHAPTER I ~ INTRODUCTION 16 INTRODUCTION Floodplain management involves proactive measures to obtain maximum benefits and minimize losses associated with flooding. Flooding is an important ecological function of every river, alluvial fan, and coastal area in California. Flooding has seasonally inundated California for thousands of years, generating unique ecosystems. Floodplain ecosystems provide essential habitat for multiple species of plants and wildlife (some dependent on the recurrence of periodic flooding), and there are economic, ecological, agricultural, and societal benefits to maintaining connections between rivers, bays, and coasts and their floodplains. At the same time, floods also cause loss of life, property, and economic activity In January 1997, California experienced one of the most geographi- cally extensive and costly floods in the State's history Of the State's 58 counties, 48 were de- clared disaster areas. Nine people were killed, 120,000 people were evacuated from their homes, and 300 square miles were flooded. Damages approached $2 billion, and floods impacted over 23,000 homes as well as numerous businesses, agricultural lands, bridges, roads, and floodwater management infrastructures. Estimated indirect costs and costs associated with the disruption of the State's economy exceeded $5 billion. While it was the most costly, the 1997 flood was not the most deadly. Previous floods caused 74 deaths in 1955, 35 deaths in 1964 (11 from a tsunami), 13 deaths in 1986, and 28 deaths in 1995. Since 1950, all 58 California counties have been declared flood disaster areas at least three times. The 1995 and 1997 floods prompted the initiation of a Governor's Flood Emergency Action Team (FEAT) and a recommendation for the development of a statewide task force com- posed of broadly represented key stakeholders. FbOODPLAIIV' " Any larid aiea'susceptibleto inundation by , floodwateis fmm anysoun:e. In 2000, Governor Gray Davis signed Assembly Bill (AB) 1147, which recommended the cre- ation of the California Floodplain Management Task Force (Task Force). In February 2002, the Governor delegated au- thority to the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to convene a Floodplain Management Task Force: The Task Force focused on the intent of AB 1147. The bill states. "The Legislature finds and declares that the impacts of flooding can be reduced through better coordination of floodplain management decisions. It is the intent of the Legislature that the Governor establish a flood- plain management task force with broad member- ship from the local, state, and federal government and stakeholders with an interest in flood control. If the task force is established, it is the intent of the Legislature that it examine specific issues related to state and local floodplain management, including, but not limited to, features that sub- stantially reduce potential flood damages, and make recdmmendations for more effective state- wide floodplain management policies." The newly formed Task Force sought to recom- mend floodplain management strategies de- signed to reduce flood losses and maximize the benefits of floodplains. The Task Force found that existing programs are inadequate to accom- plish these goals, and [hat time is of the essence. They moved forward with an understanding that failure to take action may result in loss of life, increased economic, agricultural, and property losses; continued environmental decline, and the need for ecosystem restoration. ~is FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT Floodplain management includes actions to the floodplain to induce losses [o human resources within [he floodplain and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with floodplains'and flooding. Sample actions include: L Minimizing impacts of flows; ; 2. Maintaining. or restoring natural flood .plain processes; 3. Removing obstacles within`the floodplain voluntarily or with just compen3ation; 4. Keeping obstacles out of the floodplain; 5. Educating and planning for emergency preparedness; and ' 6. Ensuring that operations of floodwater management systems'are no[ compro- mised by activities thatinterfere with, or are damaged by, design floods of these systems. ' Between April and December of 2002, the Task Force held over 30 small group meetings and 6 public plenary sessions to achieve consensus on the recommendations presented in this report. In developing their recommendations, the Task Force considered an array of previously identified options drawn from 39 repoas on the subject, including the Flood Emergency Action Team Report (FEAT Report) (Resources Agency of California, 1997) and Sharing the Challenge -Floodplain Management into the 21st Century ("Galloway Report') (Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee, 1994), and from government agency publications, books, published papers, Web sites, and specific recommendations from stakeholders. Recommendations were developed along three basic themes: ^ Better Understanding of and Reducing Risks from Reasonably Foreseeable Flood- ing -Local, State and federal agencies should consider the risk to life and property from reasonably foreseeable floods when making their land-use and floodplain management decisions. To effectively consider the risk to life and property from reasonably foreseeable floods, decision-makers need better tools and information and specific methods to comply with the federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Multi-Objective-Management Approach for Floodplains -State, local, and federal agencies should implement multi-objective floodplain management on a watershed basis. Where feasible, projects should provide REASONABLY,FORESEEABLE FLOOD; ~ , r ; A reasonably foreseeable flood ts'a flood event that is realistically piubable ftir~a particular area. In mariy cases, this event` . - could exceed a predicted: "100-year"'flood: It is.important to note that the determination •~ of a reasonably foreseeable flood can vary depending on its use and application for any , given area. Sources ofinformatioh on reasonably foreseeable.floods may include historic floods,.paleo-flodds, hydrologic ', modeling using transposition; historical . flood damage data, and hydrologic:models. Communities such as Sacramento,'.Wesf ' . Sacramento, Yuba City IVIaiysville, Los' Angeles; and Orange County are all working-;, toward protectiori against floods that exceed `. the °100-year flood. " It is up to each ~, cbmmunity'.[o consider`allinformatioii'`on, : ;;~, reasonablyforeseeable floods in making7and ; - use and-flood management decision's. ~' ' io adequate protection for natural, recreational, residential, business, economic, agricultural, and cultural resources and for water quality and supply. ^ Local Assistance, Funding, and Legislation - DWR should identify and actively pursue funding opportunities, technical assistance to local governments and other organizations, and legislative proposals to implement Task Force recommendations and ensure success- ful floodplain management, recognizing that local governments have the primary respon- sibility and authority for land-use decisions. An additional but key element was to establish a common understanding of the issues, terms, and definitions associated with floodplain manage- ment. The language associated with floodplain management often varies among professional disciplines and governmental bodies. Defining terms became a critical element of the Task Force discussion. Table 1 includes the working terms and definitions used by the group for [his process. The group grew to appreciate the knowledge, wisdom, and thoughtfulness of its members. Through long hours of work and deliberation, it was possible to create common ground and recommendations that will benefit a]] Californians if implemented. Z l' TABLE 1 TERMS Flood management is an overarching term that encompasses both floodwater management and floodplain management. Floodwater management includes actions to modify [he natural flow of floodwaters [o reduce losses to human resources and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with flooding. Sample actions include: 1. Containing flows in reservoirs, dams, and natural basins; 2. Conveying flows via levees, channels, and natural corridors; 3. Managing flows through reservoir re-operation; and 4. Managing watersheds by decreasing rainfall runoff and providing headwater stream protection. Floodplain management includes actions to the floodplain to reduce losses to human resources within the floodplain and/or to protect benefits to natural resources associated with floodplains and flooding. Sample actions include: 1. Minimizing impacts of flows (e.g., flood-proofing, insurance); 2. Maintaining or restoring natural floodplain processes (e.g., natural community succession, meander corridors); 3. Removing obstacles within the floodplain voluntarily or with just compensation (e.g., relocating at-risk structures); 4. Keeping obstacles out of the floodplain (e.g., planning, mapping, and zoning land-use decisions); 5. Educating and planning for emergency preparedness (e.g., emergency response plans, data collection, outreach, insurance requirements); and 6. Ensuring that operations of floodwater management systems are not compromised by activities that interfere with, or are damaged by, design floods of these systems. Floodplain management measures interrelate and frequently overlap with floodwater management measures, such as the following, to reduce losses within the floodplain: 1. Emergency response activities; 2. Realigning levees; 3. Reconnecting historical floodplains; and 4. Re-operation of reservoirs. zi .CHAPTER II ~ ~'~ ~_ FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT KEY ISSUES ?4' FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT -KEY ISSUES The Task Force identified the three major im- pediments to effective floodplain management: Insufficient understanding of the risks from reasonably foreseeable flooding; single-purpose approaches to floodplain management issues; and insufficient technical assistance and funding [o local agencies. INSUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE RISKS FROM REASONABLY FORESEEABLE FLOODING The first challenge to effective floodplain man- agement is the misunderstanding by the public and decision-makers of the real risks of flooding. The phrase °100-year flood" is a concept used by the NFIP to calculate flood insurance premium thresholds and rates. Many people have heard the term 100-year flood, and they believe that it means their home will not be flooded for 100 years. In actuality, the 100-year flood is a flood with a one percent chance of occurrence each year. It is therefore possible that a 100-year flood or larger can occur more than once per year or in back-to-back years. In other words, over the lifetime of a 30-year mortgage, there is a 26 percent chance of being flooded by a 100-year flood. Many communities use the 100-year flood as the basis for making floodplain management deci- sions, whereas, in truth, they may still experi- ence floods of larger magnitudes. In these cir- cumstances, floodplain management decisions based on the 100-year flood may fail to achieve the expected goals of preventing flood damage and loss of life. Areas that have a designed protection from the 100-year flood are not protected from more severe floods. An increasing number of commu- nities, including Sacramento, West Sacramento, Yuba City, Marysville, Los Angeles, and Orange County, are working toward protection against floods that exceed the 100-year flood. Another problem the public experiences is that areas identified as flood-prone keep changing. One year, a property is considered to be outside of the regulated floodplain; a few years later, the same property may be considered in the regulated floodplain, perhaps requiring owners to pay for flood insurance. There are several reasons for such changes. The modeled hydrol- ogy of a watershed may change. For example, since the 100-year flood is a hypothetical flood magnitude that is derived from mathematical procedures using existing storm and stream flow records, it changes as the amount of flood data accumulates through the years. Sometimes the way in which the watershed is modeled is changed as updated assessments of floodplain topography, stage/flow relationships, and ways of modeling the performance of flood- water management systems are implemented. In other cases, the watershed itself changes. For example, in many areas of the State, maps of flood-prone areas only reflect the impacts of current development in that watershed. As new development occurs, more hard surfaces, such as roads and roofs, accelerate and increase flood runoff, increasing the size and often the depth of the floodplain. The problem is compounded by the use of California floodplain maps that do not reflect today's development in many areas. On the average, these maps have not been updated for over a decade. In addition, there are thou- sands of square miles of floodplains that have not been mapped at all. Currently, many communities allow the lowest floor of new residences to be constructed at the fs 100-year base flood elevation, as shown on Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS). The mapping technology and methods used to map and define base flood elevation are, a[ best, accurate to only plus or minus one foot. In addition, changes in the watershed can alter the level of flooding shown on the issued FIRMS. Therefore, residences built to minimum standards are subject to damages from the 100-year flood as encroachment takes place in the watershed. ALLUVIAL FAN An alluvial fan is a gently sloping, fan-shaped landform cleated over tlme by the depositlon of eroded sediment. Alluvial fans are common at the base of mountain ranges such as~the American. West. Alluvial fans present unique challenges to flood- plain management. Alluvial fan flooding is unpredictable, given its geologic and geomorphic nature. The principal hazards associated with alluvial fan flooding are the high velocity, debris- laden flows and the uncertainty of the flow path. Many of the alluvial fan floodplains in Southern California have experienced development and are projected for additional development. To prevent future loss of life and damage to prop- erty it is important that alluvial fans throughout the State be accurately identified, and that landforms be evaluated to identify-fan surfaces subject to flooding. For riverine and coastal flooding, bank stabiliza- tion is frequently used to protect developed areas. However, for alluvial fan flooding, this approach can actually concentrate flood risks in neighboring areas. Repetitive losses within Californias floodplains are another problem. Repetitive losses are de- fined by FEMA as two or more losses that occur to the same property within a 10-year period. Approximately 40 percent of all FEMA's NFIP claims nationally result from repetitive losses. Many of the areas where repetitive flooding has occurred remain unmapped and unregulated. Consequently, flood management measures to reduce loss of life and property damage in these areas are seldom practiced. Although programs are available [o assist homeowners in reducing repetitive losses, many communities do not take advantage of them. California's policies for building State facilities within floodplains have not been updated for 25 years. Therefore; the policies do not reflect current knowledge of the risks associated with such development. Furthermore, these policies fail to direct State agencies owning structures or property in floodplains to cooperate with other stakeholders in multi-objective floodplain management. FEMA has notified the State that its existing Executive Order for floodplain management issued in 1977 does not effectively bring the State and its political subdivisions into compliance with the NFIP. According to FEMA, continued noncompliance could endanger the State's ability to obtain federal financing from FEMA and other federal sources for State build- ing construction and improvement projects located in floodplains and for disaster recovery. California faces multi-faceted challenges associated with the impacts of climate change. Recent scientific studies suggest that climate changes might increase flood frequency and could exacerbate the uncertainty of flood-flow prediction. California's dependence on reservoir storage and snow pack for flood management ;zs and water supply make the State particularly vulnerable to these potential changes. Climate change could impact regional hydrology and hydraulics directly, resulting in an increase in temperature, rise in sea level, change in precipi- tation patterns, and changes in storm frequency and intensity SINGLE-PURPOSE APPROACHES TO:'. FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT ISSUES In [he past, many projects within floodplains have been developed and implemented to carry out single-purpose objectives, without consider- ing the importance of flooding in maintaining a healthy environment. Conversely, some ecosys- tem restoration projects have been implemented without sufficient consideration of long-term floodway maintenance requirements. While achieving single-purpose objectives, these approaches may have adversely impacted other beneficial uses of the floodplains. While single-purpose flood management projects were acceptable in the past, they no longer are considered the preferable approach to floodplain management. Increasingly, floodplains are seen as valuable resources by our society They pro- vide opportunities for flood protection, agricul- tural production, open space, valuable native habitat, ecosystem protection, recreation, eco- nomic development, and housing. Financial limitations are another disadvantage of single-purpose projects, Governmental agencies and the private sector typically do not have the resources or public support to fund projects that do not achieve multiple benefits. In recognition of these limitations, greater incentives are now available for multi-objective projects. AB 1147, which authorized the creation of the Task Force, provides significant financial incentives for multi purpose flood management projects that also address ecosystem and recreational needs. The Safe Drinking Water, Watershed Protection, and Flood Protection Act of 2000 (Proposition 13) funded projects that combine flood protection with agricultural conservation and ecosystem protection. The Water Security, Clean Drinking Water, Coastal and Beach Protection Act of 2002 (Proposition 50) contains additional incentives for watershed- based management approaches. INSUFFICIENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND FUNDING TO LOCAL AGENCIES Local governments have the primary responsibil- ity and authority for regulating land develop- ment. However, in most cases, they lack the necessary resources to fully implement flood- plain management strategies. Information on the numerous potential funding sources available for implementing floodplain management strategies is difficult to access. Untike other issues of statewide concern, there is no unified public information or education program.for floodplain management. Indepen- dently each agency has had to develop public awareness programs and disseminate informa- tion on all floodplain values, flooding hazards, public safety and hazard mitigation measures. One important program that assists local areas is FEMA's Community Assistance Program (CAP), which is administered and cost-shared by DWR and FEMA. This program, which includes technical assistance and incentives for enhanced floodplain management, could provide the critical assistance needed by local communities 'ig to develop multi objective floodplain manage- ment. Currently, CAP funding is insufficient to provide this assistance to communities in need. Without specific legislative authority, the State's ability to participate in and leverage federal and local cost-share funds for multi-objective flood management projects in limited. As a result, the State is unable to fully support its interests in ecosystem restoration, responsible floodplain management, and comprehensive flood manage- ment planning. In response to the challenges mentioned above, the Task Force presents recommendations in Chapter III for providing local governments, landowners, and others with floodplain manage- ment tools to maximize the benefits of flood- plains and minimize flood-related losses. ~zs X30 RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AND REDUCING RISKS FROM REASONABLY FORESEEABLE FLOODING Most residents generally expect that the government will protect their communities from reasonably foreseeable flood events. Reasonably foreseeable floods are floods that are realistically probable for a particular area; often, they may exceed a predicted 100-year flood. The determi- nation of a reasonably foreseeable flood can vary depending on its use and application for any given area. The communities of Sacramento, West Sacramento, Yuba City, Marysville, Los Angeles, and Orange County are all working toward protection against floods that exceed the often discussed 100-year flood. To provide protection from reasonably foresee- able floods, communities need information to predict those flood flows. Sources of relevant information may include historic flood and damage data, paleo-flood data, and the results of hydrologic, hydraulic, and meteorological models, including hydrologic modeling using transposition. Communities may find this information valuable in making land-use and flood management decisions. Once-they identify reasonably foreseeable flood flows, they can consider a variety of flood management tools for protecting their residents. This will enable them to meet community priorities for flood protection, economic development, housing, agricultural conservation, ecosystem protection and restoration, open space, and recreation. Summary of the Recommendations Local, State and federal agencies should consider the risk to life and property from reasonably foreseeable floods when making their land use and floodplain management decisions. To accom- plish this objective, decision makers need better information and improved tools. In addition, better tools are needed to comply with the federal National Flood Insurance Program. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. AWARENESS FLOODPLAIN MAPPING Problem: In the coming decades, it is projected that millions of additional Californians will be living in Flood-prone areas. Many communities do not have current information to use in identifying and characterizing areas subject to inundation by reasonably foreseeable floods. DWR has a small Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program, but its funding is expiring. Awareness floodplain mapping is acost-effective solution to mapping areas that otherwise would not be mapped through the FEMA mapping program. Recommendation: The State should continue DWR's current non-regulatory Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program to analyze all flood-prone developing areas in California, for optima] use by local government. DWR should expand its Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program to provide information on areas that are subject to inundation by reasonably foreseeable floods, for use by local communities. DWR should provide awareness floodplain maps and other flood hazard information for use by local governments and the public. 2. FUTURE BUILD-OUT MAPPING Problem: Future build-out is not always included on maps used to identify flood-prone areas. As future development occurs, runoff from that development can increase flows in flood- prone areas downstream. This is one of the reasons why levels of protection decrease; one year an area may have 100-year flood protection, and the next year the same area may have less than 100-year flood protection. ?31 Recommendation: Local and State agencies preparing floodplain maps should incorporate consideration of current and future planned development, pursuant to [he local General Plan. If new or additional floodwater management measures are implemented in the future, their impacts also'should be reflected in updated floodplain maps. 3. WATERSHED-BASED MAPPING Problem: Many floodplain maps are prepared based on political boundaries (e.g., city, county, or agency), not on watershed boundaries. Differ- entjurisdictions frequently use different flood- plain mapping data and methods. These different standards lead to inconsistencies in floodplain mapping and limit the ability [o do comprehen- sive floodplain management. Recommendation: Wherever practical and appropriate, floodplain maps should be prepared on a watershed basis. 4. GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM-BASED FLOOD MAPS Problem: Insufficient, inadequate, and incom- patible Geographical Information System (GIS) data make the integration of floodplain informa- tion more difficult for localjurisdictions engaged in comprehensive planning. Recommendation: Local, State, and federal .agencies should create, develop, produce, and disseminate compatible GIS-based flood maps. 5. ALLUVIAL FAN FLOODPLAINS Problem: Unlike flows in riverine or coastal floodplains, flows in alluvial fan floodplains are unpredictable, making it more difficult to delin- eate flood hazard areas. In addition to water, flows in alluvial fan floods often contain mud, rocks, and boulders and cause scour. All of these conditions can be devastating in urban areas. Many of the alluvial fan floodplains in Southern California have experienced development and are projected for additional development. The Task Force was able to develop several recommendations for alluvial fan flooding issues. As one of the following recommendations indicates, additional work is needed to more fully define the issues. 5.1 Recommendation: Priority for alluvial fan floodplain mapping should be given to those alluvial fan floodplains being considered for development. 5.2 Recommendation: Entities involved in land-use planning for alluvial fans, distinct from FEMA mapping, should address the following: ^ Alluvial fan flood flows are generally unpredictable, and a site analysis should be performed to determine all reasonably foreseeable flood apex flow paths. ^ Flood flow depths and velocities should be determined for these flow paths. ^ Any debris and scour associated with reason- . ably foreseeable apex flood flow should be determined. ^ Land-use agencies should be encouraged to ensure that new development will not be damaged by the special risks associated with alluvial floods. These risks include velocities, debris, and scour associated with reasonably foreseeable floods. 5.3 Recommendation: The State should convene a task force specifically for alluvial fans, with stakeholder participation, to review the state of knowledge regarding alluvial fan flood- plains, [o determine future research needs, and, if appropriate, to develop recommendations specific to alluvial fan floodplain management. 32 5.4 Recommendation: In making land-use decisions, local governments should have knowledge of the characteristics of alluvial fan floodplains. 5.5 Recommendation: As with other types of floodplains, local agencies should assess the risks of the reasonably foreseeable flood instead of relying solely on the 100-year flood. 5.6 Recommendation: Residents in alluvial fan floodplains should be informed of any increased risks that might result from changed conditions, including fire, seismic activity, or other physical changes, that could affect the risk of alluvia] fan flooding. 5.7 Recommendation: Structural and/or non- structural measures should be explored to provide sufficient flow-through areas on alluvial fans. 6. STREAM GAGING AND MONITORING Problem: Federal and State budget cuts have reduced the number of stream gages in Califor- nia. This reduction means that historical flow data are not maintained and updated. Therefore, estimates of flow for mapping purposes are less extensive, especially given the potential for climate changes. In addition, real time informa- tion needed for flood fighting is less available. Recommendation: DWR and other agencies should sponsor projects in cooperation with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to install and maintain additional gages and, where appro- priate, include real-time technology in priority locations throughout California. 7. REPETITIVE LOSSES Problem: Some homes, businesses, and public infrastructure located in floodplains are flooded repeatedly. Repetitive loss causes major eco- nomic and social disruptions. Owners may be willing to have their residential structures and. businesses floodproofed or relocated; when damages are substantial, NFIP communities must require either floodproofing or relocation. However, local agencies may not be aware of voluntary programs that are offered to their residential property owners, businesses, and public agencies by FEMA to assist in reducing repetitive flood losses. FEMA sponsors these programs through DWR and the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES). Other agencies may also have resources to reduce repetitive losses. Recommendation: Local agencies should 'work with the OES and/or DWR to identify whether they have any residential properties or businesses that flood repeatedly If so, they should work with OES and/or DWR and other agencies to make voluntary programs available for residences, businesses, and public infrastructure and to encourage owners to take advantage of these programs to reduce repetitive losses. 8. FLOOD WARNING AND LOCAL COM- MUNITY FLOOD RESPONSE PROGRAMS Problem: Flood warning programs, including real-time flood risk information, are not available for all areas. The absence of reliable flood warn- ing programs can delay evacuation and flood fighting and lead to loss of life and property. Recommendation: The State should increase assistance to local agencies to improve flood- warning programs. Those programs should promote and develop effective systems specific to each watershed and based on improved instrumentation, communication systems, and advanced remote sensing technology. Flood-prone communities should (1) develop and publish potential evacuation routes for the whole community, specifically including those areas developed with flood protection levees, (2) provide real-time multi-lingual information 33 on flood risk to its population to minimize loss of life and property, (3) conduct periodic flood simulation exercises, and (4) include community input and involvement. 9. FLOOD INSURANCE RATE MAP (FIRM) ISSUES Problems: Local communities misunderstand the purpose of FIRNis. Although FIRMS do not necessarily represent the full extent of a communitys flood-prone area, they are required for participation in the NFIP and often form [he exclusive basis of a communitys flood management efforts. Many flood-prone areas have not been mapped. Where maps do exist, most are more than a decade old and do not account for future or current build-out. 9.1 Recommendation: Decision makers should use FIRMS conservatively, as a decision tool starting point, if [hey provide the best informa- tion available. However, decision makers should gather information and data beyond FIRMS, including historical flood damage records, to better predict and plan for reasonably foreseeable floods. 9.2 Recommendation: DWR should continue to participate collaboratively with local commu- nities in FEMA's Mapping Needs Update Support System (MNUSS) program, which provides a priority-setting tool. 9.3 Recommendation: The State should affirm its support for FEMAs Map Modernization Program and update existing flood maps, pursu- ant to MNUSS priorities, as soon as possible.. 9.4 Recommendation: Local agencies should request that FIRM maps from FEMA include build-out as well as current development. If new or additional floodwater management measures are implemented in the future, their impacts should be reflected in updated floodplain maps. If new or additional floodwater management projects alter the size of a floodplain, cities and counties should evaluate their objectives for areas removed from or added to that floodplain. I0. EXCEEDING NFIP MINIMUM FLOOD- PLAIN MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS Problem: Currently, some communities allow the lowest floor of new buildings to be constructed at or above the base flood elevation, as shown on FEMA FIRMS. The mapping technology and methods used to map and define floodplains produce estimates that necessarily involve uncer- tainty about the precise size and depth of the 100- year floodplain. In addition, anticipated and unanticipated changes in the watershed, including new flow data, can change the level of flooding of the 100-year flood from that shown on issued FIRMS. Also, the impacts of global climate change may increase uncertainties related to the magnitude of both the base flood and reasonably foreseeable floods. Finally, since FEMA allows encroachment in its regulated floodway fringe, the predetermined base flood elevation is permitted to rise. Therefore, a building built to minimum standards in FEMAs floodway fringe could be subject to damage from the 100-year flood as encroachment occurs. Recommendation: Local communities should be encouraged to require new and substantially improved buildings to have their lowest floor elevations to be at least one foot above the NFIP's base flood elevation, factoring in the effect of full build out of the watershed. The effects of new or additional flood management measures should be reflected in an updated base flood elevation. 11. EXECUTIVE ORDER Problem: Many State agencies do not adequately consider the use of current floodplain manage- ment knowledge and practices in their decision- making processes. The Governor's 1977 Execu- tive Order for Floodplain Management, B-39-77, has not been updated to reflect more current 34. floodplain management knowledge and practices or changes in federal law. As a result, State agencies may contribute [o further loss or degra- dation of floodplain resources and increased flood risks to State facilities. FEMA has notified the State that its existing Executive Order for floodplain management issued in 1977 does not effectively bring the State and its political subdivisions into compli- ance with the NFIP. According to FEMA, contin- ued noncompliance could endanger the State's ability to obtain federal financing from FEMA and other federal sources for State building construction and improvement projects located in floodplains and for disaster recovery. Recommendation: The Governor should update the 1977 Floodplain Management Executive Order to meet or, where appropriate as allowed by existing law, to exceed current minimum Floodplain management criteria. See Appendix C for proposed revisions to the Executive Order language. For State agencies directly under the jurisdiction of the Executive Branch, the proposed Executive Order should include the following, to the extent allowed by State law: ^ For State development in the floodplain, compliance with current minimum NFIP regulations, as stated in Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations or succeeding regula- tions. should be explicitly required. ^ For State development in the floodplain Stale agencies should be encouraged to exceed minimum NFIP regulations, where appropriate. ^ State agencies developing or assisting with the development of critical infrastructure should avoid approving such development within a floodplain unless it is clearly demonstrated that this siting is necessary to achieve the purposes of [he critical infra- structure, and that the infrastructure will be operable and not create a hazard to public safety during a major flood event. ^ State agencies should be directed to consider alternatives that avoid or minimize adverse effects and incompatible development in the floodplain, consistent with their legal authority. ^ Consistent with its legal authority, if a State agency has determined to, or proposes to, conduct, support, or allow development, as defined by the State's Executive Order, Note 4, to be located in the floodplain and which is not subject to local floodplain management requirements, the State agency should be encouraged to consider alternatives that avoid or minimize adverse effects and incom- patible development in the floodplain. ^ Each Stale agency should be directed to prepare a written statement on how it will comply with the updated Executive Order, subject to review by DWR or OES, as appropriate. State agencies and State constitutional entities not subject to the authority of the Executive Branch should be: ^ Encouraged to comply with the new Execu- tive Order and the provisions of the NFIP, consistent with their legal authority; ^ Requested to develop their own Floodplain Management Procedures, consistent with the Executive Order; and ^ Encouraged to consider alternatives that avoid or minimize adverse effects and incom- patible development in the floodplain, consistent with their legal authority 35 12. STATE MULTI- HAZARD b1ITIGATION PLAN Problem: The Federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA) requires California to prepare a Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan by 2004 to continue [o be eligible for federal disaster assistance funding. Recommendation: DWR should partner with OES and other agencies to incorporate into the State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan floodplain management measures that will, at a minimum, meet FEMAs requirements. 13. MULTI-HAZARD MAPPING Problem: The State does not have a specific permanent program for multiple-hazard (e.g., flood, fire, seismic, etc.) mapping. Therefore, decision makers and the public may not be fully aware of all of [he threats to life and property from multiple hazards or of hazard mitigation needs in California. Recommendation: OES should coordinate with other hazard mapping efforts and create a permanent program with the specific purpose of developing and distributing GIS-based multi-hazard cdvisory maps for use by local governments and the public. 14. STATE BUILDING CODES Problem: Local community building depart- ments authorized to issue building permits are governed by the California Building Standards law and other statutes, which regulate what code requirements apply to what types of buildings. The California Building Standards Code consists of several parts, some of which may apply statewide and some of which may apply to certain types of uses. In addition, local govern- ments may adopt codes if State requirements do not apply and may modify certain State codes for limited reasons. NFIP requirements are not always adequately considered in the enactment and implementation of the codes. Recommendation: Ensure that the California Building Standards Code meets, at a minimum, NFIP requirements. Ensure that other State codes applicable to public buildings meet, at a minimum, NFIP requirements. Ensure that any local code adoptions or amendments and any development approvals meet, a[ a minimum, NFIP requirements. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MULTI- OBJECTNE-MANAGEMENT APPROACH FOR,FLOODPLAINS In the past, many projects within floodplains were developed and implemented to carry out single-purpose objectives, without considering the importance of flooding in maintaining a healthy environment. Conversely, some ecosys- tem restoration projects have been implemented without sufficient consideration of long-term floodway maintenance requirements. In addi- tion to achieving single purpose objectives rather than multiple objectives, these approaches may have adversely impacted other beneficial uses of the floodplains. Floodplain ecosystems provide essential habitat for multiple species of plants and wildlife. About 55 percent of the animals and 25 percent of the plants designated by the State as threatened or endangered depend on wetland habitats. In the U.S., California ranks second in the number of endangered aquatic species (Pacific Marine Fisheries Council, 2000). California is the winter home of more than 60 percent of the migratory waterfowl in the Pacific Flyway Over the years, approximately 95 percent of this wetland and riparian habitat, which serves wintering ducks, geese, swans, and millions of other birds [hat use the Pacific Flyway has been lost (Wildlife Conservation Board, 2002). . 36 In addition to the importance of Floodplain habitats for native plants and wildlife, the associ- ated freshwater ecosystems are essential for providing goods and services valued by society These goods and services include soil replenish- ment, water quality, timber production, fishing, and cultural,-recrea[Tonal, and scenic benefits. Agriculture provides a safe, healthy, reliable food supply, valuable wildlife habitat and open space, groundwater replenishment, cultural, recre- ational, and scenic benefits, al] of which serve the objectives of the multi-objective management approach for floodplains. California has been the largest agriculture producing state in the U.S. since 1948; current gross production is $27 billion. Much of Californias richest farmland is found in its floodplains. For example, according to the California Farm Bureau Federation, approximately 60 percent of farmland in the San Joaquin Valley is in the floodplains. At the same time, California is challenged with ways to accommodate a rapidly increasing population. The State Department of Finance estimates that California's population will grow by at least 14 million in the next 25 years. All of these people will need homes jobs, services, public facilities, and other types of development. While single-purpose flood management projects were common in the past, they no longer are considered the preferable approach to Floodplain management. Increasingly floodplains are seen as valuable resources for our society In addition, greater incentives are being provided for multi- objective-management (M-O-M) projects. AB 1147 of 2000 (Proposition 13) provided signifi- cant financial incentives for multi-purpose Flood protection projects that also address ecosystem and recreational needs. The Safe Drinking Water, Watershed Protection, and Flood Protection Act of 2000 contains grant-funding for projects that combine flood protection with agricultural conservation and ecosystem restoration. The Water Security, Clean Drinking Water, Coastal and Beach Protection Act of 2002 (Proposition 50) contains additional incentives for watershed- based management approaches. More local agencies are beginning to pursue multiple objective Floodwater management programs. The Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency and the Santa Clara Valley Water District have found that including ecosystem restoration and recreation elements results in broader support for flood management projects. Stake- holders in the Santa Ana River watershed in San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties are achieving agricultural, groundwater recharge, ecosystem, and flood protection benefits with their M-O-M programs. Stakeholders along the Tuolumne River, a tributary to the San Joaquin River, are receiving grant funding for projects that combine Flood protection with ecosystem restoration. In the Cosumnes River watershed, healthy agriculture is a major part of flood protection and ecosystem restoration. Similar successes are found throughout California. Summary of Recommendations Local, State, and federal agencies should implement multi-objective management for floodplains on a watershed basis. Where feasible, projects should provide adequate protection for natural, recreational, residential, business, economic, agricultural, and cultural resources and protect water quality and supply. RECOMMENDATIONS 15. MULTI-OBJECTIVE MANAGEMENT Problem: Many flood management programs and projects do not follow a M-O-M approach. Tradi- tionally, programs and projects have emphasized 3Z flood damage reduction, with little or no consider- ^ Provide for natural, dynamic hydrologic, and ation of the potential benefits of floodplains Recommendation: Promote a M-O-M approach to flood management projects. State and local agencies should approach flood management as part of multi-objective watershed management. Where feasible, these projects should provide adequate protection for natural, recreational, residential, business, economic, agricultural, and cultural resources and protect water quality and supply. 16. FLOOD MANAGEMENT APPROACHES FOR ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION AND AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION Problem: Historically, flood management projects generally have not given adequate consideration to the restoration and protection of natural floodplains or the conservation of agriculture. Creative approaches that provide for these objectives exist and need to be used, where feasible, when designing or improving flood management projects. Recommendation: While providing for public safety and flood damage reduction, flood man- agement programs and projects should maximize opportunities for agricultural conservation and ecosystem protection and restoration, where feasible. When land is being considered for use in a flood management project or program, the following should be addressed equitably: ^ Conserve productive agricultural ]and and natural habitat; ^ Promote the recovery and stability of agriculture; ^ Promote the recovery and stability of native species populations, and overall biotic community diversity; geomorphic processes; ^ Increase and improve the quantity, diversity, and connectivity of native habitat; ^ Eliminate or mitigate negative redirected impacts to neighboring landowners; and ^ Evaluate and address economic impacts to local communities and regions. 17. NONSTRUCTURAL APPROACHES, RESTORATION, AND CONSERVATION OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL LANDS Problem: Traditional structural approaches to floodwater management have provided signifi- cant protection from flooding. However, there can be disadvantages to using structural approaches. including: ^ Increased risk of catastrophic flooding if structures fail or exceed capacity; ^ Damage to natural resources and natural floodplain function; and Increased economic damages if catastrophic flooding occurs. Nonstructural approaches to floodwater and floodplain management, such as [he conservation of agriculture and natural lands in floodplains, can complement or substitute for structural approaches, where appropriate. Recommendation: In planning new or upgraded floodwater management programs and projects, including structural projects, local and State agencies should, where appropriate, encourage nonstructural approaches and the conservation of the beneficial uses and functions of floodplains. It is recognized that some structural approaches provide needed flood protection and opportuni- ties for agricultural conservation and ecosystem protection and restoration. 38 18. TOOLS FOR PROTECTION OF FLOOD-COMPATIBLE LAND USES Problem: Protection and promotion of flood- compatible land uses, such as agriculture, recreation, and native habitat, require a variety of incentive-based tools for private landowners and local governments. Different areas require various degrees and types of protection, and landowners have different needs and preferences for their property; the current array of tools fail to accommodate these differences. Support for these tools is necessary at the State level. Recommendation: The State should identify, develop, and suppoa a variety of tools for the protection of flood-compatible land uses. These tools should be developed in consultation with, and be made available to, private landowners, local governments, and non-governmental organi- zations. Examples of such tools can include: ^ Easement fee acquisition programs ^ Management payments ^ Land exchanges/bank ^ Incentives for placing new development outside of the floodplain ^ Safe harbor policy ^ Adjacent landowner protections ^ Stewardship incentive payments ^ Voluntary agriculture wildlife habitats ^ Habitat conservation plans ^ Natural community conservation programs ^ Special area management plans 19. PROTECTION OF FLOODPLAIN GROUNDWATER RECHARGE AREAS Problem: Most floodplains, including alluvial fans, provide valuable groundwater recharge. Paving over such recharge areas reduces the groundwater recharge capacity, thus potentially affecting some surface flows and the groundwa- ter supply Some permitting agencies are making land-use decisions without full knowledge of the impacts on natural groundwater recharge. Recommendation: Permitting agencies should consider the impacts of land-use decisions on -the capacity of the floodplain to recharge groundwater. 20. VECTOR CONTROL Problem: Ecosystem restoration projects within the floodplain have the potential to raise public health issues, paaicularly in regard to mosquito- transmitted diseases. In response to this potential risk, local communities may identify a need to increase their vector control efforts, which can impose a financial burden. Recommendation: Planning and development of ecosystem restoration projects should consider costs and impacts with respect to vector control and monitoring related to mosquito-transmitted diseases. 21. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PARTNERSHIPS Problem: Flood management projects often are approached on ajurisdictional basis, without consideration of the impacts to other communi- ties in the watershed. Recommendation: The State should encourage multi jurisdictional partnerships when flood- plain management projects are planned and implemented. Jurisdiction-based projects pro- vide localized solutions, when a greater benefit might be achieved if the project adopted a watershed-wide approach. Communities and jurisdictions should work together to develop, implement, and monitor watershed-wide flood- plain management programs. 39 22. WATERSHED MONITORING Problem: Historically floodwater management projects have been planned at a local level to solve localized problems; thus, projects do not always address regional problems. After projects are completed, the performance of each project is monitored only at the local level, at best, monitor- ing on a comprehensive basis is not done. Recommendation: The State and others should financially support comprehensive monitoring of flood management projects, including impacts on natural resources and other intended multiple objectives, on a watershed level or other appropri- ate scale. 23. PROACTIVE AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF FLOODPLAINS Problem: All benefits of a floodplain are not realized if changing economic, hydraulic, environmental, and biological conditions are overlooked. Recommendation: Slate and local agencies should manage floodplains proactively and adaptively by periodically adjusting to current environmental, economic, hydraulic, and biological conditions and in response to new scientific information and knowledge. If new or additional flood management projects alter the size of a floodplain, cities and counties should evaluate all of their objectives for the area removed from or added to [hat floodplain. 24. BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES Problem: Although many agencies and organizations are carrying out effective flood- plain management practices, mechanisms for identifying and disseminating best management practices (BMPs) to others are limited. That means that individual agencies and organizations are frequently left to °reinvent the wheel" rather than being able to benefit from the knowledge and experience of others. Examples of successful State and localjurisdiction floodplain manage- ment policies and programs are not commonly shared. These success stories are not readily available or used to the maximum extent possible for public benefits. 24.1 Recommendation: DWR should work with stakeholders to develop a process for identifying, monitoring, and updating voluntary BMPs for multi-objective floodplain management. This could be similar to the successful California Urban Water Conservation Council model that has been used for over a decade to identi€y BMPs for urban water conservation. Over 200 organi- zations voluntarily come together in the Council to share who[ they have learned. 24.2 Recommendation: Encourage floodplain proponents and professionals, such as the Flood- plain Management Association, the National Association of Flood and Stormwater Manage- ment Agencies, and the Association of State Floodplain Managers, to identify and share successful State and local programs and policies. 24.3 Recommendation: DWR should review State and local floodplain management policies, projects, and programs, identify successes that have been achieved, and share those examples with other State and local entities and floodplain managers. 25. MULTI-OBJECTIVE FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION Problem: Floodplain management calls for multi-disciplinary knowledge including hydrol- ogy flood hazard reduction, ecosystem restora- tion, and other topics. Generally, colleges and universities do not offer floodplain management courses as part of their curricula. There are few certified State floodplain management professionals in California. ?40 25.1 Recommendation: The State should encourage the inclusion of multi-objective floodplain management curricula in urban planning, civil engineering, hydrology, and other degree programs at colleges and universities. 25.2 Recommendation: The State should encourage the training, education, and profes- sional certification of floodplain management professionals to provide local decision makers with the best professional support. 25.3 Recommendation: DWR, in coordination with the Association of State Floodplain Manag- ers, the Floodplain Management Association, and other professional organizations, should provide training, education, and certifications of floodplain management professionals to ensure they have the multi-objective floodplain knowledge and tools necessary to perform their jobs efficiently and effectively. 25.4 Recommendation: The State should develop custom-designed short courses and offer them to local officials and leaders, such as Boards of Supervisors, planning commissioners, and other decision makers, to increase floodplain management awareness of issues and techniques. 25.5 Recommendation: The State should offer programs that include training specific to all types of floodplains, (alluvial, riverine, and coastal) and recognize the expertise of existing practitioners through certification. 26. COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES AND GROUPS Problem: Inadequate coordination among local, State, and federal agencies and nongovernmen- tal organizations regarding flood management .policies, programs, and practices often limiu the effectiveness of comprehensive flood management. Recommendation: The State should encourage and create incentives for additional coordination among all stakeholders. Roles, responsibilities, and conflicts of local, State, federal, and non- governmental agencies should be identified and addressed. 27. STATE GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES Problem: The State's General Plan Guidelines are used by local land-use jurisdictions to update the State-required local General Plan. The Governor's Office of Planning and Research (OPR) is cur- rently updating the 1998 General Plan Guide- lines for completion in 2003 and is requesting comments by December 16, 2002. The Task Force should comment on the 2002 draft guide- lines to assure incorporation of the latest issues on flood management. Recommendation: DWR should provide the Task Force's recommended changes to the 2002 draft Guidelines for consideration by OPR during the public review period. The Task Force should support the incorporation of flood management in the State's 2002 draft General Plan Guidelines as indicated in Appendix B of this report. The recommended changes proposed in Appendix B address the following concepts: ^ Integrate flood management advice into the Flood Management Section of the Safety Element; ^ Link flood management advice with other General Plan elements; ^ Expand the discussion of floodplain func- tions; ^ Address flood management on a watershed basis with system-wide approaches; ^ Update information regarding data sources; ^ Update the discussion of the federal flood insurance program and its regulations; 41 ^ Incorporate a discussion of the requirements of the federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, including requirements for aMulti- Hazard Mitigation Plan for future disaster relief funds; ^ Expand the discussion of flood management to encourage multi-objective management and consideration of various local environ- mental, social, and fiscal issues; ^ Expand the Safety Element Relevant Issues Section to include reasonably foreseeable flood areas, repetitive losses, and flood management mitigation measures; ^ Expand the Safety Element's Ideas for Devel- opment Policies to include multiyurisdic tional planning for flood management and multi-hazard mitigation measures, including references to FEMA regulations pursuant to the federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000; ^ Expand the Safety Element's Ideas for Implementation by including multi-hazard mitigation planning approaches and provide a discussion of alluvial fan flood management issues, if applicable; and Expand NFIP map discussion [o indicate disadvantages of depending solely on FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps. Also provide appropriate references to FEMA and Task Force definitions for various issues related to flood management. implementation of comprehensive statewide floodplain management. For example, FEMA funding has been virtually stagnant for the Community Assistance Program since 1990, and State baseline funding requests for technical assistance and education have been denied. Without funding, the recommendations provided in this report with the purpose of coordinating and improving current floodplain management practices in the State of California cannot be implemented. Task Force members explored funding options to maximize existing funds and identify possible sources for new funding from local, State, and federal governments and nongovernmental sources. Technical assistance, funding, and education were recognized as critical compo- nents for local government implementation of any new or existing programs. Incentive-based programs were identified as a good means of increasing public and private participation in floodplain management projects. In addition, specific legislation was identified to ensure the full participation and cooperation of the State government. SUMMARY OF THE RECOIViMENDATIONS DWR should identify and actively pursue funding opportunities, technical assistance to local governments and other organizations, and legislative proposals to implement Task Force recommendations and ensure successful floodplain management, recognizing that local RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL governments have the primary responsibility ASSISTANCE, FUNDING,'AND LEGISLATION and authority for land-use decisions. Additional local technical assistance, funding, RECOMMENDATIONS ,. .~.: and legislation will be required for many of the suggested floodplain management recommends- 28. NEW AND EXISTING FUNDING [ions by the Task Force to be implemented. Lack SOURCES of adequate funding and some existing State Problem: Currently, local, State, and federal policies have been major obstacles to the funding for floodplain management is frag- 42 mented, inadequate, and unreliable. Without new or increased funding, programs and policies recommended by [he Task Force could be 'delayed or not implemented. 28.1 Recommendation: State and local govern- menrs should increase and leverage federal programs, as_appropriate, and encourage local, State, federal, public, nongovernmental, and other private cost sharing to achieve equitable and fair financing of multi-objective floodplain management actions and planning. 28.2 Recommendation: The State should identify potential sources of funding to suppott the implementation of Task Force recommenda- tions. These sources should include water bonds, assessment fees, federal grants, or State General Fund appropriations. 28.3 Recommendation: The State should identify and disseminate information on existing funding sources, including funding reliability, variability, and authority to provide the support needed to implement Task Force recommenda- tions. To accomplish this, the State should create and maintain a database of funding sources for local, State, and federal floodplain management- related activities and planning. 29. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION PRIORITIES Problem: The State is limited in its ability to fund all of the Task Force recommendations, and it will require a method for prioritizing and ranking those recommendations, that have cost, based upon appropriate floodplain management criteria. Recommendation: DWR and The Reclamation Board should take the cooperative lead in devel- oping aconsensus process, involving appropriate stakeholders, in identifying criteria for and carrying out prioritization of Task Force recom- mendations, based on expected expenditures, from existing and new funding sources. 30. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES OUTREACH PROGRAMS Problem: Many Californians living in flood prone regions are unaware of flooding hazards and available mitigation measures. Therefore, existing public information and outreach are inadequate for public safety. Recommendation: Expand and implement DWR's outreach programs by implementing the following actions. ^ Provide public service announcements to increase public awareness of all of the values of floodplains, and of flooding hazards, public safety, and hazard mitigation measures. Provide information and supporting material. ^ Use all media and electronic communication, including print, local television programs, public and commercial radio, and the Internet. ^ Create an interactive Web site for public access to information about flooding. ^ Produce multi-lingua] and cross-generational educational materials. ^ Coordinate public safety awareness efforts with State and federal agencies including OES. ^ Support local flood management agency and county requests for technical assistance. DWR should offer to provide technical assistance to local communities, including in areas where new development is likely to occur. 31. DESIGNATED FLOODWAYS Problem: The State's Designated Floodway Program, which is limited to the Central Valley, is not comprehensive statewide. As a result, non- flood-compatible development is occurring and may continue to occur within floodways. Non- flood-compatible development in these areas may 43 put people and structures at risk and may impact the operation of the floodwater management systems. Some interests believe that The Reclamation Board regulations can be impediments to flood compatible uses, such as agriculture and habitat, within floodways. cost-sharing participation in FEMA's Community Assistance Program is limited by insufficient State funding. In addition, FEMA has eliminated the Community Assistance Contact portion of the Community Assistance Program in Region IX, which includes California. This has decreased coordination and communication with local communities. ",RECOMMENDATION Recommendation: The S[a[e should provide 31.1 Recommendation: Include in the Commu- nity Assistance Workshops, held in the Central Valley and provided by DWR and The Reclama- tion Board staff, an educational component on The Reclamation Board's current authority to adopt and update designated floodways in the Central Valley. The workshops should include [he current status of existing designated flood- ways, and a comparison of the Reclamation Board§ Designated Floodways Program to FEMAs NFIP. For areas within itsjurisdiction, the Reclamation Board should meet with stake- holders to communicate existing policies and procedures for designating floodways and ap- proving encroachments within the floodway. For areas outside the Reclamation Boards jurisdic- tion, DWR should expand its technical assistance to local agencies for their use as they designate floodways for their own or FEMA purposes. 31.2 Recommendation: The Reclamation Board should work with stakeholders to identify, if any, a list of Reclamation Board regulations that are impediments to flood-compatible uses within the floodway and recommend specific revisions. 32. STATE FLOODPI,AIN MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Problem: Technical assistance requests by local governments to the State for floodplain manage- ment assistance have increased because of greater awareness of flood hazards. Currently, the State's additional resources [o continue and enhance the implementation of tli'e State's floodplain manage- ment programs, including full support of the Community Assistance Contact program. 33. COMPLIANCE WITH NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS Problem: Some new and existing public facilities, such as schools, are and continue to be placed at risk from known flood hazards. Various public agencies in California either are not aware of, or believe they are not required to comply with, NFIP standards, local floodplain management ordinances, or the Governor's Executive Order on Floodplain Management. For example, in 2001 FEMA formally notified the State that some public schools are out of compliance with the NFIP, and that those school districts, governed by local school boards, believe that they are not subject to the requirements of local floodplain management ordinances under State law. FEMA requires that communities that participate in the NFIP and experience the benefits of the program adopt legally enforceable floodplain management standards. It is FEMAs view that unless public schools comply with NFIP requirements, States or participating NFIP communities may lose program eligibility This means that State or local governments that do'not adopt floodplain management regulations consistent with at least the minimum standards of the NFIP, cannot participate in the NFIP or be eligible for federal 44 financial assistance for buildings in the special flood hazard areas of their community. In some cases, State agencies with discretionary permitting authority over floodplain develop- ment are not required to consider the project's compliance with NFIP. This circumstance may result in the$tate inadvertently superceding local floodplain management ordinances. Failure to enforce NFIP minimums could result in the loss of NFIP eligibility (including accompanying federal assistance for buildings in special flood hazard areas) for local California communities or perhaps the entire state of California. In these cases, the State misses the opportunity to demonstrate its desire to show leadership in ensuring [hat good floodplain management be accomplished statewide where [he State plays a key decision-making role. 33.1 Recommendation: To assure compliance with NFIP requirements, legislation should be enacted, or other mechanisms implemented for public agencies not subject to local government floodplain management requirements or the provisions in the current or proposed Governor's Executive Order on Fooodplain Management. This compliance is a requisite for participation in NFIP and to receive associated program benefits. This action includes public agencies in addition to the State, school districts, special districts, post-secondary education providers, housing authorities, and others. In the interim, the State should identify the public agencies not covered by the current or proposed Executive Order and inform them of the benefits of participation in, and compliance with, NFIP requirements and/or the current or proposed Executive Order standards and the consequences of noncompliance with NFIP requirements and/or the current or proposed Executive Order standards. 33.2 Recommendation: DWR and.OES should fully explore the problem and develop any necessary legislation to require appropriate State agencies with discretionary permitting authority over floodplain developments to take actions, such as the following, prior [o issuing a permit: ^ Assure the project's compliance with NFIP; ^ Address other flood hazards; and ^ Address adverse impacts to natural flood- plain functions. 34. COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEM Problem: NFIP flood insurance policy holders and communities may not be receiving the lowest available insurance rates or may not have access to ocher federal assistance programs because their community is not a Community Rating System (CRS) participating community NFIP communities may not be participating because of the lack of understanding and train- ing necessary to fully parcicipate in and benefit from the CRS insurance rate-adjusting program for local communities. Recommendation: DWR should encourage training in the CRS to educate local officials and the interested public about the elements and benefits of the program. 35. STATE COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEM PROGRAM COORDINATOR Problem: In California, less than 10 percent of al] NFIP communities (about 50) participate in the CRS, which is designed to encourage community floodplain management activities to exceed NFIP requirements. Without a designated State-level CRS Coordinator, many communities do not have the tools to take advantage of this program and receive the financial incentives available to reduce the potential loss of life and property from reasonably foreseeable flooding. as Recommendation: DWR should designate a CRS Coordinator at the State level who is famil- iar with the operation of State agencies and local governments that perform activities related to the CRS program. The CRS Coordinator should: ^ Serve as a point of contact for FEMA and the Insurance Services Office (ISO); ^ Provide support for cities and counties; ^ Examine ways in which the State can apply for CRS activities on behalf of its communities; ^ Encourage employees at the State and local levels to attend seminars to improve their knowledge of the CRS program and its benefits: and ^ Examine ways to encourage increased participation in the CRS program by NFIP communities in California by State agencies not subject to the Governor's authority and by local government entities other than cities and counties. 36. INTERAGENCY BARRIERS Problem Statement: There are some interagency barriers between State and federal agencies, such as those involving The Reclamation Board and the Corps of Engineers, in implementing multi-objective flood management projects. Recommendation: The Reclamation Board should work with the Corps of Engineers, State agencies, local sponsors and interested parties to identify interagency barriers to efficient imple- mentation of multi-objective flood management projects and to develop options to overcome those interagency barriers. 37. CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT LOCAL ANAYLSIS IMPROVEMENT Problem: The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Guidelines, Appendix G, provides a checklist for addressing flooding impacts under the Hydrology and Water Quality Section. The checklist should be improved to ensure that projects are evaluated for flooding impacts. In addition, some CEQA practitioners and local governments do not utilize the CEQA checklist adequately when evaluating flood impacts. 37.1 Recommendation: DWR should provide technical assistance to local agencies and practi- tioners with a practical step-by-step CEQA flood hazard and impacts assessment guide. DWR should develop definition and methodology for local jurisdiction determination of °reasoriably foreseeable flood." 37.2 Recommendation: The Resources Agency should update Appendix G of the CEQA Guidelines to include [he changes indicated in Appendix D of this report. 38. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CALIFORNIA FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT ADVISORY . COMMITTEE Problem: The Task Force recommendations identify opportunities for effective floodplain management. During Task Force discussions, many issues emerged that require additional stakeholder discussion for improving floodplain management practices. Recommendation: DWR should sponsor an ongoing floodplain management advisory com- mittee composed of local and State governments, floodplain managers, and other stakeholders to develop additional recommendations to improve floodplain management practices.. 46 48 APPENDIX A -GLOSSARY '; Adjacent landowner protections - An overarching term that applies to permits, regula- tions, and voluntary programs that preclude actions of one landowner from inducing flood- ing to a neighboring landowner. Association of State Floodplain Managers - The Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) is an organization of professionals, including members of all levels of government, scientists, engineers, and members of the insurance industry, involved in Floodplain Agriculture wildlife habitat -Practices to promote working landscapes that are profitable for agriculture and beneficial for wildlife. Agua Caliente tribe -The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians is a federally recognized Indian tribe. It is a sovereign tribal government that maintains government-to-government relations with other governments, such as the government of the State of California. Alluvial fan - A gently sloping, fan-shaped landform created over time by deposition of eroded sediment. They are common at the base of mountain ranges in avid and semiarid regions, such as the American West (Taken from National Academy Press, Alluvial Fan Flooding, 1996). Alluvial fan flooding -Flooding occurring on the surface of an alluvial fan or similar landform, which originates at the apex and is characterized by high-velocity flows, active processes of erosion, sediment transport, deposition, and unpredictable flow paths. Assembly Bill No. 1147 -Governor Davis signed AB 1147 in 2000. This bill authorizes twelve flood control projects, modifies the S[a[e local cost-sharing formula for participation in federal flood protection projects, significantly increases the State's oversight on federal flood control projects and recommends establishment of a Floodplain Management Task Force. Association of California Water Agencies (ACWA) -ACWA is a statewide association whose more than 435 public water agency members are responsible for 90 percent of the water delivered in California. management, flood hazard mitigation, the National Flood Insurance Program, and flood preparedness, warning and recovery. By fostering communication, providing technical advice and encouraging research, education, and training, the Association mission is to reduce loss of human life and property damage resulting, from flooding, preserve the natural and cultural values.. of floodplains, and avoid actions that exacerbate flooding. Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program - DWR's Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program uses approximate hydrologic and hydraulic modeling methods. Typically, this program provides communities' maps showing previously unmapped flood hazard areas more quickly and economically than NFIP Flood Insurance Rate Maps. Base Flood Elevation (BFE) -The base flood elevation is the height of the base flood, usually in feet, in relation to the National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929, the North American Vertical Datum of 1988, or other datum refer- enced in the Flood National Research Council. The base flood is defined as a flood event that has a one percent or greater chance of occurrence in any given year. California Association of REALTORS®-The California Association of Realtors is a statewide trade association of more than 110,000 members dedicated to the advancement of professionalism in real estate. The Association develops and promotes programs and services that will °30 enhance the members' freedom and ability co conduct their individual businesses successfully with integrity and competency and, through collective action, promotes the preservation of real property rights. California Association of Resource Conserva- tion Districts - A statewide organization serving 103 Resource Conservation Districts (RCD) covering 85 percent of California's land. The Association develops and promotes progress and services of local RCDs who provide services to local landowners and uses who implement conservation measures using the voluntary approach to resource management. California Building Industry Association - The California Building Industry Association (CBIA) is a statewide trade association represent- ing nearly 6,000 businesses - homebuilders, remodelers, subcontractors, architects, engineers, designers, and ocher industry professionals before the State Legislature and regulatory agencies. By advocating legislative and adminis- trative reforms needed to ensure that [here is quality, affordable housing for al] Californians, CBIA is working to remove barriers to housing construction that have resulted in a significant housing shortfall throughout California. California Business Properties Association - The California Business Properties Association (CBPA) serves property owners, tenants, develop- ers, retailers, contractors, lawyers, brokers, and other professionals in the industry by representing their interests at [he State Capitol and in Washing- ton. D.C., as well as responding to regulatory actions of dozens of state and federal agencies. CBPA is the designated legislative advocate for the International Council of Shopping Centers, [he California chapters of the National Association of Industrial and Office Properties, the International Mass Retail Association, the Associated Builders & Contractors of California, the Institute of Real Estate Management, and Commercial Real Estate Women. California Central Valley Flood Control Association -The California Central Valley Flood Control Association represents reclama- tion and levee districts, cities, and counties within the Central Valley and Sacramento/San Joaquin River Delta of California in promoting their common interest of constructing and maintaining effective flood control systems for protection of life, property, and environmental values. The Associations purposes include, the promotion of positive public and governmental attitudes toward the flood control activities of its member agencies, to promote the distribution and interchange of ideas and information among member agencies and the public, and to advocate on behalf of flood control interests before the State and federal legislatures, state and federal agencies, and others to promote effective flood control systems. California Department of Food and Agriculture -The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) protects and promotes California agriculture and consumers through programs and outreach activities includ- ing animal health and food safety; services; plant health and pest prevention services; inspection services; measurement standards; fairs and expositions; marketing services; and agricultural export enhancement. An example of specific activities includes providing information on disaster preparedness for animal owners through the California Animal Response Emergency System (CARES) Plan. California Department of Water Resources - The California Department of Water Resources is a Slate agency with the responsibility to manage the water resources of California in cooperation si. with other agencies, to benefit the State's people, and to protect, restore, and enhance the natural and human environments. Specific responsibili- ties of the California Department of Water Resources are to prepare and update the California Water Plan; plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain the Stale Water Resources Development System; protect and restore the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta; regulate dams, provide flood protection, and assist in emergency management; educate the public about the importance of water and its proper use; and serve local water needs. California State Association of Counties - The primary purpose of California State Association of Counties (CSAC) is to represent county government before the California Legisla- ture, administrative agencies, and the federal government. CSAC places a strong emphasis on educating the public about the value and need for county programs and services. California State University Center far Collaborative Policy -The California State University Center for Collaborative Policy (formerly known as the California Center for Public Dispute Resolution) is a joint program of California State University, Sacramento, McGeorge School of Law, and University of the Pacific. The Center offers services to parties seeking collaborative solutions for public deci- sions and disputes at the federal, state, regional, and Local levels. The Center offers its clients services such as mediation, facilitation, conflict assessment, training in consensus building, and dispute resolution systems design. Coastal Floodplain - A coastal floodplain is any coastal land area susceptible to high velocity wave action from storms or seismic sources or to being inundated by floodwaters from another source. Committee on Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems -The Committee on Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems was appointed by the National Research Council in 1989 to conduct an evaluation of both successful and failed attempts to restore aquatic environments. The committee published their findings in "Restora- tion of Aquatic Ecosystems: Science, Technology, and Public Policy" in 1992, which outlines a national strategy for aquatic restoration, with recommendations, and case studies of aquatic restoration activities throughout the nation. Critical infrastructure -Public facilities that are critical to the health and welfare of a population and to disaster response to a hazard event. Critical infrastructure should be presumed to include facilities that, if rendered unserviceable, would impose significant hardship on the public, or that if flooded would pose a threat to public health and public safety. Critical Infrastructure includes but is not limited to emergency re- sponse facilities (such as OES, fire and police), hospitals, water purification facilities, sewer treatment facilities, and could include transpor- tation, energy, communication, and power facilities. Department of Food and Agriculture -California Department of Food and Agriculture protects California agriculture through public outreach programs and communication and programs and services such as the Agricultural Export Program, animal health and food safety services, fairs and expositions, inspection services, marketing services, measurement standards, and plant health and pest prevention services. They also produce guides on disaster preparedness for animal owners through the California Animal Response Emergency System (CARES) Plan. si Department of Housing and Community Development -The Department of Housing and Community Development is California's princi- pal housing agency. The mission of the Depart- ment of Housing and Community Development is to provide leadership, policies and programs to expand and preserve safe and affordable housing opportunities and promote strong communities for all Californians. It accomplishes its mission by advocating and supporting hous- ing development; developing, administering and enforcing building codes, manufactured housing standards and mobile home park regulations; and administering State and federal housing, and community development. Development -Development is any man-made change to improved or unimproved real estate, including but not limited to buildings or other structures. Ecosystem -Ecosystem is a geographic area including al] the living organisms, their physical surroundings, and [he natural cycles to sustain them. Executive Order B-39-77 -Executive Order B-39-77, California's Floodplain Management Executive Order, was signed in November 1977 and does not reflect changes in federal law and FEMA regulations, policy, and terminology, which have taken place in the 25-year time interval. The Governor's Executive Order on Floodplain management is necessary to meet the NFIP regulations which requires state agencies that have programs which may impinge on the Floodplain to comply with the same federal regulations as is required by local communities. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) -The Federal Emergency Management Agency is an independent agency reporting to the President that is tasked with responding to, planning for, recovering from, and mitigating against disaster. FEMA advises on building codes and Floodplain management, teaches people how to get through a disaster, helps equip local and state agencies for emergency preparedness, coordinates the federal response to a disaster, makes disaster assistance available to states, communities, businesses and individuals, trains emergency managers, supports the nation's fire service, and administers the national flood and crime insurance programs. Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force -The Federal Interagency Flood- plain Management Task Force was established in 1975 to carry out the responsibility of the Presi- dent to prepare for Congress a Unified National Program for Floodplain Management. Member agencies include the Department of Agriculture, Department of Army, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency, Management Agency, Department of Interior, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Flood - A genera] and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dry land areas from [he overflow of inland and/or tidal waters, and/or the unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any Source, or flooding from any other source. Flood-compatible -Flood-compatible uses allow the continuation of hydrological and biological processes. Areas such as parks and recreational areas are far less likely to suffer permanent or expensive damage in floods than expensive buildings, businesses, or develop- ments. Use of these areas is more easily avoided during a flood. ^ Parks ^ Recreation ^ Open Spaces ^ Agriculture '~3~ ^ Wildlife Habitat ^ Parking Lots Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) -The official Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) map of a community on which the Flood Insurance and Mitigation Administrator (FIMA) has delineated both the special hazard areas and the risk premium zones applicable to the community. Flood Management -Flood management is the overarching term that encompasses both flood- water management and floodplain management. Floodplain - A floodplain is any land area susceptible to being inundated by waters from any source, and often bears geophysical evidence of previous flood events. The term is sometimes loosely used as an equivalent to the regulated floodplain. Floodplain Management -Floodplain manage- ment includes actions to the floodplain to reduce losses to human resources within the floodplain and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with floodplains and flooding. For example: ^ Minimizing impacts of flows (e.g. flood- proofing, insurance) ^ Maintaining or restoring natural floodplain processes (e.g. natural community succes- sion, meander corridors) ^ Removing obstacles within the floodplain voluntarily or withjust compensation (e.g. relocating at- risk structures) ^ Keeping obstacles out of the floodplain (e.g. planning, mapping, and zoning land use decisions) ^ Educating and emergency preparedness planning (e.g. emergency response plans, data collection, outreach, insurance requirements) ^ Ensuring that operations of floodwater management systems are not compromised by activities that interfere with, or are dam- aged by, design floods of these systems. Floodplain Management measures interrelate and frequently overlap with floodwater manage- ment measures to reduce losses within the floodplain. For example: ^ Emergency response activities ^ Realigning levees ^ Reconnecting historical floodplains ^ Reoperation of reservoirs Floodplain Management Association -The Floodplain Management Association is a non- profit educational association. It was established in 1990 to promote the reduction of flood losses and to encourage the protection and enhance- ment of natural floodplain values. Members include representatives of federal, state and local government agencies as well as private firms. Floodplain Mapping -Floodplain mapping programs identify and map areas that are susceptible to flooding. A typical NFIP flood- plain map delineates the area that can be expected to flood, at a one percent annual risk, but floodplain maps can be used [o delineate any probable flooding event. Floodplain maps generally show the location of the normal channel of a watercourse, surrounding features or developments, ground elevation contours, , flood levels and floodplain limits. Floodproofing -Floodproofing is a combination of structural and nonstructural additions, changes, or adjustments to structures, which reduce or eliminate risk of flood damage to real estate or improved real property, water and sanitation facilities, or structures with their contents. sa' Floodprone -Any land area or development that base flood without cumulatively increasing the is susceptible to being inundated by floodwaters water surface elevation more than a designated from any source. Floodwater Management -Floodwater management includes actions to modify the natural flow of floodwaters to reduce losses to human resources and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with flooding. For example: height. The Reclamation Board definition: 1- The channel of the stream and that portion of the adjoining floodplain reasonably re- quired to provide for the passage of a design flood, as indicated by floodway encroach- ment lines on an adopted map; or ^ Containing flows in reservoirs, dams, and natural basins; ^ Conveying flows via levees, channels and natural corridors; ^ Managing flows through reservoir re-opera- tion: and ^ Managing watersheds by decreasing rainfall runoff, and providing headwater stream protection. Floodway - FEMA Definition: The channel of a river or other water course and the adjacent land areas that must be reserved in order to discharge the 2- The Floodway between existing levees as adopted by the Board or the Legislature. Floodway Fringe -Floodway fringe is that portion of the 100-year floodplain adjoining the Floodway in which limited encroachment is permissible. Friends of the River -Friends of the River is dedicated to preserving, protecting, and restor- ing California's rivers, streams, and their water- sheds. The organization accomplishes its mission by providing public education, citizen activist [raining and organizing, and expert advocacy to influence public policy decisions on land, water, and energy management issues. ~ t00 YEAR FL600Rt.A1N -- Rooauay Ringe --I-- Rooousy - RooCUey Roge i F:\r.Y'.n4I:11AF,1lI !i'!~!_ ~ ;I ~ 651 ~ _ _L hir'~-; R;i di u'.n ~I:~ :k\zlaa alvs crpb:e :n.wrrrenl of IL'vl I; r. :}IPR4[I X55 General Plan Guidelines - An advisory document prepared by the Governor's Office of Planning and Research (OPR) to assist cities and counties in the preparation of local general plans. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program - Autho- rized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), this program provides grants, to States and local governments, to implement cost-effective, long-term hazard mitigation measures, which will reduce or eliminate damage to lives or property after a major disaster. Hydraulic Modeling -Hydraulic modeling is a numerical or physical simulation of natural riverine conditions. Hydrologic Modeling -Hydrologic modeling is a mathematical analysis of the flow of water and its components on some part of a surface or subsurface area. Hydrologic modeling using transposition - Hydrologic modeling using transposition is a process that uses hydrologic data from adjacent or similar-characteristics watersheds for other watersheds -[hat lack the data necessary for hydrologic modeling. League of California Cities -The League of California Cities is an association of California city officials who work together to enhance their knowledge and skills, exchange information, and combine resources so [hat they may influence policy decisions that affect cities. Lower San Joaquin Levee District -The Lower San Joaquin Levee District was created by the State Legislature in 1955, forthe purpose of ensuring that the benefits of the Lower San Joaquin River Flood Control Project, paid for by the taxpayers, would not be lost and to provide protection to the people and the property for whom this project was designed. The project was designed and constructed by the State Depart- ment of Water Resources between 1959 and 1966. The project's purpose is to provide flood protection along the San Joaquin River and tributaries in Merced, Madera, and Fresno Counties. The plan covers 108 river miles, contains 195 miles of levees, and protects over 300,000 acres. The project is a series of bypasses built to collect San Joaquin flood flows, as well as floodwater from the Kings River system. The bypasses divert flows around stretches of the San Joaquin where constrictions impaired its capacity. The Levee District, in accordance with its agreement with the State Reclamation Board, is obligated to maintain not only the bypasses, but also the channel of the San Joaquin River within the project, in a condition where the channel will carry flood flows in accordance with the maximum benefits for flood protection. Lowest Floor Elevation -The measured distance of a building's lowest floor above the National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) or other datum specified on the FIRM for that location. Map Modernization Program -Established in 1997 to modernize FEMAs flood mapping program. The program intent is to reduce the average age of flood maps nationwide to six years (current average age is over a decade), produce digital mapping products for high priority areas, and reduce the number of unmapped communities by 50 percent. Mapping Needs Update Support System (MNUSS) -The MNUSS program was devel- oped by FEMA to inventory and evaluate local community mapping needs and is a tool that can be used to prioritize floodplaih mapping needs. MNUSS is a software application chat stores all ss identified needs nationally, performs a benefit cost analysis, and ranks the identified Map Maintenance Needs and Flood Data Update Needs for each community. National Academy of Engineering -The National Academy of Engineering (NAE) mission is to promote the technological welfare of the nation by marshaling [he knowledge and insights of members of the engineering profession. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) - The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 provides relief from the impacts of Flood damages and established The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP provides federally subsidized flood insurance to partici- pating communities, contingent on flood loss reduction measures taken by local Floodplain management regulations. The NFIP is designed to reduce future Flood losses through state and local Floodplain management efforts and to transfer the costs of residual flood losses from the general taxpayer to the Floodplain occupant. National Research Council -The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of further knowl- edge and advising the federal government. The National Research Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. National Wildlife Federation (NWF) -The National Wildlife Federation is the nation's largest member-supported conservation group, uniting individuals, organizations, businesses and government to protect wildlife, wild places, and the environment. The Nature Conservancy -The Nature Conser- vancy was established in 1951 with the mission to preserve the plants, animals, and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive. The Nature Conservancy has protected more than 92 million acres worldwide. Natural Corridor - A passageway of land and waters, which provides a refuge that will fulfill the needs of fish, wildlife, and plants that are native to ecosystems. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) - The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) uses law, science, and the support of more than 500,000 members nationwide to protect the planet's wildlife and wild places and to ensure a safe and healthy environment for all living things. Nonstructural approaches -Nonstructural methods include the use of regulations to prevent buildings from being constructed so they will not be subject to or damaged by flooding, as well as the removal of existing Flood-prone buildings and the protection of open space along watercourses. Regulations are also used to limit new construction in Ooodplains and to prevent additional damage to existing developed flood- prone areas. One Hundred (100-Year) Flood - A 100-year Flood is a Flood event that has a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. Also known as "base flood." One percent (one percent flood) -See One Hundred Year Flood. Paleo-flood records -Flood magnitude estimates developed from geophysical evidence rather than from stream gauge records or historic accounts. Holocene (post Ice Age) climate records are usually the most relevant records to 57 use in judging the significance of paleo-flood records to potential flood magnitudes that might be seen in the remaining several thousand years of this interglacial climate period. Reasonably Foreseeable Flood - A reasonably foreseeable flood is a flood event that is realisti- cally probable for a particular area. In many cases, this event could exceed a predicted "100-year" flood. It is important to note that the determina- tion of a reasonably foreseeable flood can vary depending on its use and application for any given area. Sources of information on reasonably foreseeable floods may include historic floods, paleo-floods, hydrologic modeling using transpo- sitibn, historical flood damage data, and hydro- logic models. Communities such as Sacramento, West Sacramento, Yuba City, Marysville, Los Angeles, and Orange County are all working toward protection against floods that exceed the "100-year floods." It is up to each community to consider this information in making land use and flood management decisions. The Reclamation Board -The Reclamation Board was established ro control flooding along the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their tributaries in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, cooperate with various agencies of the federal, State and local govern- ments in establishing, planning, constructing, operating, and maintaining flood control works and maintain the integrity of the existing flood control system and designated floodways through the Board's regulatory authority by issuing permits for encroachments. Repetitive Losses -Repetitive losses are two or more losses [hat occur within ten years and each with a cost greater than $1,000. Reservoir -Reservoir is a place where water is stored as an artificial lake where water is col- lected and kept in quantity for use. The Resources Agency of California -The California Resources Agency is responsible for the conservation, enhancement, and manage- ment of California's natural and cultural re- sources. The Resource Agency is composed of departments, boards, conservancies, commis- sions, and programs. Riparian -Riparian is relating to, located on, or living/growing on the bank of a natural water- course such as a river, lake or tidewater. River Basin -The geographical area drained by a river and its tributaries. Riverine flooding - A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dry land areas from the overflow of inland rivers. The Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency - A coordination group of regional flood control projects and legislation. This particular agency consists of the City of Sacramento, [he Counties of Sutter and Sacramento, Reclamation District 1000, and the American River Flood Control District. Sacramento-San Joaquin River Basins Com- prehensive Study - A description of preferred flood management approaches [o be locally or regionally implemented as a master plan for flood damage reduction and ecosystem restora- tion in California's Central Valley. Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta -The Sacramento and San Joaquin River Delta is located a[ the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. The Delta covers over 700,000 acres and is a major collection point for California waterways. The Delta receives runoff from 40 percent of California's land area and is the major water source for almost two-thirds of California's population. Much of the Delta's land is located 20 feet below sea level and is protected by an extensive levee system. 'ss Safe Harbor Policy -Safe Harbor agreements are voluntary arrangements between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service and cooperating non-Federal landowners. The agreements benefit endangered and threatened species while giving the land- owners assurances from additional restrictions. After ttte development of the agreement, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service will issue an "enhance- ment of survival" permit, to authorize any necessary future incidental take to provide participating landowners with assurances that no additional restrictions will be imposed as a result of their conservation actions. Southern California Associated Governments -The designated Metropolitan Planning Organi- zation (for six counties: Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino. Riverside, Ventura and Impe- rial), is mandated by the federal government to research and draw up plans for transpottation, growth management, hazardous waste manage- ment, and air quality. Special Flood Hazard Area - A FEMA NFIP term for the land in the floodplain within a community subject to a one percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year. Special flood hazard area maps may not accurately describe lands that are prone to flooding. Stakeholder Policy Committee -The Stake- holder Policy Committee conferred with the Comprehensive Study team to identify potential barriers and recommendations for implementing the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Basins Comprehensive Study's Comprehensive Plan. The Stakeholder Policy Committee submitted recommendations to the Reclamation Board in "Reforming Existing Flood Management Institu- tional Policies for Pubiic Safety and Ecosystem Restoration." The recommendations were developed during a series of bi-weekly meetings in 2001-2002. Structural Approaches -Structural methods include construction of floodwalls and levees, and techniques to make structures more resistant to water penetration and pressure. Substantial Damage - An NFIP term referring to damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby the cost of restoring the structure to its before damaged condition would equal or exceed 50 percent of the market value of the structure before the damage occurred. In NFIP communities, if substantially damaged structures are rebuilt, the new structure must comply with NFIP design or location standards. Subventions Program -The State Legislature established a policy of financial assistance to local agencies cooperating in the construction of federal flood control projects. State reimburse- ment ranges from a minimum of 50 percent to a maximum of 70 percent depending on the project's multipurpose features. United States Army Carps of Engineers (USAGE) -The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE) is made up of civilian engi- neers, scientists and other specialists who work with leaders in engineering and environmental matters. The USAGE includes approximately 34,600 civilians and 650 military men and women. United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) -The United States Environ- mental Protection Agency (USEPA) is a federal agency that provides leadership in [he nations environmental science, research, education, and assessment efforts. USEPA works closely with other federal agencies, state and local govern- ments, and Indian tribes to develop and enforce regulations under existing environmental laws. United States Water Resources Council -The Water Resources Planning Act established the United States Water Resources Council in 1962. 'S9 The U.S. Water Resources Council includes the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Army, Health Education and Welfare, and the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, with the heads of other agencies participating on matters affecting their responsibilities are to be considered by the Council. The Act required the Council to establish principles, standards, and procedures for federal participants in the preparation of comprehensive regional or river basin plans and for the formulation and evaluation of Federal water and related land resources projects. Watershed - A watershed is a region or area bounded peripherally by a divide and draining ultimately to a particular watercourse or body of water. Watershed Management -Watershed manage- ment is a process of decision-making regarding uses and modifications of lands and waters within a watershed. This process provides a chance for stakeholders to balance diverse goals and uses for environmental resources, and to consider how their cumulative actions may affect long-term sustainabiliry of these resources. As a form of ecosystem management, watershed management encompasses the entire watershed system, from uplands and headwaters, to flood- plain wetlands and river channels Western Governors' Association (WGA) -The Western Governors' Association (WGA) serves the governors of 21 Western States and US-Flag Pacific Islands. WGA develops policy and carries out programs in the areas of natural resources, the environment, human services, economic development, international relations, and state management. WGA helps Governors to develop strategies for long- and short-term issues and to develop and advocate policies that reflect regional interests and consensus. Wetlands -Areas in which water saturation determines the nature of soil development and [he types of plant and animal communities living in the soil. Wildlife friendly agriculture -Management practices used by farmers and ranchers to sup- port wildlife. Examples include planting or maintaining riparian vegetation, insectivory hedgerows, native grass plantings around field edges, cover crops, installing owl nest boxes and bat roost structures, and winter flooding of harvested fields. so APPENDIX B .PROPOSED COMMENTS ON THE CALIFORNIA STATE GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES The following are proposed revisions to the text on page 127 of the 2002 preliminary draft General Plan Guidelines. All new text is underlined. FLOOD~AF MANAGEMENT Introduction Flood Manag~nent Flood management is defined as the overarching term that encompasses both floodwater manage- ment and floodplain mono eg ment Flood Water Management Floodwater management includes actions to modify the natural Flow of floodwaters co reduce losses Iii to human resources and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with flooding. For ex- ample: containing flows in reservoirs. dams. and natural basins: conveying flows via levees. channels and natural corridors: managing flows through reservoir re-operation: and managing watersheds by decreasing rainfall runoff. and providing headwater stream protection. Flop lain Management Floodplain manaPement includes actions to the floodplain to reduce losses to human resources within the floodplain and/or protect benefits to natural resources associated with Floodplains and flooding. For example' minimizing impacts of flows (e g Flood-proofing insurance)' main[aining_or restoring Natural Floodplain Processes (e.g. riparian restoration. meander corridors): removing obstacles within the floodplain voluntarily or with just compensation (e.g. relocating at- risk structures): keeping obstacles pu, of [he Floodplain (e.g. - tanning. mapping. and zoninP land use decisions): educating and emer- g~y_ps~paredness lap nning (~;g emerg~y [e$ponse plans. data collection. outreach. insurance repuirementsl' ensuring_[hat operations of Floodwater management systems are not compromised by activities that interfere with or are damaged by design floods of theses sty_ems. Floodplain management measures interrelate and occasionally overlap with floodwater management mPaairaa rn reduce losses within the floodplain For example' emergency response activities' realigning levees' reconnecting historical floodplains: and reoperation of reservoirs. Multi-hazard Mitigation Ag rn oach Federal law directs states [o develop amulti-hazard mitigation proeram (administered by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services) to implement effective hazard mitigation measures that reduce [he potential damage from natural disasters [o reduce the loss of life and property human fP ing economic disruption and disaster assistance costs resul[ingfrom natural disasters While rhP Srate rlirarrs Inral governments through existing~w to deal with fire and earthquakes in their Ioca1 lap nning the State does not lp~v a major rot with land ~ i ~ a o iat d with Flooding 's% (Fulton). The eg Hera) plan law calls far the consideration of flood hazards. flooding. and floodplains in the land use. open-space. conservation. and safety elements. Local jurisdictions may benefit by doing,a multi-hazard planning approach to meet multiple federal and state requirements. Flood management also may be approached as a stand alone program or as one component of the broader notion of watershed planning, which also includes objectives such as improved water quality, erosion control, system-wide flood management and habitat conservation and enhancement. Where possible, a community should take a broader watershed approach to flood management, which would result in a coordinated regional approach to land use planning and flood loss reduc- tions. When incorporated into the general plan, either as an optional element or as a section in the land use, open-space, conservation, or safety element, flood management principles will be reflected as long-term development policies. Floodnlain Functions Flooding is a natural function of every river. alluvial fan and coastal area. In the riverine systems. Floodwaters enrich bottomlands and provide spawning habitats for native fish. There are ecological benefits of maintaining connections between the river and its floodplain. Land use decisions directly influence the function of floodplains and may either reduce or increase ecosystem health and potential flood hazards. The functions of floodplains include, but are not limited to, water supply, improved water quality, flood and erosion convol, and fish and wildlife habitat. Development within floodplains may not only expose people and property to floods, but also increase the potential for flooding elsewhere and may negatively impact floodplain ecosystems. Land use regulations such as zoning and subdivision ordinances are the primary means of imple- menting general plan policies established to minimize flood hazards. In addition to including flood- plain management policies in the general plan, making related changes to zoning and subdivision ordinances is crucial to the success of a floodplain management progra,n. The following flood management element guidelines will discuss flood management at both the individual community level and the regional level. They are equally useful in situations where a city or county has unilaterally included flood management in its general plan, or where an individual jurisdiction's flood management element is part of a larger regional strategy [o be implemented by more than one agency Guidelines for Flood Management Programs Relationship to the General Plan - Flood management may be addressed in an optional element pursuant to §65303 of the Government Cade. Once adopted, [he flood management element becomes an integral part of and carries the same weight as the other elements of the general plan. Its objectives, policies, plan proposals, and implementation measures must be consistent with the entire general plan (§65303.5). The objectives and policies, which are adopted as part of the flood management element must not conflict with the genera] plan as a whole, or with any individual element. A floodplain management element should provide direction and specific policies correlated with the land use, housing, conservation, safety, ss°% and open-space elements. For example, policies limiting development within the floodplain to compatible agricultural uses must also be reflected in the and internally consistent with land use, housine, open-space, and conservation elements. Policies regarding levee and channel maintenance might be reflected in the safety element. Many of the provisions under flood management will affect other elements of the general plan, and they should be cross-referenced as necessary. Where a regional approach is being taken, the policies of a city or countys flood management ele- ment should also correlate to the regional flood management plan. That plan should be specific enough [o recognize the differing characteristics of each of the involved cities and counties and identify the respective roles of each and obligations vfrach within all elements of the General Plan. The regional plan may stipulate that participating cities and counties self-certify the consistency of their flood management elements with the regional plan. Relationship to CEQA The adoption or amendment of a floodplain management element is subject to the requirements of CEQA (described in Chapter "4). The element may have direct physical consequences on residential development, wildlife habitat, anadromous fish migration, agricultural resources, vector control. water quality, and other environmental resources common to rivers and their floodplains. The ~drologic and hydraulic characteristics of the rivers and associated Floodplains and ecosystems. of Pach river basin or hydrologic unit represent a complete and interconnected system. Changes to one part of tha system may change other parts of the system. Floodwater and flood lap in aRproaches must consider these factors. There may be Flood management benefits from a watershed perspective for assessing~otential impacts and opportunities for mitigation measures. Flood Insurance The most common means of planning to avoid or at least mitigate flood damage is participation in the federal flood insurance program. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) adminis- ters [he National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which makes flood insurance available to those communities, which have enacted local ordinances restricting development within the 100-year floodplain. The local floodplain ordinances must meet or exceed FEMA's regulations. As part of its program, FEMA prepares a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) delineating the theoretical boundaries of the 100-year floodplain (the area within which the statistical frequency of flooding is believed to be 1 in 100 in any given year). These maps form the basis fdr regulating floodplain development and the rating of flood insurance policies. The responsibilities of cities and counties participating in [he NFIP include requiring that all new construction have its lowest floor elevated to or above the °base flood elevation" (this is calculated in conjunction with the 100-year floodplain delineation) and keeping records of development occur- ring within the designated floodplain. Under federal law, flood insurance must be purchased when obtaining a federally backed loan for a home within the FIRM 100-year floodplain. The availability of nthP f ~ al funds also may be affected by_participation in the NFIP ~roeram The city or county must submit a biennial report to FEMA describing any changes in the community's flood hazard area, development activities which have taken place within the floodplain, and the number of flood- ~63 plain residents and structures. As of April 1998, all but 20 of the cities and 1 of the counties in California participate in the NFIP. Participating in the NFIP is no guarantee that a community will escape flood damage, or that floods will not occur outside [he boundaries of mapped floodplains. The program has a number of recog- nized shortcomings: FEMA maps tend to underestimate the extent of the floodplain. For example, existing FIRM maps do not take into account the effects of future development when estimating flood potential. FIRM macs are not updated frequently enough, with or without Future conditions. to reflect changes in [he watershed or floodplain. New FEMA regulations allow FIRM maps to provide for consideration of future conditions including "build-out" and changes to weather patterns associ- ated with climate chances for either upstream or downstream areas, which may affect local flood levels. If these maps are to be used as a planning tool, they should be updated using locally collected data to identify existing and future flood levels. The Department of Water Resources (DWR) is currently working to update many of these maps, in cooperation with FEMA. Residents and decision-makers are not always aware of the actual level of flood risk. The 100-year floodplain is a theoretical construct - in many cases there is simply insufficient historical flood data to accurately judge flood frequency. In addition, the 100-year floodplain designation is commonly misunderstood by the public - it is simply a frequency and intensity probability, meaning that in reality, severe Gooding may occur even more than once in any year, and any number of years in over a 100 year span. The NFIP and related floodplain mapping ~ a uroeram for a community to seek flood insurance and should be viewed as the foundation on which to build comprehensive flood management policies. The genera] plan may augment this program by providing long-range guidance [o avoid and reduce flood hazards. Flood Management on a Regional Basis Rivers, creeks, and other potential sources of flooding often cross jurisdictional boundaries and thus a regional, watershed-based approach may be the effective means of flood management. The broader scope offers the advantage of involving local governments, other public agencies, interest groups, landowners, and the general public throughout the watershed in a comprehensive, multi jurisdictional program for reducing flood risk and potential damages and restoring and enhancing floodplain func- tions. The larger area may offer a wider range of potential projects, policy and regulatory options than would be available in a single jurisdiction. Nonetheless, regional flood management is also more politically and logistically difficult than management undertaken within a single jurisdiction. As a component of watershed management. flood management reduces downstream flood stages and flood damages with benefits for water quality. water supply. agriculture and ecosystems. The water- shed-based approach maintains the floodplain functions of sedimentation. deposition. water filter- inc and Floodwater absorption. See page 104-105 for additional discussion on watershed planning. No two situations are alike, and [he dynamics of regional flood management are very situa[ion- specific. For that reason, [he following discussion of regional approaches is limited to generalities. For additional advice, see the reference sources listed in the 1~chnical Assistance section. 64 The general plan may be adopted in any format deemed necessary or appropriate. Awell-written general plan will serve as a constant reference for decisions regarding the physical development of the community including its floodplains. Floodplain management is interrelated with most, if not all, of the other required elements. The Office of Planning and Research recommends taking particular care to correlate Floodplain management objectives and policies with those of the land use, open- space, conservation, and safety elements. Relevant Issues When a flood management element is being prepared, the issues covered should be limited to those, which are relevant to the community, the floodplain, and the watershed. Clearly, the subjects covered by the flood management element will depend upon the community's location in relation to rivers and streams, alluvial fans or the coast past or future potential for flood events, and the potential to be affected by upstream or to impact downstream land use decisions and flood potential. Following are a variety of issues, not all of which will be relevant in everyjurisdictioh. These are simply some common ideas; [hey are not intended to be an all-inclusive list. ^ OES Multi-hazard Miti>?ation Plan ^ The reasonably foreseeable flood area ^ FEMA NFIP program and community rating system (to reduce flood insurance rated ^ DWR Awareness Mapping and other historical flooding resources ^ Reoe[itive losses ^ Land use designation and flood hazard overlay designations ^ Flood control facilities (e.g., structural approaches to flood management such as dams, levees, etc.) ^ Conformity with federal, state, and local regulations ^ Regulatory relationships, including permitting ^ Multi jurisdictional coordination and wa r h d lap nning ^ Downstream impacts as consequences of land use decisions ^ Downstream land use planning considerations (flood hazards and infrastructure) as conse- quences of upstream actions ^ Alternative non-structural allowable floodplain land uses ^ Multi-objective floodplain management planning with regional share housing needs, existing land uses, conservation of agricultural land, parks and open snare, habitat protection and restoration, and flood management mitigation measures. ^ Funding of management activities ss Ideas for Data and Analysis In the process of preparing a flood management element, the city or county will have to collect a substantial amount of information concerning its floodplains and itsand its watershed. There are a variety of sources for this information. FEMA maps are available for most communities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will do floodplain delineation on acost=sharing basis and has information on floodplains and project levees. DWR also has floodplain information and a floodplain management program, as does the Stale Reclamation Board in the Central Valley The Office of Emergency Services and DWR have information on past flooding and flood levels based on awareness mapping. Local levee districts and Resource Conservation Districts may also have information to share. The following are ideas for data and analysis to support the development of objectives, policies, and implementation measures for this element. ^ Comprehensively define the floodplain (FEMA v Army Corps of Engineers v State Reclamation Board v. local agency definition) ^ Extent and depth of historic flooding (maps) ^ Historical flooding data Frequency o• Intensity •+ Duration •a Paleoflood •a H dv rologic modeling using tr_a~2oaition or meteorological models ^ Alluvial Fan Floodolain data o Reasonably foreseeable flood apex flow paths •. Flood flow path depths and velocities ++ Debris and scour ^ Inventory land and land uses with the floodplain(s) Open-space •> Habitat Wildlife migration corridors a Agricultural •+ Flood control •r Developed (i.e., residential, commercial, industrial 6~ ^ Identify existing and future problems and opportunities .• Development within hazard areas r. Undeveloped land suitable for bypass construction + Loss of productive farmland and opportunities for conjunctive farming and floodplain management activities •> Community apathy or support a Funding shortfalls ^ Boundaries of floodplains (FEMA v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v DWR v. local agency) ^ Inventory flood control structures and areas managed for flood control, and their controlling agencies a Levees Flood walls •+ Bypasses ~, Dams/reservoirs ^ Inventory pertinent regulations of federal, state, and local agencies Regulatory authority +r Existing land use and zoning restrictions ^ Inventory ongoing floodplain or watershed management and planning activities a LocaUregional, including those of non-governmental organizations •s State w Federal ^ Inventory past, and planned management activities •a Local agencies •> Reclamation Districts •. State and federal agencies ^ Identify sources of funding for planning efforts, as well as for potential implementation activities ^ Benefit/cost analysis of alternative floodplain management strategies Ideas for Flood Management Development Policies A flood management element should conform to the pertinent policies, objectives, plans, and proposals central to the land use, conservation, open-space, and safety elements. Policies should 68 recognize existing floodplain management programs as well as existing regulations. As always, policies must conform to constitutional prohibitions on °regulatory takings." Further, the policies selected should be physically and economically feasible to implement. Following are ideas for the general types of policies, which may be incorporated into the flood management element. ^ Specify allowable uses within the Floodway fringe and floodplains ^ Specify limits on and construction standards for development and encroachment within mapped floodplains and floodway fringe (land use density, intensity, elevations, location), including areas of shallow flooding ^ Establish policies, plan proposals, and standards For dealing with constraints and minimizing land use and floodplain conflict ^ Retain and preserve floodplains for open-space and recreation ^ Encourage compatible agricultural uses and practices with habitat banking where compatible with floodplains ^ Mitigate for impacts such as loss of agricultural land, loss of native habitat, or changes in flood characteristics ^ Cooperate with the programs of other agencies and non-governmental organizations, where applicable ^ Establish consultation procedures with other affected agencies andjurisdictions ^ Identify criteria for public agency acquisition of development rights in floodprone areas .. -^ Encourage cooperation with non-governmental organizations to acquire development rights ^ Establish policies guidelines standards and b iilding cri ria to SnrP that new d v lam n will not be damaged by special risks associated with alluvial floods ^ Encourage multi jurisdictional Flood management cooperation when watersheds cross~urisdic- tional boundaries ^ Develop Flood hazard mitigation measures within iden ifi d r a onably foresP hi flood hazard areas where aRpro rp iate ^ Encourage coordination between flood management and multi-hazard managem n lan nning and mitigation ^ Retain and preserve connectivity between rivers or streams and their floodplains to preserve floodplain function and natural processes Ideas far Implementation Loca] agencies should select a combination of implementation measures or strategies that best address the unique characteristics of the specific community and establish an effective long-term ;ss approach to floodplain management. The following examples illustrate the kinds of actions local governments may take to implement the floodplain management element. ^ Adopt flood hazard zoning ^ Enact floodplain management standards as part of any zoningor lan~~g ordinance ^ Consider new and substantially-improved buildings to exceed minimum federal flood insurance requirements ^ Adopt transfer of development rights programs ^ Adopt other land use development regulations ^ Reconnect the river and its floodplain through public land acquisition and structural modification of existing flood control devices ^ Include nonstructural floodplain management approaches to help conserve beneficial uses and functions of the floodplain ^ Identify ca aci~Qf floodplain to rechargesgroundwater ^ A r~s_technical assistance from DWR for identif~g xi g loci ~~~/or FEMA floodwa~ ^ Develop a program for preventative maintenance of active floodplains, control structures, river banks, and channels to balance the need to ensure continued flood capacity and stability compatible with the needs of established. native habitat ^ Identify and utilize floodplain management grants and assistance to develop and implement floodplain management plans and programs ^ Develop public outreach programs and information ^ Incorporate watershed and floodplain mapping, from several sources if available, into the city or county Geographic Information System (GIS) ^ Regularly review floodplain maps, and update with future conditions when new information becomes available ^ Participate in and provid a ai tan e o arraam gaslges as aR~ropria a ~ Develop reasonably foreseeable alluvial fan floodplain maw ^ Public development and redevelopment policies ^ Cooperate with OES and DWR to identify repetitive losses if any ^ Prepare and update emergency preparedness plans ~ Direct local emergency services offices to develop and implement flood warning systems ^ Establish resources and provide funding for public acquisition of private lands and structures within the floodplain and subject to flood hazards. o ^ Institute a planning mechanism and institutional framework to coordinate flood mana eg ment programs with oRportunities for agricultural conservation and o vstem protection and restora tion control and environmental management activities with local, state, federal agencies, and other stakeholders ^ Promote multi-objective management approach in flood manag m n Rrojects ^ Initiate actions to avoid inadequate or unclear responsibilities between agencies ^ Enter cooperative agreements QPA, MOU) with other entities specifying relative roles ^ Facilitate the coordination of responsibilities and activities among agencies and the public for floodplain management ^ Develop aquatic and terrestrial habitat restoration plans consistent with floodplain and river channel use guidelines ^ Develop information and coordination plans with other agencies to educate the public and all planning agencies about floodplain management objectives ^ Refer to FEMA DMA 2000 Multi-hazard mitigation Plan Criteria (source). ^ Develop Awareness Mapping Technical and Funding Assistance The following governmental and nongovernmental organizations can provide information or assis [ante for the preparation of the safety element add' Department of Water Resources Flood Divi ion for Awareness Mapping Community Rating~v m 2rggram and Floodplain Management. Governor's Office of Emergencv Services FEMA' Association of to Floodplain Managers and American Planning Association. f See 1998 Guidelines for original sectionl Floodplain Management Association P.O. Box 50891 Sparks, NV 89435-0891 http://www floodplain.org/ United States Army Corps of Engineers Floodplain Management Services South Pacific Division 630 Sansome Street, Room 720 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 556-0914 http://www/usace.army miUinet/fu nctions/cw/cwfpms Funding Mechanisms: Congressionally Authorized Civil Works Projects, Floodplain Management Services, Small Flood Control Projects, Snagging and Clearing for Flood Control, Streambank and Shoreline Protection for Public Facilities Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607 (510) 627-7100 http://www.fema.gov/home Funding mechanisms: Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Public Assistance Section 406, National Flood Insurance Program, Performance Partnership Program, Community Assistance Program-State Support Services Element, Individual and Family Gran[ Program, Disaster Housing Assistance Program Governor's Office of Emergency Services Planning and Technological Assistance Branch PO. Box 419047 Rancho Cordova, CA 95741-9047 (916) 464-3200 Or Disaster Assistance Programs Branch Hazard Mitigation Section P.O. Box 419023 Rancho Cordova, CA 95741-9023 http://www. oes.ca.gov Funding Mechanisms: Hazard Mitigation Grant Program yiz California Department of Water Resources Floodplain Management Branch P.O. Box 942836 Sacramento, CA 94236-0001 (916) 653-9902 http://www. dwr. wa ter. ca. gov United States Environmental Protection Agency 75 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, CA 94105 http://www.epa.gov Funding under the Clean Water Act: 104 (b) (3) State Wetland Protection Development Grant; 104(b)(3) NPDES demonstration projects United Stales Department of Agriculture Natural Resource Conservation Service 430 G. Street, #4164 Davis, California 95616 http://www. nres. usda.gov Bibliography A Multi-Objective Planning Process for Mitigating Natural Hazards, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Denver, CO, 1994 (a step-by-step method for organizing aweek-long session to develop local natural hazards mitigation plans) Multi-Objective Flood Mitigation Plan, Vermillion River Basin, South Dakota, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Denver, CO, 1994 Watershed Protections: A Statewide Approach, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, San Francisco, CA, 1995 Managing Floodplain Development In Approximate Zone A Areas, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Denver, CO, 1995 Cost Effectiveness Analysis For Environmental Planning: Nine Easy Steps, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria VA, 1994 Community Flood Mitigation Planning Guidebook, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Madison WI, 1995 Investing In A Safer Future: Proceedings Of The Second Annual Congress On Natural Disaster Loss Reduction, Insurance Institute For Property Loss Reduction, Boston MA, 1995 Subdivision Design in Flood Hazard Areas, PAS Report 473, Marya Morris, American Planning Association, Chicago IL, 1997 L73 APPENDIX C, _~ EXECUTIVE ORDER OPTIONS Proposed California floodplain Management Executive Order Revision Please Note: Exceeds NFIP minimum standards -more protective language underlined applies only _ SQ "NOW THEREFORE" portion not "WHFREA "portion Executive Department State of California EXECUTIVE ORDER D- _ _ - 02 (Replaces Executive Order B-39-77) Revised 11-15-02 WHEREAS, throughout the State repetitive floods continue to jeopardize those who live in flood- plains, and cause devastating losses, major risks and increase costs to California's people, property, environmental, social and economic interests, and; WHEREAS, past and. future floodplain management decisions will be an increasingly important consideration as the State's population and development continues to outpace the construction and maintenance of physical Floodwater management facilities used to reduce flood damage to floodplain developments; and WHEREAS, a more determined implementation of floodplain management would mitigate the traditional and costly cycle of allowing inappropriate uses in floodplains which in turn creates the justification for additional physical floodwater management facilities; and WHEREAS, adherence to floodplain management also protects natural resources such as wetland and riparian habitat which have been significantly reduced and require protection; and WHEREAS, prudent floodplain management values agricultural land._water resources and floodplain functions that are essential to the existing environment and necessary for our State's floodplains' continued ability to provide a safe, healthy and affordable food supply, which is vital for our national security and public welfare; and WHEREAS, appropriate pre-flood floodplain management etlort will reduce post-flood displacement, disruption, and federal and State financial disaster assistance; and WHEREAS, the State should provide leadership by example to decision-makers to develop and support prudent floodplain management policies; and WHEREAS, the State has programs for the construction, operation, or permitting of facilities and surplus State lands' conveyance which can directly or indirectly affect land use planning and devel- opment in tloodplains; and WHEREAS, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 as amended provides that State or local governments that do not adopt floodplain management regulations consistent with at least the minimum standards of the National Flood Insurance Program cannot participate in the National R Flood Insurance Program and will not be eligible for any federal financial assistance, including federal disaster assistance and USDA and HUD funding, for buildings located in FEMAs regulatory floodplains in that community; and WHEREAS, the availability of federal financing for buildings and their contents, flood insurance and disaster assistance is of importance to the residents of California. WHEREAS, [he purchase of flood insurance is a condition of any federal financial assistance for any State or local government in the construction, or acquisition of buildings in identified floodplains; and WHEREAS, [he United States Code at 42 U.S.C. 4106 (a) specifically prohibits Federal officers and agencies from providing financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes for use in the floodplains of a State, local government, or other specified public entity that is not participating in the National Flood Insurance Program; and WHEREAS, laws have been enacted since the original 1977 version of this Order including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, as amended, the Housing_ and Community Development Act of 1992, the Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, and others, and the State desires to provide leadership in multi-objective management of floodplains and the protection, restoration and enhancement of other natural and beneficial functions of the floodplain; and WHEREAS the Legislature has declared in Water Code section 8325 that a large portion of the land resources of the state is subject to recurrent flooding causing loss of life and property, and there is a recognized public need in the state for flood insurance; and WHEREAS the Legislature has declared in Water Code section 8325 that the public interest will be served by state cooperation under the National Flood Insurance Program; and NOW THEREFORE, I, Gray Davis, Governor of the State of California, by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the State of California, do hereby issue this Executive Order to supercede Executive Order B-39-77, effectively immediately. 1. Policies and priorities identified in this order further the S[a[e of Californian cooperation with the National Flood Insurance Program, and hence promote the public interest, consistent with the Legislature's declarations in Water Code section 8325. The policies and priorities identified in this Order are not intended to amend the effect of, or to qualify the operation of existing laws and regulations. 2. Consistent with its legal authority, if a Slate agency has determined to, or proposes to, conduct, support, or allow development, as defined by the State's Executive Order, Note 4, to be located in the floodplain and which is not subject to local floodplain management requirements, the State agency should be encouraged to consider alternatives that avoid or minimize adverse effects and incompatible development in the floodplain. is 3. With respect to State lands and State structures, State agency officials shall provide leadership and shall make decisions consistent with long- and short-term flood risk in order to avoid or minimize the social disruption, environmental, and economic losses associated with the use of floodplains. These agency officials shall take particular care to avoid nonconforming or haz- ardous use of floodplains in connection with all activities under their authority Note 1: In this Executive Order [he term "floodplain" means "Special Flood Hazard Area" which includes both Zone A (Riverine/Alluvial) and Zone V (Coastal) flooding as shown on FEMAs Flood Hazard Boundary Maps (FHBM) and Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) or The Reclamation Board's Designated Floodways as shown on The Reclamation Board mans The term °floodplain" includes both traditional floodplains and floodwa~ Note 2: There are certain areas not magped for re ug latory purposes by the NFIP or The Reclamation Board which may be flood-Drone areas Th indud mmapoed floodplains who e xi ten 'e i demonstrated by historic flooding or credible hydrological and hydraulic data and flood lame indicated by Awareness Maps or other r I vant s udi s 'nrh ding reasonably foreseeable flood mapping. All obligations in this Executive Ord r r laced [o 'floodplains" al o in 1 ode consid ration of these flood-Drone areas. °Reasonably foreseeable flooding" as used in this order is an estimate of the ranee of foreseeable Flood magnitudes developed for floodplain and flood management purposes which utilizes all available sources of flood related information including but not limited to historic floods. hydrologic modeling using ran position hydraulic models meteorologic ~ models and evaluation of the 1 percent frequency flood design standards Note 3: In this Executive Order. "state structure" means new or substantially improved buildings or improve- ments that are not subject to local government floodplain management requirements and that the state constructs, substantially improves, or owns. Note 4: In this Executive Order the term "development", as defined by NFIP, means any human-made change [o improved or unimproved real estate, including but not limited to buildings, or other structures, mining, dredging, filling, grading, paving, excavation or drilling operations, or storage of equipment or materials where the State constructs, improves, or owns and the activity is not subject to local floodplain management requirements. Note 5: "Critical Infrastructum"means public facilities that are critical to the health and welfare of a population and to disaster response to a hazard event Critical infrastructure should be presumed to include facilities that if rendered unserviceable. would impose significant hardship on the public or that if flooded would~ose a threat to public health and public safety Critical Infrastructure includes but is no[ limited to emergency response facilities (such as OES, fire and police), hospitals, water purification facilities, sewer treatment facilities, and could include transportation, energy, communication, and power facilities. These obligations should be implemented as follows: a. All Stale agencies responsible for development other than issuing State permits for financing, planning, designing or constructing of non-State development, shall evaluate flood hazards is when planning the location of these developments. The evaluation shall consist of a determination of whether the proposed site lies in a floodplain, and, if so, that the precautions identified in this Executive Order will be taken to minimize the hazard. If the development does not have to be in the floodplain to meet its goal and obi ctiv f asihla alt rnative locations for siting outside of the floodplain shall he give ~,~y con id ra i n unl s the location in the floodplain is necessary because it is substantially more cost-effective practical or aoordoriate for the proposed use of the development or the benefits of floo~lain functions If development occurs in the floodplain floodoroofing should be considered and implemented. if appropriate. b. All new development by State agencies proposed in floodplains must at a minimum be con- structed and maintained in accordance with federal and State regulations and local floodplain management ordinances, which include, but are not limited to, the National Flood Insurance Program design and floodplain standards set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (44 CFR, Parts 60.3, 60.4 and 60.5); and amendments thereof after the date of this Executive Order; the Appendix (Chapter 31) of the 1997 (or later) edition of the Uniform Building Code (or equivalent provision as adopted by reference in the California Building Code, and the regulations of The Reclamation Board (Title 23). Where there are established differences among federal, state and local floodplain regulations, State agencies, a[ their option, shall abide by either this Executive Order or more protective local regulations enacted to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. In the siting design and construction of rate stru tures in floodofains. state agencies enerally should strive to exceed NFIP design standards in accordance with a complete Flood risk analysis of a site and preserve natural floodplain functions and benefits to the extent feasible. To emphasize the importance of adhering to floodplain management regulations, which will reduce future flood risk and damage, State agencies shall follow this Executive Order in the development and promulgation of guidelines and regulations. c. All State agencies with existing State-owned or State-operated developments in floodplains that suffer significant or repetitive flood damage shall at a minimum carry out or require reconstruction. rehabilitation. or additions in accordance with federal ordinances includin the National Flood Insurance Program's design and floodplain standards set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations and this Ex tiv Ord r or not perform re on tr lion rehabilitation. or additions if that work is not cost-effe iv oracti a] or appropriate for that development Whenever cost- ff tiv . ora ti al and appropriate. floodproofing and flood rotection measures shall b a lied to existin develo ments in flood lain areas which have not suffered sienificant or repetitive Flood damage Where there are established differences among federal. state and local floodplain regulations State agencies at their option shall abide by either this Executive Order or more protective local regulations In undertaking these actions stale agencies generally should strive to exceed NFIP d sign standards in accordance with a complete flood risk analysis of a sire. inrluriing reasonably for CPpahIP t1~~~~ an.r preserve natural floodplain functions and benaf'rs rn the xranr fa 'ht T d. All State agencies responsible for the lease and other conveyance of surplus State property shall identify on the title that [he property is in the floodplain or Floodway' and disclose all Flood hazards when such land is leased or otherwise conveyed of e., State agencies developing or assisting with the development of critical infrastructure should avoid approving such development within a Floodplain unless it is clearly demonstrated that it is necessary to achieve the purposes of the critical infrastructure and will be operable and not create a hazard to public safety during a major flood event. 4. Each State agency shall prepare a written statement on how it will comply with this Executive Order. 5. The Department of Water Resources shall designate a State Coordinator for Floodplain Management (for NFIP and CRS programs) to coordinate statewide floodplain management efforts including, but no[ limited to, such activities as: a. Provide informational assistance to State agencies as floodplain management procedures are prepared and before final adoption by each agency to promote adepuacv consistency and compliance with applicable Floodplain regulations including identification of critical infrastructure b. Encourage and aseiy at agencies in complying with this Exeartive Order including facilitating resolution of situations betty nor among tat ag ne ties. which may have program wi h onFli ing goals for the Floodplain 6. State Constitutional Officers, the University of California, the California State University, the California Community Colleges, the State Board of Education, State Lands Commission, Trustee Agencies pursuant to Resources Code 21000, and other State agencies, departments, boards, and commissions not directly under the authority of the Executive Branch are encouraged to comply with this Executive Order and the NFIP in a manner consistent with [heir legal authority. State agencies and other constitutional entities not covered under the Executive Order are encour- aged to consider alternatives that avoid or minimize adverse effects and incompatible development in the floodplain, consistent with their legal authority. Note 6: Nothing herein is intended to create a new cause of action against the State. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the great seal of the State of California to be affixed this th day of ,two thousand and three. /s/Gray Davis (Great Seal of California) Governor of California /s/ ATTEST: Secretary of State 7@ X80 Please Note: Task Force added comments italicized 1. Project title: 2. Lead agency name and address: 3. Contact person and phone number: 4. Project location: 5. Project sponsor's name and address: 6. Genera] plan designation: 7. Zoning: 8. Description of project: (Describe the whole action involved, including but not limited to later phases of [he project, and any secondary, support, or off-site features necessary for its implementa- tion. Attach additional sheets if necessary) 9. Surrounding land uses and setting: Briefly describe the project's surroundings: 10. Other public agencies whose approval is required (e.g., permits, financing approval, or participa- tion agreement.) ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS POTENTIALLY AFFECTED: The environmental factors checked below would be potentially affected by this project, involving at least one impact that is a °Potentially Significant Impact" as indicated by the checklist on the following pages. O Aesthetics O Agriculture Resources O Air Quality O Biological Resources O Cultural Resources O Geology /Soils O Hazards & O Hydrology/Hydraulics/ O Land Use Planning Hazardous Materials Water Quality O Mineral Resources O Noise O Population /Housing O Public Services O Recreation O Transportation/Traffic O Utilities /Service Systems O Mandatory Findings of Significance ;8C DETERMINATION: (To be completed by the Lead Agency) On the basis of this initial evaluation: O I find that the proposed project COULD NOT have a significant effect on the environment, and a NEGATIVE DECLARATION will be prepared. O I find thaGalthough the proposed project could have a significant effect on the environment, there will not be a significant effect in this case because revisions in the project have been made by or agreed to by the applicant. A MITIGATED NEGATIVE DECLARATION will be prepared. O I find that the proposed project MAY have a significant effect on the environment, and an ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT is required. O I find that the proposed project MAY have a °potentially significant impact" or "potentially signifi- cant unless mitigated" on the environment, but at leas[ one effect 1) has been adequately analyzed in an earlier document pursuant to applicable legal standards. and 2) has been addressed by mitigation measures based on the earlier analysis as described on attached sheets. An ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT is required, but it must analyze only the effects chat remain to be addressed. O I find that although the proposed project could have a significant effect on the environment, because all potentially significant effects (a) have been analyzed adequately in an earlier EIR pursuant to appli- cable standards, and (b) have been avoided or mitigated pursuant to that earlier, including revisions or mitigation measures that are imposed upon the proposed project, nothing further is required. Signature Date Printed name a EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS: 1) A brief explanation is required for all answers except "No Impact" answers that are adequately supported by the information sources a lead agency cites in the parentheses following each question. A "No Impact" answer is adequately supported if the referenced information sources show that the impact simply does not apply to projects like the one involved (e.g., the project falls outside a fault rupture zone). A "No Impact" answer should be explained where it is based on project-specific factors as well as general standards (e.g., the project will not expose sensitive receptors to pollutants, based on aproject-specific screening analysis). 83 2) All answers must take account of the whole action involved, including off-site as well arson-site, cumulative as well as project-level, indirect as well as direct, and construction as wells operational impacts. 3) "Potentially Significant Impact" is appropriate if there is substantial evidence that an effect may be significant. If there are one or more "Potentially Significant Impact" entries when the determination is made, an EIR is required. 4) "Negative Declaration: Potentially Significant Unless Mitigation Incorporated" applies where the incorporation of mitigation measures has reduced an effect from °Potentially Significant Impact" to a "Less Significant Impact." The lead agency must describe the mitigation measures, and briefly explain how they reduce the effect to a less than significant level (mitigation measures from Section XVII, "Earlier Analyses," may be cross-referenced). 5) Earlier analyses may be used where, pursuant to the tiering, program EIR, or other CEQA process, an effect has been adequately analyzed in an earlier EIR or negative declaration. Section 15063 (c) (3) (D). Earlier analyses are discussed in Section XVII at the end of the checklist. 6) Lead agencies are encouraged to incorporate into the checklist references to information sources for potential impacts (e.g., general plans, zoning ordinances). Reference to previously prepared or outside document should, where appropriate, include a reference tithe page or pages where the statement is substantiated. 7) Supporting Information Sources: A source list should be attached, and other sources used or individuals contacted should be cited in the discussion. 8) This is only a suggested form, and lead agencies are free to use different ones. 9) The analysis of each issue should identify: a) the significance criteria or threshold used to evaluate each question; and) the mitigation measure identified, if any, tb reduce the impact too less than significance. sa SAMPLE QUESTION Issues: Potentially Less Than Less Than No Impact Significant Significant Significant Impact With Impact Mitigation Incorporation I. AESTHETICS -Would the project: a) Have a substantial adverse effect on a scenic vista? b) Damage scenic resources, including, but not limited to, trees, rock outcroppings, and historic buildings within state scenic highway? c) Substantially degrade the existing visual character or quality of the site and its surroundings? d) Create a new source of substantial light or glare, which would adversely affect day or nighttime views in the area? II. AGRICULTURE RESOURCES: In determining whether impacts to agricultural resources are significant environmental effects, lead agencies may refer to the California Agricultural Land Evaluation and Site Assessment Model prepared by the California Dep[. of Conservation as an optional model to use in assessing impacts on agriculture and farmland. Would the project: a) Convert Prime Farmland, Unique Farmland, or Farmland of Statewide Importance (Farmland) to non-agricultural use? (The Farmland Mapping and Monitoring Programming the California Resources Agency, Department of Conservation, maintains detailed maps of these categories of farmland.),. b) Conflict with existing zoning for agricultural use, or a Williamson Act contract? c) Involve other changes in the existing environment, which, due [o their location or nature, could individually or cumulatively result in loss of Farmland, to non-agricultural use? III. AIR QUALITY -Where available, the significance criteria established by the applicable air quality management or air pollution control district may be relied upon to make the following determinations. Would the project: 85 a) Conflict with or obstruct implementation of the applicable Air Quality Attainment Plan or Congestion Management Plan? b) Violate any stationary source air quality standard or contribute to an existing or projected air quality violation? c) Result in a net increase of any criteria pollutant for which the project region is nonattainment under an applicable federal or state ambient air quality standard (including releasing emissions which exceed quantitative thresholds for ozone precursors)? d) Create or contribute to anon-stationary source °hotspot" (primarily carbon monoxide)? e) Expose sensitive receptors to substantial pollutant concentrations? f) Create objectionable odors affecting a substantial number of people? III. BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES -Would the project: a) Adversely impact, either directly or through habitat modifications, any endangered, rare, or threatened species, as listed in Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations (sections 670.2 or 670.5) or in Title 50, Code of Federal Regulations (sections 17.11 or 17.12)? b) Have a substantial adverse impact, either directly or through habitat modifications, on any species identified as a candidate, sensitive, or special status species in local or regional plans, policies, or regulations, or by the California Department of Fish and Game or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service? c) Have a substantial adverse impact on any riparian habitat or other sensitive natural community identified in local or regional plans, policies, and regulations or by the California Department of Fish and Game or US Fish and Wildlife Service? d) Adversely impact federally protected wetlands (including, but not limited to, marsh, vernal pool, coastal, etc.) either individually or in combination with the known or probable impacts of other activities through direct removal, filling, hydrological interruption, or other means? e) Interfere substantially with the movement of any resident or migratory fish or wildlife species or with established resident or migratory wildlife corridors, or impede the use of wildlife nursery sites? f) Conflict with any local policies or ordinances protecting biological resources, such as a tree preservation policy or ordinance? g) Conflict with the provisions of an adopted Habitat Conservation Plan, Natural Conservation Community Plan, or other approved local, regional, or state habitat conservation plan? IV. CULTURAL RESOURCES -Would the project: a) Cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource, which is either listed or eligible for Listing on the National Register of Historic Places, the California Register of Historic Resources, or a local register of historic resources? ss b) Cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a unique archaeological resources (i.e., an artifact, object, or site about which it can be clearly demonstrated that, without merely adding to the current body of knowledge, there is a high probability that it contains information needed to answer important scientific research questions, has a special and particular quality such as being the oldest or best available example of its type, or is directly associated with a scientifically recognized important prehistoric or historic event or person)? c) Disturb or destroy a unique paleontological resource or site? d) Disturb any human remains, including those interred outside of formal cemeteries? V. GEOLOGY AND SOILS -Would the project: a) Expose people or structures to potential substantial adverse effects, including [he risk of loss, injury, or death involving: i. Rupture of a known earthquake fault, as delineated on the most recent Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Map issued by the State Geologist for the area or based on other substantial evidence of a known fault? ii. Strong seismic ground shaking? iii. Seismic-related ground failure, including liquefaction? iv. Inundation by seiche, tsunami, or mudflow? v. Landslides? vi. Flooding, including flooding as a result of the failure of a levee or dam? vii. Wild land fires, including where wild lands area adjacent to urbanized areas and where residences are intermixed with wild lands? a) Would the project result in substantial soil erosion or the loss of tops oil? b) Would the project result in the loss of a unique geologic feature? c) Is the project located on strata or soil that is unstable, or that would become unstable as a result of the project, and potentially result in on- or off-site landslide, lateral spreading, subsidence, liquefaction or collapse? d) Is the project located on expansive soil creating substantial risks to life or property? e) Where sewers are not available for the disposal of wastewater is the soil capable of supporting the use of septic tanks or alternative wastewater disposal systems? s~ VII. HAZARDS AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS -Would the project: a) Create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through the routine transport, use, or disposal of hazardous materials? b) Create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through reasonably foreseeable upset and accident conditions involving the likely release of hazardous materials into the environment? c) Reasonably be anticipated to emit hazardous emissions or handle hazardous or acutely hazardous materials, substances, or waste within one-quarter mile of an existing or proposed school? d) Is the project located on a site, which is included on a list of hazardous materials sites, compiled pursuant to Government Code Section 65962.5 and, as a result, would it create a significant hazard to the public or the environment? e) For a project located within an airport land use plan or, where such a plan has not been adopted, within two miles of a public airport or public use airport, would the project result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project area? f) For a project within the vicinity of a private airstrip, would the project result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project area? g) Impair implementation of or physically interfere with an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan? h) Expose people or structures to the risk of loss, injury or death involving wild land fires, including where wild lands are adjacent to urbanized areas or where residences are inter mixed with wild lands? 88 VIII. HYDROLOGY, HYDRAULICS, AND WATER QUALITY -Would the project: a) Violate Regional Water Quality Control Board water quality standards or waste discharge requirements? b) Substantially deplete groundwater supplies or interfere substantially with groundwater recharge such that there would be a net deficit in aquifer volume or a lowering of the local groundwater table level (i.e., th'e production rate of pre-existing nearby wells would drop to a level which would not support existing land uses or planned uses for which permits have been granted)? c) Substantially alter the existing drainage pattern of the site or area, including through the alteration of the course of a stream or river, or alluvial fan apex flow, in a manner, which would result in substantial erosion or siltation on- or off-site? d) Substantially alter the existing drainage pattern of the site or area, including through the alteration of the course of a stream or river, or alluvial fan apex flow or substantially increase the rate or amount of surface runoff in a manner, which would result in flooding on- or off-site? e) Create or contribute runoff water, which would exceed the capacity of existing or planned stormwater drainage systems to control? E) Place housing within a 100-year Floodrzlain as maooed on a federal Flood Hazard Boundary or Flood Insurance Rate Mao or other hazard delineation maw g) Place within a 100-year floodplain or locally adopted floodplain, structures which would impede or redirect flood flows or alluvial fan apex flow path? h) .Expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury or death involving flooding, including flooding as a result of al]uvial fan apex flow or the failure of a levee or dam? i) Expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury or death involving flooding, including flooding as a result of inundation by seiche, tsunami, mudflow, or alluvial fan apex flow? j) Place structures on alluvial fans and expose other parts of the fan to hazards associated with the relocation of flow paths? k) Place structures in areas subject to other hazards such as seismic activity and fire that would cause significant rapid changes to the hydrology and hydraulics of the watershed and increase the risk of flooding? 1) Place critical infrastructure within an area subject to flooding? [THERE ARE NO SUGGESTED CHANGES FOR THE REST OF THE CHECKLIST] as APPENDIX E -STAFF AND CONSULTANTS Sergio Guillen, Task Force Executive Officer DWR, Executive Division Maria Lorenzo-Lee, Task Force Coordinator DWR, Division of Flood Management Elizabeth Mansfield, Task Force Advisor DWR, Division of Flood Management Elizabeth Patterson, Task Force Advisor DWR, Division of Flood Management Dan Yamanaka James Bailey Lisa Beutler, Lead Facilitator Ken McGhee. Facilitator Judy Talbot Massoud Rezakhani Karl Mohr David Ruark Muawieh Radaideh Michael Smirnov Angela Carmi Douglas Hamilton Eric Simmons DWR, Division of Flood Management DWR, Division of Flood Management California Center for Collaborative Policy California Center for Collaborative Policy California Center for Collaborative Policy URS Corporation URS Corporation URS Corporation URS Corporation URS Corporation URS Corporation Exponent Dewberry & Davis Special recognition to the Department of Water Resources, Division of FI'ood Management. Stein Buer Division Chief Steve Yaeger Floodplain Management and Planning Branch Ricardo Puneda Floodplain Management Office so APPENDIX F - BIBLIn(',RAPHY I Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. National Flood Programs in Review. 2000. Available: htto://www floods org/PDF oercent20files/2000-fpm pdf Association of State Floodplain Managers and Federal Emergency Management Agency Mitigation Success Stories, Edition 4. January 2002. Available: htto'//wwwfloodsorg/MSS IVodf Bayley, Peter B. "Understanding Large River-Floodplain Ecosystems." Bioscience. Vol. 45 No. 3: 153- 158. March 1995. Available: California State Library Article Number A16763489 Bolton, Susan M., Jeff Shellberg, University of Washington, Center for Streamside Studies. Ecological Issues in Floodplains and Riparian Corridors. Final White Paper. July 2001. Available: htt ''/~dg2ts Washington ed ~/ .w/P bli ation /floodolain~ California Department of Conservation, Division of Land Resource Protection. Farmland Conversion Data. 1998. Available: htto://www.consrv.ca.gov/DLRP/fmmg/ California Department of Water Resources, Division of Flood Management, Floodplain Management Task Force Staff. Organized List of Suggested Issues for Consideration by the FPM Task Force. May-June 2002 and FPM Task Force Recommendations Based on Discussions from ASFPM. July 2002. Available: http://fomtaskforce.waterca gov/; actual notes can be obtained by contacting the Department of Water Resources, Division of Flood Management in Sacramento, California California Resource Agency. Final Report of the Flood Emergency Action Team. May 1997 Available: Department of Water Resources Office. Bulletins and Reports Committee on Alluvial Fan Flooding, National Research Council. Alluvial Fan Flooding. 1996. Available: http://www.nap.edu/books/0309055423/htmUindex h[ml Committee on American River Flood Frequencies, National Research Council. Improving American River Flood Frequency Analyses. 1999. Available: hStn://www.narz.edu/books/0309064333/html/index h ml Committee on Coastal Erosion Zone Management, Water Science and Technology Board, Marine Board, National Research Council. Managing Coastal Emsion. 1990. Available: http://wvvw.nap.edu/books/030904 1 4 30/htmUindex html Committee on Flood Control Alternatives in the American River Basin. National Research Council. Flood Risk lVfanagement and the American River Basin: An Evaluation. 1995. Available: ~tp'//wwwnao edu/books/03090 3 4 h mUind x hr i si Committee on Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems: Science, Technology, and Public Policy, National Research Council. Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems: Science, Technology, and Public Policy 1992. Available: http://www.nap.edu/orzenbook/0309045347/html/ Federal Emergency Management Agency. Flood Hazard Mapping: What does [he "100-year flood" mean? 2002. Availab]e-hffp://www.fema.gov/mit/tsd/fg fId03.htm Federal Emergency Management Agency Report to the Floodplain Management Forum. June 2000. Available: htto://w~,vw.fema.FOV/library/mitfmf.htm Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force. Floodplain Management in the United States: An Assessment Report. FIA-18. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency 1992. Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee. Proceedings of the Scientific Assessment and Strategy Team Workshop on Hydrology, Ecology, and Hydraulics. Volume 5 of Science for Floodplain Management into the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1994 Available: California State Library call number: I 19.2:SCI 2N5 Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee. Selected Studies on Natural and Human Factors Related to Flood Management in the Upper Mississippi River Basin. Volume 4 of Science for Floodplain Management into the Zlst Century. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency 1994 Available: California State Library call number: 119.2:SCI 2N4 Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee. Sharing the Challenge -Floodplain Management into the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency 1994 Available: California State Library call numbers: PrEx1.2 F65/exec.sum, PrEx1.2 F65/pt.l-4, and PrEx1.2 F65/pt.5 Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force. A Unified National Program for Floodplain Management. FEMA-248. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency June 1994. Floodplain Management Task Force. Proceedings for Plenary Meeting #2. June 2002. Available: htto://fpmtaskforce.water.ca.2ov/; actual notes can be obtained by contacting the Department of Water Resources, Division of Flood Management in Sacramento, California. Floodplain Management Task Force Staff. Issues Survey Overview May-June 2002. Available: http://fpmtaskforce.water.ca.gov/; actual notes can be obtained by contacting the Depart- ment of Water Resources, Division of Flood Management in Sacramento, California. ~sz Friends of the River. Beyond Flood Control Flood Management and River Restoration. Sacramento, CA. May 1997. Available: h~,ln://www.friendsoftheriver ore/BeyondFloodCn[rl/fldprimr html Goodridge, James D., Department of Water Resources. Historic Rainstorms in California: A Study of 1000-year Storms. 1997. Available: J.D. Goodridge, P.O.Box 970 Mendocino, CA 95460 Haeuber, Richard A. & William K. Michener. "Natural Flood Control." Science and Technology Vol. 15: p. 74. Fal] 1998. Available: Sacramento, California Library Article Number A53435952 Haeuber, Richard A. & William K. Michener. "Policy Implications of Recent Natural and Managed Floods (Flooding: Natural and Managed Disturbances). Bioscience. Vol. 48 No. 9: p. 765-773. Sep- tember 1998. Available: Sacramento, California Library Article Number A21 109056. Hinch, Nathan B., David J. Mullan, & John R. Sheaffer. "Encouraging Wise Use of Floodplains with Market-Based Incentives." Environment. Vol. 44 No. 1:34-43. January/February 2002. Available: Sacramento, California Library call numbers: Mag.Coll.: 109L0288, Article A82492655 Howe, Joe & lain White. "Flooding: Are We Ignoring the Real Problem and Solution." Regional Studies. Vol. 35: p. 368. June 2001. Available: Sacramento, California Library Article Number A77009738 Kusler, Jon & Larry Larson. "Beyond the Ark: A New Approach to U.S. Floodplain Management." Environment. Vole. 35 No. 5: p. 6-10. June 1993. Available: Sacramento, California Library call number: Mag.Coll.: 69J0065, Article A13996882 Legislative Analyst's Office. 1998 Cal Facts: California's Economy December 1998. Available: htro://www.lao.ca.~ov/1998 calfacts/98calfacts economyhtml Mileti, Dennis. Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. Joseph Henry Press. 1999. Mount, Jeffrey F. California Rivers and Streams: The Conflict Between Fluvial Process and Land Use. University of California Press. 1995. National Wildlife Federation. Higher Cround, A Report on Voluntary Property Buyouts in the Nation's Floodplains, A Common Ground Solution Serving People at Risk. Taxpayers, and the Environment. July 1998. Available: httg://www.nwf.org/floo lain/higgground !93 Nelson, John C., Richard E. Sparks & Yao Yin. "Naturalization of the Flood Regime in Regulated Rivers." Bioscience. Vol. 48 No.9: p. 706-721. September 1998. Available: Sacramento, California Library Article Number A21109051 New Mexico Floodplain Managers Association. Floodplain Management in New Mexico: A Call for Action. Apri120,02. Available: New Mexico Floodplain Managers Association, P.O.Box 531, High Rolls, NM 88325, phone: 1-877-682-1389; email: nmfma@labond.com; Web site: htto://weather.nmsu.edu/nmfma. Pacific Marine Fisheries Council, Regulation Strategies. 2000. Available: http://www.coastalconservancyca.gov/scwro/documents/ReglStradRS-Ch2,~df Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency. History of Sacramento Flooding. 2002. Available: http://www.safca.com/general/histor .hv [ml Schulze, Peter. Editor, National Academy of Engineering. Engineering within Ecological Constraints. 1996. Available: htto://www.nao.edu/books/0309051983/htmVindex.hcml Sparks, Richard E. "Need far Ecosystem Management of Large Rivers and Their Floodplains." Bioscience. Vol. 45 No. 3: p. 168-182. March 1995. Available: Sacramento, California Library Article Number A16763493 Sparks, Richard E. & Ruth Sparks. "After Floods: Restoring Ecosystems" Special Section: America Under Water. USA Today Magazine. Vol. 123 No. 2590: p. 40-43. July 1994. Available: Sacramento, California Library Mag.Coll.: 74H0965 Article Number A15594508. Stakeholder Policy Committee Recommendations to the Reclamation Board. Reforming Existing Flood Management Institutional Policies For Public Safety and Ecosystem Restoration, Staff Working Report. April 2002. Available: California Department of Water Resources Stakeholder Policy Committee Recommendations to the Reclamation Board. Stakeholder Detailed Suggestions Matrix. June 2002. Available: California Department of Water Resources Stale of California Governor's Office of Emergency Services. State of California Flood Hazard Mitigation Plan In Response to the Winter and Late Winter Storms of 1995. FEMA-DR-1044 and FEMA-DR-1046. November 1996. , Stale of California Governor's Office of Planning and Research. State of California General Plan Guide- lines. January 2001. Available: htto://www.opcca.gov/planning/PDFs/genplan.odf r94 .. . United States Army Corps of Engineers. Floodplain Management Assessment of the Upper 1Vlississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers and Their Tributaries. Main Report. June 1995. United States Water Resources Council. Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources for Implementation Studies. Washington, D.C.: the WRC. 1983. Available: California State Library call number: Y3.W29 8Ec7 University of Colorado, Cooperative Institute For Research in Environmental Sciences. 2002. Available: http://cires.colorado.edu/ Water Education Foundation, Layperson's Guide to Floodplain Management. 1995. Available: htto://www.water-ed.org/california asR Western Governors' Association. An Action Plan for Reducing Flood Risk in the West. December 1997. Available: htto://www.westgov.org/wga/oublicadfldrot htm Wildlife Conservation Board, The. Inland Wetlands and Riparian Habitat Conservation Programs, "Inland Wetlands Conservation Program." 2002. Available: h~[p://wwwdola water ca gov/environmendhabitad ram/wldcon brd html 's's 96 Building Homes on Southern California's Alluvial Floodplains af~'~-T`m' ~j' Page 1 of 3 CLssre ~-ia.-e 7 The Housing Boom on Southern California's Alluvial Fan Floodplains A Floodplain Management Crisis in the Making April 28, 2005 By Council Member Susan Lien Longville Below the beautiful mountain ranges in semi-arid Southern California lie a series of alluvial fan floodplains that stretch for miles. Many of these floodplains are exploding with new development as the housing crisis drives more families to new areas looking for homes. This new growth poses a unique challenge to the public officials who make land-use decisions aimed at keeping people and property "out of harm's way". If current population forecasts are accurate, and communities continue to develop as projected in their local General Plans, more than 60-percent of the California's new growth will occur on the state's most populous alluvial fan floodplains located in San Bernardino, Riverside, Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Kern, Imperial, Orange, and San Diego counties. Very few elected officials come into public office with a background in geology or floodplain management. Many mayors and council members have never heard of an alluvial fan and they may not be aware that a portion of their city is on a floodplain because FEMA doesn't map floodplains that extend beyond the limits of a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM). What the layperson calls a mudflow is often a debris flow from an alluvial fan. If you stand at a base of semi-arid mountain, you can see a gently sloping, fan-shaped landform at the bottom. This place has been created over time by the deposition of sediment. As the sediment continues to come down on fan, it flows onto the floodplain. Because it's a dynamic process, the cycle never ends. Much more is know about the flood flows on the floodplains near rivers or the coast and they are well mapped by FEMA. Much less is know about the flood flows on alluvial fan floodplains because they are much more unpredictable. Debris flows move faster than a speeding car consisting of not just of water, but mud, rocks, boulders, and even trees. They can be deadly because they come without warning. As conditions change, new flood paths will emerge where they never went before. Many land-use decisions on alluvial fan floodplains are occurring in a void. Elected officials are unaware that new developments may be subject to alluvial fan flooding because FEMA hasn't mapped many alluvial fan floodplains that are experiencing unprecedented growth. If the floodplain is mapped, the hazard prone areas will extend beyond FEMA's mapped zones. The project proponents don't address the issue of foreseeable flood events on alluvial floodplains in their building applications because the cities and counties don't ask. Why should we? We have no local policies about how an applicant should evaluate the long-term risk of foreseeable flooding. So there is simply no site analysis to determine the foreseeable flood risks that exist. And therein lies the problem. .. When the State of Calfornia convened the Floodplain Management Task Force in 2002 to develop recommendations for reducing the impacts of flooding, I was appointed by the Department of Water Resources to represent the Southern California Association of Counties http://www.floodplain.org/Alluvial_Fan Housing.htm 2/12/2007 Building Homes on Southern California's Alluvial Floodplains Page 2 of 3 where I serve as a Regional Council member. It took a concerted effort on my part to get the task force to change the meeting schedule to visit to the Southland and spend an entire day focusing on alluvial fan Floodplains. On the day that the members of the floodplain task force came to San Bernardino County in 2002, we stood on a fan at the base of a 9,000 mountain range. The air was filled with embers from a small wildfire burning in the foothills. A team of experts briefed us about the foreseeable flood hazards on alluvial fan floodplains, as we looked down on endless tracts of new homes including an elementary school. The experts warned us that these floodplains would always be at significant risk of producing hazardous flood flows because wildfires in these foothills are simply a fact of life. They pointed out that tree mortality in the forest had reached 60% from an extended drought coupled with a deadly bark beetle infestation. They warned that the following the next wildfire, the amount of sediment that would come down on the floodplain could be up to a 40-fold increase in the first storm season following high-intensity rainfall. Afterwards, the task force went back to Sacrament and began to make a series of strong recommendations about alluvial fan flooding in the Floodplain Management Task Force report that was sent to the Legislature in 2002. Then nature delivered awake-up call. The Southern California wildfires that started in late October of 2003 burned 742,000 acres, destroyed 3,361 homes and took 26 lives. I began to wait with dread whenever rain was in the forecast. Just two months later, on Christmas Day, not far from the place that the members of the California Floodplain Management Task Force stood just over a year before, alluvial fan flooding contributed to mudflows that took the lives of 16 people. In the next 12 months, foothill communities witnessed extensive damage as countless tons of sediment and rock poured down the mountains, filling downstream creeks, debris basins, and flood control channels beyond their capacity, and flowed onto the floodplains below. This prompted the amendment of the federal disaster declaration for the Southern California fires to provide FEMA assistance to individuals, businesses, and public entities impacted by fire-related mudslides. The record-breaking rains in January and February of 2004 continued to pound the message home to politicians that the impacts of flooding on alluvial fan floodplains can't be ignored. Today, the State of California is moving forward to implement one of the key recommendations of the Floodplain Management Task Force that is aimed at reducing future damage on the remaining alluvial fan floodplains that are slated for extensive new development. Governor Schwarzenegger signed AB 2141 by Assemblymember John Longville (D-San Bernardino) in 2004. The bill requires the Director of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to seek funding to establish an Alluvial Fan Task Force (Task Force) for one year, commencing on June 30, 2005. The bill requires DWR to appoint the members of the Alluvial Fan Task Force. It must include representatives from federal, state, and local floodplain management groups, a diverse delegation of appointees from the cities and counties in the most populous alluvial fan floodplains including elected officials, and stakeholders from the development, construction, http://www.floodplain.org/Alluvial Fan Housing.htm 2/12/2007 Building Homes on Southern California's Alluvial Floodplains Page 3 of 3 and environmental communities. It will be comprised primarily from representatives from the area of risk who have a vested interest in developing the tools to guide their own future land- use decisions. The Task Force is charged with developing tools for better land-use decisions on alluvial fan floodplains, including a model ordinance for communities that are subject to these recurrent dangers. The anticipated result is that building the capacity for informed land-use decisions will enhance the public safety. The hope is that federal, state, and local governments will spend less time and money protecting poorly sited developments. The Department of Water Resources submitted an application to implement the Alluvial Fan Task Force to FEMA in February 2005 from a Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant. DWR's application for approximately $800,000 would come from the $255 million that is available nationwide. Letters of support from Senator Dianne Feinstein and Congressman Jerry Lewis sit on the desk of FEMA's Under Secretary Michael Brown's desk in Washington DC. Congressman Lewis, the new Chair of the Appropriations Committee wrote, "The Alluvial Fan Task Force will help develop practical tools to guide the evaluation of new development proposals in potential hazard areas before they come before Planning Commissions, City Councils, and Board of Supervisors. Armed with this guidance, local officials can ensure that new development will not contribute to more flood and landslide related disasters in future years." Susan Lien Longville has been a Council Member in San Bernardino since 1998 and is the Associate Director of the Water Resources Institute at California State University- San Bernardino. She served on the California Floodplain Management Task Force in 2002 representing the Southern California Association of Governments. Originally published in the July issue of The Western City published by the League of California Cities. http://www.floodplain.org/Alluvial_Fan Housing.htm 2/12/2007 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY ............................................................................................ ii SU1V11VIARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ . v How Officials Imperil Communities by Downplaying Flood Risks........ .1 The Modern-Day Mulholland ............................................................. .1 Alluvial Primer ................................................................................... .6 Deer Creek ...........................................................................................7 What Experts Say About Flood Safety at Deer Creek .........................9 S h C 11 ays ......................................................................... orps What t e Where the Issue Stands Today ........................................................... 14 Origins of Development: the `Model Colony' .................................... 18 .. . di d F Fl d 21 . ng ....................................................................... un s an oo Voters Reject Locally Financed Flood Control ................................. 23 Controversy Emerges ........................................................................ 24 Negative Skew .................................................................................... 25 The Man Who Made a Flood Disappear ............................................ 26 The Perfect Storm .....................:..........................................:............. 29 `A Slumbering Volcano' .................................................................... 30 California Looks the Other Way ....................................................... 32 Uninterested Locals ........................................................................... 35 Affordable Views with Blinds Drawn Over History .......................... 37 Against the Flow ................................................................................ 39 Off se k T C 40 ................................................................... en es orps a The Safety Set Aside ................................................................................. 42 Schools That Could Not Be Stopped ..........................:....................... 42 i h k Th B 44 ....................................................................... ov c roc an Less OMMENDATIONS 46 ...................................................................... REC THE FOOTHILLS PRO,IECT ............................................................. 52 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT .................................................52 THE CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES ...........................53 ©2002 The Center for Governmental Studies, Los Angeles, CA. All rights reserved. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA • What the Corps Says (Page 11) includes nohonly the official responses of the agency to the controversy but also interviews with retired Corps employees who played roles in design and construction. • Where the Issue Stands Today (Page 14) describes the most au7ent stance of the government agencies involved with the controversy on Deer Creek and how the agencies aze now tending towazd inaction rather than further investigation or independent verification. • Origins of Development: the `Model Colony' (Page 18) takes the reader back to the 1880s and traces settlement in the Inland Empire in the decades before federal flood control projects were built. • Floods and Funding (Page 21) recounts how Members of Congress triumphed, after decades of failure, in securing the appropriation of federal funds for flood control projects in the Inland Empire. • Voters Reject Locally Financed Flood Control (Page 23) describes how, in two consecutive elections, local ballot measures intended to finance greater flood protection were defeated by voters despite heavy rains in those years which resulted in fatalities, damage and lawsuits. • Controversy Emerges (Page 24) introduces a residential subdivision and a federal-built levee near Deer Creek that was breached by the developer with firll permission from authorities. The controversy led nearby homeowners to embark in 1997 on a continuing legal and political battle against federal, state, county and city governments. The homeowners claim the partial removal of the levee increases their exposure to floods. • Negative Skew (Page 25) deconstructs for the layman the questionable engineering assumptions used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in its 'refutation of charges of flood danger on Deer Creek. • The Man Who Made a Flood Disappear (Page 26) describes how an academic exercise by a federal employee wiped away the official record of a deadly 1969 flood, and how his work with the U.S. Geological Survey may have affected the work of engineers struggling to agree on whether it is safe to live near Deer Creek. • The Perfect Storm. (Page 29) discusses weather patters in the Inland Empire and San Gabriel Mountains, and how precipitation assumptions used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may have underestimated the intensity of Inland Empire storms. ~~~ ALLUVIAL AMNESIA • `A Slumbering Volcano' (Page 30) reproduces official history on previous floods in the Inland Empire and how residents were unaware or failed to understand flood risks until it was too late. • California Looks the Other Way (Page 32) critiques the conflicting actions taken by state agencies in response to the controversy over Deer Creek. • Uninterested Locals (Page 35) describes how most residents and officials closest -to Deer Creek appeaz unconcerned over the potential for devastating future floods. • Affordable Views with Blinds Drawn Over History (Page 37) characterizes the lax regulatory atmosphere of the Inland Empire and the developers' newfound tendency to build residential developments in areas of historic flooding (on "alluvial fans" below mountain canyons). • Against the Flow (Page 39) tells the story of the interrupted cazeer of a Los Angeles County engineer who issued public criticism of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regarding Deer Creek. • The Corps Takes Offense (Page 40) characterizes the agency's response to increasingly pointed attacks on its credibility regazding the Deer Creek controversy. • Safety Set Aside (Page 42) reports on the actions and behind-the-scenes discussions at the California's Department of Water Resources, which was asked by U.S. Senators Feinstein and Boxer to conduct a safety investigation into flood control on Deer Creek. • Schools That Could Not Be Stopped (Page 42) uncovers how official protocol was suspended to gamer state approval for two recently built school campuses near Deer Creek. • Less Than Brockovich (Page 44) recounts the efforts of two women to bring greater accountability and transparency to the government agencies straggling to bring closure to the Deer Creek controversy. ~~ ALLUVIAL AMNESIA SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation #1: (Page 45) Create "alluvial districts," local quasi-government entities designed to inform homeowners of flood risks as well as advise the floodplain land-use decisions of cities and counties. Recommendation # 2: (Page 46) Expand the "sphere of influence" concept that local governments use to gain influence over land use decisions made by other local govememtns. The "sphere of influence" should also apply to public safety questions. Pass a state law requiring local governments to provide formal notification to affected jurisdictions and accept public comment when a proposed land use may expose other jurisdictions to flood risk. Recommendation # 3: (Page 47) Convene the National Academy of Sciences in western San Bernardino County to study the Deer Creek project, debris flows, basin design and best practices for flood containment. Recommendation #4: (Page 48) Increase public disclosure for school construction by requiring that school districts to locally maintain current files on each project for public view. Recommendation #5: (Page 48) Use local design groups when designing flood control projects rather than relying exclusively on a single agency such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA ALLUVIAL AMNESIA: How Officials Imperil Communities by Downplaying Flood Risks The Modern-Day Mulholland In 1928 William Mulholland, the famed Los Angeles Deparment of Water & Power engineer, testified in a coroner's inquest that he had inspected and pronounced safe a leaking dam the very day before its collapse would trigger what would become the worst humao-caused disaster in California history. Mulholland was being questioned under oath by a district attorney seeking a scapegoat for the hundreds of deaths that resulted when St. Francis Dam gave way and sent 12 billion gallons of water surging down the Santa Clara Valley on March 12, 1928. In his own defense Mulholland argued that the visible leaks were inconsequential. He was technically correct but at the same time dissembling. New dams do leak cleaz water, but not the "brown" water that reveals, as it did at. St. Francis, that rushing water was eating away at the foundation of the dam. The citizen jury assembled for the inquest ultimately held Mulholland and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power responsible for the disaster but no criminal chazges were ever pursued. 1 The old engineer's legacy was famished. Mulholland Reservoir was renamed Hollywood Reservoir and disguised by landscaping. The former site of St. Francis Dam and its flood path, too, have been born again as San Francisquito Canyon. Geologists studying the scene 60 years later surmised that St. Francis dam faIled because one side was built upon an ancient landshde-a critical flaw Mulholland had no way of recognizing, given methods at the time. Still, the story of Mulholland and the St. Francis Dam should give people pause today. Even in modem times, flooding can occur that forces engineers to .question their ~ Cowan, Geoffrey. "The Man Who Brought the Water," Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1993. Figure I William Mulholland taught himself the engineering skills he would later use to direct construction of the Los Angeles aqueduct. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA computations and expectations. The science of recording, predicting and preventing floods requires mastery of complex mathematics, but an engineer's job is faz from formulaic. Flood control projects never completely eliminate the risk of floods. Mother Nature still reigns supreme and defends her title regulazly. Instead, he goal in designing flood control projects is to "manage the risk" as effectively as possible. This means that government will either try to protect its citizens from flooding and if it can not do that, it will prohibit them from developing property in the danger zone, compel them to buy flood insurance or condemn their property altogether. The flip side of managing the risk is that the government m;n;mi~es, not eliminates, risks. It designs its flood control projects knowing that a larger-than expected flood could overran the system and endanger safety. Some floods are so large the conditions triggering them only occur approximately every 125, 500 or 1,000 years. The government has learned that people do not want to foot the cost of building titanic, visually unappealing structures to guard against these super floods, even if it were possible. Flood victims, of course, don't often see this distinction, but engineers must boil down society's amorphous stance on floods into actual blueprints. This takes yeazs, and it mostly happens behind the closed doors of the responsible agency. Designing dams, channels, levees and flood debris basins is a balancing act-using a combination of scientific methods to predict the intensity and frequency of floods, modifying the size of the projects depending on the level of safety required and the amount of money available, satisfying environmental and other regulations, appeasing community representatives and contracting with local businesses for the construction work. Underneath the homes are the stacked bones of 1, 000 floods For all the obstacles, flood control projects are bona fide catalysts for economic growth. Just as the Mulholland-designed Los Angeles Aqueduct enabled settlement and agriculture on acid land, flood control projects can allow flood-prone land to become home and school sites for the next wave of suburban immigration. Yet the visible signs of earlier floods are often hard to detect or erased by new developments, and passersby can be forgiven if they fail to notice flood control efforts. Not far from where Deer G~eek, on the eastern end of the San Gabriel Mountains, enters the valley floor, flood control channels snake through gated communities with names like Haven View and Rancho Cucamonga V. Stucco fences and attractive shrubbery hide the concrete ditches designed to channel floodwaters. A low wall of sandbags on the northern periphery of one development might be mistaken as just another gazdening project. A mile downstream on Deer Creek, in older single-family neighborhoods, the city has built extra-high curbs to use the streets as flood control channels. The families living there include many fast-time homebuyers with big mortgages but no mandated flood insurance. z ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Underneath the homes are the stacked bones of 1,000 floods. Future deluges, however, must rain down upon abuilt-up landscape of sod, steel and pavement. The concrete channels of flood control projects coupled with development whisk away precipitation that otherwise naturally percolates into the ground. The shakeup in the natural cycle causes diminished water quality, depleted aquifers and eradicated wildlife habitat: Velocity is another major drawback; while flowing water encounters little resistance on pavement, roughhewn open land can dismpt and slow running water. Afull-grown man can step out of his car into four inches of water flowing down a street and be swept a dozen miles away to his death. And sometimes dams like St. Francis collapse. This report, 75 years after Mulholland's nadir, investigates a little known Southern California flood control controversy as an illustration of how distaste for accountability and public debate within every level of government has resulted in extraordinary decisions that reputable experts say threaten public safety. Consulting engineers, including those who represent the State of California and Los Angeles World Airports, have voiced unanswered concerns about the Army Corps of Engineers' flood control project on Deer Creek. Private sector engineers who have studied the project say it is dangerously undersized to the point of threatening 20,000 homes, two schools and a college campus and neazly one hundred thousand people in western San Bernardino County east of Los Angeles. Most at risk may be a half-dozen subdivisions in Rancho Cucamonga built in the last two decades along the western shore of Deer Creek. Also clearly threatened are the middle- income homes and apartments that line Deer Creek for mIles. However, experts warn that nobody can predict with total accuracy the path of a rampaging flood. The critics' main target is Joseph Evelyn, Professional Engineer, a 32-year civilian employee of the Army Corps in its Los Angeles District. He does not share many similarities with Mulholland, the larger-than-life Irishman who taught himself how to be an engineer atd then paved the way for modern Los Angeles. But like Mulholland, Evelyn is a powerful engineer backed by a powerful agency, the Army Corps of Engineers. Evelyn's initial connection to the controversial flood control project on Deer Creek was in 1970 as ayoung engineer repackaging and coordinating the field work of other colleagues. (The project was completed by 1983.) Over the decades Evelyn advanced to become chief of hydrology and hydrologic engineering for the Los Angeles District of the Army Corps of Engineers. Tn 1997 Evelyn became the Corps spokesman on Deer Creek matters. Figure 2 Joseph Evelyn, Chief of Hydrology and Hydrologic Engineering, Army Corps of Engineers, Las Angeles District. Behind Evelyn is Deer Creek debris basin and the Flanks of Cucamonga Pcak. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA For Mulholland, failure at St. Francis became a dark footnote to a storied cazeer. If Evelyn and his colleagues have made wrong decisions about the Corps' flood control project m Deer Creek, they too may win an unfortunate place in history as another public agency deemed responsible for preventable deaths. a ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Alluvial Primer Floods near mountain canyons act differently than those in river valleys. The potent mix that bursts out of canyons into the flatlands below contains water but also boulders, logs, dirt and sand, collectively called debris. The rounded-off rocks and other "sediment" in streams and the mouths of canyons below the San Gabriel Mountains indicate past flooding but really show only the tip of the iceberg. The geographical features that result from this sort of flooding are called "alluvial fans." Miles-wide, alluvial fans appear to rise cone-shaped hundreds of feet from the valley floor. In reality they accumulate from the bottom up. People mistake them for foothills but the alluvial fans actually represent the accumulated flood debris of eons. They aze scattered all over the American West and beyond. As water expert Art Bnrington has written, "the alluvial cone feature so evident at the foot of every canyon emanating from the San Gabriel and San Bemazdino mountains, including Deer Canyon, is startling proof that massive fue-flood sequences have happened in the past, and there is no reason to expect that they will not continue to occur in the future." There are only two ways for society to deal with flooding on or below alluvial fans. The fast method is time-tested: simply stay away and build in a safer place. Society's manmade solution is called a debris basin. Such basins are lazge excavated areas dug out of the mouths of canyons and braced by a low dam. As floodwaters and debris pour out of a canyon during a flood, the basin is designed to catch and store debris while allowing the water to escape down a flood channel, usually lined with concrete to prevent erosion. Without a basin in place, the tumbling boulders and other debris from a flood could blast houses off their foundations; rip away bridges, destroy streets and kill people. 6 Figure 5 Anatomy of a debris basin, section view. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Fiynue 6 The flow of debris, plan view. The debris bazin is designed [o trap rocks, logs and mud but allow water to escape in concrete-lined Flood control channels. According to engineer John Cassidy; the Deer Creek debris bazin and channel system are solidly built, just too small. The proclivity in the San Gabriel Mountains for torrential rainfall, seismically shattered rock and forest fires makes Deer Creek and other nearby streams likely candidates for major flooding. But the real danger, according to critics, is that the Army Corps of Engineers debris basin and reinforced concrete channel on Deer Creek offer the illusion of safety when, they say, little exists. Deer Creek The most controversial Army Corps of Engineers project in Southern California, according to the Washington Post,2 is on little known Deer Creek above the city of Rancho Cucamonga in western San Bernardino County. A trickle most of the year, Deer Creek rages when weather systems blow in from the Pacific. The rocky San Gabriel Mountains, rising more than a vertical mile above Rancho Cucamonga but only four miles away, literally rip holes in storm clouds, sending coshing waters over seismically unstable and sometimes wildfire-scorched earth. Records from the 19`h century note z Corps Controversial Projedcts, see http://www.washingtonpostcom/act/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contenttd=A38241- 2000Sep8&notFound=true - 7 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA several lazge floods in the area, the lazgest of them in 1862. The last great flood was in the winter of 1969, when two storms a month apart caused 11 deaths s Figure 9 The hills above Rancho Cucamonga rise steeply from less than 2,000 feet above sea level to almost 9,000 feet. The Deer Creek debris basin and concrete channel are among flood control projects the Corps designed in the comparatively drier decades that followed. From the mouth of Deer Canyon, where the Army Corps of Engineers debris basin was constructed, the boxy concrete walls of Deer Creek leading away from the basin resemble a long waterslide into Rancho Cucamonga a few miles below. Like other paRS of the San Gabriel Valley, orderly streets and housing developments have replaced rows of citrus trees. During a September 25, 2002, special field trip to the Deer Creek debris basin, several dozen members of a task force assembled by Governor Gray Davis to study floodplain management pondered a question one official offered up: Would I buy a home down there? There was no consensus. The controversy at Deer Creek has traction outside select members of the local community, their experts and the clutch of officials who visited Deer Creek on September 25, 2002. Former Los Angeles County District Attorney Robert Philibosian, who as a private attorney has represented parties in the dispute, said, "The combination of the ~ The 1969 floods also introduced officials to [he dangers of multiple storm events. Workers were unable to clear away debris from a January flood when a second, smaller flood occurred about a month later. Floodwaters combined with debris from [wo Floods caused widespread destruction of property. 8 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA scientific and engineering evidence with the concerns expressed by public agencies such as (Ontario airport owner) Los Angeles World Airports make a strong case that requires a detailed investigation and public response by federal agencies." What Experts Say About Flood Safety at Deer Creek Douglas Hamilton, an environmental engineer with the consulting firm Exponent Failure Analysis who was retained by a local homeowner, said this of his fast visit to Deer Creek debris basin: "I stood on the spillway and looked up and I knew within five seconds there was a huge problem."~ Hamilton said his extensive research on Deer Creek has only confirmed his gut reaction from his initial visit. Professional Engineer John Cassidy, a consultant to Ontario airport owner Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), has warned repeatedly that the Deer Creek debris basin and the channel emptying it are both too small. Cassidy has worked for the Army Engineers and helped design. dams around the world for engineering giant Bechtel. He was hired to study flood control on Deer Creek because it flows underneath Ontario's runways a dozen miles below Deer Creek debris basin. The airport agency is concerned that a lack of flood protection may threaten Ontario International Airport, which the agency hopes to expand to relieve pressure on Los Angeles International Airport. "I'he (flood control) structures themselves are well designed and well built," he said. "They just don't have the level of protection that the Corps said would be provided."~ After reading Cassidy's report, Robert Johnson, Los Angeles World Airports deputy executive director, criticized the Army Engineers for dragging their feet on mounting concerns over safety. Ina May ]0, 2002, letter to state Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, whose agency oversees the Department of Water Resources, he wrote, "The agency responsible for the initial design [the Corps] is apparently the same agency continuing to lead the rebuttal of a growing body of contrary opinion. We believe that [the state's investigation] was limited and greatly hampered by the tactics of the Corps and the U.S. Geological Survey. LAWA is not interested in escalating this matter further at the state level but we simply cannot ignore our obligation to protect [Ontario airport] and its tenants." Water experts have crossed swords with the Corps over. the Deer Creek controversy, sometimes at peril to their careers. "I blew the whistle and I was fired,' said Massoud Rezakhani, a hydrology expert who re-examined flood zone hazard mapping below Deer Creek debris basin in 2000 for a firm under conhact to the Federal Emergency ' Interview with Douglaz Hamilton, September 17, 2002. 5 Interview with John Cassidy, September 20, 2002. e Interview with Massoud Rezakhani, September 26, 2002. 9 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Management Agency (FEMA). ~ "One thing no one's addressing on Deer Creek is safety and health. This is more than that. This is an unsafe dam." Rezakhazti now is a consulting technical engineer for the Governor's Floodplain Management Task Force. In June 2000 the Governor's Office of Emergency `One thing no one ~S Services (OES) warned against providing state funds addYeSSing On DeeY for the Los Osos high school project neaz Deer Creek because it lacked a proper flood evacuation plan. "The Creek is safety and lack of dam Failure inundation maps...is a substantial health. This is more unpediment to a full and considered evaluation of the schools in question...[P]rudence wotild dictate fiuther than that. This is an action by the Department of Education in approving unsafe dam. ' these schools be suspended until dam failure inundation maps are available and the reported -Massoud Rezakhani discrepancies in the capacity of the Deer Creek basin aze resolved," Director Dallas Jones wrote in a letter to Superintendent of Public Instruction Delaine Eastin.s The agency's concerns were never fully addressed or even alluded to in the schools' official project approval doctrments. Classes began for the first time at Los Osos on September 3, 2002. The school district makes no mention of flooding concetns on its Web site. Dan James, a senior civil engineer for Rancho Cucamonga, balked at a private developer's plan in the mid-1990s to build a debris basin to protect two pazcels of less than an acre each at a cul-de-sac directly below the mouth of a canyon adjoining Deer Creek. The developer was using a new version of Army Engineers methodology developed inside the Corps' Los Angeles District for predicting the severity of futtrre floods. But for James, the method was untested and "didn't sit right," he said. His recommendation for a lazger margin of safety derailed the entire proiect. "I believe using (the Corps method) would place an extreme btuden on the City of Rancho Cucamonga," James wrote in a March 16, 1995 letter. "The method's founding agency and our County's flood control district have not designed a facility utilizing (the applicable Corps method). UntIl one of these agencies is willing to put their.. stamp on a design, the City is not willing to approve." Public officials such as Los Angeles World Airports deputy executive director Johnson have been vocal in repeated calls for a study from an independent nationwide scientific body, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Engineers not associated with the ~ Homeowners living below Deer Creek debris basin had asked FEMA to investigate the new potential for Flooding if an existing levee was tom down. The agency responded eventually by hiring Michael Baker Corp. [o investigate the matter. When Baker's employee, Rezakhani, told the homeowners his firm would criticize the Anny Engineers' Flood control design methods, he was terminated within days. Rezakhani has sued for wrongful termination. FEMA later refused to change the Bood zone maps. The unfavorable diagnosis Rezakhani allegedly "leaked"-a criticism of the Army Corps' local flood prediction methods- never became part of the public record. a Emphasis added. From Jones's letter to Eastin, dated June 6, 2000. 10 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Corps, including a water expert with the California Depaztment of Water Resources, have mentioned convening the National Academy of Sciences, but for a wider purpose: they want the scientific community to scrutinize how the Corps predicts floods in the American southwest. Finally, Robert Kirby, a former Corps hydrologic engineer who contributed to the design of the Deer Creek project, has testified that in the 1960s "little was known of debris production," and the engineering community later realized it had failed to incorporate an extra measure of protection to handle multiple storms, such as the two floods a month apart in 1969 that swamped western San Bernardino County and killed 11. Kirby said officials used the best scientific methods available when designing Deer Creek's debris basin but the project that resulted was still too small. "I strongly believe that these inadequacies need to be addressed immediately, and all future constmction halted until viable solutions are identified and implemented.'s What the Corps Says Joseph Evelyn and other defenders say the project has operated flawlessly since it was completed in 1983 and is ostensibly safe. (No significant storm has occuaed in the azea in the past 20 years.) Responding to his critics, Evelyn praises their engineering skill and competence but ultimately dismisses them as "individuals who aze reflecting the wishes of their clients."10 Asked if residents hying below Deer Creek debris basin should feel safe, he says they should, but adds the engineer's caveat that "safe is relative here.". Joseph Evelyn is well aware of the dangers. Before he purchased his house in La Canada- Flintridge, he did his own analysis of the L.A. County debris basin protecting the prospective home site. Of the San Gabriel Mountains, he says, `you have mountains that are highly erodable, a landscape subject to wildfires and this yeaz is a perfect example ... an impermeable bamer [of burned soil] that increases runoff and leads to mass wasting [erosion] and movement of materials, very steep slopes, high intensity rainfall, the flow of air from the west hitting those mountains..." Such teaain might be a reason for extra caution. Yet, say his critics, Evelyn has been irrationally optimistic. They argue he has underestimated the effects of wildfire, trivialized the historical record of flooding and shaped his technical data to achieve "safe" numbers. Confronted with their criticisms, Evelyn doesn't flinch, nor does he attempt to prove his detractors wrong. Evelyn's conclusions, backed by the Arnty Corps of Engineers and .unchallenged by other federal or state agencies, have swayed the debate over Deer Creek so faz. 9 Declaration of Robert G. Kirby, taken at Rancho Cucamonga, CA on April 24, 2000. - 10 Interview with Joseph Evelyn, Friday, Sept. l3, 2002, Los Angeles, CA. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA In late 2000 California Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer asked the Atmy Corps of Engineers to collaborate with engineers from the state and two others hired by Los Angeles World Airports and the Rancho Cucamonga homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith. Their charge was to determine if the Deer Creek project had the amount of flood protection the Corps said it did. What happened instead was a recitation of earlier internal reviews issued by the Corps on Deer Creek. Each contributing engineer submitted separate, divergent findings. Generally, they all agreed that the Deer Creek project was too small in comparison to the projected severity of a serious flood: The degree of shortfall remains in dispute. The Corps says the shortfall is neghgible. John Cassidy, representing Los Angeles World Airports, says the shortfall is so great that even minor floods could overrun the project.) t The other engineers couldn't find much common ground with Evelyn. They were not well versed in the methods he employed ,and he refused to incorporate more widely known methods, such as those used by Los Angeles County or even those used by the Army Corps of Engineers outside the Los Angeles District. In other areas of Evelyn's flooding estimates he included no safety factor or margin for error. Evelyn's computations assume, for example, a "fire factor" of 3, an estimate that ignores the presence of wildfire on the hillsides above Deer Creek, according to Exponent consultant Douglas Hamilton, hired by Rancho Cucamonga homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith. The "fire factor" is essentially a numeric value assigned to signify how much fire-related debris (burned wood, ash and vegetation) may enter a particulaz stream during a flood. The "fire factor" ranges from a low of 3 which corresponds to an unburned watershed with mature vegetation, to a high of 6 which corresponds to a watershed that burned just one yeaz ago. Hamilton says a fire factor of 3 is analogous to saying fire never visits Deer Creek.12 Pressed on this point, Evelyn dismisses Hamilton's criticism. He concedes that "if the watershed burned yesterday, you would get a huge number" on the size of an expected flood, larger than what Evelyn himself has estimated But Evelyn has assumed that a flood on Deer Creek isn't likely to be influenced by fires at all. Evelyn explained this point to the Center while standing atop Deer Creek debris basin on Sept. 22, 2002. As he spoke the air azound him was filled with flakes of soot from the 37,000-acre Williams forest fire advancing eastward, just a few miles away. ~ t 1n John Cassidy's letter to Los Angeles World Airports, dated April 13, 2001, he concludes, "I believe that the Deer Creek Debris Basin is definitely too small to contain the volume of debris that would be carried into the basin by a 100-year flood. Its storage capacity may be as little as 25% of [he 292 acre-feet of debris that the Corps of Engineers estimates would be produced by runoff from a severe stortn." tZ According to Douglas Hamilton, "the way the Corps justifies using (a fire factor of 3) is to say that, statistically, a watershed burns every 20 years. Atter a fire, it takes I O years for the burned vegetation to mature and stabilize the watershed. Therefore the `average' condition for Deer Creek is the unburned . condition which scores a 3 in the Corps' debris method. 12 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Hamilton says it is "reckless" to make no provision for fires on the hillsides above Deer Creek. "It undercuts the historical justification for debris basins," he says. "When the City and County of Los Angeles embarked on the debris basin concept in the 1930s, the biggest debris problems were associated with moderate rain storms after fires. I recall reading an old article in the Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers where a popular viewpoint back then was that fires were the main cruse of (debris-filled flood) flows. The author's suggestion was to forge[ about debris basins and spend the money on putting fire hydrants all throughout the San Gabriel Mountains. Of course this didn't go .anywhere, but there has always been recognition that you aze most vulnerable to debris hazards during the first four-to-five years after a fire and debris basins should be designed to handle this situation to a reasonable degree."13 !n another Center interview with Joseph Evelyn, the engineer said he had come up with ways to construct better flood control on Deer Creek. The Corps could increase [he capacity of the project by doing additional excavation, he said. However, he said that the improvements would be costly, require extensive studies and perhaps would be challenged in court on environmental The clout wielded by the Army Corps of Engineers within the panopoly of government agencies is nearly unmatched. grounds. The obstacles against upgrading seem so great that he had not bothered approaching San Bemazdino County officials with any kind of detailed plan, he said. The clout wielded by the Army Corps of Engineers within the panopoly of government agencies is nearly rrnmatched. Scientists, economists, environmentalists, celebrities, members of Congress and even U.S. presidents have failed in efforts to reform, direct or downsize the Corps. The conventional wisdom dogging the Corps, especially following a series of scathing Washington Post articles pubhshed in 2000, is that they are willing to interpret facts selectively in order to justify large new public works projects. Deer Creek, however, is quite the opposite. In defending. inaction on Deer Creek over the past five years, despite an expanding chorus of criticism, the Army Corps of Engineers has offered conflicting data, frustrated the efforts of California's U.S. senators and stonewalled a politically connected homeowner-apparently all to avoid a situation whereby the Corps might have to enlazge ffie project. The response is contrary to expectation. In the same region, the Corps has responded to the needs of south Los Angeles County communities by raising he walls of the lower Los Angeles River. And the Corps' $1.3 billion Santa Ana River project will reduce flood danger for Orange County homes and businesses. But on Deer Creek, the responsible local governments (led by San Bemazdino County) are not clamoring for more flood control Instead they are deferential to the Corps' position or silent altogether. t~ Hamilton, Douglas. From an Oct. 15, 2002 email to the Center for Governmental Studies. 13 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Sometimes it is hazd to tell the exact nature of the Cotps' position. Regazding the capacity of the Deer Creek debris basin, for example, the Corps has it official documents estimated capacity variously. Separate documents lodged in congressional azchives from 1965 list an expected capacity for Deer Creek debris basin as both 300 and 380 acre-feet. The Corps itself says the basin was supposed to be 310 acre-feet in capacity. But notably, as greater outside scrutiny was brought to bear, the Corps' estimates have more closely resembled those made by critics. Some 162 acre-feet, an estimate derived from the "Corps' own data," was the capacity reported by the Los Angeles Times in its May 20, 2001 a>;ticle on Deer Creek. And most recently, the Cotps has told the State of California the debris basin can handle 172 acre-feet. Exhibit 1, pictured below, shows Deer Creek debris basin. The colored azeas correspond to the estimated debris capacity and deposition pattern reported in June of this yeaz by the Cotps, by Exponent Failure Analysis and by consulting Los Angeles World Airports engineer John Cassidy. is Angeles World Airports tgineer John Cassidy Expont Figure 10 is a photograph of Dar Creek debris basin. Shaded areas depict rnginttrs' estimates of debris capacity (or the basin. The Corps disagrees with the estimates of John Cassidy and Exponent's Douglas Hamilton, who say existing rock formations leave telltale signs proving that Flood debris will flow only into the eastern side of the basin, diminishing capacity and increasing the chances of a devastating Flood event. Where the Issue Stands Today Each public agency involved today is waiting for another entity to act. Evelyn, conceding that the debris basin may be slightly undersized, said it is up to the local communities if they want additional protection. "If the community (Rancho Cucamonga) _ or (San la ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Bernardino) county want to expand the basin, we can work with them" Evelyn said. "From a practical standpoint, they have a very high level of protection already." I ° No single agency or government entity is completely responsible for Deer Creek, as illustrated by the jurisdictional map pictured below. The Corps is waiting for the local governments to demand more flood protection. At the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, however, chief engineer Ken Miller told the Center he felt it was up to the Corps to make the first. move. And in the state's report on Deer Creek, California Secretary .for Resources Mary Nichols asks Senators Boxer and Feinstein to take the lead. The senators had asked the state to take the lead after FEMA declined the role. 14 Interview with Joseph Evelyn, July 2002. IS ALLUVIAL AMNESIA N,tr. Figure 1 I Deer Creek and the political jurisdictions governing it. Education facilities represented by light-colored bones. „_ , 16 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA By contrast, Los Angeles County investigated the performance of its debris basins after flooding in 1969 and 1978 overwhelmed some of them. There was no widespread damage at the time, but county engineers nevertheless embarked upon amulti-decade project to identify debris basin problems and upgrade them where necessary. Some 65 debris basins have been tagged 6r further study, and of those, the county has completed 21 upgrades. By now, responsibIlity for Deer Creek's failings is so diffuse that only a public outcry could move the debate. Congress could appropriate the funds necessary for a National Academy of Sciences review of Deer Creek and other debris basins. Getting the bill past pro-Corps members of Congress, however, is considered even more difficult than swaying local governments. While California's U.S. senators appeaz to speak with one mind regazding Deer Creek, Representative Joe Baca (D-San Bemazdino) has chosen to remain silent. Boxer and Feinstein will not be able to appropriate money for a NAS study of Deer Creek when the member of Congress who represents the Deer Creek area is not supportive. In the last 10 years, due in part to population growth, the area surrounding Deer Creek has had its member of Congress changed twice by the redistricting that occurs following each diennial Census. At the end of this year the area wdl come under new representation yet agaitt-this time drawn once again into Representative David Dreier's district. The Republican Dreier was reelected in November. Representative Baca received a huge stack of Deer Creek-related documents, courtesy of homeowner-activist Malissa Hathaway McKeith, on the day after he entered office in 1999 following a special election. But ultimately Baca decided the entire issue `vas not his expertise," according to his chief of staff, Michael Townsend.) s Baca serves on the House Agriculture Committee and the House Science Committee, where he is a member of the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology and Standazds and the Subcommittee on Reseazch. is Telephone interview with Michael Townsend, October 18, 2002. 17 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Origins of Development: the 'Model Colony' George Chaffey could see the future in 1882 as he gazed from a hilltop over present-day Upland, Rancho Cucamonga and Ontario, which were then neazly devoid of white settler;, "He is dreaming a dream which shall come hue. He sees lying at his feet a colony settled by prosperous people, enacting a generous living from a soil thought by generations of Spanish proprietors to be unsuitable for settlement."16 He and his brother William were recent arrivals from Ontario, Canada, intent on developing land and water infrastructure. The San Bemazdino Valley seemed like the perfect place for the brothers, described. by a biographer in 1928 as "idealists, engineers and mathematicians of the highest order."l~ The Chaffey brothers envisioned their cosmopolitan city as .being anchored by alcohol-flee living, a well-endowed agricultural college, tree-lined boulevards (Euclid Avenue was named after George's favorite mathematician) and ample water for irrigation. 16 LA. Alexander, Life of Georee Chaffee Melbourne: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1928 ~~ Ibid. IB Figure 12 Circa 1890 photo, looking northeast from present-day Upland shows sparse development. Courtesy ofOntario City Library. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA The Chaffeys' penchant for clean living drew many settlers and their town, named Ontario after their Canadian homeland, gained notoriety as a "model colony" when a scale model was unveiled at the World's Fair in SL Iouis in 1904. But the proximity of a red-light district in Chino meant sin was always within reach. Flooding was another problem. Stately Euclid Avenue, lined with grevilles robusta (drought-resistant trees from Australia) and plied by a mule-drawn trolley, was being paved in 1911 when floodwaters swept down the street and destroyed the work. Over the next 60 years persistent flooding would bedevIl development in Ontario and elsewhere in the sparsely populated azea known as the West End (moderrtday Ontario, Upland and Rancho Cucamonga). Local residents displayed a keen interest in taming the seasonal flows, dating back to the dawn of the 20th Centrury and marked in 1937 by Upland engineer R.V. Ward's "vast survey for flood control throughout San Bernardino county, which may warrant WPA funds," according to the Ontario Record.ls The few flood control projects local landowners could finance consisted of dirt levees and rudimentary fencing.. 1B Ontario Record, June 23, 1937. 19 Figure 13 The great Flood of 1938, pictured here, is considered the biggest Flood of the 20ih CenturyN the region. The 1969 floods, however, caused significantly mare damage because ofa surge in development since 1938. Photo courtesy Ontario City Library. .. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Residents may have wanted flood conrol, but paying for it would prove to be a constant stumbling block. Following the devastating 1938 flood, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers proposed a flood control project on the site of the modem-day San Antonio Dam. But 1,599 West End residents, according to a local newspaper, signed a petition in opposition to the project "on the grounds that it is too expensive, that local taxpayers ultimatmely [sic] probably will have to foot the $75,000 annual maintenance, that the project's concrete channel constitute a grave menace to replenishment of the valley's underground storage basin....and that the dam itself, built on a fault, would constitute a grave Aood menace."I9 i9 "1,599 Sign Petitions for Change in Flood Curb Plan," 1939 article courtesy Ontario City Library. 20 Figure I4 Citrus trees were more numerous than residents in [his circa 1947 view. Deer Creek alluvial fan is at top right. Photo courtesy Ontario City Library. ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Floods and Funding As the decades passed flooding problems continued throughout the West End. Local interests wanted something manmade and pem~artent to augment local water percolation azeas-"spreading grounds'=to soak up floodwaters and crude levees to channel runoff. The Army Corps of Engineers performed surveys of the area in 1937, 1946 and 1956, but following each examination, flood control projects were seen as too costly for the coral West End., Finally, after a 1960 survey, Congress in 1968 authorized but provided no funding for the Corps' Cucamonga Creek Project, which included Deer Creek. John Foley, now the director of the Moulton 7t was not one of those projects that Niguel water Disuict, was you send back to Washington and the Los Angeles District Engineer for the carps have it be accepted at face value. ' from 1973 through 1976, -John Foley shortly before work began on Deer Creek. The Cucamonga Creek project almost did not happen, he said, because "there was reticence on the part of my superiors [who questioned] he value of building a benefit to serve a pure development scheme only."20 Despite the project's authorization it would be another seven years before Congress saw fit to appropriate funds. As strange as it sounds, the arcane sociopolitical science of redistricting may have been the mother of the Cucamonga Creek project. Prior to the 1974 elections the congressional districts in California were redrawn to reflect changes in population. Redistricting seen widely as a tool of the majority party to consolidate its power, resulted in the elimination of the district that Imperial Valley Republican Victor Veysey had represented for two terms. Veysey moved north to try to recapture his seat but lost to West Covina Mayor Jim Lloyd, a Democrat. Lloyd was an aerospace man who served on the House Armed Services Committee. Local newspapers credited Lloyd with securing more than $100 million for the Cucamonga Creek project over his six years' in office. Yet it was his vanquished opponent Veysey who was in a better position to pull strings for the project. In the waning days of the Ford Administtation, Veysey was appointed to a newly created position as the top civilian at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Washington, D.C., where he served until shortly after Jimmy Carter's ascent to the presidency. Veysey's post, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, was created by Congress in 1970 as a way to bring a degree of civilian leadership and environmental sensitivity to the Corps. As a CalTech- and Stanford-trained engineer, Vesey seemed like a natural fit. He was also in position to promote certain unfunded water projects, such as the Cucamonga Creek project, above other proposed water projects. "Veysey was very helpful in getting 20 Interview with John Foley, October 30, 2002. 2I ALLUVIAL AMNESIA funds for the project," said Haden Helm, a retired Corps engineer who was a project planner on the Cucamonga Creek project zl Even. as the Corps' multi-year Cucamonga Creek project was under constnrction, local officials saw the need for much more extensive flood control. In 1977 a San Bernardino County Flood Control District official estimated at $330 million the cost of supplementary flood control channels and storm drains in the West End. "We don't have enough money to do the real work," district chief Art Sidler told the Daily Report newspaper. "Chat's why we've sought federal funds." The article also noted that the federal government was unwilling to fund flood control projects on Deer and Day creeks because, as Sidler said, "although serious flooding can occur in that area, there isn't much development surrounding it that can be destroyed. The federal government found it was not economicallyjustified to grant money."22 Following passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, which permanently reduced property taxes, local govemments saw their budgets slashed drastically. The San Bernardino Flood Control District was lambasted in a grand jury report for overstaffutg and later saw its budget cut by more than half. Then, in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter ordered a freeze on funding for all current and future Atmy Corps of Engineers projects. Carter's strategy was in line with his "hit list" of 19 Army Corps projects he considered too wasteful to build. But ultimately the president allowed more funding for the Cucamonga project, and Congress went along. Also in 1980, the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors unilaterally passed an assessment to finance $15 million for storm drains and supplementary flood control channels.23 The board unanimously repealed the assessment, however, after angry residenu stomled a board meeting with tax bills in hand. President Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 promising a wave of budget cuts that prompted San Bernardino County officials to travel to Washington to plead their case. County Supervisor Robert Townsend voiced concerns that the Army Corps of Engineers was considering asking for a separate congressional authorization for flood control on Deer Creek and the adjohung Day Creek watersheds. Townsend "noted [that] corps officials tried to do that before. While the Deer Creek leg has been part of the overall plans since about 1976 and has not faced a similar challenge in recent years, Townsend said the concern is still `valid."' 24 Separate authorization could have meant years of funding delays or outright rejection of federal funds. Proponents for flood control at Deer Creek would have to jostle For position with countless other new projects. A project Z ~ Interview with Haden Helm, October 30, 2002. zz Ziegler, Peggy. "Flood control cost...$330 million needed to guard tri-communities,' Daily Report July I5, 1977. z3 This was permissible under the law even following enactment of Proposition 13, which capped property tax rates. For example, if a community receives a "benefit" such as a streetlight, the government can assess tproperty owners to pay for the cost, installation and repair of the streetlight. Green, Don. "Reagan cutbacks: County hopes federal Flood control funds hold," the Daily Report, March 3, 1981. 22 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA already authorized by Congress can receive federal appropriations years after the fact. Seeking new authorization might have been the kiss of death for development on Deer Creek. With the Deer Creek leg of the project in jeopardy, and unable to pay for its mandated shaze of the Cucamonga Project costs, the county met with prominent area developers in May 1981 to discuss ways of raising a $5.9 million shortfall. Failure might jeopardize $36 million in remauung federal funds earmazked for the project, the group was told. Joseph_DiIorio, a patmer in Rancho Cucamonga Land Co., said the private sector would likely not contribute unless residents were taxed. Ralph Lewis, who formed the committee, added "don't look to Lewis Homes for any large chunk.25" But according to an August 4, 1981 article in The Daily Report, developers with holdings along Deer Creek pledged $1.9 million in loans to the county so it could meet its deposit deadline with the Army Corps of Engineers. The county was able to meet its end of the bargain, barely. (The San Bernardino County Flood Control District did not release any information regarding the funding plan but denied that private landowners were involved in any way.)zb David Dreier's defeat of Congressman Lloyd in the 1980 elections coincided with Reagan's rise to the presidency. Dreier, at 28 years old, was the emerging face of the Republican Party while Reagan was its beloved leader. One of the results was that while many Corps projects were cut back, Reagan's proposed budget for 1982 specifically included funds to begin work on Deer Creek. The entire Cucamonga Project including Deer Creek was completed in 1983, more than 40 years after the Corps began its surveys of the area. The anticipated cost of roughly $63 million (in 1973 dollars) had swelled to $140 million by the time the project was functional. Voters Reject Locally Financed Flood Control The Cucamonga Project was seen as only one component of flood control in western San Bernardino Counry. County supervisors tried to raise flood control funds via ballot measures in 1982 and again in 1983. Both measures failed to athact even a simple majority, much less the 2/3 approval Proposition 13 requires in order to pass tax increases. The 1982 version received support from only 42.1 percent of voters in a Congressional election year (turnout was 67.2 percent). Measure W, the 1983 version, stood perhaps the best chance at passage. Among those endorsing the measure were the unanimous city councils and mayors of Upland, Ontario and recently incorporated Rancho Cucamonga, the two county supervisors who represented the azea, all three chambers of commerce, the Montclair-Ontario school zs Green, Don. "Builders, officials try to save threatened project;' The Daily Report, May 28, 1981. zb October 25, 2002 email from Ken Miller, chief engineer, San Bernardino County Flood Control District. 23 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA boazd, all four of the community newspapers and even the local mobile home owners association. Evidence of flood danger was especially fresh since the deaths of at least three people following heavy rains in the winter of 1983. Water coshed down north-south streets and swamped confused motorists like Ruth Brady, who drowned after her vehicle fell into [aging floodwaters along Hellman Avenue at Foothill Boulevazd Her body was discovered in the wreckage of a railroad crossing ahalf--mile downstream, but rescuers saved her husband. Measure W anticipated that a normal family would pay $3.25 per month over the ]0-year life of the so-called "benefit assessment." Lazger landowners like the Southern Pacific Railroad complained that their burden was disproportionate, and other critics faulted the county for not including Ontario airport in the assessment district27 Whatever thew reasons, voters stood fum: no new taxes. Only 14.6 percent of registered voters actually voted. The margin of defeat was 54.2 percent. Controversy Emerges The Cucamonga Project touched off a building boom, clearing the way for extensive development in western San Bentardino County in the 1980s, which grew fast enough to waaant its own member of Congress after the 1990 Census. Water was the reason for the boom: not water for drinking, but protection from floods. Development continued unabated near Deer Creek until 1997, when a developer sought to teaz down part of a Depression-era earthen levee constructed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and later improved by other federal agencies. The Corps of Engineers submitted letters to the city supporting the development. The Corps' spokesman, Joseph Evelyn, testified on behalf of the developer to the Rancho Cucamonga City Council that the levee was not needed because the Deer Creek debris basin and channel would sufficiently protect the hundreds of homes newly exposed to the mountains through the breach in the levee. He recently maintained this position in federal litigation filed by Defenders of Wildlife and the National Wildlife Federation against Secretary Ann Veneman of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for allowing the levee's destmction. A fomudable collection of citizens has challenged Evelyn and the Corps regazding his testimony. But this loose knit group-which came to include California Senators Boxer and Feinstein, respected flood experts, national environmental groups and Ontario airport owner Los Angeles World Airports~ould not stop the city of Rancho Cucamonga from allowing the partial destmction of the levee in 2001. And it has thus faz been rebuffed in its quest for an independent study by the National Academy of Sciences on whether the flood control projects on Deer Creek are truly safe. ht the meantime, scores of new ' homes and two new schools have been built in the floodplain, supported by official Z~'rhe airport, owned by the City of Los Angeles, is like other government lands in that it is exempt from taxes. 2a ALLUVIAL AMNESIA . approval documents making scant or no mention of the newly realized potential for flooding danger. Negative Skew At dispute is whether people living in the vicinity of Deer Creek are unduly at risk. Engineers translate such a question into equations comparing how much debris and water they e~tpect will be spat out of Deer Creek's watershed versus how much capacity they think exists to store debris and channel runoff. Selecting the most appropriate method is of high importance. One criticism made against the Corps is for its use of "negative skew" when it reviewed flood risk on Deer Creek recently. If an equation were a tree, skew would be the wind bending the tree. Plotted on a graph, a positively skewed equation will curve upwazd while negative skew curves it downward. Skew can alter how far an equation will rise on its vertical axis. For the question at hand, the vertical axis signifies a flood's highest stage measured in how many cubic feet of floodwater passes a given point-usually a stream gage-in a second. Floods like the 1969 and 1938 events score high on the vertical axis while dry years score very low. r ppvtive skew: seventy appears to os Bearer i aaw u ~ , I u S' l~ f . 6 1 _ ~ •- ,G `• sevenM aPpean leas r ~ j~ ~ C'^ 0 50 107 70J. 1000 ran Figure 15 Positive and negative skew. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which measures and catalogues floods, used positive skew to express how large flood events like 1969 were possible in western San Bernardino County. The USGS could not account for the 1969 flood using its standard zs ALLUVIAL AMNESIA methods; it had to skew the equation positively so it would agree with the historical record. The Army Corps of Engineers has done the opposite. For his Deer Creek estimates the Corps' Joseph Evelyn skewed the equation negatively, away from the historical record. The result was lower values on the Corps' y-axis. Essentially the Corps equation predicted smaller floods and failed to account for lazge floods that had already happened. Additionally, the smaller floods predicted by the Corps using negative skew suggest that future floods wIll be contained within the present debris basin and channel Without negative skew, even the Corps equation would predict floods too lazge for the existing flood control project on Deer Creek. Even for a powerful federal agency like the Army Corps of Engineers, it is hard to deny history. As the task force on Deer Creek began its work in the spring of 2001, other engineers questioned Evelyn about his use of negative skew. Engineers with the state Department of Water Resources, appazently leery of relying on the Corps, began an independent inquiry. That effort, however, ended inconclusively after engineers on the task force were shocked to discover that the USGS was planning to "discredit," or expunge from flood records permanently, the 1969 flood as it was measured near Deer Creek. In one swift move, the Corps' negatively skewed equation seemed more in tune with the historical record. The Man Who Made a Flood Disappear In June of 2001 Joseph Evelyn was able to take advantage of controversial research by a man named Robert Meyer, a longtime employee of the USGS. Meyer is critical of hydrologists in .tis own agency for their work in measuring the 1969 floods in Southern California including western San Bernardino County.2 Ultimately, Meyer's work bolstered the tack taken by Joseph Evelyn-that floods like the 1969 event were overestimated and that the reality was less severe than the record. Meyer, a surface water expert for the USGS, azgues that existing records were flawed enough to be useless. He says it's simply too hard to measure floodwaters when the waters carry lazge debris just like it's easier to gauge the volume of a can of soda than an iced-down fountain soda. In an interview, Meyer said the eradication of 1969 flood - 28 Meyer said he invalidated the high watermark, or "peak Flow" reading, from the Day Creek gage data - from the 1969 Flood because it didn't fit a mathematical equation he had devised that plotted all California ' . "peak" flood flows on a single graph. The Flow from Day Creek-the watershed next to Deer Creek-stuck ." out because it was so much higher than what Meyer expected from his equation. The Day Creek gage is important because Deer Creek has for several decades been "ungaged, "meaning there is no installation on site to measure Flows. A primitive stream gage installed on Deer Creek was deemed unreliable in the eazly 1960s and removed. Many of the early gages were designed for irrigation purposes, not to measure storms. When historical records are not available, engineers often study Flooding patterns on a nearby, similar watershed and apply their findings to the watershed-under scrutiny. 26 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA records resulted from more than a decade of his own research. "What is the concem about throwing away a measurement that's no good?" he asked during an August, 2002 interview. Whether water, debris or some mixture thereof; `YVhat lS the CO12C2Yn something hugely destmctive came out.. of the about throwing away a mountains in the winter of 1969. Meyer's actions have rankled surviving USGS scientists, who by measurement that's nO now aze retired or are veterans in their field. "We gOOd ~ ' had surface water specialists in 1969 that were every bit as smart as surface water specialists in -Robert Meyer, USGS 2001," said John Singer, a retiree from the USGS who helped with aerial mapping on Deer Creek in 1969. "I'm totally amazed that someone would have the nerve to totally discredit that data. To say [the data is] not. possible is unscientific, unfounded and reeks of something other than what the USGS is known for.'c9 For Singer and other water experts who have studied the issue, the furor arises less from Meyer's criticisms of the USGS's data-collecting methods back in 1969-which water experts partly concede-but rather from Meyer's decision to replace 1969 flood data with nothing indicating that the century's most devastating flood occurred during that season. `To say [the data isJ not possible is unscientific, unfounded and reeks of something other than what the USGS is known for. ' -John Singer The weigh[ of Meyer's action became clearer when the Department of Water Resources- led task force on Deer Creek attempted to determine if the project's concretized rectangulaz channel was big enough. In mid-2001 the state and Corps concluded the channel was of sufficient size, and Joseph Evelyn went further, saying the channel could handle debris as well as water. The other contributing engineers, Douglas Hamilton and John Cassidy, submitted Fmdings showing the channel was likely to become clogged with debris and send floodwaters outside the channel walls. The operative difference was that the state and the Corps did not substantially incorporate the deadly 1969 floods in their measurements whereas Hamilton and Cassidy did. In an August 2002 interview, the Center was told that the U.S. Geological Survey has reopened review of Meyer's work. The USGS is also weighing new regulations that would make it hazder to invalidate flood records. Its recent actions were spurred because of the Deer Creek controversy, according to the USGS's Menlo Pazk-based, surface water specialist, Mike Nolan. "We're trying to shine as much light on this as possible," he zv From a telephone interview with John Singer conducted on July I I, 2002. 27 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA said.30 But according to a September 3Q 2002, memorandum, FEMA officials continued to reinforce Meyer's azgument, not question it. This led engineer Douglas Hamilton, in a written response dated October 26, 2002, to assert that "this USGS precedent [of removing potentially faulty flood records], followed to its logical end, would result in virtually all of the Southern California flood peaks from the two largest recorded flood seasons (1938 and 1969) being cross-examined and ultimately removed from the record due to the presence of debris flows. Ironically, the very process that makes large flood events in Southern California so hazardous has caused these floods to be banned from the historical record. Of course I, along with many other floodplain policymakers, protest this action." In obtained emails, Meyer appeazs unconcerned by the criticism. A yeaz after Meyer's work invalidated 1969 flood records, William Kirby of the USGS eked in an email about whether it was pmdent to eliminate flood data from 1969 without finding some way to "alert the conscientious analyst that something noteworthy had happened" that year, namely, a deadly flood.31 Meyer's emailed response was that he could. discern "no usefiil information" from the available record. Although it took Meyer years to amass the evidence he used to invalidate 1969 flood data, he does not feel the USGS needs to acknowledge the historical record by making revised estimates of the 1969 flood on its own. "Perhaps the agencies in the area should pay for us to make estimates of some kind," Meyer wrote in a January 2002 email to his U.S. Geological Survey colleague, Mike Nolan. Invalidating flood records is very rare; there are only a few such instances, although the USGS has records of thousands of floods. Joseph Evelyn used 1969 flooding data in the Army Corps' November 1999 report on Deer Creek in a veiled manner. s2 By adopting a negative skew, the statistics effectively ignore the 1969 flood event. Two yeazs later, when Robert Meyer rendered the 1969 flood as an unreliable record, Evelyn had a justification for marginalizing the 1969 flow. 3o From an August 6, 2002 telephone conversation with Mike Nolan. 31 May 6, 2002 email titled "re:regression decisions- and Day Creek" from Robert Meyer to William Kirby, et al. 12 The November 1999 report unveiled a new estimate for how much debris was expected to come out of Deer Creek during a I00-year Flood. The amount, 292 acre feet of debris, was considered less than the stated capacity of Deer Creek debris basin until several months later, when an investigation by Exponent's Doug Hamilton concludedthat the usable capacity of the basin was smaller than the amount the Corps had originally maintained was [he capacity, 310 acre fee[. The Corps now says Deer Creek debris basin holds 172 acre feet but only 188 acre-feet is expected in a 100-year flood. Although Ioseph Evelyn can correctly say that he used 1969 data in his computations for [he Department of Water Resources technical review committee, he effectively ignored the occurrence of both the t 969 and 1938 Flood events by imposing a negative skew on the statistics. 28 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA The Perfect Storm When trying to predict the severity and frequency of future floods, hydrologic engineers take into account a number of variables: the size of the watershed delivering precipitation to the stream, the steepness of the terrain, the incidence of fires that can dump burned vegetation into streams, the historical record of floods in the area and other factors. Engineers use these data to write equations that relate the incidence of the variables to the ultimate size of a flood. In theory the equations can be tested by applying them to recorded flood events in history. Then it can be seen whether an equation "fits" the data and can be used accurately for predictions. But when no data exist, engineers must use data from somewhere else and apply it to the watershed under examination. Deer Creek had a stream gage until the 1960s when it was deemed unrehable. Around this time the Army Corps of Engineers began to plan schematics for flood control on Deer Creek. Without reliable information on Deer Creek, the Corps decided to study a storm from another watershed and then apply the data. According to Joseph Evelyn, the Corps used 1943- flooding data from a storm in Sierra Madre (a city a few miles east of Pasadena) as a way to predict the expected severity and frequency of stonns at Deer Creek. The problem with using a project storm from Sierra Madre, according to engineers Hamilton and Cassidy, is that the topography of the San Gabriel Mountains is significantly more mountainous at its eastern tem»nus than the centrally located Sierra Madre. The northernmost neighborhoods in Rancho Cucamonga aze 6,000 feet below and four miles away from the neazest lazge mountain, 8,891-foot Cucamonga Peak. hi Sierra Madre the rise is much more gradual. See Figure 16 below. ~~~.,~o Son ~nfmio ssebhis seoncho Cucomongo / $lerro Mo[l'E Figure 16 Comparison of Siema Madre and Rancho Cucamon® slopes: Rancho Cucamonga is steeper The dispute is larger than Deer Creek. Joseph Evelyn said the Sierra Madre storm figures were used in the design of the entire Cucamonga Project. No engineer is making the assertion that there are fundamental flaws with every debris basin designed by the Corps in Southern California. But if the Corps ever concluded that its design was deficient at Deer Creek, questions will surely arise about the other basins in the Cucamonga Project, if not 'elsewhere in the nation. FEMA has mapped 134 alluvial floodplains in Southern California, and more are sure to be identified as they become urbanized. 29 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA The Los Angeles District of the Army Corps of Engineers has over the decades improved upon its design of flood control projects in Southern California and used it as a model, for projects in other Sun Belt states. The complex flood prediction equations the Corps uses in the Los Angeles District are designed specifically for southwestern topography: steep, cnunbling mountains that burn often and are pelted seasonally by storms. By all accounts, the San Gabriel Mountains are an especially extreme example-worthy perhaps of positive skew. Instead Evelyn reversed the trend of measured, historical flood data by choosing a negative skew coefficient. Skepticism of the Corps flood prediction methods in the Los Angeles District has mounted partly because the district's methods are not well known outside its downtown Los Angeles high-rise headquarters. Consulting engineers who have criticized the Deer Creek project say that the methods they themselves use-the federally sanctioned and scientifically reviewed methods they employ as project designers, consultants or expert witnesses-were rejected by the Corps' Evelyn in favor of his in-house method.31 This stance is contrary to the Corps' own how-to guide on handling "Disagreements Among Experts:" Disagreements among experts or agencies about the existence of a threat, its severity or the appropriate reaction [are] confusing. From the perspective of the lay person; they are being asked to make a decision that can't be decided by the experts. M;nimi~ing these kinds of problems requires ensuring that the experts are working with the same basic information and using the same assumptions."34 'A Slumbering Volcano' The records of the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, obtained through the National Archives, describe how the whims of nature can disguise the dangers of living near the outlets of mountain streams, on miles-wide cone-shaped mounds of ancient sediment known as alluvial fans: After 1969 the District considered Cucamonga Creek, the more populated watershed just west of Deer Creek, to be a "slumbering volcano" that "lies quiet and dom~arrt over great periods of time, lulling its co-habitards into a state of false security. Then suddenly, with little if any warning, it strikes with a vengeance, including great property damage and even death. And so it was in the floods of 1914, 1927, 1938, 1943 and 1969.'us The passage goes on: Large floods had occurred in the valley during both the winters of 1965 and 1966, resulting in a Presidential disaster proclamation for the County. However, in both instances, Cucamonga Creek was docile....[T]he people 37 The Los Angeles District Method for the Prediction of Debris Yield J4 Emphasis added. Page 13, Exnlainine Flood Risk Davis, CA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990. S5 From Page 8 of the San Bernardino County Flood Control district historical records obtained at the National Archives and Records AdministrationPacific Region (Laguna Niguel, CA). 30 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA of the alluvial fan, as might be expected, were led into a state of lethargy. Then, in 7anuary and again in quick succession in Febntary, 1969, the creek struck with a vengeance and fury never before equaled in recorded history.36 36 From Page ? I of the San Bernardino County Flood Control district historical records obtained at the National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Region (Laguna Niguel, CA). 31 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Figure 17 The Great Flood of 1969. Photograph courtesy Ontario City Literary. California Looks the Other Way Officials representing the State of California wasted an opportunity to use the Deer Creek controversy to launch a wide-ranging debate on debris basins and flood safety. Resources Secretary Mary Nichols has maintained that the state's only jurisdiction is through the Division of Dam Safety inside the Department of Water Resources. In essence Nichols argues that the state's legal power only extends to whether the dam bracing Deer Creek debris basin has structural integrity-not whether the basin is big enough. In reality the state can hardly conclude its interests _ end at the dam. The recently constmcted Los Osos High School situated near to Deer Creek, for example, is eligible for $24 million Qr state reimbursement funds. Freeway bridges designed by Calirans, including those on the Foothill (210) Freeway extension project, might be undermined by floodwaters. The California Deparhrrent of Fish and Game oversees habitat issues on Deer Creek's depleted spreading grounds. The state has failed to coordinate or direct the efforts of even its own departments. Just months after one agency, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES), advised the state to stop funding the Los Osos school project, another agency, the Cahfomia sz ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Department of Education (CDE), was seeking a way to allow the school to be built without OES approval. CDE facilities official Duwayne Brooks attended a high-level meeting on Jan. 11, 2001 held at Senator Dianne Feinstein's San Francisco offices. At the meeting federal, state and local officials joined technical consultants in a preliminary discussion on how best to study safety aspects on Deer Creek. The state Deparhnent of Water Resources, overseen by Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, was to lead a 60-day task force on Deer Creek. According. to a January 12, 2001, email he wrote to the elected director of CDE, Superintendent of Public hrstmction Delaine Eastin, Brooks wrote that he "confirmed with Mary Nichols... that it seemed reasonable for (the California Departrnent of Education) to approve the proposed (Los Osos) school site because the preponderance of current evidence shows that there is little if any danger posed by the dam, and if there were subsequently found to be any dmger it would be resolved to ensure the safety of the citizens of Rancho Cucamonga." The task force on Deer Creek spent 16 months studying the issues, but records show that the Deparnnent of Education acted sooner to issue the official approval documents necessary for the Los Osos project to become eligible for state reimbursement. The date on the first approval document-May 31, 2001-was a full year before the task force completed its work. In other words, the Department of Education allowed students to attend Los Osos while officials in other state depatUnents were trying to determine if anyone was safe neaz Deer Creek. The Center teamed of these facts only when a Public Records Act request filed with the Deparhrtent of Education provided emails referring to the conversation. In an October 2, 2002, interview Secretary Nichols said she did not remember making the statements Brooks attributed to her in his January 12, 2001 email to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Delaine Eason. She says she bazely remembers having a private conversation with Brooks and "if he thought that my statement... was a basis for making a decision, he was operating under an erroneous assumption." Interviewed by telephone on November 20, 2002, Brooks said the Center has mischaracterized the January 12, 2001, email regarding Secretary Nichols. Asked to address the disconnect, Brooks maintains that "it was the opinion of all the people in attendance that it was to be detem3ined safe or it was to be made safe." Brooks was also asked to reconcile the outstanding warning from the Office of Emergency Services regarding the lack of flood evacuation plans and concerns over general flood safety. He said, "The fact that OES didn't have an evacuation plan didn't have any impact on the safety of the site." Superintendent `The fact that OES didn't have an evacuation plan didn't have any impact on the safety [at Los Osos High School.J' -Duwayne Brooks 33 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Eastin has not returned requests for comment. The Chaffey Joint Union High School District, which built Los Osos, also has not responded to requests for an interview. The OES, somehow completely out of the loop, was not even informed that the Los Osos project had been approved over its objection. Meantime, the first-ever semester at Los Osos continues. Without the use of Los Osos's new classrooms, officials would have to relocate more than 2,400 students. By now the public has lazgely forgotten the winter of 1981, when floodwaters washed away Mitchell Elementary School in northeast San Bernardino, another campus within a few miles of streams emerging from steep hillsides. The grassy patch where the school and homes once stood is now called Twin Creeks Flood Control Basin. In May 2002 the Resources Agency disregazded the suggestion of the state's water policy expert, Tim Ramirez, to recommend convening the National Academy of Sciences on the Corps' methods for debris basins. Ramirez's statement was deleted from the state Department of Water Resource's final report on Deer Creek (the one requested by Senators Feinstein and Boxer) but appeared in an internal email from May 6, 2002. Drafts written from May 7 on state only that the state has "no objection" to outside review by ._ the National Academy of Sciences. (NAS) Ultimately in June 2002, the Department of Water Resources concluded, without plainly saying so, that debris from Deer Canyon was likely to fill the debris basin and channel past its capacity. They didn't bother to predict what might happen next. And the state has not made any substantive demands on the Corps to fix the problem. Questioned about why she decided not to invite NAS study of the matter, Secretary Nichols said "their results are extremely dependent on the exact question you ask them and who is on the panel.'a~ ln`reahty the state's task force on Deer Creek suffered from at least the appearance of bias. As a precursor to its formation, Rancho Cucamonga homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith (whose consultant Douglas Hamilton was part of the task force) had to promise not to use draft findings of the task force as a basis for litigation against a developer who aims to build new homes near Deer Creek. The state also failed to respond when the Army Corps of Engineers refused to collaborate with other participants on a common hydrological method for sizing up expected future flood flows and comparing them to flood control project capacity. At the behest of Senators Boxer and Feinstein, the state coordinated the task force. But the Army Corps of Engineers dictated the outcome. That is presaged in the charter drafted to guide the task force. In the charter there is no mention of ascertaining a possible flooding threat to communities neaz Deer Creek. histead the charter spells out which technical statistics should be sought and then concludes with legalistic language stipulating that participation in the task force should not be seen as an admission that safety is compromised at Deer Creek )n the end the statistics the task force published were neazly useless. The task force had no unified stance. The degree of }~ Oct. 2, 2002 interview with Mary Nichols, via telephone. 3a ALLUVIAL AMNESIA flooding danger on Deer Creek depended upon the source of the information-exactly the sort of confirsion the task force was meant to cleaz up. In an interview with Mary Nichols on June 7, 2002, several weeks before she signed a letter to Senators Feinstein and Boxer prefacing the Department of Water Resources final report on Deer Creek, Nichols was asked whether Los Osos students were safe from flooding danger In response she underscored the need for more classrooms all around Cahfomia and suggested that finding suitable land with absolutely no safety concerns was not always possible. As an example, she mentioned the infamous Belmont Learning Center in downtown Los Angeles, a project built atop an old oil field seeping methane and hydrogen sulfide. After unprecedented debate and study, officials believe the environmental problems will be solved and Belmont Learning Center will someday house thousands of students. Members of the public could follow Belmont's progress through the newspapers. With Los Osos the media coverage dwindled after the Department of Education approved the site in mid-2001 and resurfaced only to show students entering its doors. The reasons why Los Osos was deemed a fit site for school kids have never been publicized. The state Resources Agency, after it perhaps unwittingly allowed construction of a school in a flood plain, declined to invite the National Academy of Sciences to make an independent assessment of the Corps' design methods. By stating its official position on the NAS study as "no objection," the state in effect chose not to serve as a "local interest," i. e., a city, county or state government. The Corps of Engineers has already agreed to fund its portion of an NAS study, but only if a "local interest" stepped forward and funded a fraction of the total cost, expected to be less than $1 million. Uninterested Locals Local homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith attempted to fmance the local cost of the NAS study herself but she was fumed away by the Corps, who said the request must come , from a government entity. There were two other possible "local interests" which could have triggered action by the NAS. However, the city of Rancho Cucamonga and San Bernardino County officials have consistently declined to take action. Deer Creek debris basin lies outside Rancho Cucamonga city limits, and this fact allows the city to decline comment or to spend money on the issue. Obtained documents show, as mentioned before, that as eazly as 1993 the city had misgivings about the Corps' debris basin design methods, at least for smaller watersheds. A few years later, however, the Rancho Cucamonga City Council was willing to allow the breaching of a levee and dismissed opponents by refeaing them to the Corps. The San Bernardino County Flood Control District is the owner and operator of the Deer Creek debris basin. Although it has done its own reseazch on Deer Creek, agency ss ALLUVIAL AMNESIA engineers deferred to the Corps during the state-led task force on Deer Creek, which concluded this Jtme. The San Bemazdino County flood agency has much to lose if flood control at Deer Creek is deemed substandard. The agency repeatedly tried to convert public land located near Deer Creek for private development-even land that the Corps said should be set aside for groundwater recharge. After it could fmd no willing developers or private buyers, it sold land situated near Deer Creek to Chaffey Joint Union High School District, which built and. opened the Los Osos high school on it over the concerns expressed by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services. The agency's development of open space intended far groundwater rechazge azeas has drawn a federal lawsuit from environmental advocacy goups, which are asking the U.S. to reassert authority over its former property and stop further development. The lawsuit is pending before a federal district court judge in Washington, D.C ss Local and state representatives who represent districts surrounding Deer Creek decline to acknowledge serious concerns over flood safety. Several of these officials may be deterred by their own success in wooing new development. Rancho Cucamonga's moderately priced housing developments are attractive to fast-time homebuyers,.but the entire area would suffer economically if the responsible agencies chan~ed their stance on Deer Creek. The Corps' certification of 100-year flood protection; releases property owners from the costly mandated flood instuance payments others must pay, as did other communities along the Los Angeles River until a recent Corps project fortified the river levees. Bonded debt (such as bonds sold to fmance construction of schools, homes, etc.) also becomes more costly to repay when the level. of risk rises. Dire public safety predictions aren't much of a campaign platform in pro-growth Rancho Cucamonga. Not surprisingly, the issue has not surfaced in the months leading up to local elections in November 2002. The Center received little or no reply to repeated requests for interviews with Rancho Cucamonga Councilmember (and Republican Assemblymember-elect) Robert Dutton; San Bernardino County Supervisor Jon Mikels; Paul Biane, a Rancho Cucamonga Councilmember who recently defeated Mikels for his seat; Republican state Senator Jim Bnrlte; or Chaffey Union High School District facilities executive Susan Sundell. These pubhc of&cials may simply be reading the public's low level of interest in flooding issues. Over athree-year period, two homeowners associations and environmental groups filed seven lawsuits against Rancho Cucamonga and a developer trying to breach the Deer Creek levee to accommodate more development. (One lawsuit remains pending in federal court.) .Lauren Development home sites, owned by Newport Beach developer Robert Cristiano, aze situated uphill from an existing gated community and partially 38~Case number I:OlCV01201 EGS. }9 A 100-year flood is a major event expected to occur only once in a 100-year period, and thus has a 1 percent chance of occurring in any one year. 36 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA within an area originally controlled by the federal government for the provision of flood control, the aforementioned earthen levee built in the 1930s. Residents already living beneath this proposed Lauren development may rightly have worried that the viewsheds and real estate values of their own homes would decline if another development were to be built between them and the mountains. Womes about floods, however, were not a priority. In fact, both associations were sued for misuse of membership dues, with plaintiffs alleging that the constant legal battles were sapping funds meant for landscaping and gardening. Figure 18 The levee below Deer Canyon. Lauren Development is planning to construct 40 homes inthe area. Affordable Views with Blinds Drawn Over History The Deer Creek controversy simmers in afast-growing county with a reputation famished by successive waves of corruption investigations, indictments that led to guilty pleas from officials and businessmen and most recently, allegations that an elected county supervisor assaulted the county administrative officer. San .Bernardino County hasn't quite shed its "Cowboy County" image, according to a newspaper reporter with experience in the region. The state's inaction and reluctance to stir a wider debate affects not only Rancho Cucamonga and its environs but also any community that has allowed or is considering development on alluvial fans. In areas like western San Bernardino County, alluvial fans are the only "desirable" and affordable lands left for development. This puts great 37 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA pressure on local authorities b clear away obstacles against development rather than slow or discourage it in any way. Former Bechtel engineer John Cassidy has said that assessing and assuring flood protection in areas near mountain canyons is vital, considering developers' taste for homes built on alluvial fans, "because for the most part construction can be accomplished quickly and cheaply."30 Alluvial fans ate essentially ancient piles of sediment and usually have a unifomr slope. For contractors, Cassidy said, "there is a minunum of excavations to be done, simply enough for the home foundations and the roadways. Alluvial fans, being on a grade of (roughly 4 percent) provide for great `view homes' since the downhill home cannot generally hurt views from above it" `An alluvial fan is a flood plain, but because it is dry and gravelly or rocky most people can't identify with it as such. Floods in the deser_ t and on a hill at that?' -John Cassidy Homeowners rarely are told or understand that it took eons of flooding to build up enough sediment to create what an average person might call a hill. There are no laws requiring disclosure of flooding risks unless the parcel of land for sale lies inside an "inundation" zone as determined by the appropriate agency. hi this case San Bernardino County has no inundation maps on file with the state and thus has no requirement to inform residents of flooding risks. "Everyone identifies with floods when they are alongside a river where you can always see water flowing and the flood plain is there," Cassidy said. "However, it is difficult to get people to realize the threat even if they are on the flood plain. An alluvial fan is a flood plain, but because it is dry and gravelly or rocky most people can't identify with it as such. Floods in the desert and on a hill at thatT't t °0 From the August 27, 2002 email from John Cassidy to the Center. jt Cassidy's view was exemplified, albeit in reverse, by engineer Richard Massaro, during a 1995 meeting in Rancho Cucamonga over the design of a debris basin the city said a developer must build to protect a planned housing development. Told the basin needed to be larger than existing Corps' standards, Massaro considered that a plot to halt the development. "Huge areas of land are set aside which can become ugly scars on the landscape and large breeding grounds for diseasecarrying insects such as mosquitos," Massaro wrote. "Worse yet, good developments in the hands of honest, hard-working citizens is being set aside to accomplish a function in a most inefficient manner." 38 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Against the Flow Michael Bohlander, a high-tanking sedimentation expert from Los Angeles County, suffered a career setback after taking a position contrary to the Corps on Deer Creek. Bohlander was an l8-year veteran with the county Department of Public Works and headed its sedimentation unit when Exponent's Doug Hamilton asked him to do a peer review of his work on Deer Creek. Ironically, Bohlander was at the time a part of an elite team of L.A. county engineers who kick-started a massive upgrade program for more than half of the county's 115 debris basins. Southern California floods in 1969 and 1978 caused failure at several of the county-designed debris basins, leading to widespread flooding. Engineers learned that in steeper azeas the debris spewed out during heavy rainfall periods was turning the basins into more of a speed bump than a catchment device. LA county engineers did a thorough analysis and decided to embark on a decades-long improvement project, all without impetus from elected officials. Costs-including condemnation of homes, additional excavation and raising of walls and fences-aze expected [o run into the tens of millions of dollars over a period of many years. The project will be financed through property tax revenues from local Los Angeles County residents. Over the years, engineers from around the nation (as well as Taiwan, China, Japan and Spain) occasionally sought out Bohlander for advice on L.A. County's design of debris basins, and he wrote official responses under the official letterhead of the county Department of Public Works. He was known as an expert in the science of debris flow. Then came Bohlander's May 1, 2000, letter concluding that, based on his review of Hamilton's figures, the debris basin at Deer Creek was undersized and created a public safety risk. This brought Los Angeles County into conflict with the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, which owns and maintains the flood control facilities on Deer Creek, and with the Army Corps of Engineers, who designed the project and transferred ownership to the county upon completion. Days after the letter was sent, Bohlander said he was told he was to be disciplined, according to a recent interview. Asked to sign a letter of reprimand, he said he refused because the letter made simple misstatements of fact. His superiors didn't express any opinion on his technical opinions. Rather it was whom the opinions criticized-the Los Angeles District of the Army Corps. "Mr. Bohlander's comments are in no way a reflection on how the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works views the design standards of the Corps of Engineers," Deputy Director Gary Hartley concluded in the May 17, 2000, letter to the San Bernardino County Flood Control District. Bohlander maintains that his critique was hardly a declaration of war but was treated as such."If I had been chief of .San Bernardino County flood control, I would have said `big 39 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA deal' and forgotten about it," Bohlander said. "L.A. County has a specific flood control standard and that's how we measure things. If you want that standard, move there.s12 Bohlander left the county's employ in 2001. Deer Creek `vas the catalyst for me to leave the County of Los Angeles," he said. "It was the wake-up call for me to take a look at my life and the way my work was going in the deparhnents13 The Corps Takes Offense The commissiorung of an independent study of Deer Creek, led by concerned homeowner MaGssa Hathaway McKeith, endowed the controversy with credibility past what ordinary MMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) activists can do. The environmental consulting Earn Exponent Inc. performed an independent analysis of the debris and floodwater capacity at Deer Creek. Tn Mazch of 2000, a nonprofit group McKeith originally formed for Deer Creek-related issues bought afull-page ad in the Washington Post and the political insider periodical Roll Call that took the Army Corps to task for alleged deficiencies at Deer Creek 44 43 Prom an August l9, 2002 telephone interview with Michael Bohlander. °J Ibid. " Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion, a SOl(c)(3) nonprofit, purchased the ad in the Washington Post. The group has since expanded its scope and been renamed Citizens United for Resources and the Environment, Inc. 40 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA .10/ RIfSEME.4T 40/ERTfSE.VEMT GENERAL l0E RALIARD IS BLOCKING A SAFEIY STUDY ON THIS DANGEROUS SITUATION - WHY 1S THE ARMY CORPS ENDANGERING OUR CHILDREN? ALL AMERICANS PAY WHEN FLOODING OCCURS! Please join with us in re nesting Congressional Hearings. into~he Armyy Corps' cover- up of their mistakes on weer Creek. Soratur Fa4utdn 6 Senamr 8oxsr haw mP~Y npuss[ad fhs amy caps o1 Enpirxara do . safety aCrdr oI the Dasr Creek Aram end IXDAs Bash Pro/act !n Ra/leho CuCavnonlp4 CaBAsmia QeIIa/N Jos BaBerd hss refused arM Bw Corps has fobb{sd F!]IN rro[ ~ ro conduct Me sa/ay study. Shr adroofa end Nousands aJ Aomes could 6s destroyed by rNbrla flow 6 I/oorBnp N 1?ser Cssek Oskrfs Basin Ia1fs. o.srenrr. u.nse rw s...e..ei. sao~ (anti/. r.. ta+a) soo.aaso Exponent's study received attention in the local press. The Corps tried to refute Exponent but in the process conceded that Deer Creek debris basin cannot handle the amount of debris expected in the Corps' own estimates. In November 2000 the civilian leader of the Corps, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works Joseph Westphal, wrote a letter stating that Deer Creek debris basin does not "provide the level of protection originally al Debrii flow Boulders al Banyan Ffemenfary Sdwd ALLUVIAL AMNESIA authorized by Congress" and offered that the Corps wdl do further studies if a "local interest" would agree to fund a portion of the cost, estimated at 5250,000. Later that month, Senators Feinstein and Boxer asked the state, through Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, to investigate the situation and if it found outstanding safety issues, to consider acting as the "local interest" required for a National Academy of Science study. Nichols herself wrote a letter to the Corps in November 2000 advocating McKeith's position. Unlike her June 2002 letter, in which Secretary Nichols demands no substantive directives, her November 2000 letter stressed the need to bring closure to public safely concerns. Safety Set Aside The Department of Water Resources fomred a "technical review committee," reflecting the expertise of the department's scientists and engineers. The charter for the task force warned that participation in the committee was not a signal that a "flood protection deficiency currently exists" at Deer Creek. Two months later, the state's dam safety expert, Steve Verigin, told the engineers and interested parties that it was already clear "a consensus wIll not be reached among the present attendees." The committee simply decided to report all of the fmdings from the various engineers. One reason, according to Exponent engineer Doug Hamilton, was the feeling that "no matter what we say or do, the Corps just kind of dismisses "the work of Hamilton and others outside the federal government a: information driven by agendas. Further, the Corps' Joseph Evelyn maintains that stteamflow records from the USGS are the only Wort-Corps-originated data he would use without reservation. The flip side to this "Catch 22" is USGS's Robert Meyer, who says none of the USGS stream gages on alluvial fans are trustworthy and it is derisory to think such things can be estimated. Doug Hamilton and the other engineers didn't know whom to believe. Schools That Could Not Be Stopped The Center believes a significant reason for the state's paralysis on safety concerns at Deer Creek was the $48 million Los Osos high school project in northern Rancho Cucamonga and another recently constructed school, Banyan Elementary, located .several miles below Deer Creek debris basin but within sight of its flood channel. Rather than acting from an overabundance of caution, officials gave primary importance to the desire not to delay any further the new schools, which are to alleviate overcrowding in neighboring campuses. They succeeded-more than 2,400 students entered classes at Los Osos for he first time this fall. Nearby Banyan Elementary opened last year. Also located az >:: ALLUVIAL AMNESIA along Deer Creek is Chaffey College, which was spared during the 1969 floods because of the earthen levee-later cleaved in 1999 to make room for more home sites. To this day, Los Osos lacks a document that every other state-funded school constmction project must possess before it opens its doors. That document is an approval from the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) signifying that appropriate disaster and evacuation plans are in place and aze feasible. OES has twice rejected as incomplete plans that were submitted by local flood control officials. One of them was ahand-drawn map. It should be noted that the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, the agency responsible for submitting inundation maps, also used to own the land upon which Los Osos was built. It is important not to ignore the construction•iiiendly pohtical climate in the Inland Empire. Western San Bernazdino County is teeming with recent arrivals. [t would be quite a change in philosophy for local officials to admit publicly their concerns about flood safety while at the same time approving new housing and schools. Documents show that Los Osos passed environmental reviews without proper inundation maps because the California Department of Education (CDE) acted on what it says was the advice of Resources Secretary Nichols. Asked if it was normal for CDE to set aside environmental concerns based on a verbal promise, CDE facilities of£rcial Jim Bush said the agency assumed the Deer Creek task force would come to a conclusion within 60 days of the January 11, 2002 meeting in Feinstein's office. After more than 100 days passed without such a conclusion, officials decided- to approve the school project nonetheless. The Los Osos approval documents issued to the Chaffey Joint Union High School District make no mention of flooding or any other environmental concern at Los Osos. Records from the California Debt Advisory Commission show that Chaffey Joint Union High School District did not particularly need the state's money to build Los Osos. In April 2002 the district authorized the sale of bonds worth tens of ii~illions of dollazs. Voters had approved the bonds in years previous; it is common for districts to "save up" bond authorizations until circtunstances call for an infusion of cash. Without detailed knowledge of the school district''s spending priorities, which has not been forthcoming, it is impossible to know if paying the entire cost of the Los Osos project has unduly sttained the district's budget or rearranged funding priorities. The district hopes to receive $24 million from the state to cover half the cost of building Los Osos.as as For reasons beyond the control of local officials, state school construction money for the past year has been largely appropriated for the urgent needs of the second-largest district in the nation, the Los Angeles Unified School District. Los Osos was eligible but failed to qualify for $24 million in state reimbursement. The district can receive reimbursement for Los Osos in upcoming funding rounds at [he State Allocation Board. a3 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA The Chaffey Joint Union High School District has already had a controversy surrounding consmuction of Los Osos High School. District officials in mid-2000 were threatened with a lawsuit by the U.S. Fish acid Wildlife Service, which alleged that endangered species habitat for the California gnatcatcher, up to 388 acres, was illegally destroyed during pre-construction preparation of the school site. Ina settlement agreement, the district agreed to buy up habitat elsewhere for pem~arrent conservation. Less _Than Brockovich In real life, the activist Erin Brockovich overcame elitism in the legal arena to hold a water polluter accountable. In the movie version, actress Julia Roberts made it look easier than it really was. In Rancho Cucamonga, however, Malissa Hathaway McKeith and her family have as yet been unable to prevent the potential consequences of a flood on Deer Creek. McKeith's Alta Loma home is stuffed with dozens of boxes of documents on Deer Creek, the result of scores of records requests and independent research. McKeith and her mother joke darkly that the documents will prove most useful if people get killed by a flood on Deer Creek and their families want to sue someone. McKeith is like a broken record on Deer Creek. While she has managed to sustain her quest for a Deer Creek safety study over the last five years by paying for expensive water experts, lawyers and lobbyists to pressure higher-up state and federal officials, at home she is often dismissed as another gadfly raving about the sky falling. In 1997 the McKeiths petitioned the Corps and FEMA to get involved after it became cleaz that local officials were going to allow a developer to bulldoze a portion of the earthen levee that had provided flood protection to the city for decades. The federal agencies refined, thus allowing local officials to keep McKeith at bay by casting her as a "not-in-my-backyazd" litigation hound who didn't want any more development above her house. Though the levee was ultimately graded in 2001, the McKeiths continued to fight. And though FEMA failed to challenge the Corps as McKeith wanted, the participation of Senators Boxer and Feinstein proved to be crucial in getting the state-through Secretary Mazy Nichols of the Resources Agency-to agree to coordinate a task force on Deer Creek. The task force, its members and .its goals began to take shape during amulti-agency meeting held in Senator Feinstein's San Francisco offices on January 11, 2001. One of the attendees was a brigadier general, Peter Madsen, from the Corps. According to several people present that day, Gen. Madsen appeared furious at the meeting and demanded that McKeith apologize for the Washington Post ad slamming the Corps. "Nothing's goruta happen until she does that," Madsen reportedly growled. McKeith, participating via teleconference from Washington D.C., remained silent. Her consultant as ALLUVIAL AMNESIA from Exponent, Doug Hamilton, broke the, silence in the room by assuring the assembled officials and engineers that the group could keep its focus on technical issues. The Corps ire was such that aides from the two senators asked McKeith to apologize to help move the process along. One of them even drafted an apology for her, "The (Washington Post and Roll Call) ads succeeded in profoundly pissing off everyone who matters at the Corps, and I think probably poisoned an already tainted well," wrote a senior advisor to Boxer, John Hess. "This is not an `I-told-you-so' message, but I think feelings_ aze that strong over at the Cotps. Given the intensity of Madsen's comments to me, Mahssa, I can imagine the impression he must have made on (California Resources Secretary) Mary Nichols.s16 The aides persisted until McKeith's lawyers at the time, Latham & Watkins, outlined four years of wrongdoings. There was no more talk of an apology after that, and none was proffered. Says McKeith, "the lesson I learned was to spend your money on publicists and politicians. The ad was the most effective money I spent " ^e From an email from John Hess to Malissa Hathaway McKeith dated29 November 2000. 35 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA RECOMMENDATIONS The story of Deer Creek is more than the account of a single project. It reveals how cmcial decisions about the course of development in risky azeas of California aze made in virtual secrecy by public officials, elected and appointed and by developers helped by government actions. This is a failure of process, a revelation of the absence of protection for homebuyers and for students in schools in potentially dangerous areas. Without an open process there is no accountability. As a result, Southern Cahfornia experiences endless cycles of disaster, followed by politicians and journalists scrambling to find out what went wrong. The purpose of this report is to reveal a stilted, secretive process that led to this potential danger and to propose ways where these important decisions can be opened to public view and debate in the future-before tragedy strikes again. The issue extends faz beyond Deer Creek. As Mary Nichols, the state's resources secretary, told the Center, the problems of Deer Creek apply to all azeas of the state where development is occurring on alluvial fans. These areas are found not only at the foot of the San Gabriel Mountains, but in San Diego County, and the Sierra foothills. As part of a lazger water bill passed last yeaz in Sacramento, the state established a Floodplain Management Task Force that is to report back to the Governor by the end of 2002. According to its Web site, "The focus of the Task Force is to examine specific issues related to State and local floodplain management, including actions that could substantially reduce potential flood damages and to make recommendations for more effective statewide floodplain management policies." The task force has met four times this yeaz but only once in Southern California. Its lone representative from Southern California, Susan Lien, is the appointee of the Southern California Association of Governments. She has offered the Center what she feels are appropriate recommendations for alluvial floodplain management. Lien's brief comments are listed in full below: "As a San Bernardino Ciry Councilwoman who is serving on the current Floodplain Management Task Force, I cannot forget the devastation of alluvial flooding that destroyed homes in my city during the 1980 Harrison Canyon debris flood. It is incumbent upon this task force to recommend policies and procedures that will guide local land-use decisions on alluvial fans. I believe that the report to the Governor should: • Recormend criteria and mapping standazds on alluvial fans that cities, counties and regulatory agencies should use to identify the most reasonable maximum flow that urban azeas will face, • Recommend that general plans and local land-use decisions consider more frequent flood events, not just 100-yeaz floodplain maps, and the cumulative impact of individual debris basins in alluvial fan corridors, 36 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA • Recommend that the Governor's Office on Phnning and Research incorporate these methods for evaluating safety issues on alluvial fans in the next update on general plan guidelines, • Recommend that oversight by a specific state agency should be identified to assist local government and developers with evaluating risk, • Recommend legislation that will require property owners on alluvial fans to be informed of safety issues, and • Recommend that (California Environmental Quality Act) guidelines be updated with language specific to alluvial fans" _ The failure, the Center's study has found, is with a process that encourages important decisions to be made without debate of experts and public scrutiny. hi such a closed process, the actions of individual officials take on undue impoRance. The Center is critical of some justifications made by Joseph Evelyn of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. But if it weren't Evelyn, it would have been another engineer. He happened to have the job at the time. What is needed is a reform of the process to set higher safety standards; to provide a mechanism for regional decision making on what is clearly a regional issue and to make safety concerns available to all. A Rancho Cucamonga parent should not have to fly to Sacramento, as the Center did, to uncover the controversy over the safety of Los Osos High School. The goal is not to stop development, but to make it sustainable, to assure California's inevitable growth will take place in communities that can grow without huge public expenditures for fire and flood protection that, in the end, faIl to protect from the huge nattual disasters endemic to California. Earthquakes, for example, aze.pan of the lives of Cahfomians living in seismic high-risk azeas. Danger is always there. But legislation, public discussion, countless news stories (including a recent reporta~ of an unpubhshed Gst of California schools especially vulnerable to earthquakes), massive campaigns urging safety measures and the memories of past disasters have created a climate where risk is partially reduced-and everyone is aware of the danger and steps that can be taken to mitigate it. This process should be applied to development that is taking place in areas that were once considered too remote for residential communities or were too difficult or uneconomical for the construction techniques available a few decades ago. The Center recognizes the difficulty of enacting such legislation. Sacramento, as the historian Carey McWilliams wrote, is "one of the great commodity mazkets in America ^~ Finnie, Chuck. "Quake study of schools shelved; Davis holds up report on vutnerable sites." San Francisco Chronicle, 13 November 2002. a7 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA where an astonishing variety of interests bid for favor and preference.'~s The construction of homes, businesses, warehouses, factories, roads and schools are among the most important of these commodities. The power of lobbyists and campaign contributors associated with them is great, whether they be developers, union leaders, local merchants and political leaders or local school boazd members determined to build a high school. But the effort will, for the fast time, force a debate on building sustainable communities on risky ground. And, it will take place in the appropriate arena-the state capitol, requiring action from both the executive and legislative branches. Recommendation #1: Form Alluvial Districts. From streetlights to mosquito abatement, it is common practice in government to farm special assessment districts so that the residents who enjoy the benefit of the service are also the ones paying for it. The Center sees a need, in azeas that abut flood-prone mountain canyons, for a publicly funded entity with a cleaz role of advising local govemments on flood risks. When the Center speaks to residents who live near Deer Creek, they invariably want to know if their homes are in danger. It is a hard question to answer because the available scientific data concentrates m the Deer Creek flood control project itself and not where floodwaters might go in the event of a faIlure. More so than ideological divisions over taxes or the size and scope of government, members of the public are most concerned with their individual safety. They may not want to know every scientific. detail, but they definitely want to know the risks they face personally, and then make a decision based on reliable information. The prevailing view among the uninitiated is that flood control provides protection from floods, not "a level of protection" that could be exceeded at some point in the future. What the Center seeks is independently verified information about alluvial fans and flood risks [hat members of the public can access easily. That's easier said than done. The busy world may not want to pay to hear about another threat to their homes, but they certainly will want answers in the case of a damaging flood. Alluvial fans are a permanent feature of the landscape. The Center proposes creation of "Alluvial Districts" as a way for local communities to identify specific flood risks relating to individual alluvial fans and provide infomted counsel to cities and counties as they make land-use decisions in alluvial areas. The state and federal governments should contribute toward start-up costs for the districts but local communities-through annual assessments on the owners of property located on the alluvial fare-should support the continued operational needs of the district. The first problem is the stickiest: who is on the alluvial fan and who is not? Drawing maps of alluvial fans is the fast step toward the hill disclosure of flooding risk. Since the precise boundary of the fan may seem capricious to individual homeowners right on the boundary, the Center poshilates that all property owners living within 1000 feet of an 48 McWilliams, Carey. California: The Great Exception. 1950. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. P. 208 48 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA alluvial fan be informed that their property lies neaz an area of historic flooding. Those living on the fan (ie., in an azea where it can be proved that historic flooding has occurred) should pay an annual assessment to the Alluvial District. Mapping such an area might prove the most contentious step and thus requires intervention from a federal agency with proven experience in mapping: the Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA already maps floodplains but sometimes defers to other agencies as to the general dimensions. When creating alluvial fan maps, EEMA should set _ aside the question of flood control and concenhate on mapping the historic regime of flooding on a particular fan. As a primary benefit, the maps would simply inform interested pazties of where past floods have gone, regazdless of flood control projects. FEMA should begin with fans neaz populated areas or other aeeas undergoing requests for development. Near populated areas, local governments should fund a portion of the risk assessment with help from the state and federal governments. In unpopulated areas the developer should pay all or most of the cost. The assessments for an Alluvial District could be weighted depending on the distance from the mouth of the alluvial fan or the body of water. Though the precise fornula is uncleaz,.the danger increases the closer one gets to the mountains and the assessment should reflect that. It is necessary to separate the authority over land use from the authority that assesses flood risks. Local governments that depend on gowth for fiscal solvency aze more likely to gamble that floods will not come into play-it may seem like a faraway risk compared to the upfront demands of budget furarrce. The development community often is complicit, framing land use decisions as a duel between the "common folks" developers claim to serve and the rights-by-proxy of small animals or native plants (usually litigated by powerful homeowners or environmental groups.) An Alluvial District, led by an elected or appointed board of directors, would be responsible for determining risk and disseminating flood safety information. The district could issue nonbinding resolutions on land use questions within their boundaries. Most importantly the districts would act as a permanent public forum devoted to the unique challenges of alluvial fans. Recommendation #2: Expand the "Sphere of Influence" Concept to Include Flood Risks. Local governments should take an interest in and a responsibility for land uses that may affect other jurisdictions. The "sphere of influence" concept has appeared mostly in courtrooms during land use controversies such as when a local government feels its quality of life is unduly threatened by a proposed major development just outside its borders. The northern Los Angeles County city of Santa Clarita, for example, fears additional traffic and other effects from the thousands of homes proposed on Newhall Ranch land just over the border in Ventura County. One might assume that Rancho 49 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA Cucamonga wants its voice heard on Deer Creek-related issues, since the stream flows duectly through the city. But the stream itself flows on a shyer of county-owned land once owned by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps project on Deer Creek azguably cemented Rancho Cucamonga's future; the city was incorporated at roughly the same time, 1981, during which the Corps was drawing up bids for the final stages of construction work. Rancho Cucamonga has disengaged itself from the project that ensured its survival. The city didn't. bother submitting its own findings on flood safety during the task force led by the state Department of Water Resources. And yet Rancho Cucamongans will be among the fast to suffer if the flood control on Deer Creek fails. The government entities at the lowest levels in California prize their control over local land use and public safety. At least two entities-the City of Rancho Cucamonga and the County of San Bernardino-are relying on an embattled federal agency, the U.S. Army Carps of Engineers, for reliable facts on flood safety. The officials who have been most active in lobbying on behalf of public safety are Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, not local city council members, county supervisors or local members of Congress. The city and county prefer not to hear the alarms sounded by local residents, who have had to pay consultants to conduct reseazch since their city and county will not. The Army Corps of Engineers has no preeminence over flooding issues in Southern California. The Los Angeles County Depamnent of Public Works, for example, oversees I15 debris basins and houses one of the most extensive repositories of flooding information in the nation. Local government must account for all foreseeable risks that threaten its borders, not just quality-of-life issues that may or may not accompany the next super store. The Center recommends passage of a state law requiring cities and counties to conduct formal notification and comment periods when a proposed land use has the potential to affect flood safety in other jurisdictions (other cities, school- buildings, etc.). Each affected jurisdiction should be notified in writing of the proposed land use and allowed a period of 60 days in which to submit comments. The Southern California Association of Governments should also receive formal notification and the opportunity to comment from a regional perspective. Recommendation #3: Convene the National Academies of Science to bring closure to the Deer Creek controversy. The local cost involved with bringing the NAS to Deer Creek is estimated at a quarter million dollars (the Corps would make up the diffe;ence in the total cost, pegged at roughly $I million). The State of California already spent at least that much in its 16- month task force. The Army Corps of Engineer has a standing offer to pay most of the cost of bringing the NAS to Deer Creek, but only if the state, Rancho Cucamonga or San Bemazdino County agree to be a "local interest." The Center urges these three entities to sponsor a NAS study on debris flows in Southern California, despite the. potential "bad 50 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA news" that may follow. As the region strains to grow, there is more and more pressure to develop lands on alluvial Ens. Scattershot decisions on important issues such as these may lead to even more devastating losses if the detractors on Deer Creek are even close to accurate. Recommendation #4: Increase the disclosure standard for school construction Center staff flew to Sacramento several times to unearth details on the Los Osos High School project. The state Office of Public School Construction (OPSC) was unable to provide any details on the Deer Creek flooding controversy. The OPSC, which releases to local school districts state funds that are administered to individual school projects by the State Allocation Boazd, was unaware of any controversy. Documents from the agency showed only that Los Osos was eligible for state funds. It took another Public Records Act request and a Sacramento visit to another agency, the Depaztment of Education, to gain a cleazer sense of how the Los Osos project surmounted the obstacles against it. Pazents seeking similaz information about school constmction projects should not have to rehace the Center's steps. Vital information on prospective school sites needs to be as close to the public as a public librazy or a Web site. The Center suggests-passage of a state law requiring individual school construction projects to have an on-site repository of documents that can be made available to administrators, teachers, other school employees and finally, to pazent-teacher associations. The information needs to reach the grassroots levels, not simply executives. Recommendation #5: When designing debris basins or other alluvial fan flood control projects, create and use a collaborative "local design group" consisting of members from different governmental and nongovernmental entities to help ensure that a project has a measure of local buy-in and technical accountability. Under current practices local politicians ask the Army Corps of Engineers to survey for and build flood control projects in their communities. Local governments take over ownership and maintenance of the structures when they are built. There is no single constant authority on Deer Creek and thus nobody is really in charge. Currently the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers designs projects in seclusion from independent scrutiny or public oversight. Local engineers-those employed by cities, counties, or private citizens-possess institutional knowledge and expertise that the Corps can only hope to replicate on their own. Welcoming nontechnical viewpoints, especially fmm environmental organizations, business groups and others, would foster an atmosphere of collaboration rather than continued litigation. si ALLUVIAL AMNESIA THE FOOTHILLS PROJECT This is the first in a series of studies into widespread residential development in the San Gabriel Mountain foothills, from Glendale eastwazd to Rancho C~rcamorga in San Bemazdino County. These studies, collectively called the Foothills Project, will examine: Safety, disclosure of risks and environmental impacts in aeeas where _ -residences, schools and commercial developments adjoin the mountain range; Cost to taxpayers for financing the extensive fire and flood control facilities in the foothills of one of the world's steepest mountain ranges, an urban wildland interface subject to periodic fire and floods; and Governance in 16 cities and in Los Angeles and San Bemazdino counties. We will examine how campaign contributors, local political alliances and the need for new housing and commercial development, influence these decisions. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT We intend to release our report in stages, and then combine the sections into one complete volume. The report will cover: Floodplain development. The Army Corps of Engineers and other public agencies have allowed construction of schools, homes and businesses in a floodplain surrounding a flood control project that consulting engineers representing homeowners and other public agencies warn is dangerously undersized. This section illushates the safety and governance aspects of the Foothills Project. 2. Tracking local costs of fighting foes in Southern California. Local health services face budget cuts while countywide taxpayers (and California property insurance ratepayers) pay the skyrocketing costs of protecting homes in the San Gabriel foothills and similar areas. This, in effect, is a subsidy for those who choose to live in the foothills. Meantime, resource managers aze hamstrung by regulation and costs and see disaster ahead as development further encroaches upon wild lands. 3. Glendora, "Variance City." A study of this small city shows how local politics and campaign contributions-demonstrated by a large number of variances given to San Gabriel Mountain foothill developments-results in weak zoning laws and decisions that influence aeeas faz beyond the city boundaries. 4. How a Sate insurance program designed to help property owners hurt by urban unrest has been tamed into a program ~ permitting insurarrce of homes and businesses in expensive but dangerous hillside developments. sz ALLUVIAL AMNESIA 5. Governance. An examination of how the many levels of government, financial pressures that began with Proposition 13 and agency rivalries contribute to isolationist planning and dangerous conditions along the foothills. THE CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS), a nonprofit, nonpartisan Los Angeles-based organization, was established in 1983. The Center is best known for its studies on campaign finance and its efforts in writing new laws on the subject, including Los Angeles' public financing and ethics ordinances and creation of the city ethics commission. The Center has also done studies and conceived of legislation in other. public policy areas. CGS was responsible for three statewide blue ribbon commissions, the California Commission on Campaign Financing, the California Citizens Budget Commission and the California Citizens Commission on Higher Education. The Center was a major force in creation of the Califorttia Channel, the statewide public affairs television network, and it operates Connect LA, an online resource center providing low income communities with inforntation about employment, health, child care, housing and government services. CGS' work is lazgely financed by grants from foundations. This pazticulaz project is funded by a grant from The James Irvine Foundation. 53 Alluvial Amnesia: Hnw O~ciaLs Imperil Communities by Downplaying Flnnd Risks Emmett Berg, Project Director Center for Governmental Studies 10951 W. Pico Blvd., Sui[e 120 Los Angeles. California 90064 P310-470-6590 F 310-475-3752 www.cgs.org Center for Governmental Studies Solutions for Democracy ,- Emmett Berg Bill Boyarsky LOSING GROUND: HOW TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES AND BALKANIZED GOVERNANCE PROP UP FtOMEBUILDING IN WILDFIRE AND FLOOD ZONES EMMETT BERG, Project Director and BILL BOYARSKY, Senior Consultant with LARA HOFFMAN, AMBER HEALY and JENNIFER LOZANO Center for Governmental Studies 1095! W. Pico Blvd., Suite l20 Los Mgeles, California 90064 310.470.6590 F 310.475.3752 www.ces.ore cen[er(c~ces.ore 2004 Center for Governmental Studies Solutions for Democracy Board of Directors Rocco C. Siciliano Chairman Tracy Westen Vice Chairman & CEO Robert Stern President Art Agnos Rebecca Avila Elizabeth Daley Rabbi Allen I. Freehling Aileen C. Hernandez Stephen D. Rountree Harold M. Williams The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS), founded in 1983, creates innovative political and media solutions to help individuals participate more effectively in their communities and governments. CGS uses research, advocacy, information technology and education to improve the fairness of governmental policies and processes, empower the underserved to participate more effectively in their communities, improve communication between voters and candidates for office, and help implement effective public policy reforms. Copyright ©2004 by the publisher, the Center for Governmental Studies. Single copies of this publication are available from CGS. The Cen[er for Governmental Studies grants permission to copy and distribute this publication, with acknowledgement ojthe Center for Governmental Studies as its source. ABOUT CGS The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan Los Angeles-based organization. Established in 1983, CGS is known for its studies on governance reform, including campaign finance, ballot initiatives and judicial elections. Its efforts in writing new laws include Los Angeles' public financing and ethics ordinances and creation of the city's ethics commission. CGS organized three statewide blue ribbon commissions, the California Commission on Campaign Financing, the California Citizens Budget Commission and the Califomia Citizens Commission on Higher Education. CGS created the California Channel, the statewide public affairs television network, and the Democracy Network, a national online system of voter information. CGS operates Connect LA, an online resource center providing low income communities with information about employment, health, childcare, housing and government services. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Responsibility for the findings and recommendations in this report rests with the authors, but credit is due in no small part to public agency personnel and private individuals to whom we turned again and again for guidance and support. CGS issued numerous Public Records Act requests and found agencies generally open and willing to provide documents. When documents could not be located, retired and former officials stepped into the breach to provide valuable insight and institutional knowledge. CGS also acknowledges the valuable contributions made by three interns on the Foothills Project. Lora Hoffman researched and helped prepare capsule reports on 14 communities. Amber Healy contributed research to Chapter One, Alluvial Amnesia, and unearthed the legislative history of the Califomia F. A.I.R. Plan Association, aquasi-public insurance authority. Jennifer Lozano collected supporting data. [n addition, we recognize Tracy Westen, CGS Chief Executive Officer, and Bab Stem, CGS President, for their editing, advice and project oversight. Finally, CGS staff contributed much appreciated time and energy, including Rebecca Schwaner, graphics, layout and design; Pau] Ryan, election law counsel; Raymond Uyemura and Miesha Watson, technical; and Janice Roberts and Saidiah Johnson, administrative. CGS' work is largely financed by grants from foundations. This project has been generously supported by a grant from The James Irvine Foundation of San Francisco. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The James Irvine Foundation. The James Irvine Foundation is an independent grantmaking foundation dedicated to enhancing the social, economic and physical quality of life throughout Califomia, and to enriching the State's intellectual and cultural environment. The Foundation was established in 1937 by James Irvine, the Califomia pioneer whose 110,000-acre ranch in Southern California was among the largest privately owned land holdings in the State. With assets of 51.5 billion, the Foundation makes grants of approximately S66 million annually for the people of California. For more information, please visit www.irvine.ore. Additional funding was provided by the David Schwartz Foundation of New York City. Table of Contents About CGS Acknowledgements INTRODUCTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FINDINGS Flood Control: Locally Zoned, U.S. Taxpayer Owned Paying for Wildland Fire Control Guaranteed Property Insurance in Fireprone Areas Governance: Isolated Cities, Common Cosu RECOMMENDATIONS Flood Related Wildfire Related Insurance Related Govemance Related Chapter l: Floods 7 8 9 10 ll 12 13 14 ALLUVIAL AMNESIA: How Offlcials Imperil Communities 15 by Downplaying Flood Rfsks Mulholland and the St. Francis Dam Disaster 15 Alluvial Primer 18 Deer Creek 19 What Experu Say About Flood Safety at Deer Creek 20 The Quiet Battle Over Los Osos High School 22 What the Corps Says 24 Where the Issue Stands Today 28 Origins of Development: The 'Model Colony'. 30 Floods and Funding 32 Voters Reject Locally Financed Flood Control 35 Controversy Emerges 35 Negative Skew 36 The Man Who Made a Flood Disappear 36 The Perfect Storm 40 'A Slumbering Volcano' 41 California Looks the Other Way 42 Uninterested Locals 44 Affordable Views with Blinds Drawn Over History 46 Against the Flow 47 The Corps Takes Offense 48 Safety Set Aside 50 Schools Tha[ Could Not Be Stopped 50 What One Citizen Can Do 52 2004 Deer Creek Updates 53 Flood Plain Recommendations 54 Form Alluvial Districts 56 Expand the 'Sphere of Influence' Concept to Include Flood Risks 57 Convene the National Academies of Science to Bring Closure 58 to the Deer Creek Controversy Increase the Disclosure Standard for School Construction 59 Chapter I1: Wild Fires SMOLDERING SUBSIDIES: Why Wildfire Policies Worsen Losses 61 Foreword 61 Inconsistent Federal Policy 61 Summary of Subsidies 62 Los Angeles County Fire Department 64 Where's Wildfire 65 The Early Years 66 Small Fire Districts and County Fire Stations 68 FundinE Cuts Spur Budget Consolidation 69 How Wildfire Money Became Automatic 71 How is the Money Spent? 73 Hot Spots 75 Los Angeles County Recommendations 76 State Responsibility Areas 77 Building Homes in SRA 78 Why the State Took Responsibility in the First Place 80 Urban Counties Demand Inclusion into SRA 81 War Footing Made Permanent 82 State of California Recommendations 83 Lakewood Plan and Contract Cities 84 `Progeny of a Sweetheart Marriage' 84 Claremont Fire Services Study 85 tv Contract City Recommendations 89 Why Subsidies Stay Hidden 90 Mitigation: Fees, Brush Clearance, FireSafe Design 92 Less Subsidy for New Development Expected 92 Wisdom of the Ancients 93 Brush Clearance's Giant Footprint 93 Ways to Go 95 Mitigation Recommendations 96 Chapter I11: Insurance EQUITABLE BUILDING? Wlldflre Insurance and the F.A.I.R. Plan 97 How the F.A.I.R. Plan Works 99 F.A.I.R.'s Impact on Development 1 O l Does F.A.I.R. force Flatlanders to Subsidize Hillsiders? 102 F.A.I.R. Plan Recommendations 102 Chapter IV: Governance CHECKERBOARD GOVERNANCE: The Foothills Communltles 103 The Problem: Fragmented Government 103 Consequences of Home Rule in Action 105 An Example: Gentrifying Azusa 105 How Local Decisions Have Regional Impact 107 Trials and Tribulations of Regional Agencies 1 10 Rivers and Mountains Conservancy 1 1 1 Can't We All Get Along? 1 12 Snapshot of Home Rule: Glendora 1 13 Pride of the Foothills 1 13 Glendora Politics 1 1 5 Retum of Wal-Mart 1 1 5 Triple Recall 1 16 Election Night Interviews 1 19 Interviews with Recall Opponents 1 19 Doctor's Diagnosis 1 10 Other Interviews with Recall Proponents 122 v `At 20 homes, a lawsuit is cheaper' 123 Get Out of My Town 124 Recommends[ions for Glendora 124 Appendix CAPSULE REPORTS ON 14 FOOTHILLS COMMUNITIES 127 La Canada Flintridge 127 Altadena 128 Sierra Madre ~ 129 Arcadia 130 Monrovia 1 30 Bradbury 131 Duarte 132 Azusa 132 Glendora 133 San Dimas 134 La Verne 135 Claremont 136 Upland 137 Rancho Cucamonga 138 CGS PUBLICATIONS 8i REPORTS 139 vt INTRODUCTION Since the late 1800s, when settlement of the Los Angeles area began in earnest, the San Gabriel Mountains have formed an imposing northern obstacle to urban and suburban growth. Occasionally snowcapped but more often hidden by smog, the mountains rise in several places more than a vertical mile above the Los Angeles basin, cloud-ripping and wind-channeling topography that can transform annual rain and windstorms into destructive floods and wildfires. While most development is ' restricted in the barren San Gabriel mountain highlands, especially inside the 697,000-acre Angeles National Forest, the more lush, chaparral-covered foothill slopes of the San Gabriels now support thousands of homes, many of them in gated residential developments. The Foothills, as they are known, have long been wilderness havens for urban dwellers, within a comparatively short driving distance to job centers such as downtown Los Angeles. The Foothill communities, all 14 of which CGS surveyed for this report,t have distinct histories but in large part trace their founding to the breakup of Spanish colonial land grants following California statehood in 1850. t: Y ea t 4~ M1+~a t ,, n z ~~~ ~ ~ r 1~ ~~ ~. C .y' Fil ' ~~ ~~~ 3ia ~ 4~6 ( t ~'tt4 it ~i~~j t`yl;£ ~.xT _v ~' rt '.? ~~ i 3 ,i ;,t ~' ,arppf~.t t -~ ti~ ~ ;~ a 4~pi Y ~ ~ '."-J iL ,/~ Y "~} - C 1 _ , t. Y n~ i ' `11 ~T ~ M .ryn~ 1 i «~ SOS W O l~ ~~ {,~ Y~ H t t~ b G ~+ ''~ Y v±. .~- ~ a o- ~ 7y' i ~~t j~yc `~i `!~ ix` rsr~x =~- si"h r, t ~~ 8 .tP ~' ~ Y. -~ F ~ F ~ ~h ~ ~ c~r 7 y9~.y~ s c.~.-~ctt ~sr:` . ii y { ,_ ~~ F San~GabrielMountamr + r~ ',was ~4~.,r,.(./~ r~~ yI ~e, ~ ~- ~ .. r0 -- 3.,.1 ,?. S-,.r I r~ ~ ~~,~~ft ~ ~ y~ ~° a ~s t ~ s ~~ ,. t n , , ~ ~ v }fr~'V S ~ o ~ a.~ "~i r is L. Fig. 1. Location of San Gabriel Mountains. Communities began to form as early as 1885, when the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad started service to Los Angeles, thus entering into competition with the Southern Pacific Railroad, which had tracks extending northward [o Oakland. A fare war, population influx and speculative land boom commenced.2 ~ La Canada Flintridge, Altadena, Arcadia, Sierra Madre, Monrovia, Duarte, Bradbury, Azusa, Glendora, San Dintas, La Verne, Claremont, Upland and Rancho Cucamonga. ~ Reimer, Marc. A Daneerous Place: California's Unsettline Fate. Pantheon: New York, 2003. p. 24. A man named Monroe founded Monrovia. He did it by purchasing a few acres and building himself a house, which he called a town. The land was barren. Above it was the mile-and-a-half-high, nearly vertical wall of the San Gabriel Range, some of the youngest mountains on earth, which sent down floods, mud, gravel, trees, thousand- ton boulders, and uphill homes during torrential winter storms. Monrovia lots measuring fitty by one hundred fifty feet sold out [at] a hundred dollars a [parcel]. Another man bought a piece of outlying nowhere, named it after Glendora, his wife, and in one day sold off three hundred lots.3 The msh to buy land foreshadowed the contemporary crunch for housing. By the spring of 1888, however, the region's first big bubble burst. The banks that had sustained [the boom], often with usurious five-day notes, caught a chill and stopped lending money for any transaction outside the heart of [Los Angeles proper]....Some laid-out~towns never materialized; others-Monrovia and Glendora-were repopulated by coyotes and jackrabbits. Orchards that had fallen into the hands of waitresses and policemen and clerks wenTto ruin. By the end of 1888, the assessed valuation of Los Angeles County dropped to 820 million from an earlier assessment of 863 million.° Despite the turnabout, growth returned in ever-greater exponents. Financiers provided the cash, and the lack of flood control systems or organized fire protection did not stop the constant flow of speculators, settlers and farmers. In the mostly uninhabitable hills above, Congress set aside land in 1892 for a timber reserve which would in 1903 become the Angeles National Forest.5 The early days were a matter of holding on against the elements. Nine of the 12 Los Angeles County citiesb sited along the base of the San Gabriel Mountains were incorporated prior to the formation of the Los Angeles County Flnod Control District in 191 ~ and decades before imported water arrived from the Owens Valley and Colorado River. The nine cities also predated Los Angeles County's creation in 191 I of a Board of Forestry, one of the forerunners to the county Fire Department. The rapid settlement of the foothills, initiated before the era of the motorcar, was aided by the Pacific Electric "red cars" and the Santa Fe railway, which connected the newer cities to each other and across miles of open land to Los Angeles. While Southern California tract homes and strip malls have been maligned for their sameness, the environs of early Los Angeles also were not much to look ar. Since the countryside had a paucity of native trees and other greenery, the vista was often not the most pleasing of scenes to the eyes of incoming tourists [or] local ~ Id. a[ 27. ° Id. at 29. s The Angeles National Forest, a title signifying a larger purpose for public forested lands than timber extraction alone, was created from the federal San Gabriel Timber Reserve first set aside by President Benjamin Hanson in 1892. e Monrovia, 1887; Pasadena, 1896; Azusa, 1898; Arcadia, 1903; La Verne, 1906; Glendale, 1906; Claremont, 1907; Sierra Madre, 1907; and Glendora, 191 I. residents as they traveled from town to town. Grass and brush fires burned largely unchecked, often for days at a time, adding further to the barrenness of the summer and fall months. Then rainfall during the following winter would wash out the roads and bury the farms and ranches in mud and silt. Communities grew as developers purchased and subdivided land, often without the infrastructure required for such building. This oversight proved deadh~ when cyclical disasters struck. Altadena, in the San Gabriel Mountain foothills adjacent to Pasadena, was hit by the devastating Kinneloa fire in 1993, which resulted in civilian and firefighter fatalities-and the loss of 155 homes. The Los Angeles County Fire Department's official report on the fire describes the impact: To fully understand human-enhanced factors that effected structure loss during [the Kinneloa Fire], we must go back in history to the 1920's. The areas involved were developed originally as weekend getaways for Los Angeles residents [and] consisted mainly of isolated cabins. As time has passed the areas have gradually evolved into year round residences, situated in a high fire hazard area, plagued with substandard roads and virtually nonexistent emergency access.s In some places, fire trucks could not navigate narrow roads with overhanging canopies of burning vegetation, nor could they access water sources due to malfunctioning pumps. OfScials implemented stricter fire codes in the aftermath of the Kinneloa and Old Topanga fires, not quite in time for many unprepared homeowners. Today, according to the 2000 Census, approximately 567,709 people live in the San Gabriel Mountains foothills communities, including the unincorporated township of Altadena and the cities of La Canada Flintridge, Sierra Madre, Arcadia, Monrovia, Duarte, Bradbury, Azusa, Glendora, San Dimas, La Verne, Claremont, Upland and Rancho Cucamonga. See the map on the next page (Fig. 2). ~ Boucher, David. Ride the Devil Wind, Fire Publications: BeIlFlower, CA. 1991, p. 3. s County of Los Angeles Fire Department. O~cia! Report Kinneloa Incident. p. 33. T N 0 0 c a m H 7 n m 3 m p D m ,. 'i- ° oo ON A ~ z ~y3L'7 ~ FI ~a o ~ iTn m ~ ~ i # f ] I ' n, ~'pi~ .~ o a J,. z 1 ~, r a .-1, x 'o ~'a 7 / :,~ a~/ z is 1 3 N.:G ' ~ tD N '~ ~4' / 6w 1f~ 1 ~ ~~ 6 x ''~ ~~ 'Q N ~ ~4~rc~~ ~ j Q_+ ~-.~k~{iz: X 1 w (ZD ~ ~~~ I6 `3~'ra: ~ ~3"i p"`~,~~t x '< uF~ IL~i'S ~}_ ~ O ~~\g ,s r 4' \ u '•.Gt ~a' Y~~d.Q tix~l O \i M N ~ 3 I ~/~3t ' --~~~ ~ { ~~Gt ~2 -, I ac } f~ l , t ~f'+~ 1 ,{~~i I' ~~ ~tY y.5 ~K{~~ , ~ yS f ~~ .P iro ~ ! t1 ~'t 1 ~'S ~ i c iV e~ ~ u z` ~ r m 1 ~ ~ I 1 4 1 x x $N D ~. . 1~ ` a~„~~ ` I < 0 3 _ ~'3 Z to i' _. e~ r'~ S o 3 n o~ ~ O ~ 1,' 1 W 2~ 7~'.]I g ~ ~ ~J4 ~ '. ~r~'S ~s 1 ,i+ m '~ L 1 4 - T, rM~ -~- }~+( / L ~ a nonin L j ~ ~'~7I _",' it~ M m~ {~~`~sz~~^~t ~V(r 't ~ ~ ~ o Y t ~ ~ 3 ,m sx / t. i t m. (.a ~~ .I o n .~ I '. of z ~ i t {z~~ r'te' a.. ~ o ~ ' ~ ~~ ~i n.~o ~ A ~ 4 \\~ ~`~y t I J~ 1r a~~i 'y These communities are located within a 689 square-mile watershed. The watershed drains into the San Gabriel River, flows southward to Long Beach, and into the Pacific. The San Gabriel Mountains present natural challenges to developers and governments alike. This report proposes reopening the debate on public policies that have placed homes in harm's way, often with the financial backing of taxpayer subsidies that siphon tax money away from strained public coffers Although such a policy debate is necessary, it is often difficult to focus attention on the key issues. When fires and floods kill people and destroy residential areas, the disasters bring out heavy television news broadcasts and print media coverage. But once the danger has past, the media, always in search of something new, shows little interest in examining systemic or policy-based causes. Those involved in dry and fire-free year discussions of potential danger are treated like Henny Penny,.warning that the sky is falling. But the fires of 2003, along with many unexpected calamities before them, show the need for an understanding of the causes of fire and flood and the need to minimize their destruction. Homebuilding not only fulfills some of the California dream but is an important force in driving the state's economic growth. Government must support homebuilding rather than restrict it. Yet government has a basic responsibility to protect its residents and its environmeht. Inevitably, this produces conflict, which must be settled in the political arena, a process that has failed so far. The issues examined in this report resonate with issues in other high growth areas in California. Portions of two other California mountain ranges, the coastal ranges and the Sierra Nevada, whose foothills also border growing suburban areas, share the San Gabriels' nearness to urban centers. Hillside homebuilding continues up and down the state, but it is rarely examined as a phenomenon unto itself. That is the function of this report. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Twenty-two died in the October 2003 Southern Califomia wildfires, and more than a dozen also were killed tragically in flash floods on Christmas day. Striking again, the deadly cycle of fire and flood offered a tragic reminder that living in and around the mountain ranges and foothills add beauty but also an element of danger to life in Southern California. Development in dangerous areas was responsible for much of the devastation. Losine Ground uncovers the political history, legislation, bureaucracy and financing actions that over time have reconfigured public laws and resources to protect and serve the interests of the relatively few homeowners choosing to live on lands where fires and floods can be slowed but never stopped. The four main chapters of this report include surveys of three major public services (flood control, fire protection and insurance joint-underwriting authority) which influence and allow settlement of lands prone to fire and floods. The final chapter explores land use and governance topics (including a case study of the City of Glendora) drawing from information collected on individual cities and unincorporated communities situated along the base of the San Gabriel Mountains. Losine Ground also proposes a series of recommendations for action. Its goal is not to stop development but to enhance safety controls and to identify and, if possible, reduce the public subsidies discussed in this report. Flood Control: Locally Zoned, U.S. Taxpayer Owned The first subsidy and development scenario for homebuilding on disaster-prone lands is . described in Chapter I, Alluvial Amnesia: How Officials Imperil Communities by Downplaying Flood Risks. This chapter opens with a detailed reconstruction of the decisions, and non-decisions, that led to the construction of homes and a high school on a flood plain, protected by a flood control dam that qualified experts say is inadequate. The Deer Creek dam above Rancho Cucamonga, in western San Bernardino County, was designed and subsidized by the federal government through the efforts of local congressmen, including one who was appointed to be the top civilian official at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alluvial Amnesia is more than a warning flag for one community. CGS's investigation of the Deer Creek dam reveals subsidy and decisional patterns highly relevant to land development policy in other California wildfire and flood zones-especially the new growth zones outside highly urbanized Los Angeles County. Housing cannot easily exist in flood runoff areas. Without modern flood control methods, entire towns would be washed away. Creating stable societies in such hazardous areas requires dams and establishment of concrete riverbeds-costly investments for sparse-in- numbers country, folk to fund on their own. Local voters can finance dams on their own through assessments attached to property tax bills, but many voters have refused to authorize . such additional taxes, especially where federal flood control projects exist. Deer Creek is one of these instances.9 Despite the home building boom below Deer Creek and in other parts of western San Bernardino County, and widespread flooding in 1983, local voters in 1982 and 1983 turned down measures to finance flood control facilities some felt were necessary. Voters may have felt [ha[ the federal dam and concrete channel system built in the 197Os to hold back Deer Creek's floodwaters was enough on its own. History has a tendency to revise flood control systems, which are reliant on scientific estimates and limited in scope by economic indicators. The flood-proof dam of today can be overrun by a massive flood for which there is no precedent. A flood control system can fail to operate as expected, even in smaller floodwaters, such as above Glendora in January 1969. Science is evolving, and while if evolves, the sheer humanity stacked up behind dams grows with each new subdivision. To address these concerns, Los Angeles County officials are amid adecades-long initiative to upgrade, enlarge and modify their flood control facilities. But at Deer Creek, no one is really in charge, and so everyone will have to hope for the best. Alluvial Amnesia unearths the extraordinary topography of the San Gabriel Mountains, the historical record behind the construction of Deer Creek and the controversy that ensued when one private citizen hired a flood expert for a second opinion. Paying for Wildland Fire Control The second major subsidy for homebuilding on wild and hazardous lands is described in Chapter II, Smoldering Subsidies: How Wildfire Policies Worsen Losses. This chapter reveals the statutory mechanisms under which the State of California and Los Angeles County have tapped taxpayers to pay for µ ildland fire defense, thereby encouraging homebuilding in fire- prone areas. Laws originally drawn up to fund protection of forests are today being used to subsidize protection of homeowners on the wildland-urban interface.10 These subsidies are not listed in the various budget books in a section called "subsidies." Far example, nowhere in the Los Angeles County budget is found a clearly identifiable line entry for the S67 million a year allocated from the county general fund for brush fire fighting and suppression in hillside areas. Nor is this general fund allocation voted on each year when the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approves the budget. Nor must the fire department itemize its wildfire spending or return money to the general fund if it spends less than $67 million per year fighting wildfires. I 'One exception is Los Angeles Counry, where voters in 1915 voted to authorize formation of a countywide flood control district. 10 If you live near forests, chaparal stands or other kinds of wild vegetation, you live on the urban-wildland interface. tt Moreover, the federal government repays millions to local governments when major wildfires strike; the Los Angeles Counry Fire Department in 2003 proposed and won approval to lower a special taz on residents inside its fire~district, along the way noting that "unanticipated increases" in federal wildfire disaster reimbursement was one of the reasons for the tax Another example of a subsidy is the use of Califomia Department of Forestry fire fighters- originally assembled to protect timber stands from enemy attack in World War II-as suburban firefighters, battling house by house to save homes built in brush fire areas. A state fire plan implemented under duress during wartime has been twisted into a program to protect people and homes. The system of counties providing fire service to cities-inaugurated by Los Angeles County in the 1950s-has also created inequalities. Many cities receive greater value in fire services (fire stations, equipment, personnel) than the taxes they pay for these services; others receive less. Newer communities that incorporated after Proposition 13 provide more in tax revenue than they receive in fire protection services, according to a study commissioned by the City of Claremont. Finally, Smoldering Subsidies explores how government agencies have responded slowly in adapting to wildfire threats. Many thousands of homes have bumf down because of a preference for wooden shingle shake roofing. Modern improvements in building design; invented to lessen fire losses, have been opposed by developers as too costly. Brush clearance laws have been enacted without assessing the downstream adverse effects of denuding. And environmental regulations have slowed or prevented efforts to reduce fire fuels (brush, trees) near suburban communities, especially on state and federal lands. Guaranteed Property Insurance in Fireprone Areas Chapter III digs into the history of the Califomia F.A.I.R. Plan Association. (F.A.I.R. stands for Fair Access to Insurance Resources.) The F.A.I.R. Plan is ajoint underwriting authority designed to guarantee low-cost property insurance for homeowners in distressed areas identified by the Association and approved through the Califomia Department of Insurance. The F.A.I.R. Plan exists because of redlining in poor communities, especially where riots have occurred, such a.: in Watts in 1965. Association membership is mandatory for any company offering property insurance in California. In 1968, however, a state legislator set out to revise the F.A.LR. Plan's eligibility criteria. Homes in the affluent community of Bel Air had recently burned in a wildfire, and homeowners were worried they would fail to find affordable insurance. Bel Air Assemblyman Paul Priolo brokered changes to the F.A.I.R. Plan that conflated the risks faced by poorer urban areas with risks faced by more affluent people who can more easily choose where to live. As the years went by, the F.A.I.R. Plan mutated even further. From 1968 to 1997, insurers could earn financial rewards for writing policies in areas prone to brush fires, but there were no such credits for the insurers who wrote policies in urban areas. (The head of a company with a business focusing on inner-city areas discovered the inequality. He brought his objections to State Senator Art Torres, and Torres won passage of a bill in 1994 correcting Ca[. Source: Letter of Los Angeles County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman to [he Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, da[ed August 29, 2003. the uneven credit policy. It took three years for the correction to be implemented by the Department of Insurance, however.) Finally, former Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush even authorized the extension of eligibility for coverage [o houseboats-a far cry from the program's original intent. The F.A.I.R. Plan affects everyone in California who buys property insurance, since their carriers must belong to the F.A.I.R. Plan Association. Laws require F.A.I.R. Plan coverage to be affordable, but when wildfires strike, insurance claims flood in to the F.A.I.R. Plan. When its solvency is threatened due to the claims it is paying out, the F.A.I.R. Plan can assess all insurers in its association to make it solvent again-a financial liability the insurers pass on in higher premiums to policyholders. This is where subsidy is apparent. Despite its ability to designate areas as inner-city or subject to brushfires-designations that carry both stigmas and economic. ramifications-the F.A.I.R. Plan Association is protected by sections of state law that protect the Plan's financial records from public scrutiny. F.A.I.R. Plan administrators claim the secrecy is necessary to protect privacy, but the argument does not ring true. There is no stigmatism attached to insurance obtained through the F.A.I.R. Plan, such as might arise for a welfare recipient, for instance. (Celebrities such as basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar have received policies through the F.A.I.R. Plan.) Someone who gets insurance through the F.A.I.R. Plan may actually be spending their neighbors' money through increased premiums levied on homeowners who pay full price. Governance: Isolated Cities, Common Costs Chapter IV explains how a multitude of city and county governments and special districts have been incapable of dealing with the widespread regional impact of foothill development. Storm water, air pollution, traffic and habitat loss affect entire regions, yet the institutions created to deaf with these issues lack real power for coordinated enforcement. This chapter examines existing regional agencies and conservancies and the challenges they face, especially pertaining to the San Gabriel Mountains and its watershed. This chapter includes a case study and campaign finance analysis of Glendora, which experienced a recall election in March 2002. Glendorans were told their recall would determine the future of their picturesque foothills. A closer look reveals that whatever personality conflicts were afoot, individual elected leaders who promise a conservationist approach or tough laws governing development could be rebuffed and recalled when they opposed market forces-such as the arrival of a Wal Mart down the street, or increased demand for pricey homes in the hills. The chapter concludes with an appendix of development and zoning patterns gathered from 14 communities nestled below the San Gabriel Mountains: La Canada Flintridge, Altadena, Arcadia, Sierra Madre, Monrovia, Duarte, Bradbury, Azusa, Glendora, San Dimas, La Verne, Claremont, Upland and Rancho Cucamonga. to SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS Flood Related Reducing losses and abatingJlood dangers requires commitment ofscientif c expertise from the state government, greater accountability from local governments and increased participation by citizens. • The governor should order his Office of Planning and Research to map and legally define the historic boundaries of all alluvial fans-mountain flood zones-in the state, beginning with fans nearest to urban or high-growth areas. These maps should chart the location of floods through recorded history and describe what flood control installations are in place to protect communities. • State legislation should be passed to enable local formation of "alluvial districts," financed by an assessment on local property districts, with the authority to hold hearings on development encroaching upon alluvial fans. The districts should have a governing board comprised of appointees from state and local jurisdictions as well as at least one directly elected public representative. Alluvial districts should hold hearings on new development and include testimony and reports on the impact of potential flooding by county, city, state, school district and representatives of any other agency involved in the development. The proceedings of the hearings should be easily accessible to the public in the form of reports assessing flood risk and ways to mitigate the danger. Districts should be required to send these reports to property owners on alluvial fans. As an alternative to forming another layer of bureaucracy, the task of holding such hearings could be required of the local county board of supervisors. Guidelines in the legislation might prevent the supervisors from ignoring their responsibilities; for example, if an alluvial district's governing board failed to find that a new development was "reasonably safe for habitation" because of flood danger, the county board of supervisors would have to address the finding formally (usually called a mitigated negative declaration) to allow that development to proceed. These declarations should be reviewable in state court. State legislation should require school districts located fully or partially on alluvial fans to maintain locally available files on each new school construction project. This would allow members of the public to be aware of state agencies' assessment of flood threats without traveling to Sacramento to retrieve documents. This practice could be extended to all California school districts, as urban districts also face safety concerns related to new school construction. ii The Governor or the City of Rancho Cucamonga should request the National Academies of Science (NAS) to convene a definitive study on debris flows at Deer Creek and elsewhere in Southern California. If Rancho Cucamonga or the state provides $250,000 in seed money, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has already agreed to pay the balance of the cos[ for the NAS study, expected to be about S I million. Los Osos High School cost S48 million, but its location may be exposed to a destructive flood. Los Osos students and the residents of Deer Creek deserve to know flood dangers if they truly exist. Wildfire -Related State and local governments must come to grips with the new reality of widespread residential development in lands subject to repeated wildfires Reform should begin by revisiting laws already on the books. The Legislature should initiate a study of the role of the California Department of Forestry in firefighting in light of its increased activities in suburban instead of purely wildland areas. The study should examine the extent to which local homeowners and govetnments should pay for firefighting costs in the wildland-urban interface. Revising the department's role is a complex subject requiring consensus. The legislature, in tackling it, should form a select two house committee with representation from relevant committees and include legislators from affected areas. The committee should hold hearings in affected areas. • Faster-growing counties should examine ways to encourage consolidation of small fire districts, as has been done in Los Angeles County. The runaway San Diego frre, battled by several undermanned fire departments, demonstrated the need for consolidation of resources and command. • Property owners and developers in the urban-wildland interface should be required to shoulder more of the financial burdens of firefighting facilities in their area. This is a complex issue because suburban wildfires affect not only homes but recreational areas used by everyone. • The Legislature should examine the possibility of establishing a hazard tax for high risk fire areas in State Responsibility Areas, which would replace the regressive parcel tax now under consideration by the Califomia Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. • The Legislature should devise criteria to determine the full costs of suburban-style development in wildfire-prone lands. Criteria could include fire history, insurance rating and density, among others. Local fire departments, the California Department of Forestry and the Federal Emergency Management Agency should also provide a 12 cost assessment of model development, creating a guide forjurisdictions as they decide land use questions. Given the wildfire history of a particular area, how much public resources might a new development require? Such information could appear in environmental impact reviews. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors should provide a true picture of its firefighting budget, breaking down the costs of forest and brush firefighting and urban firefighting. The supervisors should end the practice of diverting to the county fire department more than $60 million a year from the general fund, financed by all county taxpayers, without debate or a vote. The county fire department budget request should be put on the table, with budget requests from other departments, and debated, as is now the case with budgets from the sheriff s department, the district attorney and other county departments that are responsible for public safety. Insurance Related The state government should consider phasing out an inszrance program that since 1968 has granted insurance coverage at below market cost to homeowners in affluent neighborhoods such as Bel Air and Malibu. • The California Department of Insurance should disclose neighborhood locations of F.A.I.R. Plan-brokered policies and their general liability to determine the costs of providing insurance to homes in suburban fire risk areas. • The California Department of Insurance should order a study on the environmental impact of the F.A.I.R. Plan's brush clearance policies. Governance Related The state government should provide creative incentives to local government to encourage responsible development and diminish inter jurisdictional rivalries. A state constitutional amendment should be passed to authorize creation of regional districts, along the lines of those proposed by former Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg's regional study commission, that would allow local governments to combine into joint-power-authority districts with the power to sell bonds, ask voters for approval of tax increases and provide for regional planning of projects with region-wide impact, such a large housing tract or an auto mall. The power to raise local taxes~and sell bonds would be a carrot to persuade local governments to take up the tough task of beginning to regulate development along regional lines. The district boundaries should be based on watersheds, whenever possible. Such districts would preserve local contrbl while addressing the increasing regionalization of California problems. 13 The Legislature should rejuvenate California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) environmental impact reports by mandating provisions for economic impact reviews for new development tracts, even for as few as 10 homes. These reports are crucial to public consideration of development projects, but over the years the process has been, in effect, privatized. Reports are now financed by and prepared by developers through consultants. Local planning departments approve CEQA-mandated reports but rarely challenge developers' preparation of them. The process needs more public scrutiny by government regulators. Reports should address safety threats, such as the potential for fire and flood. They should examine regional implications of a project instead of dealing only with [he impact within a city or even a neighborhood. CEQA should be amended to require the listing and location of a new development's impact on neighboring jurisdictions. Neighboring jurisdictions affected by such external impacts (e.g. water pollution, straining of fire resources) would be officially notified and given 60 days to issue comments with the local jurisdiction in which a new development is proposed. to Chapter I ALLUVIAL AMNESIA: HOW OFFICIALS IMPERIL COMMUNITIES BY DOWNPLAYING FLOOD RISKS Mulholland and the St: Francis Dam Disaster [n 1928, William Mulholland, the famed Los Angeles Department of Water and Power engineer, testified in a coroner's inquest that he had inspected and pronounced safe a leaking dam the very day before its collapse triggered the worst human-caused disaster in California history. Mulholland was being questioned under oath by a district attorney seeking a scapegoat for the hundreds of deaths that resulted when St. Francis Dam gave way and sent 12 billion gallons of water surging down the Santa Clara Valley on March 12, 1928. Mulholland argued in his own defense that the visible leaks were inconsequential. He was technically correct but at the same time dissembling. New dams do leak clear water, but not the "brown" water that reveals, as it did at St. Francis, that rushing water was eating away at the foundation of the dam.. 15 Fig. 3. Deer Creek alluvial Flood plain. Cucamonga Peak rises more than a vertical mile above Rancho Cucamonga. but only 4 miles away. The citizen jury assembled for the inquest ultimately held Mulholland and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power responsible for the disaster, but no criminal charges were ever pursued.12 The old engineer's legacy was tarnished. Mulholland Reservoir was renamed Hollywood Reservoir and disguised by landscaping. The former site of St. Francis Dam and its flood path have been born again as San Francisquito Canyon. Geologists studying the scene 60 years later surmised that St. Francis dam failed because one side was built upon an ancient landslide-a critical flaw Mulholland had no way of recognizing, given methods at the time. Still, the story of Mulholland and the St. Francis Dam should give us pause today. Even in modem times, flooding forces engineers to question their computations and expectations. The science of recording, predicting and preventing floods requires mastery of complex mathematics, but an engineer's job is far more than plugging in formulas. Flood control projects never completely eliminate the risk of floods. Mother Nature still reigns supreme and defends her title regularly. The goal in designing flood control projects is to "manage the risk" as effectively as possible. This means that government will either try to protect its citizens from flooding or, if it can not do that, it will prohibit them from developing property in the danger zone, compel them to buy flood insurance or condemn their property altogether. Managing the risk means that the government minimizes, not eliminates, risks. It designs its flood control projects knowing that alarger-than expected flood could overrun the system and endanger safety. Some floods are so large the conditions triggering them only occur approximately every 125, 500 or 1,000 years. The government has learned that people do not want to foot the cost of building titanic, visually unappealing structures to guard against these super floods, even if it were possible. Flood victims, of course, do not often see this distinction, but engineers must boil down society's amorphous stance on floods into actual blueprints. This takes years, and it mostly happens behind the closed doors of the responsible agency. Designing dams, channels, levees and flood debris basins is a balancing act, using a combination of scientific methods to predict the intensity and frequency of floods, modifying the size of projects depending on the level of safety required and the amount of money available, satisfying environmental and ~= Cowan, Geoffrey. "The Man Who Brought the Water," Los Angeles Times, Iuly 25, 1993. 16 Fig. 4. William Mulholland taught himself the engineering skills he would later use to direct construction of the Las Angeles aqueduct. other regulations, appeasing community representatives and contracting with local businesses for the construction work. For all their challenges, flood control projects are bona fide catalysts for economic growth. Just as the Mulholland-designed Los Angeles Aqueduct enabled settlement and agriculture on arid land, flood control projects can transform flood-prone land into home and school sites for the next wave of suburban immigration. Yet the visible signs of earlier floods are often Underneath the homes are the stacked bones hard to detect or erased by new developments, and passersby of 1,000 Floods. can beforgiven if they fail to notice flood control efforts. Near the eastern end of the San Gabriel Mountains, where Deer Creek enters the valley floor, flood control channels snake through gated communities with names like Haven View and Rancho Cucamonga V. Stucco fences and attractive shrubbery hide the concrete ditches designed to channel floodwaters. A low wall of sandbags on the northern periphery of one development might be mistaken for just another gardening project. A mile downstream on Deer Creek; in older single-family neighborhoods, the city has built extra-high curbs to use the streets as flood control channels. The families living there include many first-time homebuyers with big mortgages but no mandated flood insurance. Underneath the homes are the stacked bones of 1,000 floods. Fumre deluges, however, must rain down upon abuilt-up landscape of sod, steel and pavement. The concrete channels of flood control projects, coupled with paved roads, buildings and other impervious manmade surfaces, whisk away precipitation that otherwise naturally percolates into the ground. The shakeup in the natural cycle causes diminished water quality, depleted aquifers and eradicated wildlife habitat. Velocity is another major drawback; while roughhewn open land can disrupt and slow running water, flowing water encounters little resistance on pavement. A full-grown man can step out of his car into four inches of water flowing down a street and be swept a dozen miles away to his death. And sometimes dams like St. Francis collapse. This chapter, 75 years after Mulholland's nadir, investigates a little known Southern California flood control controversy as an illustration of how distaste for accountability and public debate within every level of government has generated extraordinary decisions that reputable experts say threaten public safety. Consulting engineers, including those who represent the State of California and Los Angeles World Airports, have voiced unanswered concerns about the Army Corps of Engineers' flood control project on Deer Creek. Private sector engineers who have studied the project say it is dangerously undersized to the point of threatening 20,000 homes, two schools, a college campus and nearly one hundred thousand people in western San Bernardino County east of Los Angeles. Most at risk may be a half-dozen subdivisions in Rancho Cucamonga built in the last two decades along the western shore of Deer Creek. Also clearly threatened are middle-income homes and apartments that line Deer Creek for miles. (Experts warn that nobody can predict with total accuracy the path of a rampaging flood.) it The critics' main target is Joseph Evelyn, Professional Engineer, a 32-year civilian employee of the Army Corps in its Los Angeles District. He does not share many similarities with Mulholland, the larger-than-life Irishman who taught himself how to be an engineer and then paved the way for modern Los Angeles. But like Mulholland, Evelyn is a powerful engineer backed by a powerful agency, the Army Corps of Engineers. Evelyn's initial connection to the controversial flood control project on Deer Creek was in 1970 as a young engineer repackaging and coordinating the field wnrk.of other colleagues. (The project was completed by 1983.) Over the decades, Evelyn advanced to become chief of hydrology and hydrologic engineering for the Los Angeles District of the Army Corps of Engineers. In 1997 Evelyn became the Corps spokesman on Deer Creek matters. ~ . For Mulholland, failure at St. Francis became a dark footnote to a storied career. If Evelyn and his colleagues have made wrong decisions about the Corps' flood control project on Deer Creek, they too may win an unfortunate place in history as another public agency deemed responsible for preventable deaths. Alluvial Primer Floods near mountain canyons act differently than those in river valleys. The potent mix that bursts out of canyons into the flatlands below contains water mixed with boulders, logs, dirt and sand, collectively called debris. The geographical features that result from this sort of flooding are called "alluvial fans." Miles-wide, alluvial fans appear to rise cone-shaped hundreds of feet from the valley floor: People mistake them for foothills but the alluvial fans actually represent the accumulated flood debris of eons. They are scattered all over the American West. As water expert Art Bruington has written, "the alluvial cone feature so evident at the foot of every canyon emanating from the San Gabriel and San Bernardino mountains, including Deer Canyon, is startling proof that massive fire-flood sequences have happened in the past, and there is no reason to expect that they will not continue to occur in the future." There are only two ways for society to deal with flooding on or below alluvial fans. The first method is time-tested: stay away and build in a safer place. Society's manmade solution is called a debris basin. Such basins are large excavated areas dug out of the mouths of canyons and braced by a low dam. As floodwaters and debris pour out of a canyon during a flood, the basin is designed to catch and store the debris (rocks, logs, etc.) while allowing the water to escape down a flood channel, usually lined with concrete to prevent erosion. Without a basin in place, the tumbling boulders and other debris from a flood could blast houses off their foundations, rip away bridges, destroy streets and kill people. 78 Fig. 5. Joseph Evelyn, Chief of Hydrology and Hydrologic Engineering, Anny Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles Distdcl. Behind Evelyn is Deer Creek debris basin and the flanks of Cucamonga Peak. Fig. 6. The Flow of debris, plan view. The debris basin is designed to trap rocks, logs and mud but allow water to escape in concrete-lined flood control channels. According to engineer John Cassidy, the Deer Creek debris basin and channel system are solidly built, just too small. The proclivity in the San Gabriel Mountains for torrential rainfall, seismically shattered rock and forest fires makes Deer Creek and other nearby streams likely candidates for major flooding. But the real danger, according to critics, is that the Army Corps of Engineers' debris basin and reinforced concrete channel on Deer Creek offer the illusion of safety when, they say, little exists. Deer Creek The most controversial Army Corps of Engineers project in Southern California, according to the Washington Post,13 is on little known Deer Creek above the city of Rancho Cucamonga in western San Bernardino County. A trickle most of the year, Deer Creek rages when weather systems blow in from the Pacific. The rocky San Gabriel Mountains, rising more than a vertical mile above Rancho Cucamonga but only four miles away, literally rip holes in storm clouds, sending rushing waters over seismically unstable and sometimes wildfire- scorched earth. Records from the 19th century note several large floods in the area, the largest of them in 1862. The last great flood was in the winter of 1969, when two storms a month apart caused 11 deaths.14 ~~ Carps Controversial Projects, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&content[d=A3824 t-2000Sep8&notFound=true 1° The 1969 Floods also introduced ofTicials to the dangers of multiple storm events. Workers were unable to clear away debris from a January Flood when a second, smaller flood occurred about a month later. Floodwaters combined with debris from two floods caused widespread destruction of property. 19 The Deer Creek debris basin and concrete channel are among flood control projects the Corps designed in the comparatively drier decades that followed. From the mouth of Deer Canyon, where the Army Corps of Engineers debris basin was constructed, the boxy concrete walls of Deer Creek leading away from the basin resemble a long waterslide into Rancho Cucamonga a few miles below. Like other parts of the San Gabriel Valley, orderly streets and housing developments have replaced rows of citrus trees. During a September 25, 2002 special field trip to the Deer Creek debris basin, several dozen members of a task force assembled by Governor Gray Davis [o study floodplain management pondered a question one official offered up: "Would I buy a home there?" There was no consensus. What Experts Say About Flood Safety at Deer Creek Douglas Hamilton, an environmental engineer with the consulting firm Exponent Failure Analysis who was retained by a local homeowner, said of his first visit to Deer Creek debris basin: "I stood on the spillway and looked up and I knew within five seconds there was a huge problem."15 Hamilton said his extensive research on Deer Creek has only confirmed his initial reaction. Professional Engineer John Cassidy, a consultant [o Ontario airport owner Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), has warned repeatedly that the Deer Creek debris basin and the is In[erview with Douglas Hamilton, September 17, 2002. 20 Fig. 7. Hills above Rancho Cucamonga rise steeply from less than 2,000 feel above sea level to almost 9,000 feet. channel emptying it are both too small. Cassidy has worked for the Army Engineers and helped design dams around the world for engineering giant Bechtel. He was hired to study flood control on Deer Creek because it flows underneath Ontario's runways a dozen miles below the Deer Creek debris basin. The airport agency is concerned that a lack of flood protection may threaten Ontario International Airport, which the agency hopes to expand to_relieve pressure on Los Angeles International Airport. "The [flood control] structures themselves are well designed and well built," he said. "They just don't have fhe level of protection that the Corps said would be provided.'>l6 _ After reading Cassidy's report, Robert Johnson, Los Angeles World Airports deputy executive director, criticized the Army Engineers for dragging their feet on mounting concerns over safety. In a May 10, 2002 letter to state Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, whose agency oversees the Department of Water Resources, he wrote, "The agency responsible for the initial design [the Corps] is apparently the same agency continuing to lead the rebuttal of a growing body of contrary opinion. We believe that [the state's investigation] was limited and greatly hampered by the tactics of the Corps and the U.S. Geological Survey. LAWA is not interested in escalating this matter further at the state level but we simply cannot ignore our obligation to protect [Ontario airport] and its tenants." Water experts have crossed swords with the Corps over 'One thing no one's addressing the Deer Creek controversy, sometimes at peril to their on Deer Creek is safety and careers. "I blew the whistle and I was fired,"l~ said health. This is more than that. - This is an unsafe dam.' Massoud Rezakhani, a hydrology expert who re- -Massoud Rezakhani examined flood zone hazard mapping below Deer Creek debris basin in 2000 for a firm under contract to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). "One thing no one's addressing on Deer Creek is safety and health. This is more than that. This is an unsafe dam." Is Rezakhani was a consulting technical engineer for the Governor's Floodplain Management Task Force. 1B Interview with John Cassidy, September 20, 2002. ~~ Interview with Massoud Rezakhani, September 26, 2002. in Homeowners living below Deer Creek debris basin had asked FEMA to investigate the new potential for flooding if an existing levee was tom down. The agency responded eventually by hiring Michael Baker Cory. to investigate the matter. When Baker's employee, Rezakhani, told the homeowners his fine would criticize the Army Engineers' Flood control design methods, he was terminated within days. Rezaldtani has sued for wrongful termination. FEMA later refused to change the flood zone maps. The unfavorable diagnosis Rezakhani allegedly "leaked"-a criticism of the Army Cotps' local Flood prediction methods-never became part of the public record. 21 Fig. 8. Deer Creek Debris basin and concrete spillway. Note residential development at left. Two dry channels of Deer Creek are visible at the bottom of the photo. At top, pond-shaped catchment basins flanking the spillway store water in wet years (or recharge to underground aquifers. Dan James, a senior civil engineer for Rancho Cucamonga, balked at a private developer's plan in the mid-1990s to build a debris basin to protect two parcels of less than an acre each at a cul-de-sac directly below the mouth of a canyon adjoining Deer Creek. The developer was using a new version of Army Engineers methodology developed inside the Corps' Los Angeles District for predicting the severity of future floods. But for James, the method was untested and "didn't sit right," he said. His recommendation for a larger margin of safety derailed the entire project. "I believe using [the Corps method] would place an extreme burden on the City of Rancho Cucamonga," James wrote in a March 16, 1995 letter. "The method's founding agency and our County's flood control district have not designed a facility utilizing [the applicable Corps method]. Until one of these agencies is willing to put their...stamp on a design, the City is not willing to approve.'>I9 Public officials such as Los Angeles World Airports deputy executive director Johnson have been vocal in repeated calls for a study from an independent nationwide scientific body, the National Academies of Science (NAS). Engineers not associated with the Corps, including a water expert with the California Department of Water Resources, have mentioned convening the National Academies of Science, but for a wider purpose: they want the scientific community to scrutinize how the Corps predicts floods in the American southwest. _ . Finally, Robert Kirby, a former Corps hydrologic engineer who contributed to the design of the Deer Creek project, has testified that in the 1960s "little was known of debris production," and the engineering community later realized it had failed to incorporate an extra measure of protection to handle multiple storms, such as the two floods a month apart in 1969 that swamped western San Bernardino County and killed 11. Kirby said officials used the best scientific methods available when designing Deer Creek's debris basin, but the project that resulted was still too small. "I strongly believe that these inadequacies need to be addressed immediately, and all future construction halted until viable solutions are identified and implemented."20 The Quiet Battle Over Los Osos High School In June 2000 the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) warned against providing state funds for the $48 million Los Osos high school project near Deer Creek because it lacked a proper flood evacuation plan. "The lack of dam failure inundation maps...is a substantial impediment to a full and considered evaluation of the schools in question... [P]rudence would dictate further action by the Department of Education in approving these schools be suspended until dam failure inundation maps are available and the reported discrepancies in the capacity of the Deer Creek basin are resolved," Director Dallas Jones wrote in a letter to Superintendent of Public Instruction Delaine Eastin.21 is March 16, 1995 letter from Dan James, City of Rancho Cucamonga Senior Civil Engineer, [o Richard O. Massaro. 20 Declaration of Robert G. Kirby, taken at Rancho Cucamonga, CA on April 24, 2000. ~~ Emphasis added. From Joncs's letter to Eastin, dated June 6, 2000. 22 CGS's investieation shows that Jones' concerns were never fully addressed or even alluded to in the schools' official project approval documents. However, at least one Department of Education official was present at Senator Dianne Feinstein's office in San Francisco on March 11, 2001. That was the day when representatives from federal, state and local agencies sat down with interested members of the public to begin the task of evaluating safety concerns at Deer Creek-which directly affects safety at Los Osos. In response to a Public Records Act request, the Department of Education opened its files on Los Osos to CGS. In the files, two unpublished memos discuss flood danger and Los Osos. Duwayne Brooks, a school construction official with the Department of Education, attended the meeting in Feinstein's office on January 11, 2001. He discussed the meeting in an email dated January 12, 2001: Bottom line, the various local, state and federal agencies have declared [Deer Creek] safe, which means we can approve the school site. There are some `technical' disagreements that the various parties have that they will discuss further in the next 30 days. However, I confirmed with [former state Secretary for Resources] Mary Nichols in a private conversation after the meeting that it seemed reasonable for [the California Department of Education] to approve the [Los Osos] school site because the preponderance of current evidence shows that there is little if any danger posed by [Deer Creek], and if there were subsequently found to be any danger it would be resolved to ensure the safety of the citizens of Rancho Cucamonga.'`2 Official "site approval" documents from the Department of Education, dated May 2, 2001, . say that "no potential hazards have been identified." Yet officials knew the case on Deer Creek was far from closed. Another Department of Education employee, facilities consultant Kent Van Gelder, included this observation in his June 2002 memo titled, "Thoughts on Los Osos": The task force that was formed after the [January 11, 2001 ]meeting was supposed to have completed its work in 30 days. It is now almost two years later. Then, it was concluded based on conversation with Mary Nichols that the Los Osos site would either be safe or would be made safe if there was a shortfalL23 When former Secretary Nichols was asked about Los Osos, she denied Brooks' account and said such an approval could never happen in an informal conversation. She says she barely remembers having a private conversation with Brooks and "if he thought that my statement... 'The fact that OES didn't have an was a basis for making a decision, he was evacuation plan didn't have any operating under an erroneous assumption."za impact on the safety [at Los Osos High School.]' -Duwayne Brooks Interviewed by telephone on November 20, 2002, Brooks said that CGS has mischaracterized the January 12, 2001, email regarding nZ January 12, 2001 email from Duwayne Brooks to former Superintendent of Public Instruction Delaine Eastin. ~~ June 10, 2002 memo from Kent Van Gelder. ~' Interview with Mary Nichols, October 2, 2002. 23 Secretary Nichols. Asked to address the disconnect, Brooks maintains that "it was the opinion of all the people in attendance that it was to be determined safe or it was to be made safe." Brooks was also asked to reconcile the outstanding warning from the Office of Emergency Services regarding the lack of flood evacuation plans and concerns over general flood safety. He said, "The fact that OES didn't have an evacuation plan didn't have any impact on the safety of the site."~s Former Superintendent Eastin did not return requests for comment. The Chaffey Joint Union High School District, which built Los Osos, also has not responded to requests for an interview_The OES, somehow completely out of the loop, was not even informed that the Los Osos project had been approved over its objection. Meantime, classes at Los Osos continue. Without the use of Los Osos's new classrooms, officials would have to relocate more than 2,400 students. By now the public has largely forgotten the winter of 1981, when floodwaters washed away Mitchell Elementary School in northeast San Bernardino, another campus within a few miles of streams emerging from steep hillsides. The grassy patch where the school and homes once stood is now called Twin Creeks Flood Control Basin. Classes began for the first time at Los Osos on September 3, 2002. The school district makes no mention of flooding concerns on its Web site. What the Corps Says,. Joseph Evelyn and other defenders say the Deer Creek project is safe and has operated flawlessly since it was completed in 1983. (No significant storm has occurred in the area in the past 20 years.) Responding to his critics, Evelyn praises their engineering skill and competence but ultimately dismisses them as "individuals who are reflecting the wishes of their clients."'`6 Asked if residents living below Deer Creek debris basin should feel safe, he says they should, but adds the engineer's caveat that "safe is relative here." .Joseph Evelyn is well aware of the dangers. Before he purchased his house in La Canada- Flintridge, he did his own analysis of the L.A. County debris basin protecting the prospective home site. Of the San Gabriel Mountains, he says, "you have mountains that are highly erodable, a landscape subject to wildfires and this year is a perfect example ... an impermeable barrier [of burned soil] that increases runoff and leads to mass wasting [erosion] and movement of materials, very steep slopes, high intensity rainfall, the flow of air from the west hitting those mountains..." Such terrain might be a reason for extra caution. Yet, say his critics, Evelyn has been overly optimistic. They argue he has underestimated the effects of wildfire, trivialized the historical record of flooding and shaped his technical data to achieve "safe" numbers. Confronted with their criticisms, Evelyn doesn't flinch, nor does he attempt to prove his detractors wrong. ~' Interview with Duwayne Brooks, November 20, 2002. 3B lnterview with Joseph Evelyn, Friday, Sept. 13, 2002, Los Angeles, CA. 2a Evelyn's conclusions, backed by the Army Corps of Engineers and unchallenged by other federal or state agencies, have swayed the debate over Deer Creek so far. [n late 2000 California Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer asked the Army Corps of Engineers to meet with engineers from the state and two others hired by Los Angeles World Airports and the Rancho Cucamonga homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith. (The meeting, discussed on the previous page, took place January 11, 2001 in San Francisco.) The charge to the Corps and the other engineers was to detennine if the Deer Creek project had the amount of flood protection the Corps said it did. What happened instead was a recitation of earlier internal reviews issued by the Corps on Deer Creek. Each contributing engineer submitted separate, divergent findings. Generally, they all agreed that the Deer Creek project was too small in comparison to the projected severity of a serious flood. The degree of shortfall remains in dispute. The Corps says the shortfall is negligible. John Cassidy, representing Eos Angeles World Airports, says the shortfall is so great that even minor floods could overrun the project?~ The other engineers could not find much common ground with Evelyn. They were not well versed in the methods he employed, and he refused to incorporate more widely known methods, such as those used by Los Angeles County or even those used by the Army Corps of Engineers outside the Los Angeles District. In other areas of Evelyn's flooding estimates, he included no safety factor or margin for error-not a safe bet given the history of fires and floods in the San Gabriel Mountains. Evelyn's computations assume, for example, a "fire factor" of 3, an estimate that ignores the presence of wildfire on the hillsides above Deer Creek, according to Exponent consultant Douglas Hamilton, hired by Rancho Cucamonga homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith. The "fire factor" is essentially a numeric value assigned to signify how much fire-related debris (burned wood, ash and vegetation) may enter a particular stream during a flood. The "fire factor" ranges from a low of 3 which corresponds to an unburned watershed with mature vegetation, to a high of 6 which corresponds to a watershed that burned just one year ago. Hamilton says a fire factor of 3 is analogous to saying fire never visits Deer Creek.28 Pressed on this point, Evelyn dismisses Hamilton's criticism. He concedes that "if the watershed burned yesterday, you would get a huge number" on the size of an expected flood, larger than what Evelyn himself has estimated. But Evelyn has assumed that a flood on Deer Creek isn't likely to be influenced by fires at all. Evelyn explained this point while standing atop Deer Creek debris basin on September 22, 2002. As he spoke, the air around him was Z' [n John Cassidy's letter to Los Angeles World Airports, dated April 13, 2001, he concludes, "f believe chat the Deer Creek Debris Basin is definitely too small to contain the volume of debris that would be carried into the basin by a 100-year flood. Its storage capacity may be as little as 25°/ of the 292 acre-feet of debris that the Corps of Engineers estimates would be eproduced by mnoff from a severe stomr." s According to Douglas Hamilton, "the way the Corps justifies using [a fire factor of 3] is to say that, statistically, a watershed bums every 20 years. After a fire, it takes 10 years for the burned vegetation to mature and stabilize the watershed. Therefore the 'average' condition for Deer Creek is the unburned condition which scores a 3 in the Corps' debris method." 25 filled with flakes of soot from the 37,000-acre Williams forest fire advancing eastward, just a few miles away. A little more than a year later, Deer Creek burned in the old fire. Hamilton says it is "reckless" to make no provision for fires on the hillsides above Deer Creek. "It undercuts the historical justification for debris basins," he says. "When the City and County of Los Angeles embarked on the debris basin concept in the 1930s, the biggest debris problems were associated with moderate rain storms after fires. I recall reading an old article in the Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers where a popular viewpoint back then was that fires were the main cause of [debris-filled flood] flows. The author's suggestion was to forget about debris basins and spend the money on putting fire hydrants all throughout the San Gabriel Mountains. This idea didn't go anywhere, but there has always been recognition that you are most vulnerable to debris hazards during the first four-to-five years after a fire and debris basins should be designed to handle this situation to a reasonable degree." 29 In another interview with Joseph Evelyn, the engineer said he had come up with ways to constmct better flood control on Deer Creek. The Corps could increase the capacity of the project by doing additional excavation, he said. However, he said that the improvements would be costly, would require extensive studies and perhaps would be challenged in court on environmental grounds. The obstacles against upgrading seem so great that he had not bothered approaching San Bernardino County officials with any kind of detailed plan, he said. The clout wielded by the Army Corps of Engineers within the panoply of government agencies is nearly unmatched. Scientists, economists, environmentalists, celebrities, members of Congress and even U.S. presidents have failed to reform, direct or downsize the Corps. The conventional wisdom dogging the Corps, especially following a series of scathing Washington Post articles published in 2000, is that it is willing to interpret facts selectively in order to justify large new public works projects. Deer Creek, however, is quite the opposite. In defending inaction on Deer Creek over the past five years, despite an expanding chorus of criticism, the Army Corps of Engineers has offered conflicting data, frustrated [he efforts of California's U.S. senators and stonewalled a politically connected homeowner-apparently all to avoid a situation whereby the Corps might have to enlarge the project. The response is contrary to expectation. In the same region, the Corps has responded to the needs of south Los Angeles County communities by raising the walls of the lower Los Angeles River. And the Corps' S 1.3 billion Santa Ana River project will reduce flood danger for Orange County homes and businesses. But on Deer Creek, the affected local governments, led by San Bernardino County, are not clamoring for more flood control. Instead they are deferential to the Corps' position or silent altogether. Sometimes it is hard to tell the exact nature of the Corps' position. Regarding the capacity of the Deer Creek debris basin, for example, the Corps has in official documents estimated capacity variously. Separate documents lodged in congressional archives from 1965 list an expected capacity for Deer Creek debris basin as both 300 and 380 acre-feet. The Corps itself zs Hamilton, Douglas. From an Oct. I5, 2002 email to the Center for Governmental Studies. 26 says the basin was supposed to be 310 acre-feet in capacity. But notably, as greater outside scrutiny was brought to bear, the Corps' estimates have more closely resembled those made by critics. Some 162 acre-feet, an estimate derived tiom the "Corps' own data," was the capacity reported by the Los Angeles Times in its May 20, 2001 article on Deer Creek. And most recently, the Corps has told the State of California the debris basin can handle 172 acre- feet. Figure 9 below shows Deer Creek debris basin. Three shaded areas correspond to the estimated debris capacity and deposition pattern reported in June, 2002 by the Corps, by Douglas Hamilton of Exponent Failure Analysis and by consulting Los Angeles World Airports engineer John Cassidy. Cassidy and Hamilton's estimates are similar, while the Corps estimates a much larger capacity. N O O N L U A L L O Z_ E m w n m c Y O O J C N N m Y W a U v v' `o v v 0 U L a m m 0 a 0 t- a: w LL 27 Where the Issue Stands Today No single agency or government entity is completely responsible for Deer Creek, as illustrated by Fig. 10 on the next page. Each public agency involved today is waiting for another entity to act. Evelyn, conceding that the debris basin may be slightly undersized, said it is up to the local communities if they want additional protection. "If the community (Rancho Cucamonga) or (San Bernardino) county want to expand the basin, we can work with them." Evelyn said. "From a practical standpoint, they have a very high level of protection already."'0 The Corps is waiting for the local governments to demand more flood protection. At the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, however, chief engineer Ken Miller told CGS Center he felt it was up to the Corps to make the first move. And in the state's report on Deer Creek, Secretary Mary Nichols asks Senators Boxer and Feinstein to take the lead. The senators had asked the state to take the lead after FEMA declined. By contrast, Los Angeles County investigated the performance of its debris basins after flooding in 1969 and 1978 overwhelmed some of them. There was no widespread damage at the time, but county engineers nevertheless embarked upon amulti-decade project to identify debris basin problems. Some 65 debris basins have been tagged for further study, and of those, the county has completed 21 upgrade projects. Today, responsibility for Deer Creek's failings is so diffuse that only a disaster could move the debate. Congress could appropriate the funds necessary for a National Academies of Science (NAS) review of Deer Creek and other debris basins. Getting the bill past pro-Corps members of Congress, however, is considered even more difficult than swaying local governments. While California's U.S. senators appear to speak with one mind regarding Deer Creek, Representative Joe Baca (D-San Bernardino) has chosen to remain silent. Boxer and Feinstein will not be able to appropriate money for a NAS study of Deer Creek when the local member of Congress is not supportive. Representative Baca received a huge stack of Deer Creek-related documents, courtesy of homeowner-activist Malissa Hathaway.McKeith, on the day after he entered office in 1999 following a special election. But ultimately Baca decided the entire issue "was not his expertise," according to his chief of staff, Michael Townsend.3 ~ However, Baca serves on the House Science Committee and has spots on the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology and Standards and the Subcommittee on Research. [n the last ] 0 years, due in part to population growth, the area surrounding Deer Creek has had its member of Congress changed twice by the redistricting that occurs following each diennial Census. Afrer 2002 the area came under new representation yet again-this time drawn once again into Representative David Dreier's district. The Republican Dreier was reelected in November 2002. Figure 9 depicted below shows various jurisdictions surrounding Deer Creek and its environs. J0 Interview with Joseph Evelyn, July 23, 2002. " Telephone interview with Michael Townsend, October I8, 2002. 28 Fig. 10. Deer Creek Jurisdictions 29 Origins of Development: The `Model colony' George Chaffey could see the future in 1882 as he gazed from a hilltop over present-day Upland, Rancho Cucamonga and Ontario, which were then nearly devoid of white settlers. "He is dreaming a dream which shall come true. He sees lying at his feet a colony settled by prosperous people, exacting a generous living from a soil thought by generations of Spanish proprietors to be unsuitable for settlement." 32 He and his brother William were recent arrivals from Ontario, Canada, intent on developing land and water infrastructure. The San Bernardino Valley seemed like the perfect place for the brothers, described by a biographer in 1928 as "idealists, engineers and mathematicians of the highest order." 33 The Chaffey brothers envisioned their cosmopolitan city as being anchored by alcohol-free living, awell- endowed agricultural college, tree-lined boulevards (Euclid Avenue was named afrer 'George's favorite mathematician) and ample water for irrigation. "J.A. Alexander, Life of Georee Chaffey. Melbourne: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1928. ~~ Id. 30 Fig. 11: Circa 1890 photo, looking northeast from present-0ay Upland, shows sparse development. Courtesy of Ontario City Library. The Chaffeys' penchant for clean living drew many settlers and their town, named Ontario after their Canadian homeland, gained notoriety as a "model colony" when a scale model was unveiled at the World's FAIR. in St. Louis in 1904. But the proximity of a red-light district in Chino meant sin was always within reach: Flooding was another problem. Stately Euclid Avenue, lined with grevillia robusta (drought-resistant trees from Australia) and plied by a mule-drawn trolley, was being paved in 1911 when floodwaters swept down the street and destroyed the work. Over the next 60 years, persistent flooding would bedevil development in Ontario and elsewhere_in the sparsely populated area known as the West End (modem-day Ontario, Upland and Rancho Cucamonga). Local residents displayed a keen interest in taming the seasonal flows, dating back to the dawn of the 20s' Century. These flows were marked in 1937 by Upland engineer R.V. Ward's "vast survey for flood control throughout San Bernardino county, which may warrant WPA funds," according to the Ontario Record.34 The few flood control projects local landowners could finance consisted of dirt levees and rudimentary fencing. Residents may have wanted flood control, but paying for it would prove to be a constant stumbling block. Following the devastating 1938 flood, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers proposed a flood control project on the site of the modem-day San Antonio Dam. But 1,599. ~1 Ontario Record, June 23, 1937. 31 Fig. 12: The great Flood of 1936, pictured here,is considered the region's biggest flood of the 20'" Century. The 1969 Floods, however, caused significantly more damage because of a surge in development since 1938. Photo courtesy Ontario City Library. West End residents, according to a local newspaper, signed a petition in opposition to the project "on the grounds that it is too expensive, that local taxpayers ultimatmely [sic] probably will have to foot the $75,000 annual maintenance, that the project's concrete channel constitute a grave menace to replenishment of the valley's underground storage basin....and that the dam itself, built on a fault, would constitute a grave flood menace." 35 Floods and Funding As the decades passed, flooding problems continued throughout the West End. Local interests wanted something manmade and permanent to augment local water percolation areas-"spreading grounds" to soak up floodwaters-and crude levees to channel runoff. The Army Corps of Engineers performed surveys of the area in 1937, 1946 and 1956, but J6 "I,599 Sign Petitions for Change in Flood Curb Plan;' 1939 Ontario Record article courtesy Ontario City Library. 32 Pig. 13: CiWS trees were more numerous than residents in this circa 1947 view. Deer Creek's alluvial fan is at top dght. Photo courtesy Ontario City Library. following each examination, flood control projects were seen as too costly for the rural West End. Finally, after a 1960 survey, Congress in 1968 authorized but provided no funding for the Corps' Cucamonga Creek Project, which included Deer Creek. John Foley, now the director of the Moulton Niguel Water District, was the Los Angeles District Engineer for the Corps from 1973 through 1976, shortly before work began on Deer Creek. The Cucamonga Creek project almost did not happen, he said, because "there was reticence on the part of my superiors [who questioned] the value of building a benefit to serve a pure development scheme only."se '[Deer Creek] was not one of those projects Despite the project's authorization, it would that you send back to Washington and have it be accepted at face value.' be another seven years before Congress saw fit to appropriate funds. As strange as it -John Foley sounds, the arcane sociopolitical science of redistricting may have been the mother of the Cucamonga Creek project. Prior to the 1974 elections the congressional districts in California were redrawn to reflect changes in population. Redistricting, seen widely as a tool of the majority party to consolidate its power, resulted in the elimination of the district that Imperial Valley Republican Victor Veysey had represented for two terms. Veysey moved north to try to recapture his seat but lost to West Covina Mayor Jim Lloyd, a Democrat. Lloyd was an aerospace man who served on the House Armed Services Committee. Local newspapers credited Lloyd with securing more than $100 million for the Cucamonga Creek project over his six years in office. Yet it was his vanquished opponent Veysey who was in a better position to pull strings for the project. In the waning days of the Ford Administration, Veysey was appointed to a newly created position as the top civilian at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Washitigton, D.C., where he served until shortly afer Jimmy Carter's ascent to the presidency. Veysey's post, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, was created by Congress in 1970 as a way to bring a degree of civilian leadership and environmental sensitivity to the Corps. As a CalTech- and Stanford-trained engineer, Veysey seemed a natural fit. He was also in position to promote certain unfunded water projects, such as the Cucamonga Creek project, above other proposed water projects. "Veysey was very helpful in getting funds for the project," said Haden Helm, a retired Corps engineer who was a project planner on the Cucamonga Creek project.37 Even as the Corps' multi-year Cucamonga Creek project was under construction, local officials saw the need for much more extensive flood control. In 1977 a San Bernardino County Flood Control District official estimated at $330 million the cost of supplementary flood control channels and storm drains in the West End. "We don't have enough money to do the real work," district chief Art Sidler told the Daily Report newspaper. "That's why we've sought federal funds." The article also noted that the federal government was unwilling to fund flood control projects on Deer Creek because, as Sidler said, "although serious flooding can occur in that area, there isn't much development surrounding it that can ~6 Interview with John Foley, October 30, 2002. ~~ Interview with Haden Helm, October 30, 2002. 33 be destroyed. The federal government found it was not economically justified to grant money." 38 Following passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, which permanently reduced property taxes, local governments saw their budgets slashed drastically. The San Bernardino Flood Control District was lambasted in a grand jury report for overstaffing and later saw its budget cut by more than half. Then, in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter ordered a freeze on funding for all current and furure Army Corps of Engineers projects. Carter's strategy was in line with his "hit list" of 19 Army Corps projects he considered too wasteful to build. But ultimately the president allowed more funding for the Cucamonga project, and Congress went along. Also in 1980, the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors unilaterally passed an assessment to finance $15 million for storm drains and supplementary flood control channels.39 The board unanimously repealed the assessment, however, after angry residents stormed a board meeting with tax bills in hand. President Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 promising a wave of budget cuts that prompted San Bernardino County officials to travel to Washington to.plead their case. County Supervisor Robert Townsend voiced concerns that the Army Corps of Engineers was considering asking for a separate congressional authorization for flood control on Deer Creek and the adjoining Day Creek watersheds. Townsend "noted [that] corps officials tried to do that before. While the Deer Creek leg has been part of the overall plans since about 1976 and has not faced a similar challenge in recent years, Townsend said the concern is still `valid. "' 40 Separate authorization could have meant years of funding delays or outright rejection of federal funds. Proponents for flood control at Deer Creek would have to jostle for position with countless other new projects. A project already authorized by Congress can receive federal appropriations years after the fact. Seeking new authorization might have been the kiss of death for development on Deer Creek. With the Deer Creek leg of the project in jeopardy, and unable to pay for its mandated share of the Cucamonga Project costs, the county met with prominent area developers in May 1981 to discuss ways of raising a $5.9 million shortfall. Failure might jeopardize $36 million in remaining federal funds earmarked for the project, the group was told. Joseph DiIorio, a partner in Rancho Cucamonga Land Co., said the private sector would likely not contribute unless residents were taxed. Ralph Lewis, who formed the committee, added, "don't look to Lewis Homes for any large chunk.'~1 But according to an August 3, 1981 article in The Daily. Report, developers with holdings along Deer Creek pledged $1.9 million in loans to the county so it could meet its deposit deadline with the Army Corps of Engineers. Developers were to be first in line for reimbursement from state grants.42 (The San Bernardino County re Ziegler, Peggy. "Flood control cosL..$330 million needed [o guard trieommumities," Daily Report July l5, 1977. "This was permissible under the law even following enactment of Proposition l3, which capped property tax rotes. For example, if a community receives a "benefit" such as a streetlight, the government can assess property owners to pay for the cost, imstalla[ion and repair of the streetlight. i0 Green, Don. "Reagan cutbacks: Counry hopes federal Flood control funds hold;' the Daily Report, March 3, 1981. '~ Green, Don. "Builders, officials try to save threatened project;' The Daily Report, May 28, 1981. °3 Green, Don. "Flood control work may go ahead without lery," The Daily Report, August 3, 1981. 34 Flood Control District did not release any information regarding the funding plan but denied that private landowners were involved in any way.43) David Dreier's defeat of Congressman Lloyd in the 1980 elections coincided with Ronald Reagan's rise to the presidency. Dreier, at 28 years old, was the emerging face of the Republican Party. One of the results was that while many Corps projects were cut back, Reagan's proposed budget for 1982 specifically included funds to begin work on Deer Creek. The entire Cucamonga Project including Deer Creek was completed in 1983, more than 40 years after the Corps began its surveys of the area. The anticipated cost of roughly $63 million (in 1973 dollars) had swelled to $140 million by the time the project was functional. Voters Reject Locally Financed Flood Control The Cucamonga Project was seen as only one component of flood control in western San Bemardino County. County supervisors tried to raise flood control funds via ballot measures in 1982 and again in 1983. Both measures failed to attract even a simple majority, much less the 2/3 approval Proposition 13 requires in order to pass tax increases. The ] 982 version received support from only 42. I percent of voters in a Congressional election year (turnout was 67.2 percent). Measure W, the 1983 version, stood perhaps the best chance at passage. Among those endorsing the measure were the unanimous city councils and mayors of Upland, Ontario and recently incorporated Rancho Cucamonga, the two county supervisors who represented the area, all three chambers of commerce, the Montclair-Ontario school board, all four of the community newspapers-and even the local mobile home owners association. Evidence of flood danger was especially fresh since the deaths of three people following heavy rains in the winter of 1983. Water rushed down north-south streets and swamped motorists such as Ruth Brady, who drowned after her vehicle fell into raging floodwaters along Hellman Avenue at Foothill Boulevard. Her body was discovered in the wreckage of a railroad crossing ahalf--mile downstream, but rescuers saved her husband. Measure W anticipated that a normal family would pay $3.25 per month over the 10-year life of the so-called "benefit assessment." Larger landowners like the Southern Pacific Railroad complained that their burden was disproportionate, and other critics faulted the county for not including Ontario airport in the assessment district.°° Whatever their reasons, voters stood firm: no new taxes: Only 14.6 percent of registered voters actually voted, and 54.2 percent of them voted no. . Controversy Emerges The Cucamonga Project touched off a building boom, clearing the way for extensive development in western San Bemardino County in the 1980s, which grew fast enough to '~ October 25, 2002 email from Ken Miller, chief engineer, San Bemardino County Flood Control District. '10 The airport, owned by the Ciry of Los Angeles, is like other government lands in that it is exempt from taxes. 35 warrant its awn member of Congress after the 1990 Census. Water was the reason for the boom: not water for drinking, but protection from floods. Development continued unabated near Deer Creek until 1997, when a developer sought to tear down part of a Depression-era earthen levee constructed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and later improved by other federal agencies. The Corps of Engineers submitted letters to the city supporting the development. The Corps' spokesman,'Joseph Evelyn, testified on behalf of the developer to the Rancho Cucamonga City Council that the levee was not needed because the Deer Creek debris basin and channel would sufficiently protect the hundreds of homes newly exposed to the mountains through the breach in the levee. He recently maintained this position in federal litigation filed by Defenders of Wildlife and the National Wildlife Federation against Secretary Ann Veneman of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for allowing the levee's destruction. A formidable collection of citizens has challenged Evelyn and the Corps regarding his testimony. But this loose knit group-which included California Senators Boxer and Feinstein, respected flood experts, national environmental groups and Ontario airport owner Los Angeles World Airports-could not stop the city of Rancho Cucamonga from allowing the partial destruction of the levee in 2001. And it has thus far been rebuffed in its quest for an independent study by the National Academies of Science on whether the flood control projects on Deer Creek are truly safe. In the meantime, scores of new homes and two new schools have been built in the floodplain, supported by official approval documents making scant or no mention of the newly realized potential for flooding danger. Negative Skew At dispute is whether people living in the vicinity of Deer Creek are unduly at risk. Engineers translate such a question into equations comparing how much debris and water they expect will be spa[out of Deer Creek's watershed versus how much capacity they think exists to store debris and channel runoff. Selecting the most appropriate method is of high importance. One criticism made against the Corps is for its use of "negative skew" when it reviewed flood risk on Deer Creek recently. If an equation were a tree, skew would be the wind bending the tree. See Fig. 14 on the next page. Plotted on a graph, a positively skewed equation will curve upward while negative skew curves it downward. Skew can alter how far an equation will rise on its vertical axis. For the question at hand, the vertical axis signifies a flood's highest stage measured in how many cubic feet of floodwater passes a given point-usually a stream gage-in a second. Floods like the 1969 and 1938 events score high on the vertical axis while dry years score very low. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which measures and catalogues floods, used positive skew to express how large flood events like 1969 were possible in western San Bernardino County. The USGS could not account-for the 1969 flood using its standazd methods; it had to skew the equation positively so it would agree with the historical record. 36 The Army Corps of Engineers has done the opposite. For his Deer Creek estimates, the Corps' Joseph Evelyn skewed the equation negatively, away from the historical record. The positive skew: severity appears to be greater ~ data 1 i V % i U ~ N f ~ i °' r ' f~ ~t--"~ en gativesk 5 f~ severityappeorsJess .T ~~ a 0 50 100 200 1000 Time Fig. 14. PositivelNegative skew. result was lower values on the Corps' y-axis. Essentially the Corps equation predicted smaller floods and failed to account for large floods that had already happened. Additionally, the smaller floods predicted by the Corps using negative skew suggest that future floods will be contained within the present debris basin and channel. Without negative skew, even the Corps equation would predict floods too large for the existing flood control project on Deer Creek. Even for a powerful federal agency like the Army Corps of Engineers, it is hard to deny history. As the task force on Deer Creek began its work in the spring of 2001, other engineers questioned Evelyn about his use of negative skew. Engineers with the state Department of Water Resources, apparently leery of relying on the Corps, began an independent inquiry. That effort, however, ended inconclusively after engineers on the task force were shocked to 37 discover that the USGS was planning to "discredit," or expunge from flood records permanently, the 1969 flood as it was measured near Deer Creek. In one swift move, the Corps' negatively skewed equation seemed more in tune with the historical record. The Man Who Made a Flood Disappear In June 2001 Joseph Evelyn was able to take advantage of controversial research by a man named Robert Meyer, a longtime employee of the USGS. Meyer is critical of hydrologists in his own agency for their work in measuring the 1969 floods in Southern California including western San Bernardino County.45 Ultimately, Meyer's work bolstered the tack taken by Joseph Evelyn-that floods like the 1969 event were overestimated and that the reality was less severe than the record. Meyer, a surface water expert fqr the USGS, argues 'What is the concern about that existing records were flawed enough to be throwing away a measurement useless. He says it's simply too hard to measure that's no good?' floodwaters when the waters carry large debris just -Robert Meyer, USGS like it's easier to gauge the volume of a can of soda than an iced-down fountain soda. In an interview, Meyer said the eradication of 1969 flood records resulted from more than a decade of his own research. "What is the concern about throwing away a measurement that's no good?" he asked during an August, 2002 interview. Whether water, debris or some mixture thereof, something hugely destructive came out of the mountains in the winter of 1969. Meyer's actions have rankled surviving USGS scientists, who by now are retired or are veterans in their field. "We had surface water specialists in 1969 that were every bit as smart as surface water specialists in 2001," said John Singer, a ieiiree from the USGS who helped with aerial mapping on Deer Creek in 1969. "I'm totally amazed that someone would have the nerve to totally discredit that data. To say [the data is] not possible is unscientific, unfounded and reeks of something other than what the USGS is known for."'6 - For Singer and other water experts who have studied the issue, the furor arises less from Meyer's criticisms of the USGS's data-collecting methods back in 1969-which water experts partly concede-but rather from Meyer's decision to replace 1969 flood data with nothing indicating that the century's most devastating flood occurred during that season. The weight of Meyer's action became clearer when the Department of Water Resources-led task force on Deer Creek attempted to determine if the project's concretized rectangular channel was big enough. In mid-2001, the state and Corps concluded the channel was of sufficient a5 Meyer said he invalidated the high watermark, or "peak Flow" reading, from the Day Creek gage data from the 1969 flood because it didn't fit a mathematical equation he had devised that plotted all California "peak" flood Flows on a single graph. The Flow from Day Creek-the watershed next to Deer Creek-stuck out because it was so much higher than what Meyer expected from his equation. The Day Creek gage is important because Deer Creek has for several decades~been "ungaged, " meaning [here is no installation on site [o measure Flows. A primitive stream gage installed on Deet Creek was deemed unreliable in the early 1960s and removed. Many of the early gages were designed for irrigation purposes, not to measure storms. When historical records are not available, engineers often study flooding patterns on a nearby, similar watershed and agply their findings to the watershed under scmtiny. ° From a telephone interview with John Singer conducted on July I I, 2002. 38 ' size, and Joseph Evelyn went further, saying the channel could handle debris as well as water. The other contributing engineers, Douglas Hamilton and John Cassidy, submitted findings showing the channel was likely to become clogged with debris and send floodwaters outside the channel walls. The operative difference was that the state and the Corps did not substantially incorporate the deadly 1969 floods in their measurements whereas Hamilton and Cassidy did. In an August 2002 interview, CGS was told that the U.S. Geological Survey has reopened review of Meyer's work. The USGS is also weighing new regulations that would make it harderto invalidate flood records. Its recent actions were spurred because of the Deer Creek controversy, according to the USGS's Menlo Park-based surface water specialist, Mike Nolan. "We're trying to shine as much light on this as possible," he said.47 But according to a September 30, 2002, memorandum, FEMA officials continued to reinforce Meyer's argument, not question it. This led engineer Douglas Hamilton to assert [hat "this USGS precedent [of removing potentially faulty flood records], followed to its logical end, would result in virtually all of the Southern California flood peaks from the two largest recorded flood seasons (1938 and 1969) being cross-examined and ultimately removed from the record due to the presence of debris flows. Ironically, the very process that makes large flood events in Southern California so hazardous has caused these floods to be banned from the historical record. Of course I, along with many other floodplain policymakers, protest [his action."4S Meyer appears unconcerned by the criticism. A year after Meyer's work invalidated 1969 flood records, William Kirby of the USGS asked in an email whether it was prudent to eliminate flood data from 1969 without finding some way to "alert the conscientious analyst that something noteworthy had happened" that year, namely, a deadly flood.49 Meyer's emailed response was that he could discern "no useful information" from the available record. Although it took Meyer years to amass the evidence he used to invalidate 1969 flood data, he does not feel the USGS needs to acknowledge the historical record by making revised estimates of the 1969 flood on its own. "Perhaps the agencies in the area should pay for us to make estimates of some kind," Meer wrote in a January 2002 email to his U.S. Geological Survey colleague, Mike Nolan.s Invalidating flood records is very rare; there are only a few such instances, although the USGS has records of thousands of floods. Joseph Evelyn used 1969 flooding data in the Army Corps' November 1999 report on Deer Creek, st but by adopting a negative skew to the '~ From an August 6, 2002 telephone conversation with Mike Nolan. 's Letter of Doug Hamilton to Mike Nolan, surface water expert, U.S. Geological Survey, dated October 26, 2002. '9 May 6, 2002 email titled "re:regression decisions -and Day Creek" from Robert Meyer [o William Kirby, e[ al. so January 24, 2002 email from Robert Meyer to Mike Nolan, tided "Fw: Deer Creek Report " si The November 1999 report unveiled a new estimate for how much debris was expected to come out of Deer Creek during a 100-year flood. The amount, 292 acre feet of debris, was considered less than the slated capacity of Deer Creek debris basin until several months later, when an investigation by Exponent's Doug Hamilton concluded that the usable capacity of the basin was smaller than the amount the Corps had originally maintained was the capacity, 310 acre feet. The Corps now says Deer Creek debris basin holds 172 acre feet but only 188 acre-feet is expected in a 100-year Flood. Although Joseph Evelyn can correctly say that he used 1969 data in his computations for the Department of Water Resources technical review 39 data, the statistics downplay the 1969 flood event. Two years later, when Robert Meyer took steps to remove 1969 flood records, there were no longerexisting records that could challenge Evelyn's use of negative skew. T~vo federal agencies are now satisfied Deer Creek is safe; however, their judgment depends on the notion that floods in the San Gabriel Mountains are milder than floods elsewhere. Experts like Hamilton and Cassidy say the opposite is true, and point to the 1969 record as an example. The Perfect Storm When trying to predict the severity and frequency of future floods, hydrologic engineers consider a number of variables: the size of the watershed delivering precipitation to the stream, the steepness of the terrain, the incidence of fires that can dump burned vegetation into streams, the historical record of floods in the area and other factors. Engineers use these data to write equations that relate the incidence of the variables to the ultimate size of a flood. In theory the equations can be tested by applying them to recorded flood events in history and it can be seen if an equation "fits" the data and can be used for accurate predictions. But when no data exist, engineers must use data from somewhere else and apply it to the watershed under examination. Deer Creek had a stream gage until the 1960s when it was deemed unreliable. Around this time the Army Corps of Engineers began to plan schematics for flood control on Deer Creek. Without reliable information on Deer Creek, the Corps decided to study a storm from another watershed and then apply the data. According to Joseph Evelyn, the Corps used 1943 flooding data from a storm in Sierra Madre (a city a few miles east of Pasadena) as a way to predict the expected severity and frequency of storms at Deer Creek. The problem with using a project storm from Sierra Madre, according to engineers Hamilton and Cassidy, is that the topography of the San Gabriel Mountains is significantly more mountainous at its eastern terminus than the centrally located ,Sierra Madre. The northernmost neighborhoods in Rancho Cucamonga are 6,000 feet below and four miles away from the nearest large mountain, 8,891-foot Cucamonga Peak. In Sierra Madre, the rise is much more gradual. See Figure 15 below. Fig. 15. Comparison of slopes about Siema Madre and Rancho Cucamonga: Rancho Cucamonga is steeper over a shorter interval. committee, he efTectivety ignored the occurrence of both the 1969 and 1938'Flood events by imposing a negative skew on the statistics. 40 The dispute is larger than Deer Creek. Joseph Evelyn said the Sierra Madre storm figures were used in the design of the entire Cucamonga Project. No engineer is making the assertion that there are fundamental flaws with every debris basin designed by the Corps in Southern Califomia. But if the Corps ever concluded that its design was deficient at Deer Creek, questions will surely arise about the other basins in the Cucamonga Project, if not elsewhere in the nation. FEMA has mapped 134 alluvial floodplains in Southern Califomia, and more are sure to be identified as they become urbanized. Over decades the Los Angeles District of the Army Corps of Engineers has improved upon its design of flood control projects in Southern California and used it as a model for projects in other Sun Belt states. The complex flood prediction equations the Corps uses in the Los Angeles District are designed specifically for southwestern topography: steep, crumbling mountains that burn often and are pelted seasonally by storms. By all accounts, the San Gabriel Mountains are an especially extreme example-worthy perhaps of positive skew. Instead, Evelyn reversed the trend of measured, historical flood data by choosing a negative skew coefficient. Skepticism of the Corps flood prediction methods in the Los Angeles District has mounted partly because the district's methods are not well known outside its downtown Los Angeles high-rise headquarters. Consulting engineers who have criticized the Deer Creek project say that the methods they themselves use-the federally sanctioned and scientifically reviewed methods they employ as project designers, consultants or expert witnesses-were rejected by the Corps' Evelyn in favor of his in-house method, the Los Angeles District Method for the Prediction of Debris Yield. This stance is contrary to the Corps' own how-to guide on handling "Disagreements Among Experts": Disagreements among experts or agencies about the existence of a threat, its severity or the appropriate reaction [are] confusing. From the perspective of the lay person, they are being asked to make a decision that can't be decided by the experts. Minimizing these kinds of problems requires ensuring that the experts are working with the same basic information and using the same assumptions."sz `A Slumbering Volcano' The records of the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, obtained through the National Archives, describe how the whims of nature can disguise the dangers of living near the outlets of mountain streams, on miles-wide cone-shaped mounds of ancient sediment known as alluvial fans. After 1969 the District considered Cucamonga Creek, the more populated watershed just west of Deer Creek, to be a "slumbering volcano" that "lies quiet and dormant over great periods of time, lulling its co-habitants into a state of false security. Then suddenly, with little if any warning, it strikes with a vengeance, including great sx Exolainine Flood Risk Davis, CA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990. Page 13. 41 property damage and even death. And so it was in the floods of 1914, 1927, 1938, 1943 and 1969."'3 The passage goes on: Large floods had occurred in the valley during both the winters of 1965 and 1966, resulting in a Presidential disaster proclamation for the County. However, in both instances, Cucamonga Creek was docile....[T]he people of the alluvial fan, as might be expected, were led into a state of lethargy. Then, in January and again in quick succession in February, 1969, the creek struck with a vengeance and fury never before equaled in recorded history.54 California Looks the Other Way Officials representing the State of California wasted an opportunity to use the Deer Creek controversy to launch awide-ranging debate on debris basins and flood safety. Former Resources Secretary Mary Nichols has maintained that the state's only jurisdiction is through the Division of Dam Safety inside the Department of Water Resources. In essence Nichols st From Page 8 of the San Bernardino County Flood ConVOI district historical records obtained at the National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Region (Laguna Niguel, CA). sa tbid, Page 21. 42 argued that the state's legal power only extends to whether the dam bracing Deer Creek debris basin has structural integrity-not whether the basin is big enough. [n reality the state can hardly conclude its interests end at the dam. The recently constructed Los Osos High School situated near to Deer Creek, for example, is eligible for S24 million in state reimbursement funds. Freeway bridges designed by Caltrans, including those on the Foothill (210) Freeway extension project, might be undermined by floodwaters. The Califonaia Department of Fish and Game oversees habitat issues on Deer Creek's depleted spreading grounds. The state has failed to coordinate or direct the efforts of even its own departments. Just months after one agency, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES), advised the state to stop funding the Los Osos school project, another agency, the California Department of Education (CDE), was seeking a way to allow the school to be built without OES approval. ~. In May 2002, the Resources Agency rejected the suggestion of the state's water policy expert, Tim Ramirez, to recommend convening the National Academies of Science on the Corps' methods for debris basins. A statement Ramirez added to the state's draft report, calling for a NAS study, was deleted from the state Department of Water Resource's final report on Deer Creek (the one requested by Senators Feinstein and Boxer) but appeared in an internal email from May 6, 2002. Subsequent emails, however, state only that the state has "no objection" to outside review by the National Academies of Science. (NAS) The "no objection" language appeared on the state's final report, which in essence meant the state decided not to pursue a NAS study. Ultimately in June 2002, the Department of Water Resources concluded that flood debris from Deer Canyon was likely to fill the debris basin and channel past its capacity.55 Though they calculated that 80 acre-feet of debris would spill out of the dam, they did not predict what might happen next. And the state has not made substantive demands on the Corps to fix the problem. Questioned about why she decided not to invite NAS study of the matter, Former Secretary Nichols said "their results are extremely dependent on the exact question you ask them and who is on the panel."sb In reality the state's task force on Deer Creek suffered from at least the appearance of bias. As a precursor to its formation, Rancho Cucamonga homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith (whose consultant Douglas Hamilton was part of the task force) had to promise not to use drafr findings of the task force as a basis for litigation against a developer who aims to build new homes near Deer Creek. The state also failed to respond when the Army Corps of Engineers refused to collaborate with other participants on a common hydrological method for sizing up expected future flood flows and comparing them to flood control project capacity. At the behest of Senators Boxer and Feinstein, the state coordinated the task force. ss See Deer Canyon Debris Basin, Dam No. 87-I 1, San Bernardino County, Report of the Coordinated Technical Review Committee, January 7, 2002. On Page 4, on TABLE t-Summary of Results, the Department of Water Resources reports a "Basin Deficit" of 80 acre-feet. se Interview with Mary Nichols, October 2, 2002. 43 But the Army Corps of Engineers dictated the outcome. That is presaged in the charter drafted to guide the task force. In the charter there is no mention of ascertaining a possible flooding threat to communities near Deer Creek. Instead the charter spells out which technical statistics should be sought and then concludes with legalistic language stipulating that participation in the task force should not be seen as an admission that safety is compromised at Deer Creek. In the end the statistics the task force published were nearly useless. The task force had no unified stance. The degree of flooding danger on Deer Creek depended upon the source of the information-exactly the sort of confusion the task force was meant to clear up. In an interview with Mary Nichols on June 7, 2002, several weeks before she signed a letter to Senators Feinstein and Boxer prefacing the Deparhnent of Water Resources final report on Deer Creek, Nichols was asked whether Los Osos students were safe from flooding danger. In response she underscored the need for more classrooms all around California and suggested that finding suitable land with absolutely no safety concerns was not always possible. As an example, she mentioned the infamous Belmont Learning Center in downtown Los Angeles, a project built atop an old oil Feld seeping methane and hydrogen sulfide. Members of the public could follow Belmont's progress, however, through the newspapers. With Los Osos, the media coverage dwindled after the Department of Education approved- the site in mid-2001 and resurfaced only to show students entering its doors. The reasons why Los Osos was deemed a fit site for school kids have never been publicized. The state Resources Agency, after it perhaps unwittingly allowed construction of a school in a flood plain, declined to invite the National Academies of Science to make an independent assessment of the Corps' design methods. By stating its official position on the NAS study as "no objection," the state in effect chose not to serve as a "local interest," i.e., a city, county or state government. The Corps of Engineers has already agreed to fund its portion of an NAS study, but only if a "local interest" stepped forward and funded a fraction of the total cost, expected to be less than $1 million. Uninterested Locals Local homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith attempted to finance the local cost of the NAS study herself, but she was turned away by the Corps, who said the request must come from a government entity. There were two other possible "local interests" that could have triggered action by the NAS. However, the city of Rancho Cucamonga and San Bernardino County officials have consistently declined to take action. Deer Creek debris basin lies outside Rancho Cucamonga city limits, and this fact allows the city to decline comment or spend money on the issue. Obtained documents show that as early as 1993 the city had misgivings about the Corps' debris basin design methods, at least for smaller watersheds. A few years later, however, the Rancho Cucamonga City Council was willing to allow the breaching of a levee and dismissed opponents by referring them to the Corps. as The San Bernardino County Flood Control District is the owner and operator of the Deer Creek debris basin. Although it has done its own research on Deer Creek, agency engineers deferred to the Corps during the state-led task force on Deer Creek, which concluded in June of 2002. The San Bernardino County flood agency has much to lose if flood control at Deer Creek is deemed substandard. The agency repeatedly tried to convert public land located near Deer Creek for private development-even land that the Corps said should be set aside for groundwater recharge. After it could find no willing developers or private buyers, it sold land situated near Deer Creek to Chaffey Joint Union High School District, which built and opened the Los Osos High School on it over the concerns expressed by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services. The agency's development of open space intended for groundwater recharge areas has drawn a federal lawsuit from environmental advocacy groups, which are asking the U.S. to reassert authority over its former property and stop further development. The lawsuit is pending before a federal district court judge in Washington, D.C.57 Local and state representatives from districts surrounding Deer Creek decline to acknowledge serious concerns over flood safety. Several of these officials may be deterred by their own success in wooing new development. Rancho Cucamonga's moderately priced housing developments are attractive to first-time homebuyers, but the entire area would suffer economically if the responsible agencies changed their stance on Deer Creek. The Corps' certification of 100-year flood protections releases property owners from the costly mandated flood insurance payments others must pay, as did other communities along the Los Angeles River until a recent Corps project fortified the river levees. Bonded debt (such as bonds sold to finance construction of schools, homes, etc.) also becomes more costly to repay when the level of risk rises. CGS received little or no reply to repeated requests for interviews with former Rancho Cucamonga Councilmember (and current Republican Assemblymember) Robert Dutton; San Bernardino County Supervisor Jon Mikels; Paul Biane, a Rancho Cucamonga Councilmember who recently defeated Mikels for his seat; Republican state Senator Jim Brulte; or Chaffey Union High School District facilities executive Susan Sundell. These former public officials may simply be reading the public's low level of interest in flooding issues. Over athree-year period, two homeowners associations and environmental groups filed seven lawsuits against Rancho Cucamonga and a developer trying to breach the Deer Creek levee to accommodate more development. (One lawsuit remains pending in federal court.) Lauren Development home sites, owned by Newport Beach developer Robert Cristiano,.are situated uphill from an existing gated community and partially within an area originally controlled by the federal government for the provision of flood control, the aforementioned earthen levee built in the 1930s. Residents already living beneath this proposed Lauren development may rightly have worried that that their vistas would be °~ Case number I:01 C VO 1201 EGS. se A 100-year Flood is a major event expected to occur only once in a I00-year period, and thus has a I percent chance of occurring in any one year. 45 spoiled and that real estate values of their own homes would decline if another development were to be built between them and the mountains. Worries about floods, however, were not a priority. In fact, both associations were sued for misuse of membership dues, with plaintiffs alleging that the constant legal battles were sapping funds meant for landscaping and gardening. Fig. 17: The levee below Oeer Canyon. Lauren Development is planning to construct 40 homes in the area. Affordable Views with Blinds Drawn Over History The state's inaction and reluctance to stir a wider debate affect not only Rancho Cucamonga and its environs but also any community that has allowed or is considering development on alluvial fans. In areas like western San Bernardino County, alluvial fans are the only "desirable" and affordable lands left for development. This puts great pressure on local authorities to clear away obstacles against development rather than slow or discourage it in any way. Former Bechtel engineer John Cassidy has said that assessing and assuring flood protection in areas near mountain canyons is vital, considering developers' taste for homes built on alluvial fans, "because for the most part construction can be accomplished quickly and cheaply." Alluvial fans are essentially ancient piles of sediment and usually have a uniform slope. For contractors, Cassidy said, "there is a minimum of excavations to be done, simply enough for the home foundations and the roadways. Alluvial fans, being on a grade of (roughly 4 percent) provide for great `view homes' since the downhill home cannot generally hurt views from above it.° s9 es From the August 27, 2002 email from John Cassidy to the Center. 46 Homeowners rarely are told or understand that it took eons of flooding to build up enough sediment to create what an average person might call a hill. There are no laws requiring disclosure of flooding risks unless the parcel of land for sale lies inside an "inundation" zone as determined by the appropriate agency. In this case San Bemardino County has no approved inundation maps on file with the state and thus has no requirement to inform residents of flooding risks. "Everyone identifies with floods when they are alongside a river where you can always see water flowing and the flood plain is there," Cassidy said. "However, it is difficult to get people to Yealize [he threat even if they are on the flood plain. An alluvial fan is a flood plain, but because it is dry and gravelly or rocky most people can't identify with it as such. Floods in the desert and on a hill at that?"60 Against the Flow Michael Bohlander, ahigh-ranking sedimentation expert from Los Angeles County, suffered a career setback after taking a position contrary to the Corps on Deer Creek. Bohlander was an 18-year veteran with the county Department of Public Works and headed its sedimentation unit when Exponent's Doug Hamilton asked him to do a peer review of his work on Deer Creek. Ironically, Bohlander was at the time a part of an elite team of L.A. county engineers who kick-started a massive upgrade program for more than half of the county's 115 debris basins. Southern California floods in 1969 and 1978 caused failure at several of the county-designed debris basins, leading to widespread flooding. Engineers learned that in steeper areas the debris spewed out during heary rainfall periods was turning the basins into more of a speed bump than a catchments device. LA county engineers did a thorough analysis and decided to embark on a decades-long improvement project, all without impetus from elected officials. Costs-including condemnation of homes, additional excavation and raising of walls and fences-are expected to run into the tens of millions of dollars over a period of many years. The project will be financed through property tax revenues from local Los Angeles County residents. Over the years, engineers from around the nation (as well as Taiwan, China, Japan and Spain) occasionally sought out Bohlander for advice on L.A. County's design of debris basins, and he wrote official responses under the official letterhead of the county Department of Public Works. He was known as an expert in the science of debris flow. Then came Bohlander's May 1, 2000, letter concluding that, based on his review of Hamilton's figures, the debris basin at Deer Creek was undersized and created a public safety risk. This brought Los Angeles County into conflict with the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, which owns and maintains the flood control facilities on Deer Creek, and co Cassidy's view was exemplified, albeit in reverse, by engineer Richard Massaro, during a 1995 meeting in Rancho Cucamonga over the design of a debris basin the city said a developer must build to protect a planned housing development. Told the basin needed to be larger than existing Corps' standards, Massaro considered that a plot to halt the development. "Huge areas of land are set aside which can become ugly scars on the landscape and large breeding grounds for disease- cartying insects such as mosquitos;' Massaro wrote. "Worse yet, good developments in the hands of honest, hard-working citizens is being set aside to accomplish a function in a most inefficient manner." 47 with the Army Corps of Engineers, who designed the project and transferred ownership to the county upon completion. Days after the letter was sent, Bohlander said he was told he was to be disciplined, according to a recent interview. Asked to sign a letter of reprimand, he said he refused because the letter made simple misstatements of fact. His superiors didn't express any opinion on his technical opinions. Rather it was whom the opinions criticized-the Los Angeles District of the Army Corps. "Mr. Bohlander's comments are in no way a reflection on how the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works views the design standards of the Corps of Engineers," Deputy Director Gary Hartley concluded in the May 17, 2000, letter to the San Bemardino County Flood Control District. Bohlander maintains that his critique was hardly a declaration of war but was treated as such. "If I had been chief of San Bernardino County flood control, I would have said `big deal' and forgotten about it," Bohlander said. "L.A. County has a specific flood control standard and that's how we measure things. If you want that standard, move there.i61 Bohlander left the county's employ in 2001. Deer Creek "was the catalyst for me to leave the County of Los Angeles," he said. "[t was the wake-u~ call for me to take a look at my life and the way my work was going in the department." z The Corps Takes Offense The commissioning of an independent study of Deer Creek, led by concerned homeowner Malissa Hathaway McKeith, endowed the controversy with credibility past what ordinary NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) activists can do. The environmental consulting firm Exponent Inc. performed an independent analysis of the debris and floodwater capacity at Deer Creek. In March of 2000, a nonprofit group McKeith originally formed for Deer Creek- related issues bought afull-page ad in the Washington Post and the political insider periodical Roll Call that took the Army Corps to task for alleged deficiencies at Deer Creek es See Fig. 18. 61 From an August 19, 2002 telephone interview with Michael Bohlander. cx [bid. °~ Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion, a 50I(c)(3) nonprofit, purchazed the ad in the Washington Post. The group has since expanded its scope and been renamed Citizens United for Resources and the Environment, Inc. 48 sJ rL K.~:St Ntalr .V vL Frtl ta+c~r ~E~IEL !QE BALLA~tO tS B1tICKINf A S~!~1Y S~UaY 0~1 T[~IS DAt~~ER4t~S~~ITUATI~N- WHY IS THE ARMY CARPS ENDANGERING. OUR CHILDREN? ALL AMERICANS PAY 1NHEN FLOODING OCCURS! Please join with us in reqnesting Congressional Hearings into the Arm~yy Carps' cover- up of .their mistakes an Lfeer Creek. son+esr rein.eNe, 6 Serumr emrer nsMe rapoissaly +s4 arts ,army. Corps oI Eay~h+ssrs do ~ sNet~! s~ a qn w+r pwk Dens arM warts easa- Fro(scr 0a Rancho .Gac.~+uonpa,' CaA'to.rriw. Gansrvl Joo 6sRard has rsfw+td Deer Yts CMps has lo8t~isd fEAAA rws m eanaRret tlrr aakry ahxy; Sur schools amd tnonsarrds~ of homes could be dssaroy~ed a7 abbrls tkow ~ 1Aooaang u Dray Crr~sk Dseeis Basta riRa G.r~rn. vrw «» ~G...erm es.+rw couRp. Me. yss~1 aoo - rasa Fig. 18. CURE Advertisement. .. - 49 Debris Flaw Boulders al Banyan flemeMary Schoo- Exponent's study received attention in the local press. The Corps tried to refute Exponent but in the process conceded that Deer Creek debris basin cannot handle the amount of debris expected in the Corps' own estimates. In November 2000 the civilian leader of the Corps, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works Joseph Westphal, wrote a letter stating that Deer Creek debris basin. does not "provide the level of protection originally authorized by Congress" and offered that the Corps will do further studies if a "local interest" would agree to fund a portion of the cost, estimated at $250,000.64 Later that month, Senators Feinstein and Boxer asked the state, through Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, to investigate the situation and if it found outstanding safety issues, to consider acting as the "local interest" required for a National Academy of Science study. Nichols herself wrote a letter to the Corps in November 2000 advocating McKeith's position. Safety Set Aside _ The Department of Water Resources formed a "technical review committee," reflecting the expertise of the department's scientists and engineers. The charter for the task force warned that participation in the committee was not a signal that a "flood protection deficiency currently exists" at Deer Creek. Two months later, the state's dam safety expert, Steve Verigin, told the engineers and interested parties that it was already clear "a consensus will not be reached among the present attendees."65 The committee simply decided to report all of the findings from the various engineers. One reason, according to Exponent engineer Doug Hamilton, was the feeling that "no matter what we say or do, the Corps just kind of dismisses" the work of Hamilton and others outside the federal government as information driven by agendas. Further, the Corps' Joseph Evelyn maintains that streamflow records from the USGS are the only non-Corps-originated data he would use without reservation. The flip side to this "Catch 22" is USGS's Robert Meyer, who says none of the USGS stream gages on alluvial fans are trustworthy and it is useless to think such things can be estimated. Doug Hamilton and the other engineers did not know whom to trust. Schools That Could Not Be Stopped CGS believes a significant reason for the state's paralysis on safety concerns at Deer Creek was the $48 million Los Osos high school project in northern Rancho Cucamonga and another recently constructed school, Banyan Elementary, located several miles below Deer Creek debris basin but within sight of its flood channel. Rather than acting from an overabundance of caution, officials gave primary importance to the desire not to delay any further the new. schools, which are to alleviate overcrowding in neighboring campuses. They succeeded-more than 2,400 students entered classes at Los Osos in 2002. Nearby Banyan A° November 3, 2000 letter from Westphal to Senators Boxer and Feinstein. b5 From handwritten minutes to March 12, 2001 meeting of Deer Creek task force. 50 Elementary opened in 2001. Also located along Deer Creek is Chaffey College, which wa: spared during the 1969 floods because of the earthen levee-later cleaved in 1999 to make room for more home sites. To this day, Los Osos lacks a document that every other state-funded school construction project must possess before it opens its doors. That document is an approval from the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) signifying that appropriate disaster and evacuation plans are in place and are feasible. OES has twice rejected as incomplete plans that were submitted by local flood control officials. One of them was ahand-drawn map. It should-be noted that the San Bernardino County Flood Control District, the agency responsible for submitting inundation maps, also used to own the land upon which Los Osos was built. It is important not to ignore the construction-friendly political climate in the Inland Empire. Western San Bernardino County is teeming with recent arrivals. It would be quite a change in philosophy for local officials to admit publicly their concerns about flood safety while at the same time approving new housing and schools. Documents show that Los Osos passed environmental reviews without proper inundation maps because the Califomia Department of Education (CDE) acted on what it says was the advice of Resources Secretary Nichols. Asked if it was normal for CDE to set aside environmental concerns based on a verbal promise, CDE facilities official Jim Bush said the agency assumed the Deer Creek task force would come to a conclusion within 60 days of the January 11, 2002 meeting in Feinstein's office. After more than 100 days passed without such a conclusion, officials decided to approve the school project nonetheless. The Los Osos approval documents issued to the Chaffey Joint Union High School District make no mention of flooding or any other environmental concern at Los Osos. Records from :he California Debt Advisory Commission show that Chaffey Joint Union High School District did not particularly need the state's money to build Los Osos. In April 2002 the district authorized the sale of bonds worth tens of millions of dollars. Voters had approved the bonds in years previous; it is common for districts to "save up" bond authorizations until circumstances call for an infusion of cash. Without detailed knowledge of the school district's spending priorities, it is impossible to know if paying the entire cost of the Los Osos project has unduly strained the district's budget or rearranged funding priorities. The district hopes to receive $24 million from the state to cover half the cost of . building Los Osos,bb The Chaffey Joint Union High School District has already had a controversy surrounding construction of Los Osos High School. District officials in mid-2000 were threatened with a lawsuit by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which alleged that endangered species habitat for the Califomia gnatcatcher, up to 388 acres, was illegally destroyed during pre- 66 For reasons beyond the control of local officials, state school construction money for the past year has been largely appropriated for the urgent needs of the second-largest district in [he nation, the Los Angeles Unified School District. Los Osos was eligible but failed to qualify for S24 million instate reimbursement. The district can receive reimburscment for Los Osos in upcoming funding rounds at the State Allocation Board. 51 construction preparation of the school site. In a settlement agreement, the district agreed to buy up habitat elsewhere for permanent conservation. What One Citizen Can Do In real life, the activist Erin Brockovich overcame elitism in the legal arena to hold a water polluter accountable. In the movie version, actress Julia Roberts made it look easier than it really was. In Rancho Cucamonga, however, Malissa Hathaway McKeith and her family have as yet been unable to prevent the potential consequences of a flood on Deer Creek. McKeith's Alta Loma home is stuffed with dozens of boxes of documents on Deer Creek, the result of scores of records requests and independent research. McKeith and her motherjoke darkly that the documents will prove most useful if people get killed by a hood on Deer Creek and their families want to sue someone. McKeith is like a broken record on Deer Creek. While she has managed to sustain her quest. for a Deer Creek safety study over the last five years by paying for expensive water experts, lawyers and lobbyists to pressure higher-up state and federal officials, at home she is often dismissed as another gadfly raving about the sky falling. In 1997 the McKeiths petitioned the Corps and FEMA to get involved after it became clear that local officials were going to allow a developer to bulldoze a portion of the earthen levee that had provided flood protection to the city for decades. The federal agencies refused, thus allowing local officials to keep McKeith at bay by casting her as a "not-in-my-backyard" litigation hound who didn't want any more development above her house. Even though the levee was ultimately cleaved with a bulldozer in 2001, the McKeiths continued to fight. And though FEMA failed to challenge the Corps as McKeith wanted, the participation of Senators Boxer and Feinstein proved to be crucial in getting the state- through Secretary Mary Nichols of the Resources Agency-to agree to coordinate a task force on Deer Creek. The task force (officially called the Coordinated Technical Review Committee), its members and its goals began to take shape during amulti-agency meeting held in Senator Feinstein's San Francisco offices on January 11, 2001. One of the attendees was a brigadier general, Peter Madsen, from the Corps. According to several people present that day, Gen. Madsen appeared furious at the meeting and demanded that McKeith apologize for the GVoshington Post ad slamming the Corps. "Nothing's gonna happen until she does that," Madsen reportedly growled. McKeith, participating via teleconference from Washington D.C., remained silent. Her consultant from Exponent, Doug Hamilton, broke the silence in the room by assuring the assembled officials and engineers that the group could keep its focus on technical issues. Aides to the two senators also asked McKeith to apologize to help move the process along. One of them even drafted an apology for her. "The (Washington Post and Roll Call) ads succeeded in profoundly pissing off everyone who matters at the Corps, and I think probably poisoned an already tainted well," wrote a senior advisor to Boxer, John Hess. "This is not an `I-told-you-so' message, but I think feelings are that strong over at the Corps. Given the s2 intensity of Madsen's comments to me, Malissa, I can imagine the impression he must have made on (Califomia Resources Secretary) Mary Nichols.i67 The aides persisted until McKeith's lawyers at the time, Latham & Watkins, outlined four years of McKeith's treatment by the Corps. There was no more talk of an apology after that, and none was proffered. Says McKeith, "the lesson I learned was to spend your money on publicists and politicians. The ad was the most effective money I spent."68 2004 Deer Creek Update As Losing Ground went to press in early 2004, no consensus over flood control issues had been gained at Deer Creek or elsewhere in San Bernardino County. The topic, however, was looming larger in the public eye. That was the result of wildfires that blackened nearly 740,000 acres in Southern California and a deadly flash flood that killed 15 on Christmas Day 2003. The flood struck Lytle Creek and residents of Devore, just a few miles from the Deer Creek watershed. After the flash flood, residents complained that pre-flood warnings delivered by the Califomia Geological Survey "seemed casual, and that there was no recommendation to evacuate."e9 The state Geological Survey and the state Department of Forestry and Fire Protection concluded that 28 properties in northwestern San Bernardino County had increased risk following the wildfires. However, the state lacked authority to order evacuations and instead sent letters or verbally warned homeowners during post-fire property inspections. Most recently, San Bernardino County sent letters to 113,000 homeowners along a 32-mile area county officials say may be subject to slides and flash floods-residents of Deer Creek included. Crews have been going door to door to warn residents verbally and offer them sand and sandbags to build stanchion walls. "I have never seen the county go to these lengths to advise people of a possible hazard before," San Bernardino spokesman David Wert told the Los Angeles Times. "But then, we've never faced a flood risk of this magnitude.i70 In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has for the first time issued post- wildfire "advisory maps" in Southern California showing locations where wildfires have increased the chances of being inundated by a flood. The maps, however, do not replace official FEMA maps used to calculate flood insurance rates. These post-wildfire actions are good news but do not signal a sea change. State agencies warned of danger in Devore but lacked authority to enforce action. Federal agencies noted the significant post-wildfire danger of flooding but ordered no changes to flood maps or debris basin capacity. s~ From an email from John Hess to Malissa Hathaway McKeith dated 29 November 2000. ae Interview with Malissa McKeith, November 22, 2002. nv Martin, Hugo "At-Risk Areas Brace for Raid' Los Angeles Times December 31, 2003. ~~ Sahagun; Louis "Flood blaming Targe[s Foothills;' Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2004. 53 County officials, now on their public outreach campaign in high-risk zones, have failed to re- examine Deer Creek even as they struggle to secure funding for a massive new debris basin just west of Deer Creek. In nearby Cucamonga Creek's watershed, gravel pits and open space offer a measure of protection against flooding that a Deer Creek resident lacks. In the Cucamonga drainage, however, the Colonies Crossroads project (a commercial and residential mixed-use development already in early stages of construction) is scheduled to receive $ l0 million in bond funds from Proposition 50-the $3.4 billion water quality measure approved by voters in 2002 to protect water supplies from terrorists and boost conservation efforts and pollution control. The money will help construct a larger debris basin to protect Colonies Crossroads from flooding. The $10 million was arranged through a budget amendment introduced by the influential Rancho Cucamonga state Senator, Jim Brulte, at the request of San Bernardino County Supervisor Paul Biane. Biane was a former business partner of one of the Colonies Crossroads developers. Colonies Crossroads also gave $10,000 to Biane's election campaign in 2002.'1 The amendment, astoundingly the only "line item" in the entire bond act, does not name Colonies Crossroads specifically. Instead, it allocates $10 million toward a Southern California water project that is in an area where the county population has increased by at least 2.4 percent in 2002, which also lies outside the service area of the Metropolitan Water District but is within one mile of an established residential and commercial development. Those parameters virtually name Colonies Crossroads because few if any other projects would meet those standards, according to officials.72 Because of legal disputes it is not yet clear who will pay the lion's share of debris basin upgrades protecting Colonies Crossroads. What is known is that debris basin upgrades will be completed to protect Colonies Crossroads and associated neighborhoods in the Cucamonga Creek drainage. Neighboring Deer Creek communities will have to summon more political capital to get the ball rolling on any upgrades. Recommendations The story of Deer Creek is more than the account of a single project. It reveals how crucial decisions about development in risky areas of Califomia are made in virtual secrecy by public officials, elected and appointed, and by developers helped by government actions. This is a failure of process, a revelation of the absence of protection for homebuyers and for students in schools located in potentially dangerous areas such as Deer Creek. Without an open process there is no accountability. As a result, Southern California experiences recurrent cycles of disaster, followed by politicians andjournalists scrambling to find out what went wrong. The purpose of this report is to reveal a stilted, secretive process that leads to this potential danger and to propose ways in which these important decisions can be opened to public view and debate in the future-before tragedy strikes again. ~~ Martin, Hugo "Water Funds Could Aid Development;' Los Angeles Times, September I I, 2003. ~~ Ibid. 54 The issue extends far beyond Deer Creek. As Mary Nichols, the state's former resources secretary, told CGS, the problems of Deer Creek apply to all areas of the state where development is occurring on alluvial fans. These areas are found not only at the foot of the San Gabriel Mountains, but in San Diego County and the Sierra foothills. The failure, CGS's study has found, is with a process that encourages important decisions to be made without debate of experts and public scrutiny. In such a closed process, the actions of individual officials, such as Joseph Evelyn at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, take on undue importance. What is needed is to reform the process for setting and enforcing safety standards; to provide a mechanism for regional decision making on what is clearly a regional issue; and to make safety concerns publicly available to all. A Rancho Cucamonga parent should not have to fly to Sacramento, as CGS staff did, to uncover a controversy over the safety of Los Osos High School. The goal of reform is not to stop development but to make it sustainable, to assure that California's inevitable growth will take place in communities that can expand without huge public expenditures for fire and flood protection that, in the end, fail to protect from the huge natural disasters endemic to Califomia. Earthquakes, for example, are part of the dangers for Californians living in seismic high-risk areas. But legislation, public discussion, countless news stories (including a recent report73 of an unpublished list of California schools especially vulnerable to earthquakes), massive campaigns urging safety measures and the memories of past disasters have created a climate in which risk can be anticipated. When aware of the danger, Californians can take steps to mitigate it. This process should be applied to development on alluvial fans and other areas once considered too remote for residential communities or too difficult or uneconomical for the construction techniques available a few decades ago. CGS recognizes the difficulty of enacting such legislation. Sacramento, as the historian Carey McWilliams wrote, is "one of the great commodity markets in America where an astonishing variety of interests bid for favor and preference.s74 The construction of homes, businesses, warehouses, factories, roads and schools are among the mast important of these commodities. The power of lobbyists and campaign contributors associated with them is great, whether on behalf of developers, union leaders, local merchants and political leaders, or local school board members determined to build a high school. But the effort will, for the first time, force a debate over the desirability of building sustainable communities on risky ground. And, it will take place in the appropriate arena-the state capitol, requiring action from both the executive and legislative branches. °~ Finnie, Chuck. "Quake study of schools shelved; Davis holds up report on vulnerable sites." San Francisco Chronic/e, l3 November 2002. }0 McWilliams, Carey. Califomia: The Great Exception. 1950. Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1995. p. 208. 55 Recommendation #1: Form Alluvial Districts From streetlights to mosquito abatement, it is common practice in government to form special assessment districts so that the residents who enjoy the benefit of a service are also the ones paying for it. CGS sees a need, in areas that abut flood-prone mountain canyons, to create a publicly funded entity with the clear responsibility to advise local governments on flood risks. When CGS speaks to residents who live near Deer Creek, they invariably want tc know if their homes are in danger. It is a hard question to answer. More than concerns over taxes or the siie and scope of government, members of the public are most concerned with their individual safety. They may not want to know every scientific detail, but they definitely want to know the risks they face personally and then make a decision based on reliable information. The prevailing view among the uninitiated is that flood control provides protection from floods, not "a level of protection" that could be exceeded at some point in the future. CGS recommends the creation of independently verified information about alluvial fans and flood risks that members of the public can access easily. Alluvial fans are a permanent feature of California's landscape. CGS proposes that the Legislature authorize creation of "Alluvial Districts" as a way for local communities to identify specific flood risks relating to individual alluvial fans and provide informed counsel to cities and counties as they make land-use decisions in alluvial areas. The state and federal govemments should contribute toward start-up costs for the districts, but local communities-through annual assessments on the owners of property located on the alluvial fan-should support the ongoing operational needs of the district. The firsf question is the hardest to answer: who is on the alluvial fan and who is not? Drawing maps of alluvial fans is the first step toward the full disclosure of flooding risks. Since the precise boundary of the fan may seem capricious to individual homeowners right on the boundary, CGS recommends that all property owners living within 1000 feet of an alluvial fan be informed that their property lies near an area of historic flooding. Those living on the fan (ie., in an area where it can be proved that historic flooding has occurred) should pay an annual assessment to the Alluvial District. Mapping such an area might prove the most contentious step and thus requires intervention from a federal agency with proven experience in mapping: the Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA already maps floodplains but sometimes defers to other agencies on the general dimensions. When creating alluvial fan maps, FEMA should set aside the question of flood control and concentrate on mapping the historic regime of flooding on a particular fan. As a primary benefit, the maps would simply inform interested parties where past floods have occurred, regardless of flood control projects. FEMA should begin with fans near populated areas or other areas undergoing requests for development. Near populated areas, local governments should fund a portion of the risk assessment with help from the state and federal governments. In unpopulated areas developers should pay all or most of the costs. ss Assessments for an Alluvial District could be weighted depending on the distance from the mouth of the alluvial fan or the body of water. Though the precise formula is unclear, the danger increases the closer one gets to the mountains and assessments should reflect that. It is necessary to separate the authority over land use from the authority that assesses flood risks. Local governments that depend on growth for fiscal solvency are more likely to gamble that floods will not occur-suggesting that floods are a faraway risk compared to the immediate demands of budget finance. The development community often is complicit, Beaming land use decisions as a duel between the "common folks" that developers claim to serve and the rights-by-proxy of small animals or native plants usually litigated by powerful homeowners or environmental groups. An Alluvial District, led by an elected or appointed board of directors, would be responsible for determining risk and disseminating flood safety information. The district could issue nonbinding resolutions on land use projects within their boundaries. Most importantly the districts would act as a permanent public foram devoted to the unique challenges of alluvial fans. As an alternative to forming another layer of bureaucracy, the task of holding such hearings could be required of the local county board of supervisors. Guidelines in the legislation might prevent the supervisors from ignoring their responsibilities; for example, if an alluvial district's governing board failed to find that a new development was "reasonably safe for habitation" because of flood danger, the county board of supervisors would have to address the finding formally (usually called a mitigated negative declaration) to allow that development to proceed. These declarations should be reviewable in state court. Recommendation #2: Expand the "Sphere of Influence" Concept to Include Flood Risks Local governments should take an interest in and a responsibility for land uses that may affect other jurisdictions. The "sphere of influence" concept has appeared mostly in courtrooms during land use controversies, such as when a local government feels its quality of life is unduly threatened by a proposed major development just outside its borders. The northern Los Angeles County city of Santa Clarita, for example, fears additional traffic and other effects from the thousands of homes proposed on Newhall Ranch land just over the border in Ventura County. One might assume that Rancho Cucamonga wants its voice heard on Deer Creek-related issues, since the stream flows directly through the city. But the stream itself flows on a sliver of county-owned land once owned by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps project on Deer Creek arguably cemented Rancho Cucamonga's future; the city was incorporated at roughly the same time, 1981, during which the Corps was drawing up bids for the final stages of construction work. s~ Rancho Cucamonga has disengaged itself from the project that ensured its survival. The city did not bother submitting its own findings on Hood safety to the task force led by the state Department of Water Resources. And yet Rancho Cucamongans will be among the first to suffer if the flood control on Deer Creek fails. Government entities at the Lowest levels in California prize their control over local land use and public safety. Yet the City of Rancho Cucamonga and the County of San Bernardino are relying on a federal agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for facts on flood safety. The officials who have been most active in lobbying on behalf of public safety are Senators Barbara Baxer and Dianne Feinstein, not local city council members, county supervisors or local members of Congress. The city and county apparently prefer not to hear the alarms sounded by Local residents, who have had to pay consultants to conduct research that their city and county will not undertake. The Army Corps of Engineers has no monopoly over flooding expertise in Southern California. The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works, for example, oversees 1 15 debris basins and houses one of the most extensive repositories of flooding information in the nation. Local government must account for all foreseeable risks that threaten its borders, not just quality-of--life issues that may or may not accompany the next super store. CGS recommends passage of a state law requiring cities and counties to conduct formal notification and comment periods when a proposed land use has the potential to affect flood safety in other jurisdictions. Each affected jurisdiction should be notified in writing of the proposed Land use and allowed a period of 60 days in which to submit comments. The Southern California Association of Governments should also receive formal notification and the opportunity to comment from a regional perspective. Recommendation #3: Convene the National Academies of Science to bring closure to the Deer Creek controversy The local cost involved in bringing the NAS to Deer Creek is estimated at $250,000 (the . Corps would make up the difference in the total cost, pegged at roughly $1 million). The State of California already spent at least that much on its 16-month task force. The Army Corps of Engineers has a standing offer to pay most of the cost of bringing the NAS to Deer Creek, but only if the state, Rancho Cucamonga or San Bernardino County agree to be a "local interest." CGS urges these three entities to sponsor a NAS study on debris flows in Southem California, despite the potential "bad news" that may follow. As the region strains to grow, there is more and more pressure to develop lands on alluvial fans. Scattershot decisions on important issues such as these may lead to even more devastating losses if the critics of Deer Creek's flood protection are even close to accurate. 58 Recommendation #4: Increase the disclosure standard for school construction CGS staff flew to Sacramento several times to unearth details on the Los Osos High School project. The state Office of Public School Constmction (OPSC) was unable to provide any details on the Deer Creek flooding controversy. The OPSC, which releases state funds to local school districts that are administered to individual school projects by the State Allocation Board, was unaware of any controversy. Documents from the agency show only that Los Osos was eligible for state funds. It took another Public Records Act request and a Sacramento visit to another agency, the Department of Education, to gain a clearer sense of how the Los Osos school construction project surmounted the obstacles against it. Parents seeking similar information about school construction projects should not have to retrace CGS's steps. Vital information on prospective school sites needs to be as close to the public as a public library or a Web site. CGS suggests passage of a state law requiring individual school constmction projects to have an on-site repository of documents that can be made available to administrators, teachers, other school employees and finally, to parent-teacher associations. The information needs to reach the grassroots levels, not simply executives. San Bernardino City Councilmember Susan Longville, the appointee of the Southern California Association of Governments to the state Floodplain Management Task Force, has endorsed several of CGS's recommendations for alluvial floodplain management. Longville's comments are listed in full below: "As a San Bernardino City Councilwoman who [served]...on the...Floodplain Management Task Force, I cannot forget the devastation of alluvial flooding that destroyed homes in my city during the 1980 Harrison Canyon debris flood. It is incumbent upon this task force to recommend policies and procedures that will guide. local land-use decisions on alluvial fans. I believe that the report to the Governor should: • Recommend criteria and mapping standards on alluvial fans that cities, counties and regulatory agencies should use to identify the most reasonable maximum flow that urban areas will face, • Recommend that general plans and local land-use decisions consider more frequent flood events, notjust 100-year floodplain maps, and the cumulative impact of individual debris basins in alluvial fan corridors, • Recommend that the Governor's Office on Planning and Research incorporate these methods for evaluating safety issues on alluvial fans in the next update on general plan guidelines, • Recommend that oversight by a specific state agency should be identified to assist local government and developers with evaluating risk, ss • Recommend legislation that will require property owners on alluvial fans to be informed of safety issues, and • Recommend that (California Environmental Quality Act) guidelines be updated with language specific to alluvial fans." 2004 Legislative Update Assemblymember John Longville, an Inland Empire Democrat, has introduced AB 2141, which would create an Alluvial Fan Task Force with an operating budget of S 1 million. The bill, which will be discussed publicity for the first time in April 2004, would require the Department of Water Resources•to lead inquiry into the "state of knowledge regarding alluvial fan floodplains and to prepare recommendations relating to alluvial fan floodplain management." Findings and declarations would follow. This legislation, if it passes, could accomplish many of the goals of a National Academies of Science study. It does not affect the actions of federal agencies, but at the very least it will further knowledge and promote public safety. so Chapter II SMOLDERING SuBSID1ES: WHY WILDEFIRE POLICIES WORSEN LOSSES Foreword The State of California and Los Angeles County provide a variety of subsidies that in effect encourage home building in fire-prone forests and brush areas. Compounding this problem, small local governments are allowed to make land use decisions in fire-prone areas without due consideration of the fiscal and resource toll incurred by neighboring local govetments, state and federal agencies and insurance policyholders. This chapter focuses on residential development abutting the San Gabriel Mountains. It identifies and challenges public policy actions over the decades which have required the general taxpaying public to build up the financial and bureaucratic network that support wildfire control there. The chapter also unearths the unique mandate of the California Department of Forestry and challenges the legislative basis for statewide funding of 5refighting. Finally, the chapter reports on related effects of wildfire policy: how contracts for fire service between Los Angeles County and 48 of its cities have resulted in further subsidies for San Gabriel Mountains cities, and how brush clearance laws may be contributing to habitat loss and water pollution. In recommendations listed at the conclusion of each major section, CGS proposes reforms to bring wildfire policy into the modem age. CGS advocates these changes in recognition of the intractable reality of housing growth in areas prone to wildfires. For homeowners freely choosing to live near fire-prone areas, CGS proposes they "pay for what they get" in fire services. As a Los Angeles Times editorial put it, "just as urban homeowners are required to fix ruptured sewer lines that endanger public health or repair properties that become public nuisances, people who choose to live in and around wilderness areas must bear some of the associated costs.i75 Inconsistent Federal Policy This report concentrates on nonfederal aspects of wildfire policy, especially relating to Southern California and environs. The federal government has asserted little regulatory authority over the growing problem of private development near fireprone areas. Its main activities have been financial. Since passage of the Stafford Act in 1970, the federal rs December 27, 2003, ezcetpted from "Burned Once is Enough." 61 government has reimbursed local fire departments for emergency costs, helped them prepare for future emergencies, guaranteed low-interest loans for homes and businesses destroyed in large wildfires and lent a helping hand when its own interests (e.g. a national forest) are threatened. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, better known as FEMA, allocates money from the U.S. Treasury at the discretion of the President. While FEMA is often associated with "bailouts" of homes and businesses that suffer losses during wildfires, the bailouts themselves are made necessary by local governments that allow subdivision and development in dangerous areas. FEMA only mops up the messes, real and financial, and helps locals prepare for future emergencies. Local govemments cannot easily reverse bad decisions caused by poor local decisions that allow property owners to build in risky areas. After a poorly located church camp washed away in a flood, Los Angeles County began a fight to condemn the land, battling all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The court ruled, however, that once a land use has been approved, a local government may not condemn that land for health and safety reasons without just compensation.~b In providing federal money, FEMA categorically ignores the location of some communities in areas prone to repeated wildfires. By contrast, the federal government demands a universal standard of protection in flood-prone areas,77 or failing that, requires affected landowners to purchase flood insurance policies, the availability of which the federal government guarantees through the National Flood Insurance Program. The federal government is an activist against flood losses but does little to guard against future losses and redevelopment in fire-prone areas following major wildfires. Yet fires and floods are part of the same cycle. Summary of Subsidies Hidden subsidies have long supported development in fire-prone areas and today continue to bolster that development with massive firefighting agencies, insurance assigned-risk pools and sharing of losses by taxpayers located far from where wildfires strike. To be sure, an argument can be made that all society benefits when govemment mobilizes to fight wildfires. For example, the closure of an interstate freeway due to a wildfire affects interstate commerce and mobility. Intelligent policy, however, should not accommodate the cost of protecting dangerous home sites for a relatively small sector of the population, homeowners on the urban-wildland interface, without asking these homeowners to pay their fair share of the costs. Subsidies supporting residential development in fire-prone areas are listed in abridged form below: r6 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vs. County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304, 318 (1987). ~~ The standard for protection is a 100-year flood; no federal funds can support activity inside a zone designated as subject to inundation in [he largest expected Flood over a I00-year period. 62 Los Angeles County taxpayers are assessed a hidden tax. Until 1992, taxpayers in Los Angeles County could find out the amount of money spent each year by the county fire department to prepare for and fight wildfires. Because of unpublicized actions taken since then, however, taxpayers have been assessed an un-itemized, hidden tax through a highly irregular transfer from the Los Angeles County General Fund to the fire department, now exceeding S67 million per year. The transfer is an accounting remnant from the era (1920s-1992) when the county fire department oversaw two command and control bureaucracies: one for residential and commercial functions (financed by taxpayers living inside a fire district), and one for forestry and -wildfire control (financed by all county taxpayers). In 1992, county supervisors voted to consolidate all county fire department services under one bureaucracy, but they retained the two separate financing sources. This fact is not reflected in budget finance reports after 1992. The county argues that fire department funding comes only from taxpayers inside the fire district, but this assertion is provably false. The state pays for wildfire-related residential home defense in fast-growing suburban unincorporated areas. During World War II, under the threat of enemy attack on its forests, California designated wide swaths of timberland as "state responsibility areas," or SI2As. The state also appropriated funds to create a statewide firefighting force, now known as the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. In the decades following the war, however, the top priority of this statewide force began increasingly to focus on protection of homes, not forests. Since SRA designation falls on roughly a third of all California lands, the task of firefighting in these places has grown exponentially in cost and scope. Meantime, laws restricting residential development inside SRA lands are permissive, and attempts to recoup costs are in their infancy. A common result is that the state government is increasingly supplying firefighting resources for residential areas, even though state law restricts this activity. This was evinced in San Diego and San Bernardino counties in 2003, where state firefighters mobilized in and near SRA lands to defend homes on the wildland-urban interface. Seven wildfire-prone cities which contract with Los Angeles County for fire department protection receive sophisticated service at prices well below cost. Claremont, San Dimas, Glendora, Azusa, Bradbury, Duarte, and La Canada Flintridge, all small cities which hug the San Gabriel Mountains and the Angeles National Forest, are among the 48 "contract cities" belonging to the Consolidated Fire Protection District of the County of Los Angeles. Alittle-known study commissioned by Claremont officials in 1989 reported that these areas receive more in county fire department resources-stations, equipment, personnel-than the amount contributed through taxes by residents of those cities. These cities pay comparatively even less than other urban-wildland interface zones in the fire district, such as affluent new municipalities in northern Los Angeles County, the Santa Monica Mountains and the Antelope Valley. In those places, homes are newer and more fireproof, post- Proposition 13 tax rolls are fatter and a separate, special fee has been assessed since 1990 to finance fire-related infrastructure inside their own geographic area. In the San 63 Gabriel Mountains, however, extensive county fire infrastructure was paid for by taxpayers who do not live there. Los Angeles County Fire Department Without the Los Angeles County Fire Department and its force ofwell-trained and accomplished firefighters, home construction would not be possible in the San Gabriel Mountains foothills and other brush fire areas. The fire department's early days were spent fighting wildfires at the base of the San Gabriel Mountains, which constituted a kind of proving ground not only for firefighters but for the techniques and prevention strategies they still employ. For instance, although mountaintop fire lookouts have dwindled, other early installations are still functioning, such as mountain camps and nine fire stations spaced a couple miles apart in the foothills. At a total cost to taxpayers now approaching $608 million per year, the 4,428-person Los Angeles County Fire Department serves more than 3.1 million people over its 2,278-square mile service area. Included in its service area are 48 cities and numerous unincorporated neighborhoods, which pay the county to provide fire protection through its 157 fire stations and numerous other facilities. (When a city joins the fire district, they are told, "you're not just getting a few fire stations, you're getting 157."~s) However, the residents of all of Los Angeles County's 88 cities contribute a portion of their property taxes to the county fire department to fund wildfire control and prevention. Totaling more than $67 million in 2003, these property taxes are taken from Pasadena, Glendale, Los Angeles and other cities that have their own sophisticated wildfire operations, as well as from smaller cities like Compton, surrounded by urban neighborhoods and located dozens of miles from where wildfires burn. At the very least, this stretches unfairly the intent of Section 25643 of the California Government Code.79 The $67 million is set aside in the name of wildfire protection, but the department has authority to spend the money to accomplish other ends-paying departmental workers compensation costs or buying equipment, for example. County officials claim all county residents benefit from wildfire protection in tandem with flood control services. However, Los Angeles Counry's flood control district is contiguous with its entire area, while its fire district is only half of it, concentrated in the mountains ringing Los Angeles and north and east of the city itself. Two-thirds of the county's roughly l0 million residents live outside the fire district. 08 Statement of Brian Jordan, former public information officer, Los Angeles County Fire Department. t9 Section 25643 reads in paR: "Except for the costs of forest, range, and watershed fire protection within state responsibility areas as defined in Part 2 (commencing with Section 4101) of Division 4 of the Public Resources Code, for which the county is not reimbursed by the state, [he [axes for [he costs of county fire protection services shall be levied only on property within the county served by and benefiting from county fire protection services, or such costs shall be paid from other nonproperty tax revenues collected within the unincorporated area of the county" [emphasis added]. As detailed later in this section, we suggest this amounts to double taxation within broad swaths of Los Angeles County serviced by municipal fire departments. 64 At least one Los Angeles County supervisor has commented on the seeming inequity of charging all taxpayers to extinguish fire in the mountains. In 1991, then-Third District Supervisor Ed Edelman said mingling property taxes from different sources was "legally questionable and morally wrong" to cities with their own fire departments.80 That countywide property taxes fund Fire Department wildfire activities is a little known fact, even among top county officials. The Los Angeles County budget and annual report do not mention it, and neither do revenue charts prepared by Fire Department officials. One of the charts is reproduced in Fig. 19 below. LA County Fire Dept. Adopted Budget 2002-03 Total Funding Sources = $601.9 Million $19,500,000 ©Fund Balance $88,200,000 "~-~'' ~ ~PropertyTaxes .3E~m~ Y W •.r =._...,:r:.. v "$1~'i ~;a ~~,r` y ®Prop. E Special Tax $66,900,000 - ~ Fee-For-Ser~ce Cities p Other RevQnue $54,600,000 $372,700,000 - Fig. 19. Fire Depanment revenue sources for adopted budget, 2002-03. While the pie chart shows $372 million coming from property taxes, it does not show that these property taxes originate from different taxpayer jurisdictions. By combining Ihem, spending far wildfires is blended with spending for basic fire services, as though their financing sources are separate. Source: Los Angeles County Fire Department. Where's Wildfire? Figure 18 displays funding sources for the Los Angeles County Fire Department, presented to CGS in May 2003. Their pie chart, which is reproduced above, does not delineate, nor did county officials mention, that there are three distinct pots of money that comprise the $372 million collected in property taxes. The largest, exceeding $282 million, is property taxes collected from residents living within unincorporated areas or the 48 cities belonging to the eo Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1991. 65 Consolidated Fire Protection District. Next biggest is $67 million in wildfire funding, collected from every Los Angeles County taxpayer. Finally, almost $20 million, also collected countywide, is allocated to the fire department for the provision of beach lifeguards. Although the annual county budget reports lifeguard revenue and spending separately from all other Fire Department budget data, wildfire-related revenue and spending is not. Revenues collected countywide for wildfire control and prevention are co-mingled with revenue collected from the Consolidated Fire Protection District, even though [he two "pots of money" are collected from two legally distinct jurisdictions of taxpayers.81 Without interviewing several former Los Angeles County officials, who have asked to remain anonymous. CGS would not have known to verify independently the Fire Department pie chart reproduced above. Corpparing the pie chart with records from the Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller, CGS' detected a $67 million shortfall. CGS asked the Fire Department and only then learned about a department which exists now only as a bookkeeping function, the Los Angeles County Forester and Fire Warden. 1992 was also the last time Los Angeles County supervisors voted to announce and authorize a specific dollar amount for wildfire spending. Since then, elected officials have allocated wildfire money automatically without a yearly vote or detailed disclosure to the public. According to the appointed Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller, J. Tyler McCauley, the special mechanism by which the Fire Deparnment gets wildfire money is unique in the county's $16 billion budget. To see how this happened, it is necessary to review the origin and growth of the Forester and Fire Warden. The Early Years For communities to take root and grow in the picturesque but fire- and flood-prone San Gabriel Mountains, they needed organized fire protection. In the founding years of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, there arose a strong, centralized firefighting bureaucracy backed by citizens groups located mostly in high-growth communities along the base of the San Gabriel Mountains. State officials were more concerned with trees. Fire protection in Califomia was first envisioned as a way to preserve future harvests for the timber industry. The Forest Protection Act of 1905, besides re-establishing a state Board of Forestry and endowing it with regulatory powers, enabled local governments like Los Angeles County to form fire districts and "appropriate money for the purpose of forest protection, improvement and management."sz "~ The `"Caxpayers' Guide" issued each year by the county Auditor-Controller is the only place wildfire revenues are announced publicly, and it is published under a different cover than official budget documents. Even there, disclosure is limited to a few letters, "Fire-FFW." sz Califomia Forest Protection Act of 1905, § 21. 66 Even though the desire to protect forestlands led to the Act, forestry and residential development were intertwined early in Southern California's history: The [Los Angeles County Fire] department was at first an outgrowth of attempts to solve very early problems in the forest domain, both at the state and national Ievel....Only later did many of the features of the `standard fire department' emerge. Linked tightly with early forestry work in Los Angeles County was the urban growth pattern that had begun to spread across the vast area. The county's political -relationship with the state of California and the efforts of several prominent local citizens who dealt with the state in an influential manner also were of prime importance in the development of the department. All of these factors evolved almost simuftaneously.B3 Financing the fledgling department was up to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. It supported fire operations directly from its General Fund, spending $710 in 1908 to extinguish 21 fires. (The Fire Department's current estimated budget is $608,599,00084) It was still a small operation in 1912, when county residents approved a 51.5 million bond issue to improve county roads and line them with shade trees. County Forester Stuart J. Flintham and his crew led the planting of trees later to grace roads such as Foothill Boulevard in the San Gabriel Valley. When some county supervisors suggested road workers could also plant trees, Flintham bristled that only his personnel had the "scientific expertise.85i In 1917, when the forester learned his department faced elimination through budget cuts, he persuaded burgeoning citizens' groups and businesses (notably from San Gabriel Mountains foothills communities) to fight the move before the board of supervisors. The Pasadena Shakespeare Club, the California Federations of Women's Clubs, the Pasadena Independent, the San Dimas Water Company and the Monrovia Chamber of Commerce appeared before the board to support forestry in general and Flintham especially. sb The Board of Supervisors reversed course, awarding Flintham a larger budget. Not incidentally, he took over "fire warden" duties for the county following two September 1919 conflagrations that consumed 135,000 acres in the San Gabriel Mountains. Previously, fire control had been under the purview of the county Fish and Game Department, but the 1919 fires were widely seen as, resulting from "flaws in large-fire organization and cooperation between fire agencies.i87 Thus was the state set for formation of the predecessor to the modern fire department, the Los Angeles County Department of Forester and Fire Warden. es Boucher, David. Ride [he Devil Wind, A History of the CACFFW Dept. and Fire Protection Districts. Fire Publications: Bellnower, CA: 1991, p.2. 80 County of Los Angeles 2003-2004 Proposed Budget, p.26. ~. - ns Boucher, p. I I. ss Boucher, p.l I. er Dr. Frank Beall et al. Introduction to the t-Zone University of California Forest Products Laboratory, 2001. Chapt. 3, p. 4. 67 Modem firefighting techniques-attending to house fires, rescues, paramedic duties, hazardous waste, aerial attack, mutual aid and industrial fires-all were decades away. The seeds for subsidy, however, were firmly planted. Small Fire Districts and County Fire Stations Though state law had allowed formation of fire districts since 1905, volunteer fire companies were the norm in unincorporated parts of Los Angeles County until the mid 1920s.g8 Also common when wildfires struck was conscripted labor. Men plucked from their barstools by authorities (a constable was posted at the rear door of the saloon to prevent escape) were among the first firefighters documented in the history of Los Angeles County. In time, labor would be drawn from the Civilian Conservation Corps, and during World War II prison inmates began service on the fire lines, which continues to this day.89 Between major fires, however, volunteers were largely on their own. "In spite of [Chief Flintham's] best efforts, . the effectiveness of the volunteer system began to wane. This was largely due to a lack of monetary support by the communities involved, in addition to an overwhelming growth factor."90 State law allowed formation either of countywide fire districts or multi-county fire districts- both unacceptable to larger cities like Los Angeles that wanted exclusive local control over fire services. Los Angeles County officials solved their problem (temporarily) by securing changes in state law to allow separate fire districts within a county. Thirty-one fire districts were approved by the end of 1924. Each was funded through property tax assessments on residents of the particular district. County supervisors allocated funding to maintain central control and loaned the districts money to purchase start-up equipment. This resulted in a patchwork of self-supporting fire districts supervised by the county Forester and Fire Warden. Independent cities had their own fire departments. Unincorporated areas relied on the county Department of Forester and Fire Warden or on volunteer fire organizations: This resulted in inequities. Aself-supporting fire district in the San Gabriel Mountains foothills, such as La Crescenta, was financed only by local residents. A county Forester and Fire Warden station adjacent in La Canada Flintridge was financed by countywide taxes. Thus taxpayers in areas far from fire danger contributed to protecting homes in La Canada Flintridge, 50 years before it incorporated. As the decades passed, fire district consolidation improved organizational efficiency, eliminated bureaucracy and broadened [he tax base. By the late 1920s, the consolidated operation became the "Los Angeles County Fire Department," in charge of firefighting in the fire districts. The Forester and Fire Warden became a subsumed division inside the Fire Department. Forester and Fire Warden engines were identifiable by their green color. Their ee The city of Sierra Madre is the only municipality in the foothills to retain its volunteer fire department into the 2l" Century. Sierra Madre relies on neighboring cities to coordinate dispatch efforts, which are sometimes derided as "foundation savers": arriving too late to save the house but in time [o we[ down a newly exposed foundation. ev The inmates' compensation for fire dory was S I an hour in 2003. 90 Boucher, p. 29. . 68 operations were still financed by a separate funding stream, the county General Fund. Their job was to fight brush fires, larger forest fires and to do forestry and watershed-related work. A harbinger of the future was evident by 1930, when the green F&FW engines started being equipped with ladders for use in house fires. Defending homes and fighting wildfires were becoming one in the same. Funding Cuu Spur Budget Consolidation Widespread local funding cuts followed passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, which capped how much property taxes could rise from year to year. The county struggled to maintain its general fund appropriation to the Forester and Fire Warden division and had to balance Fire Department needs with those of other county departments facing budget cuts. Funding levels for fighting wildfires rose some years and fell in others, which challenged the fire department's ability to train regularly and expand services to new development. See Figure 20 below. Los Angeles County fire budgets, 1975-2003 $650,000,000 $ V 00,000, 000 $550,000,000 $500.000,000 $450,000,000 $400,000,000 $350,000,000 $300,000,000 $250,000,000 $200,000,000 $150,000.000 $100,000.000 $50,000,000 $0 ~v'~X~'!`~•x ~'+ ~tKS~S3xaw~~~•~#"¢1iN^{l`J~. t~i{~~e'eStl..il Y~~ ~°'. j~ K4 R. ~~a~i»14 ~i#'c..a 4Y T:y P v3n.'M'"'~S klti .. fil +t~A ~µ~ a~.~3~k~', w,{.w,aF -G ~r:: 7 -c.4:, ;a n,+:tw""~~ r :c~.~i; ~~ ab'~'k?s:~'w~r ;:hut a;n s a ,} '°~ sue.. ~. >-c ~ .~.,,: k~ a zP't~~x^ r:Fcz '~.3';. tt'v'.'?t~,tw.<r~1i <~,lk *" r ~m~', Syr „~,~~ -, - ~ys~y's~` ~~ g~ ~c~i. p*F! -*wi i5°:T°' ix~"a~#_ ~.~+:"a+ R9 '~.~,k$~i.~ty e. F~ ~_s,,,n "rx". i ~r+az.~*;.-a Er"~ •..~w-t ."~?.;~:p'zw"e.• ~ ava } L-.T~'r'e ~ci:. '+t } ,;K'~ -sc 7~'.z.'.. 4, va~. w. ~.Ct.° ~k>' w -na t r, ~4 -s ,-^~.~'r+ ^~^,{~'. ~ a.;~s•~c~.~~ - ~ iTi4!'41M4k. ~~: ^~ai _4F~,Y.,~ ''a''^ n.«v~~`+hl~~`'F-:'` .r.^w...~..F ~.SL'~j3:i. Yy,y~>•.''+" •-:"-.. ..1 p _Q..umL}C`hY ys ~p~ tak r ~ a.. ...(~~ ".` .~+.-_;""_+~>'.?' -~,~"~.^,a,.r.f 'd Y..,~?'~~'y~y,~ 3~~'L:fit 3£ S.L:+4 ~Y'F{P w''1 -'"t::. w _~ ., _ " 4 t ,:{ ; ~ ,~. ~G.~.a rv:~-.w: a0° . 1'n.. 't t~ -.n°.. ^'a. s3t_. ^'_ °~`n~~-4«~°:'.' ,«-r ,.- ,~O 10 00 Ott. OA 06 Og 90 O`l' ~b A6 oiO 00 O`l' Ob 10 . 11 10 ~'~ ~,b 0~ 0~ g°' A^ AO 00 01 00 O^ O~ O Forester and Fire Warden adopted budget . ~ . f - • Net County Cast }Total Consolidated Fire Protection Districts-adopted budget Fig. 20. Los Angeles County Fire Department budget data, 1975-2004. Source: Los Angeles County. 69 By 1992, the fire department was weary of funding uncertainty and had decided its internal organization was overly complex. "We didn't want to have to lobby for the funding before the board every year," Los Angeles County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman said.91 County officials persuaded the supervisors to support the permanent removal of fire department funding from the county's annual budget deliberations. This unprecedented move, which the press mostly ignored, had been previously discussed before the Board of Supervisors. A year before the fire department consolidation, In [he July 26, 1991 edition of the Los Angeles Times, reporter Richard Simon wrote, [Los Angeles County Supervisor Ed] "Edelman argued that if the county diverted property taxes collected countywide to the fire district, it would be `legally questionable and morally wrong' to cities that have their own fire service." However, Edelman voted unanimously with the other four supervisors to authorize the property tax diversion on July 28, 1992. Commenting for this report, retired Los Angeles County firefighter and historian David Boucher wrote that consolidation "was done because the department continued to grow rapidly and it was becoming very complicated to do the math each year. It also provides for finer-tuning of money [so it can] flow to special problem areas." How Wildfire Money Became Automatic Under the 1992 arrangement, the Consolidated Fire Protection District receives a flat dollar amount as well as money determined through a formula for estimating average growth in property taxes. The dollar amount was originally set at the "Net County Cost" of the Forester and Fire Warden division in 1991, around $59 million. In 2003 the transfer exceeded $67 million a year.92 This action was significant because it permanently exempted the Fire Department from the annual give-and-take of budget deliberations. [n a technical sense, the fire district gained legal responsibility for language in the County Charter, which identifies the Forester and Fire Warden as the means by which the county would control brush and wildfires. As a practical matter, the Los Angeles County Fire Department was always the bureaucracy responsible for fighting wildland fires in the county. The major change resulting from the consolidation was the omission of ongoing Forester and Fire Warden (wildfire) funding from the Los Angeles County budget after 1992. The official documents to the consolidation state that "the funding mechanism has been designed to preserve the F&FW's current financial relationship to the General Fund."93 This statement clearly identifies from which fund the transfer money will come. However, in editions of the Los Angeles County budget subsequent to 1992-93, the page once devoted to Forester and Fire Warden appropriations no longer appears, and money formerly separated as Forester and Fire Warden appropriations is co-mingled with property tax revenue from Consolidated Fire 91 Interview, July 8, 2003, Los Angeles County Fire Department headquarters, Los Angeles, CA. " Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller Tyler McCauley, Tax Pavers' Guide 2002-03. p.41. " Los Angeles County Fire Department letter to the Board of Supervisors, dated July I5, 1992. p. f. 70 Protection District residents. Since 1992 some 5650 million has been transferred to the Fire Department without a line item`in the county budget. In defending the 1992 tax transfer, Los Angeles County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman said that the 560 million transfer prevents the Fire Department from asking county supervisors for more money in subsequent years.9-0 County officials also maintain that Forester and Fire Warden funding does not come from their General Fund. Further, the county annual report depicts its Fire Department operating with zero "net county cost."9s Los Angeles County does not currently make clear what its Fire Department costs to all county taxpayers. The official consolidation documents state that the county provides a "base year revenue transfer for 1993-94 which is set at the Proposed 1992-93 Forester & Fire Warden Net County Cost.s96 Yet while this statutory precedent has remained unchanged, the county currently claims its Fire Department operates with no "net county cost." In truth, this tax on all Los Angeles County tax~ayers, while not new, ceased to be expressed as a cost following Fiscal Year 1992-1993. 7 In the past, county officials have suggested that permanent General Fund transfers to the fire district were illegal. In 1991, months before he voted with other supervisors to consolidate funding sources for the fire department, Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich asked fire department staff present at the Board of Supervisors meeting why existing property tax revenues controlled by Los Angeles County could not finance fire protection. (Antonovich was opposed to the creation of a new tax, the ill-fated "benefit assessment" discussed in greater detail below, which would fall only upon residents of the fire district.) According to the Los Angeles Times, "representatives of the fire department said that, by law, only 17 cents out of each property tax dollar can go to the Consolidated Fire Protection District."9B The 17-cent figure refers to Proposition 13, which decreed that the percentage distribution of property tax allocations remain exactly what it was prior to implementation. This would seem to throw doubt on the legality of adding property taxes, such as those transferred in 1992, to the revenues of the fire district, since any addition would be an increase over the l7-cents-per-dollar cap. As it turned out, the 560+ million transfer was only one of the major fire protection financing actions taken by Los Angeles County in the 1990s. The loss of local government property taxes following Proposition 13, new development in rural areas, rising costs and declining state payments for inmate work camps were instrumental in the county's decisions in 1990 to eliminate 70 Forester and Fire Warden jobs and establish fees on new development in high- growth areas of the county. The Consolidated Fire Protection District also struggled to 90 July 8, 2003 interview with Los Angeles County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman. ss Counry of Los Angeles Annual Report 2002-2003, p. 19. se Los Angeles County Fire Department (e[ter to the Board of Supervisors, dated July I5, 1992. p.2. 9i Asked why budget reporting ended for the Forester and Fire Warden funding, Auditor-Controller J. Tyler McCauley wrote in an email that "FFW was annexed into the Fire Dept." and as such is no longer an annual transfer Rom the general fund to the Fire Department. ARer CGS issued in August 2003 a press release describing budget irzegularities in the Fire Department, San Gabriel Valley Tribune reporter Michelle Rester told CGS that McCauley and all five Los Angeles County supervisors had declined comment for her article on the CGS press release. 9s "Supervisors Take Step Toward New County Fire Tax;' Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1991. 71 maintain service levels. As early as 1987, District officials were proposing a "benefit assessment" on property in the Consolidated Fire Protection District. Rebuffed by irate homeowners, county supervisors at first backed away from levying the assessment without a vote of the public. By July of 1991, however, the county's financial condition was markedly worse, and a split board approved the county's unilateral levy of the assessment. The average benefit assessment for a residential homeowner was $13.99 in 1991, but it would more than triple by November, 1996, when voters approved Proposition 218. Figure 21 below, provided by the Los Angeles County Fire Department, tracks average single-family home yearly supplemental tax payments to the Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County resulting from the county-imposed benefit assessment levied from 1991-1996 and the voter approved Proposition E levy from 1996 onward LOS ANGELES COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT HISTORY OF BENEFIT ASSESSMENT/SPECIAL TAX LEVY SINGLE FAMILY HOME BESEFlT A95ES5]IE~T SPECIAL TAC S6O.00 550.00 _____ ___________________ _______ ___ ______ __ _.. I c - ' i _ > 5i0.ao _____ ________________ _______________________________ ______ ______ ______ LL 5)0 00 _____ _ ___________________________ _ . ____ Z TA%PAVER SAVINGS j ~ 51,1CE 1995% ~ A9.5 MILLION i • 510.00 _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ r Y 510.00 _ _' 50.00 1991-9E 199Z-9J 199}y0 199195 199596 1996-9] 199]-9B 199&99 1999-00 1006D1 2001-0E EOOZ-0J '~-CAP 555.96 555.96 555.96 535.96 555.96 555.96 51tl.00 S<tl.96 Si9.tl] SSO.tl] SSLtl9 SSZ.9l -~ACNA L LEW SU.99 SJ6.55 SJ6.55 SJ6.33 f55.% 530.% SII.66 S9E.66 SiZ.66 SiZ.66 Si866 SSZ.9l FlSGL YEAR Fig. 21. 'TAXPAYER SAVINGS" refers to difference between actual taxes levied and the maximum allowable levy, the "cap; for a particular Fiscal Year. Proposition 218 in 1996 had the effect of invalidating most local taxes imposed without a vote of the people. Challenged by Los Angeles County but upheld by the courts, Proposition 218 cost the Fire Department more than $50 million in annual revenues-none of them wildfire-related-and forced the county to hold an election in June 1997 to ask voters in the fire district whether to approve a new special tax on property to replace the lost revenues. 72 Proposition F in 1997 was distinct from and was in several ways the antithesis of the county's 1992 merger of tire budgets. The purpose, amount and scope of Proposition E were given a full public airing to win over historically stingy voters. An Independent Citizens Oversight Committee was specified in the proposition language to monitor the flow of Proposition E tax funds. (It now meets twice yearly.) In contrast, the county's 1992 merger of fire budgets, which set into motion automatic allocation of more than $67 million, provides to the fire department more money than Proposition E every year99-but without significant public oversight. The successful campaign to pass Proposition E marked the Fire Department's entry into the political realm. Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman explained to CGS that he supported the S60 million permanent annual transfer of property taxes in 1992 because he didn't want to lobby the board every year for the money. However, the years following 1992 began a string of unprecedented public lobbying efforts from Chief Freeman and the firefighters union. According to the Los Angeles Times, "The firefighters union has gotten behind [Proposition E] in a big way; more than 300 firefighters have volunteered to be trained as public speakers and have stumped for the measure, according to [Chief P. Michael] Freeman. About 200 community meetings have been held, and dozens more are scheduled."loo How is-the Money Spent? The Los Angeles County supervisors have transferred millions to a special district that they rarely, if ever, audit. The Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller, as of November 2003, lists no audits of the Fire Department on its Web site. (Audits available online dated back only to 2001; CGS was unable to find evidence of earlier Fire Department audits.) The auditor appears to focus most attention on services funded by federal "pass through" dollars: child protection, senior services, health care and welfare. Other than the sheriff, locally funded public safety departments rarely face audits. See Figure 22 below, which graphs publicly available (in November 2003) audits of major Los Angeles County departments. Source: Los Angeles County Web site. 's Proposition E revenues equal approximately S50 million per year since 1997; FFW funding has exceeded that mark every ear. 44 "Campaigns Wage Battle to Save Library, Fire Services;' Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1997. By Times Staff Writer Josh Meyer, Page B-l. This article also notes that "an opinion by the county counsel has given Proposition E campaigners an added weapon in their fight against voter apathy: The lawyers have concluded [hat if it doesn't pass, the county supervisors would be prohibited from taking money from their general fund to pay for the services rendered through the fire assessment district." However, Los Angeles County, in response to a Public Records Act request, reports that the Times got it wrong and what the lawyers ruled out was using sales tax revenue for the fire department-not general fund revenue. 73 Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller Available Online Audits 50 46 45 40 35 30 25 21 19 L 15 13 11 10 13 10 2 2 01 2 2 5 0 ~,Ge. x,05' ~A°' + °~ ~,°e cccA Leo o`G`.' O Q~~ ~'b oc ~ ~ re a~~ P`~ Gr`a 0ec\o` ~~o~. eay~~a dear e~Q~a Qa~y4r 9JQa`• ~\a 5 Q`o~o O\y~. Qv ~~ Q- Fig. 22. Among 12 major Los Angeles County departments, only the Fire Department has zero audits. The Fire Department does not publicize its own costs of fighting major wildfires, including incidents declared to be federal emergencies that trigger the flow of federal funds to homeowners and fire agencies. The Fire Department did send a letter responding to a California Public Records Act request from CGS, in which they report spending $7.88 million on the 1993 firestorms and receiving initial reimbursement of $7.68 million from federal and state sources. 101 As part of the same request from CGS, the Department announced its total federal revenue for the past nine fiscal years, which is compiled in a chart below. The Department cited increased federal revenue as one reason for cutting the voter-approved Proposition E taxes in 2003 to residents in the Consolidated Fire District. Subsidy from afar is helping to cut taxes at home. Fig. 23 below lists total federal revenue to the Los Angeles County Fire Department, 1994-2003. Source: Los Angeles County Fire Department. 101 As the result of a Federal Emergency Management Agency audit, some 5771,000 of the reimbursement may be returned to the federal government. Cliff Caballero, acting deputy chief of the Los Angeles County Fire Department's administrative bureau, said that as of November, 2003, the issue has not yet been resolved. 74 Fig. 23. Total Fede21 Revenue Received by the Fire District Hot Spots There is little information on which Los Angeles County communities are most costly for the fire department to protect, and for what reasons: rescue calls, fires at industrial sites or conflagrations threatening communities on the urban-wildland interface. It is unclear whether expensive homes in the foothills generate enough in tax revenues to "pay their own way," or which locales rely most heavily on countywide services such as helicopter water drops during brushfires or emergency air transport. The department appears not to collect data that would shed light on such questions. In its annual statistical summaries, the department formerly listed its busiest (ranked by incident volume) squads, stations and battalions. But in 2001 and years following, this category was eliminated. The public might be better able to determine the levels of public resources hillside home dwellers use if it had statistics tracking over a period of decades where large brushfires occurred. There is no line item in Los Angeles County's $16 billion budget which quantifies wildfire spending. A 1994 public report on the Kinneloa and Old Topanga fires noted that the fire department received $9.7 million in federal disaster advance payments, as a lump sum reimbursement for local costs incurred "above board." While a RAND Corporation study ~s calculated a 90 percent "save" ratio (Houses burned/houses saved), the department's total expenses were never itemized for serious public review.102 Available statistics from 1999-2001 showed that eight central Los Angeles Basin communities (the "Gateway Cities" including Bell, Bell Gardens, Cudahy, Commerce, Huntington Park, Maywood, Pico Rivera and South Gate) generated the greatest number of fire department calls, although the "busiest station" was in the Antelope Valley city of Lancaster. 103 But since roughly two-thirds of all incidents are of the emergency medical variety, this data likely indicates areas where residents are more likely to have no health insurance, waiting for extreme symptoms before summoning authorities for aid. Recommendations for Los Angeles County Los Angeles Cozrnty owes its citizens more complete reporting of local spending on wildland frefighting and shozrld cozzsider additional assessments on areas likely to be subject to wildfires. The county should reinstate a separate line item indicating Forester and Fire Warden funding as part of overall Fire Department budget reporting. Future budgets should duly report the more than $67 million spent from the General Fund each year, ostensibly for wildfire control. Further, each "final budget" should both report the $67 million General Fund contribution and describe its financing uses in the previous fiscal year-i.e. wildfires, air operations. The county should study the feasibility of a hazard tax, which would be assessed it high-risk fire areas (Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones). An alternative is to study formation of community facility standards districts in such zones to fund fire prevention activities such as brush clearance, training and community outreach. (A hazard tax would require approval by a countywide vote of the people; a standards district would require a vote only inside the proposed district.) The county should create greater opportunities for citizen oversight of wildfire disbursements. A citizens commission oversees disbursement of Proposition E revenues to the fire department (about $54 million a year). Similarly, Los Angeles County owes its citizens better accounting and knowledge of the $67 million spent for wildfire protection each year. This sum should be debated and voted on in public, along with the rest of the $16 billion in the budget. By doing this, supervisors will be forced to decide whether county taxpayers should continue to subsidize fire prevention for homes on the wildland-urban interface, and if so, by how much.. County-supported health clinics are closing due to lack of funding; this tradeoff should be more visible to the public. An altemative is to expand the responsibilities and membership of the Proposition E oversight committee. 102 The official report on the Old Topanga fire estimates haurdous waste control costs due to the fire as in excess of S68 million. Afollow-up report by the RAND Corporation put this figure at S6S thousand. 10J Web site of the Los Angeles Counry Fire Department, lacofd.org. 76 State Responsibility Areas State Responsibility Area (SRA) designation requires the sophisticated California Department of Forestry to respond directly to wildfires, or pay counties or the federal government (by "balancing of acres"loa) to control fires there. State Responsibility Areas can exist only on state lands or within unincorporated areas of counties. But while state law provides that "it is not the state's responsibility to provide fire protection services to any building or structure located within the wildlands,"los in practice this occurs. See Fig. 24, a map of SRA in California. Fig. 25, a fire perimeter map, shows where wildfires have actually occurred from 1950-2002-note the similarity to Fig. 24. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AREAS FOR FIRE PROTECTION r-. sRA ` j_f_.1 i Thtrlnbrm~YOn wa. trkw lmm N. Strtr oleWllomu + l I Fin RUOYrt. ASFmrtnnt Prt9ram IFRAPI. °".°.]~i.~.~ i FRAP wE.ib: ~• ~ttpJMnP~f.u.gwMVEEaulnupNbbWM/eramFpyE(. ~ I I I I _{_ f r~t~~~y~~{.a1~ t '' '~ 1 +i~'w; _ _ .1 .j. ..1 ~~ ;~ ~. `~" GELES ~'f J.i Y1 Y ~. st+Y 1 ¢ _ \~ a -~;O ~C. .' TI3 J k i e~ I ~. r ~.~ t _ I ,, 73r1 fig` rl a el ~l r I+~ y~ ~ yh 1r,fFY Y ] _ i ~. ~E+'f,,,r~>`.~ e~1 '. a.t p.+, Y~n'~~J-s~.Y +e`T'.r F r r~ ' tty~ ~~ '~. b~~ tfi~ ' c _. ~ ' "~ t ~ +,.v~3 1 Y~ I"r.. ~ ~i . b.,p ~% ~ • M ~ is .~. ry ~ ~~~ ~~ ~ 'fir S {~ I ~~ Los '~ eles ~ ~< ~i.~ ~~~ I ~+ > ~ ,I ~ , v, , 3 x ,~ . ~N / :.~~ ds:: a C N N 0 E N n E r~ N 9 C ri N O V W O a` N = LL U o ~ n m v m c T Q ~ ~ N ~ C o n n N C ~ O ~ E ~N ~~ e= N N OC IL U Iw The U.S. Forest Service provides wildland fire protection to state lands and [he state provides [he same [o federal lands depending on proximity. If there is a Fare on SRA lands next to the boundary of a national forest, the U.S. Forest Service is likely to respond. los Califomia Public Resources Code 4142. The Califomia Department of Forestry can provide fire suppression services in State Responsibility Areas if cooperative local agreements are in place. CGS was unable to assess in total the "civil collection" success rate-the bill homeowners are supposed to get when CDF provides wildfire collection-because it is enforced by six counties and CDF itself. 77 Fig. 25. Fires exceeding 10 acres in size, 1950-2002. Building Homes in SRA California Department of Forestry firefighters coordinated most control efforts during the epochal 2003 Southern Califomia wildfires, partly because the combined strength of local units was inadequate to the task and partly because wildfires raged in State Responsibility 78 Areas.1°6 Watershed protection may have been a goal, but firefighters and officials often spoke of their first priority-protecting lives10' and property. Eighteen months before the fires of 2003, state fire officials speaking to an Assembly subcommittee identified the benefits of state fire protection in State Responsibility Areas. Protecting lives, safety and structures topped the list, followed by watershed protection; open space; timber; range; recreation; wildlife habitats; endangered species; historic and cultural assets; coastal, wild and scenic rivers and other scenic assets; and local economic destruction.108 The list had no numbers to indicate priority among the many benefits, but its top-to-bottom grouping underscores how the fundamental role of State Responsibility Areas has changed. The California Department of Forestry might be more suitably called the California Fire Department. Partly in recognition of the cost of defending homes in the wildland-urban interface, the Legislature in 2003, struggling with a record budget deficit, cut roughly 552.5 million from the 5671.5 million Department of Forestry budget and instructed it to recoup that cost=a fraction of its overall budget-by assessing landowners in SRA lands. A Fee now under consideration is parcel-based, which could result in identical fees for parcels vastly different in size and population density. Opponents seeking to overturn the fee as unconstitutional, including the California Farm Bureau Federation, are amassing forces for a possible court battle.109 In a July 2003 form letter to Governor Gray Davis posted for download on the Web site of the California Fire Chiefs Association, the chiefs lament the CDF parcel assessment as "based on a mistaken believe [sic] that private property owners within SRA lands benefit from CDF protection services at the expense of the general tax-paying public. In reality, the vast majority (90%-95%) of all private property owners within SRA lands are provided fire protection services through paid, part paid volunteer, or volunteer fire departments, paid for [by] the local taxpayers."t 10 While local efforts cannot be taken for granted, the reality is that they are too small to mount large-scale actions when big wildfires strike-they need the state to step in. Indeed, many wildfires get a chance.to spread relatively unchecked because local initial attack units juggle two goals: structure (and human life) protection on the one_ hand, and attacking the fire perimeter directly. The division of resources can prove deadly. A San Diego rural gated subdivision received little warning from officials before one wave of the 2003 firestorm swept through, killing seven residents. Over and over, wildfires get out of hand, and reinforcements are summoned. Everyone pays. 106 State Responsibility Areas burned in San Bernardino and San Diego counties. A front-page Los Angeles Times story of October 31, 2003 reports how training of local fire protection personnel and numbers of fire-related resources in the San Diego area lag behind other urban areas. 1D~ David Boucher, a retired Los Angeles County firefighter and unofficial historian of the department, in his review of this report, noted that the importance of protecting lives "is drilled into every new recmi[ from day one." io Reimbursement for Services Governor's Proposed Budget, 2002-2003. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, Presentation to Assembly Budget Sub-Corrvnittee 3, April 3, 2002. ~09Andersoq Craig W. "Parcel Fees to Offset CDF Budget Crisis;' San Joaquin Fartn Bureau Federation Web site, December 2003, http://sj fb.org. 110 from Web site of California Fire Chiefs Association, http://calchiefs.org. 79 A loophole allows fairly dense development inside State Responsibility Areas. There is a limit on the allowable density of homes before SRA status is automatically lifted-leaving local governments financially responsible for fire control-but it is a huge limit. Under current regulations, as many as 750 homes can be built on only 250 acres inside an SRA and the state still maintains financial responsibility for wildfire control.) l l The total distribution of structures within SRAs-which cover a third of California-is unknown, but there are roughly 1.5 million privately owned parcels within SRA.11' While many of these parcels are served by large and small fire departments for everyday needs such as house fires; medical emergencies and rescues, the state staffs and pays for major wildfire responses. Concern over homebuilding inside SRAS is hard to find. An anonymous document in the database of the University of Califomia Forest Products Library, titled "TACTICAL PLAN," includes the observation that "thousands of homes and other structures are built in SRA[s] each year without consideration for the hazards of the setting or the survivability of the structure. These vulnerable structures detract from [the Califomia Department of Forestry's] wildland fire protection mission." As a solution, the unnamed author suggests "[working] with the Resource Protection Committee of the Board of Forestry on a critical review of what constitutes [a] state responsibility area."113 Why the State Took Responsibility in the First Place It took an event of fearsome significance to convince Califomia legislators to swallow a hefty price tag and fund formation of a permanent statewide firefighting force. Wildfire alone could not persuade representatives of California's timber industry to set aside decades of resistance against any state control of private timberlands. Only World War II and the threat of enemy attack on timber reserves were epochal enough to precipitate the state's entry, starting in 1943, into systematized wildland fire control.) l4 The war has long ended, but another risk-home building in the wildland-urban interface-has kept the state busy ever since. C. Raymond Clar, a longtime official of the California Department of Forestry and later its historian, was influential in the creation of State Responsibility Areas. Ina 1969 report produced for then-Gov. Ronald Reagan, he offered a general philosophical underpinning as to why city dwellers should be taxed to protect forests and watersheds.) Is Timber and watersheds deserved special protection, he argued, because ~~t Reimbursement for Services Governor's Proposed Budget, 2002-2003. Califomia Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, Presentation to Assembly Budget Sub-Committee 3, April 3, 2002. Tex[ reads, "By Board [of Forestry] regulations, unless specific circumstances dictate otherwise, lands are removed from SRA when housing densities average more than 3 units per acre over an area of 250 acres:' ~ ~= Anderson, Craig W. http://sj Po.org. ~ ~~ University of Califomia Forest Products Laboratory Urban-Wildland Interface database. Available at htto://www.ucfol.ucoo.eduNWl%20Documents/017.PDF p. 5. ~ 1° State firefighrers fought fires prior to 1943, and grants were made to local firefighting agencies, but the designated State Responsibility Areas in use today arose during [he War. ~ is Clar, C. Raymond. Evolution of California's Wildland Fire Protection Svsiem. Publication of the Califomia Slate Board of Forestry. 1969: Sacramentq CA, p. 7. 80 [H]ome owners in Chicago and San Francisco do have an interest in [rural Amador County] timber, and each helps pay for its protection. Because the State of Califomia has a more localized interest, the man in San Francisco pays a little more for the job of fire protection. He pays that added share in state taxes. And, further, because the water and snow that falls upon the Amador [County] forests and the other uplands is actually of more material benefit to the resident of San Francisco and other lowland residents than to the landowner, and because it is of benefit to the general welfare of the Nation, both the man in San Francisco and the man in Chicago have some responsibility for the protection of general public watersheds.) le Clar is right that all must shoulder a burden to protect natural resources that in tum are shared by all. Clar does not assert, however, that all must share the burden of protecting homes. Urban Counties Demarid Inclusion into SRA In Sacramento, the legislature in 1923 created a "state fire district" in six counties (Los Angeles, Orange, Santa Barbara, Kern, Ventura and Marin), essentially making them permanent subcontractors responsible for fire control inside State Interest Lands, which included both public and private parcels that existed within county borders but not within any city.) l~ Forestry-related work would soon grow in scope. In the early 1930s, the state Board of Forestry, led by its chairman S. Rexford Black, a representative of the timber industry, led completion of dozens of firebreak and lookout projects using help from labor camps, which after 1933 became part of the federal Civilian Conservation Corps or other relief organizations. State fire control efforts "had grown lustily because of the forced feeding during the Depression era."I Is The state also marked off "blocks of that portion of California which had come to be clearly accepted as timber or watershed land wherein the general public would suffer a loss in the event of wildfire.s119 These blocks-later to become State Responsibility Areas~id not include any lands inside the six contract counties formed in 1923, an omission that would later upset officials in those more urban counties. Still, there was not significant planning for statewide fire control until 1938, when Governor Culbert L. Olson appointed a new Board of Forestry that in turn appointed a commission (headed by C. Raymond Clar) to produce a fire plan administering statewide fire control, delineating specific resources needed and describing desired areas of protection. State coverage areas in the so-called Clar Plan were expanded to include parts of the urban contract counties, after complaints by Los Angeles County that it was being cut out of state funding. Clar wrote in 1969 that SRA designation inside urban counties "was done, but not °6 Id. on 7. °' Forestry Ponds also Flowed from the federal government. Califomia lands were the largest single beneficiary of the federal Clarke-McNary Act of 1924. The act enabled appropriation of matching funds to states for fire- and forestry-related work on public and private lands. 118 Id. on 21. 119 Id. on 22. 81 with enthusiasm."~~0 The more urban counties had higher expectations of service and associated costs than what the state already provided elsewhere, he wrote. "But who was to say what portion of [the state's allocation to urban counties] was, in good faith, actually spent to protect the wildland values and what portion to protect the industrial and suburban investments. s I z ~ Clar's musing is an important question in this report. It remains unanswered in large part. However, Section 4135 of the Public Resource Code states in part that the California Department of Forestry has the "power and duty to require that the money paid by the departmem under the contract to a county shall be expended by the county for fire prevention and suppression in that area." War Footing Made Permanent Clar and others had a fully developed fire plan, but the Legislature would provide no money. Reservations would soon be set aside, however, and the Clar Plan would be seized upon as a workable blueprint. [n fall of 1941 a State Council of Defense was created. After the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, lookout stations built during the Depression were staffed to wam of the approach of enemy aircraft. Fire trucks were sent to potential bomb targets, and a 24-hour team of dispatchers was sited in Sacramento. izz The exploding cost of the new effort scared state officials and lawmakers. "The sum [requested by Forestry officials] was considerably more than the total war-caused needs requested by 22 other State departments.i123 Only half the request was appropriated, but in 1943 Governor Earl Warren took office and his staff began to implement the Clar Plan unilaterally by May of that year. The Chief Deputy State Forester was sent around the State to inform the boards of supervisors that henceforth the State Division of Forestry would give such fire protection to the delineated State and privately owned timber and watershed lands as a specified number of fire crews and other facilities would provide. And also, whenever necessary the State would pay such emergency fire fighting costs as might be deemed proper by the State.124 izo Id. on 28. ~'~ Id. on 28. iu Id. on 31. ~~~ Id. on 31. '~° Id. on 33. 82 State of California Recommendations • The California Department of Forestry should assess and map current numbers of homes and persons living in State Responsibility Areas, create and overlay such population density maps with jurisdictions of local fire agencies color-coded by sophistication (volunteer, volunteer-paid, part time and fulltime paid), and overlay a map of fire perimeters. In a real way, where people live in SRAs is where CDF's priorities now lie. The state should consider a proposal for drastic reduction in acres of State Responsibility Areas due to extension of the wildland-urban interface in the five decades following implementation of the Clar Plan. The state should encourage consolidation of smaller local agencies into larger units under regional; not state, control. As big as California is, and despite the success of Ivtutual Aid protocols, the 928 fire agencies in California would almost certainly function more efficiently if their total number were half the current amount, or fewer. Rural fire collectives have a storied history but can tend toward clubbish pride in their smallness and individuality. More importantly, their human resources live full lives outside firehouses. Greater efficiency requires consolidation, as Los Angeles, Orange and Ventura Counties have already Teamed, and as San Bernardino and San Diego counties perhaps will learn following the devastating 2003 firestorms. To greater endow local firefighting efforts, the California Department of Forestry should hold a "fire sale" of the majority of its assets to newly consolidated coral fire agencies. This will lessen the state's burden for maintaining CDF assets and increase local control. After SRA areas are redrawn to emphasize the state's remaining watershed and timber reserves, a CDF fire engine and associated personnel could come under the control of a San Bernardino, [nyo or San Diego regional fire authority, for example. The state must shunt to regional fire agencies the responsibility for fighting fires in the wildland-urban interface. After all, cities and counties are in the driver's seat allowing development of homes in SRAs. Assets controlled by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services should remain under state control. • The state should consider a lower threshold or outright ban for development in SRAs. • The state should tailor the proposed California Department of Forestry rural fire tax to reflect density of population and size of structure. The current parcel-based tax arbitrarily places an equal burden on families with mansions or single mobile homes. 83 Lakewood Plan and Contract Cities Post World War II development increased the work of the Los Angeles County Fire Department as homes, businesses and industry exploded. At the same time, the department's tinancing was threatened by the possibility of several unincorporated areas becoming cities. Such incorporations shift property taxes from the county to the new city. Fire Chief Keith Klinger and other county officials offered a revolutionary alternative-the county contracting with the new cities for fire and police services. It became known nationally as the Lakewood Plan, named after the new city where it originated. The plan assured the county fire and sheriff s departments that they would grow and saved the new cities the expense of creating their own police and fire departments. Thirty-nine of the 41 cities in Los Angeles County that incorporated after 1954 selected the county to provide fire service under contract. As a result, both the fire and sheriff s departments experienced great growth. The Lakewood Plan also fostered the proliferation of small cities able to decide land-use questions individually but dependent upon the county for services. `Progeny of a Sweetheart Marriage' The southeastern Los Angeles County city of Lakewood was a suburb of 70,000 persons living in newer tract homes just outside Long Beach. Lakewood became the first of the "contract cities" that would eventually tota148 in Los Angeles County alone. The Lakewood Plan permitted incorporations in a time of rapid new development, preserving revenue to the county and reducing expenses to the new cities. "It might be said that the contract cities were the progeny of a sweetheart marriage," begins the history of the Califomia Contract Cities Association. The Harvard Law Review called it "the most significant undertaking involving transfer of service functions in the United States."ias As the number of contract cities grew, they felt the county was overcharging them for services. They formed the California Contract Cities Association in 1957 to lobby for their interests collectively. Cities that provided their own services, on the other hand, felt the contract cities were getting a free ride. "These old-line cities charged that the contract cities could operate so economically only because they were being subsidized by the county out of the county general tax revenues."IZe The association led court fights against what it called bureaucratic featherbedding and overcharging. The fire district has also been the target of statewide legislation pushed by lobbyists for the contract cities; laws written exclusively to affect only Los Angeles County fire operations (ie. by passing a statewide law affecting only those counties with more than ~~' The Califomia Contract Cities Association Historical Review, published internally in 2001. p.6 Available at http://www.contractcities.org/htmVabout us/ll_21_OI_historical_review_edited.html. 13° The Califomia Contract Cities Association Historical Review, p.2. 84 eight million residents: Los .\ngeles County).~''7 Both sides have money and influence, but the California Contract Cities Association prevailed more ofren than not in forcing the county to justify (and sometimes lower) its costs of providing fire service to individual cities. Claremont Fire Services Study The charge that contract cities were being subsidized was backed up by a 1989 study. It showed how contract cities located in the Foothills of the San Gabriel Mountains received more in fire services than they paid out in property taxes. In that year, officials from Claremont hired a consulting firm to assess whether the city was receiving as much as it paid for from the Consolidated Fire Protection District. Officials were considering forming a city fire department but wanted to assess start-up and operational costs. The report, by Hughes, Heiss & Associates, documented tax revenues from all cities in the Consolidated Fire Protection District and compared them with direct and indirect costs of providing fire-related services, including paramedic squads. iza Fig. 26 on the next page displays costs of fire services in Foothill cities that are members of the Consolidated Fire Protection District. CGS has added, on the right-hand side, a column enumerating the difference between city property taxes and documented cost of providing fire service. Numbers within parentheses indicate negative values. Adapted from "Progress Report, Fire Services Study, City of Claremont," prepared by Hughes, Heiss & Associates. Source: City of Claremont °' The Gonsalves Act, first introduced in 1972 by Assemblyman Ioe Gonsalves of Cerritos, directed Los Angeles County to enumerate and justify its overhead costs of contracting services. The Act resulted in millions of dollars of savings for cities, according to the California Contract Cities Association. irs Including revenue from redevelopment property [ax increment passed through to the Consolidated Fire Protection District. 85 r "" m m m n r' d' 9 j1 N u i O~ O1 ry m Np 0 N Vf m L ~ C m ~ O N N N w ~ ~. ... ~ ~ ... a K ~ d m N ~d r ~ m e e .d U ` O ~ o ~ v e N o 0 o VLL w '^ w w w w w ~ ~ - ~ N m O V ~ m N ~_ _ ~ ~ O ~_ _ l '1_ ~ VdI Q b ~ m m O N ~ m Y 0 I~ h - m m ~ m 0 - d - m O ~ d m _ A O N N N r N N O 0 A N V 0 N g m' N 0 1 N m N f •I N F w w w w w w w w w w `^ w w w w w w w w w ei c u v b y ~ i O d ~ {O t0 t0 t0 •A ! 10 ' b 0 Nd3 ~ .: N N~ N N N N N N N y Q b O1 V C! N_ N a ' LL M N w w w w w w w w w w m a ` ~ 7 N p 10 m N p 10 O n0 d0 y 10 N O m ~ m m 01 w ~ Oa m O m N m d 0 m O ~ m I V {n - N Oi - - O .- vi - m 1.j p y N ~ m m N N N q _ m ' !~ m p 0 m N ~ m ~ : - m N - O m N p j m - OI C` a O._ w 'A w ~ w . w w ~ w w w w w w w w w w w w MULL ~ m m m ^ m m o m m m m m in o r m m m 10 , ~ Y] Q 10 ~ N Q ~ m N ~ ~ 0 N L N F 1- IO 10 Q O 1 Q (O_ T Q - 1 0 Q O m O N m F O m 1- 01 1- m 1O H 7 U N N ~ p ^ O p 0 N p ^ O O w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w ~ m m .- m m m m m m m m n ~ - m '" U y a ° e v v' a a 11 v m m ° 1' ° U p Y] N n d N N m N y N N N V d 0 8 •A n a ~ N n yj O m rn d m m m m Y I m 1- ° °d m °- ° w w w w w w w w w N w w w w o v w D w ~ ~ E 0 o d m ` _ ~ ° ~ ry o o d c J ~ o p p 'Q d U ~ c E U U N U U~ < U U U ~ N U N U N 0 N ' C ° ° °m ~ ~ C @ ~ '~' ~ ~ ° ~ ~ a D = m n o n w ` m ° mU i a n v n n a ~ ~ ~' ~ $ o v m n n d y C a L C L : _ S a o ~ a o N LL F F LL LL LL LL LL LL LL K I- LL y F F- LL K r ~- ~- ~ ~ r t7 ~- ~ ~ ~ N N r o a E m ~ n' m t a ° ~ O .T. ~ N A c U c _ U ~ 0 U O (7 ~ LL N The results showed cost/revenue imbalances throughout the District. The consultants concluded that Claremont was among those cities receiving more in services than it gave in tax receipts, at a rate of $2.221 million per year. In fact, each Foothill city that was a member of the Consolidated Fire Protection District-Azusa, Claremont, Duarte, Glendora, La Canada Flintridge and San Dimas-received greater value in basic fire services (ie. the cost of operating and staffing a fire station) than it paid out in taxes, with annual subsidies ranging from 51.286 million (Duarte) to $3.256 million (La Canada Flintridge).I'9 The consultants also studied cities similar to Claremont but which had their own city fire departments. The three Foothills cities included among them-Arcadia, Monrovia and La Verne-all paid more to operate their city fire departments than the amount Claremont paid to the county for fire services. Indeed, the consultants found no way that Claremont could generate enough property tax revenue to launch its own fire department. Not surprisingly, the city remains a member of the Consolidated Fire Protection District. -The subsidies for Foothill cities apparently continue. [n 2003, the Foothills city of Azusa paid Los Angeles County $2.4 million for its fire services, while its independent-minded neighbor city of La Veme, of similar size and geography to Azusa but with its own fire department, paid $3.56 million. Other indirect subsidies exist as well. Sierra Madre's volunteer fire department, for example, could not itself defend against awind-driven firestorm without drawing heavily on the resources of neighboring fire departments, as was the case in 1993 during the Kinneloa Fire. In addition, Sierra Madre lacks even the "automatic aid" agreements common to fire departments all over the nation. Contract City Recommendations Los Angeles County and the Contract Cities Association should jointly perform an updated cost analysis similar to 1989 Claremont study. Los Angeles County should publicize yearly what each city pays the Consolidated Fire Protection District for fire control. In future contracts with Los Angeles County, county officials should negotiate a contractual contribution to an emergency wildland fire response fund. Participation in the fund can be discounted if a municipality pays more in property taxes than it receives in value for its fire services-the amount roughly equal to the operating budgets of firehouses in a particular community. ~" The Ciry of Bradbury abuts the Foothills and is a member of the Consolidated Fire Protection District, although it has no fre stations within its boundaries. The Hughes report compared only those assets located inside ajurisdiction. 89 Why Subsidies Stay Hidden Hot air and smoke rises in a massive column over a huge wildfire. Likewise, media interest is most concentrated during firestorms, leading to a drumbeat of coverage on containment, bravery, happenstance and tragedy, albeit with few nods to what a particular fire agency reports it has spent so far. The drama of Southern California firefighting all but sweeps away consideration of whether wildfire-prone communities get a "free ride" and at what cost: Blinding smoke fills the air, and trees explode as the heat from the fire boils away wafer and sap. Breathing becomes difficult because of the hot, choking smoke. Parents hold their children close trying to comfort them. In a matter of minutes powerful Santa Ana winds have whipped the distant smoke plume into a raging firestorm. Flames leap more than 200 feet into the air, consuming everything in their path. As the firefighters stand by their hoses trying to protect these homes, a message crackles over the radio that sends a shiver through the command post: "This is Strike Team 404 at Hidden Hills Road. We are cut off. A firestorm is going to hit us. We need an air strike now. Civilians are with us at the engines." Within seconds comes the reply: "Strike team 404, Air Attack has your situation. Two fast movers and the Beast are on the way, 30 seconds out. Keep your heads down. They're going to put it right on top of you." Minutes later, out of the depths of the dense smoke, Los Angeles County's two fixed-wing Canadair CL-4l5 "Super Scoopers" swoop down, each unleashing its 1,622-gallon load of water into the heart of the firestorm, then disappearing back into the smoke.....As the smoke clears and the flames die down, it's clear that all of the houses are still standing-and the civilians that waited by the engines are still alive.13o For such performances, the Los Angeles County Fire Department deserves and receives praise for its actions. The drama attracts attention; fiscal concerns and the comparative utility of firefighting methods and prevention are ignored. When wildfires strike, the typical metaphors rolled out to describe it all conjure up theoretically winnable military conflicts. In the Los Angeles County Fire Department's "Special Report: Firestorm 2003," the first paragraph states: "Nightly television news became a blur of yellow and orange, as camera crews chased flames whipping up canyons and barreling through neighborhoods like a solid wall of unstoppable destruction. /t was war" [italics added].13t Considering the federal government's "war" on poverty, drugs and now terror, applying that term to wildfires makes metaphorical sense. It renders a complex problem too simple, however. Dramatizing as war the wholly natural cycle of wildfire-or correspondingly, focusing on reputed arsonists when accidental starts are almost as frequent--cloaks the indisputable casus belli:tsz humans living where uncontrollable wildfires burn. ~r0 From "Aerial Workhorses,' by Craig Bonholzer. Rotor & Wing, November 1998. - ~'~ From "Special Report: Firestorm 2003, On the Line and Behind the Scenes." Available at lacofd.org. itZ In Latin, the "actor event that provokes or is used to justify war." Source: Dictionary.com. 90 In media and government reports, losses are almost always described in terms of lost homes and lives. On such a war footing, the media might consider it unseemly to probe public costs rather than simply report private costs of wildfire. The Los Angeles Times quotes a homeowner likening a future wildfire to a "coming war" and paraphrases him as saying, "the county should be prepared to outgun the conflagration."133 Fire is the enemy, firefighters are our troops and homeowners are innocent bystanders. The names change from event to event but the myth is constant: fires in the mountains can be controlled with enough resources. The reality of nature is that weather conditions-wind, humidity and rain especially-affect large fires much more so than firefighters. Modernity is no more able to halt large fires in extreme wind conditions than were primitive societies. What can be done is limited to containing the flanks of a fire or removing fuel sources in its path, sometimes by lighting more fires. No matter the region, the two common conditions leading to uncontrollable wildfires are dry, windy weather conditions and low moisture content in trees and vegetation. In Southern California, inland high pressure weather systems can lead to the infamous Santa Ana winds. Typically in the late fall before the winter rains, hot desert air, usually kept inland by onshore breezes, reverses course and blows over the coastal ranges and out to sea, taking with it great amounts of tiny sediment and any remaining moisture content in the chaparral hills and crumbling canyons. Blown dry by the "Devil Wind" and even seeping naturally explosive oil, chaparral fires can spread more quickly than firefighters' capacity to mobilize resources to "fight" it. A modern helicopter can lay a swath of water infused with retardant that is wide enough to "paint" the average large home. But in subdivisions boasting dozens of large homes, even the skies aren't big enough for a guaranteed air defense against wildfire. Veterans of firestorms exacerbated by Santa Ana winds have witnessed advancing curtains of flaming cinders, impenetrable walls of fire laying waste to homes and firefighters escaping with their lives only because of the last-second deployment of personal fire shelters. In short, while smaller brush fires can be isolated and extinguished, certain wind-driven fires are unstoppable, and no amount of arms buildup will turn the tide. Only by altering the environment-the result of laws requiring homeowners to cut back brush from homes and build or rebuild with fire resistant materials and methods-have authorities had success in protecting hillside communities from cyclical conflagrations such as the 1993 Kinneloa firestorm that started in the hills above Altadena. The official report following that fire stated that "environmental, situational, mechanical and man made factors" caused loss of Altadena homes in the Kinneloa Fire.134 ~~~ Peabody, Zanto. Los Angeles Times, ]uly 22, 2002. "Topanga Fire Plan Isn't Flying." p° Los Angeles County Fire Department, Official Report Kinneloa Incident, 1994. 97 Mitigation: Fees, Brush Clearance, FireSafe Design Another source of funding for firefighting is a per-unit fee ou new development. It was adopted in 1990 by the Board of Supervisors. The fees, initiated at $0.1997 per square foot, were devised to finance fire stations and equipment incurred when extending service to new housing developments in three areas-the outlying Antelope and Santa Clarita valleys, as well as the Santa Monica Mountains. The fees took effect in unincorporated areas in these three areas because of the board action; individual cities residing in one of the three zones also had to approve the fees for them to take effect, which they all did. In Fiscal Year 2001- 02, the Fire Department took in almost $13 million in developer fees. Developer fees must be used in the area from which they are collected. Yet the fees do not apply to all high-growth areas of Los Angeles County-for example they do not apply anywhere in the San Gabriel Valley, though growth there has more than a thousand new homes since 1990. The Fire Department in 2003 raised these developer fees 83 percent, to $0.3716 per square foot. Initial opposition from the Southern California chapter of the Building Industry Association melted after Chief Freeman met with them. "I told them the very things [developers] make profits on are the things [fire departments] have to pay for.i135 In a July 2003 interview, Chief Freeman maintained that developer fees are unnecessary in the Foothill cities of the San Gabriel Mountains because growth potential there is negligible compared to existing resources. Existing resources, however, include the nine former Forester and Fire Warden stations bought and paid for with county General Funds. Two of the stations-Station 64 in San Dimas and Station 62 in Claremont-have been rebuilt since 1990 without a local cost share to those municipalities. The growth potential in the San Gabriel Mountain foothills communities may not be enough, in Chief Freeman's opinion, to warrant developer fees. Paradoxically, this may be because Los Angeles County taxpayers have already spent so much protecting new development there. Less Subsidy for New Development Expected The Los Angeles County Fire Department underwent a tectonic shift in the early 1990s. The deep cuts forced by Proposition l3 in 1978. were increasingly damaging in the decade to follow. As state budgets grew leaner, officials eventually were forced to address funding shortfalls in the Forester and Fire Warden as well as the Consolidated Fire Protection District. The 1990 decision to establish developer fees was symbolic as it "grandfathered" all development prior to 1990. When the Fire Department secured the permanent tax transfer of wildfire funds from the General Fund in 1992, the lines between rural and wildland fire protection and purely urban fire services were forever blurred. Finally, the Board of Supervisors decision in 1991 to Levy 115 Interview with Los Angeles County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman, May 23, 2003. 92 a "benefit assessment" was a tacit admission that the level of fire protection was vitally important to maintain, but also that the system had grown bigger than what post-Proposition l3 property assessments could support. Wisdom of the Ancients Fifreen thousand years of Indian settlement and 100 years of Spanish dominion in Califomia shows that wildfire losses can be minimized by making structures less flammable and separating them from dense vegetation. The Achumawi Indians, former residents of the San Gabriel Mountains, buried their wooden structures almost completely in dirt and even pre- burned grasses growing on rooftops, making them extremely resistant to fire. The San Antonio Mission, also at the foot of the San Gabriels, was the first Spanish mission to fabricate clay roof tiles, which kept out most wildfires as well as flaming arrows fired by marauding Indians.136 These predecessor societies thrived amid constant wildfire, adapting their structures with the tools available to them through the natural world. It is likely that sooner or later an organized system against wildfires would be necessary [o allow exponentially greater amounts of homes and businesses. However, the `49ers and other waves of settlers who followed the gold msh did not balance their development of firefighting resources and protocols with other measures that might have worked more efficiently, such as mandates on building design and brush clearance. Though destructive Bay Area fires in 1923 resulted in a statewide prohibition against wooden roofs on new residential development, the ban was rescinded during the postwar boom.137 It has taken more than 150 years of California statehood to begin learning the knowledge accumulated by early Californians. Today every new development abutting forest lands in Los Angeles County has age-old measures intended to keep wildfires away: avegetation-reduced buffer zone, homes constructed with fire-resistant building methods and materials, and prohib;tions against overly flammable landscaping. Even these homes can bum in a major firestorm, such as widespread losses in the modern Scripps Ranch development during the 2003 firestorms. Still at risk are the older neighborhoods dominated by houses with wooden roofing and uncovered venting-homes built before the advent of stricter building codes in the mid 1990s. They may be living on borrowed time, and brush clearance might not be the way to safety. Brush Clearance's Giant Footprint Clearing away flammable vegetation from homesites and trimming brush between homes and wildlands has become a top priority for fire departments and home insurers in the San Gabriel Mountains as well as Southern Califomia and beyond. The theory behind brush clearance is that wildfires are increasingly less likely to ignite a home if flammable material around the home is removed down to mineral soil beforehand. °B Beall, et aI. Chapter Two, p. 7. °' Pyne, Stephen J. "Answer to Fires Is Old as the Hills;' Los Angeles Times, 30 October 2003. 93 Cutting away so much greenery comes at a price to nature and society. Associated negative effects of brush clearance upon water recharge, runoff and habitat have been asserted in scientific studies, but never by a public agency. Brushfire laws have so far not been subject to review under the Califomia Environmental Quality Act. There is no question whether brush clearance has a positive effect; still open to debate, however, is whether brush clearance has unexamined downstream costs, and whether it is effective at the levels enforced by fire departments and the Califomia F.A.I.R. Plan Association, an insurance consortium described in the next chapter. Southem California wildfire agencies vary in how much brush clearance is required for homes subject to wildfire risk. The city and county of Los Angeles require a "fuel modification zone" of 200 feet. The City of La Verne has a 300-foot fuel modification zone. Homes insured through the California F.A.I.R. Plan Association can be forced to cut away brush 400 feet from their homes. "Four hundred feet from house to flame? That's a long way," said Jack Cohen, aMontana- based fire researcher for the U.S. Forest Service. "In Southern Califomia fires, I'm trying to think of any situation where 400 feet would be right and reasonable. You can stand and watch the fire from 400 feet. Now why do I mention that? Because humans are 100 times more sensitive to bum injury than what it takes to ignite a house.i138 Cohen's 31 years of research into wildfire management and "structural ignition," i.e., how homes bum in wildfires, led him in 1995 to develop SIAM-the Structure Ignition Assessment Model. The widely-used model helps predict how close heat and flames must come to homes for them to ignite and combust. For example, under high heat conditions, Cohen found that shingles and other wooden building materials decompose and release volatile chemicals ignitable by even a small spark. In Southern Califomia chaparral wildlands, such sparks, or firebrands, can be part of a "brand blizzard" that travels far past buffer zones where brush'.tas been cleared, threatening homes and lives located far from tall flames. "Firebrands are a significant source of ignition," Cohen said in an interview.179 "Whether you clear 200 feet or 1,000 feet, you're still susceptible to a brand blizzard. When we studied the 1980 Panorama Fire in San Bernardino and correlated dispatch tapes with structure ignitions, we found houses that ignited ahalf--mile away from the fire front. Especially if a neighborhood has homes with wooden roofs, firebrand ignition can happen blocks and blocks away." (Historian David Boucher commented that in the 1978 Kanan Fire, brand blizzards ignited homes l-2 miles away from the flame front.) Cohen's research has led him to a philosophy partly at odds with the direction taken by local fire agencies to enact and enforce brush clearance standards. He thinks wildfire losses are prevented best by making structures less combustible. "You start with the house and work your way out," he said. "You can't put donuts around homes and be satisfied." ~~" Telephone interview with Jack Cohen, May 23, 2003. u9 ld. 94 An argument for fire-resistant design methods cited by Cohen and others is the "miracle house" found unburned following [he devastating Laguna fire in southern Orange County in 1993. Though wildfire flames did not actually reach the "miracle house" or neighboring structures, firebrands ignited the wooden homes but spared the "miracle house" built with FireSafe building methods.140 Brush clearance can be costly, is labor-intensive and harms the environment by reducing habitat,141 promoting erosion, preventing groundwater recharge and speeding storm runoff (again impeding groundwater percolation). Still, it has proven useful and likely will stay an indispensable part of local efforts to abate wildfire losses. Ways to Go Wildfire expert Stephen J. Pyne, of Arizona State University, says a "hierarchy" of brush clearance might provide the greatest degree of safety in terms of fuel modification. He suggests "an immediate zone that prevents actual flame contact with the structure, an intermediate zone of brush reduced to the point that radiant heat is no longer effective [and] a broad zone that dampens the prospects for wind- and convection-carried embers. The latter I imagine as the equivalent of a fire greenbelt."142 Pyne adds, however, that "one can only build to a standard. It is foolish to build in the fire equivalent of a floodplain. But no house can take the direct blast of a maximum- intensity fire, any more than it can a direct hit from a tornado. Almost all studies indicate that, however well designed, a structure needs someone to swat out the stray sparks and small kindling that can burn even after the front. Our policy of mass evacuations leaves communities literally defenseless."143 Not everyone is on the brush clearance bandwagon. Almost all the Foothills cities abut a federal land boundary with the Angeles National Forest. Therefore, lands densest in brush are often where federal lands meet urban areas. (State and local lands near urban areas are often clogged with brush as well; removal is made more difficult by budget shortfalls and environmental regulation.) This problem is compounded the by brush clearance minimums demanded by insurance companies. If a private home is located only 30 feet from federal land, an insurer may require 200 feet of brush clearance, but a homeowner cannot cut brush on federal land. Thus, the brush remains uncut and the insurer adds a hefty surcharge to the home's fire insurance premium. The California F.A.I.R. Plan Association, the property insurer of last resort in California wildland areas, can require up to 400 feet of brush clearance, though that standard 1°0 FireSafe building construction includes techniques such as boxed eaves, screened vents, no open balconies, no wooden outbuildings, noncombustible roofing and other modifications. Fire agencies often find developers resistant to FireSafe methods because of the extra expense. ~'t Longcore, Travis. 2000 "Ecological Effects of Fuel Modification on Arthropods and Other Wildlife in an Urbanizing Wildlznd;' Included in anthology of National Congress on Fire Ecology, Prevention, and Management Proceedings, No. I, Tall Timbers Research Station, Tallahassee, FL. iaz Email from Stephen Pyne, dated.May 18, 2003. .. iar Id. 95 appears not to have any published scientific basis.l'''' Further, private landowner X could be assessed a surcharge if a neighbor's home is insured by the F.A.I.R. Plan and the required amount of brush clearance around the home extends past the property line into X's parcel. Brush clearance works. The more pertinent question may be how well brush clearance works relative to alternative methods. Sweeping legislation to enforce Firesafe construction would likely meet with resistance from developers, but other options are possible. One can imagine a system whereby a homeowner could earn credits toward brush clearance if a structure includes Firesafe building design elements. Local governments could require that structures be built no-closer to public lands than what is possible given existing brush clearance guidelines. To date, no organization has sued a fire agency to require California Enviommental Quality Act review for brush clearance standards. CEQA review and new standards could occur independently, but disasters have proven to be the best motivating factor. Mitigation Recommendation • The State of California should prepare an environmental impact report on brush clearance. Excessive brush clearance may be contributing to loss of habitat and groundwater recharge, as well as increasing velocities of runoff, which further retards recharge. Fire agencies in California, such as the Los Angeles County Fire Department, can contribute separate reports or contribute to an overall state report. 1°O The F.A.I.R. Plan has not published scientific reviews of its brush clearance policy. 96 Chapter III EQUITABLE BUILDING? WILDFIRE INSURANCE AND THE F.A.I.R. PLAN The California Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (F.A.I.R.) Plan Association has a major impact on foothill development. The association is astate-created, insurance industry- sponsored property insurance."assigned risk pool" that finds policies for residential and business owners who cannot obtain insurance elsewhere. This chapter explores whether selling these policies in brush areas encourages high-risk development in undeveloped areas. As Los Angeles Times Staff Writer Thomas Mulligan asked in a Nov. 12, 1993 article, "Are the vast majority of Los Angeles flatlanders-through insurance premiums and taxes that reflect the tremendous costs of fighting urban wildfires- subsidizing the few who choose to live on remote slopes choked with flash-paper chaparral?s145 Certainly, foothills dwellers are making potentially dangerous choices. Former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt urged more control over such developments, "the obvious solution to the fire hazards of the urban-wildland intermix is to maintain more separation between forests and subdivisions, thereby allowing natural fire to function without constantly alarming residents and endangering firefighters," he said. Babbitt in 1999 cited a "California writer" who wrote that "`the new density of hillside housing has transformed the battle against wildfire from a wide ranging war of maneuver into the equivalent of street fighting. "' 146 If the F.A.I.R. Plan does not encourage development, it at least enables it. Without F.A.I.R.'s guarantee that insurance is available in high-risk hillside brush areas, developers could not be sure of the insurance that is needed for the financing of their projects. Without the F.A.I.R. Plan, development would not occur in some dangerous areas or during times when insurance companies, for a variety of reasons, decline to sell policies in hillside areas. F.A.I.R. Plan policies also appear to have a detrimental impact on the environment. That is because the F.A.I.R. Plan requires a minimum area of 200 feet around a house to be cleared of brush, and in some cases the Plan requires 400 feet of clearance. A surcharge is levied on policies sold to homeowners who do not meet that standard, which is the same standard set ias Mulligan, Thomas. "Fire Fans Debate Over Who Should Foo[ Insurance Costs." LosAngeles Times, November 12, 1993. Page A-l. ~~ Babbitt, Btuce. "Making Peace with Wildland Fire." Wildfrre Magazine: August, 1999. 97 by the Los Angeles County Fire Department The surcharges range from 52,250 to 56,036, depending on the amount of excess brush.147 Professor Travis Longcore of UCLA, an expert on insects, said stripping away brush in such large quantities causes environmental damage in the area and downstream, as far away as the ocean. He wrote, "the denudation from fuel modification results in increased storm water flow, higher peak flows, and more suspended solids in streams that drain into the Pacific Ocean from the tnountains, decreasing water quality for rare and endangered fishes and increasing erosion." He called for environmental impact reports on the impact of such brush clearing.laa Information is tightly guarded within the F.A.I.R. Plan Association. Created by the .Legislature but run by the insurance industry, it operates with little public disclosure and many of its records are not open to the public. The law creating F.A.I.R. says, "The reports and communications of the inspection bureau, the facility, the association (both synonyms for EA.LR.) and the records of the governing shall not be considered public records.i149 While the elected. State Insurance. Commissioner has authority over the F.A.LR. Plan Association, he has used it sporadically and whimsically. For example, before a corruption scandal drove him from office, Instrance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush extended F.A.I.R. Plan eligibility to owners of houseboats. Changes in insurance law that are passed by the Legislature can also be delayed at the insurance commissioner's office for years. One such change grew out of F.A.I.R.'s inequitable system of awarding financial incentives to insurance companies if they insure homes at full market rates in areas prone to brush fires. The same incentives were not extended to companies doing market-rate business in urban areas designated by F.A.I.R.-a far cry from the Plan's original intent to help urban communities rebuild. Smaller insurers whose niche is inner-city markets complained that they should receive the same incentives as the often larger companies that insure homes on the hillsides. In 1992 the Legislature and then-Governor Pete Wilson responded by decreeing financial incentives for market-rate policies written anywhere in F.A.I.R.'s coverage area. However, it was another seven years before Commissioner Quackenbush implemented the law. Thus, from 1968 through 1999, insurers had financial incentives to do business in brushfire areas but not in the inner-city. F.A.I.R. officials say three-quarters of all policies issued through the plan cover inner-city areas. The current Insurance Commissioner, John Garamendi, said the F.A.I.R. Plan does not promote or encourage development of brushfire areas, brit is "part of the enabling system."iso He said the F.A.I. R. Plan makes the most sense for smaller developments with a handful of t °i Las Angeles Times, Feb. 22, 1999. ~°e Longcore, Travis. 2000. "Ecological Effects of Fuel Modification on Arthropods and Other Wildlife in an Urbanizing W ildland," included in anthology of National Congress on Fire Ecology, Prevention, and Management Proceedings, No. 1, Tall Timbers Research Station, Tallahassee, FL. X09 CA Insurutce Code, Section 10097. iso Telephone interview with Iotin Garamendi, Nov. 20, 2003. 98 homes and less sense for tracts with hundreds of houses. "F.A.I.R. is not the driver of development, but it is part of the enabling system."isi How F.A.I.R. Plans Work F.A.LR.-an acronym for Fair Access to Insurance Requirements-is a fund run b~ the insurance industry to find property insurance for home and business owners in hard-to-insure areas such as riot prone sections of the inner city, brush fire hillside areas and the beachfront. It has headquarters in the Equitable Building on Wilshire Boulevard in Mid-City Los Angeles. Nationally, such efforts began after the 1960s urban riots when insurance companies hesitated to write more policies in inner city areas because of the devastating losses they had sustained. As a result, when Congress passed the Housing and Urban Development Act in 1968, the measure made federal riot reinsurance available to states that set up F.A.I.R. Plans. Reinsurance is when an insurance company insures itself against the risks it is taking in issuing a higher risk policy. In this case, the federal government would insure the policies issued by private companies in the F.A.I.R. states.15'` Private companies also sell reinsurance. F.A.I.R. plans exist in 28 other states and the District of Columbia. All insurance firms doing business in California must participate. When a F.A.I.R. plan loses money, the insurance company members are assessed according to their share of the market. Losses are then passed on to the F.A.I.R. policyholders and, in some states, to policy holders outside F.A.I.R..153 In 1994, for example, the California F.A.I.R. Plan assessed its member companies 5150 million for losses from Southern California brush fires and $80 million from Northridge earthquake losses.154 The plan lost almost $30 million from the 1992 Los Angeles riot.lss The Califomia F.A.LR. Plan began three years before the national effort. In August 1965, Los Angeles was shaken by the Watts Riot, six days of violence that cost lives and tens of millions in property damage. Besides the immediate loss of life and damage, both physical and psychic to the city, the riot inflicted along-tetra blow to business in Watts and surrounding neighborhoods. Insurance was an immediate symptom. Fourteen per cent.of the merchants questioned in a survey reported their policies had been cancelled, and 44 per cent said they had trouble finding insurance. Business owners complained. The insurance commissioner formed a committee of insurance industry members who came up with a plan to provide insurance to businesses denied access to the normal market. They formed a pool, run through a company, the United States Liability Insurance Co., which issued the policies. This company was backed by 110 ~s~ Telephone interview with John Garamendi, Nov. 20, 2003. ~sr The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Study 1994. isr Insurance Issues Update June 2002. ~5° Business Insurance, Crain Communications, Jan. 3, 1994. iss A M. Best Company Bes[wire January 14, 1994. 99 insurance companies that did business in the Watts area. The liability of each company was determined by its share of the California market. Three years after the riot, affluent residents, living in the hills and mountains miles from South Central Los Angeles, found that they needed the same sort of assistance. Hillside fire insurance policies began to be cancelled after a series of brush fires, most notably the S25 million Bel Air Brentwood fire in 1961. Pressure for a rescue became intense early in 1968. Many of the 7,000 Southern California brush area home owners found they were unable to purchase fire insurance at any price. Then, insurance companies cancelled the policies of 2,300 homeowners. The wave of cancellations occurred just as the Legislature was considering a revision of the F.A.I.R. Plan, giving the homeowners, many of them with strong political connections and clout, an opportune moment to ask the lawmakers for help. The Legislature was considering bills in 1968 to bring California's F.A.LR. Plan into conformity with the new federal F.A.LR. plan law. Then-Governor Reagan's finance director, Caspar Weinberger, opposed the maih measure, AB 1577, because it would have required the state funds to contribute to a federal reinsurance plan. Chairman Bob Moretti of the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee took advantage of the political clout of mountain homeowners, who wanted the benefits of F.A.I.R., and merged their protection plan with the inner city provisions. As a result, AB 1577 protected both inner city business and homeowners and those in hillside brush areas. Afrer the bill became law, Moretti said, "we have been trying to ge[ something to cover the curfew area for a long time... We used.this bill (AB 1577) as a vehicle because people who this bill I expect are more influential than [other] people who needed this bill. We used this as a method to put both into law."Ise The law required all "admitted fire insurers" tojoin an Insurance Placement Facility and Reinsurance Association. The facility would be set up by insurance companies, and it created a program for "the equitable apportionment among insurers of basic property insurance which ma~ be afforded persons who are unable to obtain such insurance through the normal market."1 ~ Insurance companies backed the plan, a reversal of an earlier stand. Early in the 1960s, the insurance industry opposed such an assigned risk program, contending insurance companies could provide insurance to anyone who wanted it. But by the late 60s, the situation had changed. "It is just that this area is growing so fast and dwellings are being built more and more and more in these brush fire areas and we continue to have these losses," W.F. Williams of the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau told the Assembly subcommittee. "We just haven't been able to keep up with them.i158 The bureau inspects buildings to determine whether they are eligible for an insurance policy and sends out inspectors to examine the property of each applicant. ise Hearings of Subcommittee on Brush Fire Insurance of Assembly Committee on Finance and rnsurance, September 26, 27 1968 Santa Monica, California, p. 130. is' Statement of Chairman Paul Priolo Transcript of Assembly Finance and Insurance Brush Fire hearings 1965. 13° Hearings of Subcommittee on Brush Fire Insurance of Assembly Committee on Finance and Insurance, September 26, 27 1968 Santa Monica, California. p. 34. 100 F.A.I.R.'s Impact on Development The numbers indicate that the California F.A.LR. Plan Association is not yet used widely in brushfire areas. They show F.A.I.R. as primarily an urban-inner city operation, a fact which currently diminishes i[s importance in the hillside development picture. However, in a November 2003 telephone interview, Insurance Commissioner Garamendi said widespread losses from the 2003 Southern California wildfires could cause more policies to be brokered through F.A.I.R. in the future. As of April 1, 2003, F.A.I.R. has sold 191,274 residential insurance policies, the overwhelming majority of them in [he urban core. A breakdown from F.A.LR. shows: • 158,643 urban-inner city residential; 11,262 urban inner-city commercial. • 19,964 brush area residential; and • 276 brush area commercial brush. Most of the brush area policies have been sold in the Santa Monica Mountains, according to F.A.I.R. spokesman Mike Hams. He said about 12% have been purchased by San Gabriel Mountain foothill area homeowners. He believes this is because private insurance is easier to purchase in the San Gabriel Mountain area. Without F.A.I.R., developers, including those in the San Gabriel Mountains, would in some cases be unable to obtain financing for multi-home projects. That was made clear during 1968 legislative hearings. Whitney.Reeve of Malibu testified in his capacity as president of the Topanga-Las Virgenes Soil Conservation District, resource director of the County Soil Conservation District and a director of the Metropolitan Water District, representing the Las Virgenes Municipal Water District, all agencies favoring development in the Santa Monica Mountains. He said without F.A.I.R., such development would halt. "People cannot finance building without a dependable insurance industry," he said. "Neither can they afford to pay a disproportionate portion of the overall cost for insurance."159 Former State Insurance Commissioner Harry Low, a retired appellate court justice, said that F.A.I.R. as an insurer of last resort is important to developers because they need fire insurance to obtain the loans to build. "I think the impact is slight but I think it is there." Most hillside residents, he said, "could find some kind of insurance."160 By contrast, Brian Perkins, staff director of the State Senate Insurance Committee said he does not believe that F.A.I.R. spurs hillside development.l61 1p9 Hearings of Subcommittee on Btush Fire Insurance of Assembly Committee on Finance and Insurance, September 26, 27 1968 Santa Monica, California. p. 109-1 l0. 1fi0 Telephone interview with Harry Low, June 17, 2003. ini Telephone interview with Brian Perkins, June 23, 2003. 101 Does F.A.I.R. Force Flatlanders to Subsidize Hilisiders? F.A.LR., in a sense, amounts to a subsidy. In the years that it has run a deficit, insurance company members make it up and pass along the costs to their policy holders. There are strong indications that without F.A.I.R., brush Fire area dwellers would be paying much more for their insurance. On November 12, 1993, Thomas Mulligan reported in the Los Angeles Times that the F.A.I.R. rates seem somewhat low considering the danger. At that time, F.A.I.R. covered 26,000 homes in the Santa Monica and San Gabriel mountains with an average coverage amount of $318,000 per home. The yearly average premium was $715. A comparable policy for a house on Melrose Avenue right next to a fire station would cost about $600. Sheldon Richman, an analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, said he believes F.A.I.R. is a subsidy because if there were no such coverage available, private insurance would be much more expensive.lez F.A.I.R. Plan Recommendations • The state should require publication of the location and value of all policies subsidised through the Association. The state should require California Environmental Quality Act review of Association guidelines regarding brush clearance. As aquasi-public entity, the Association has not been forced to test whether its policies harm the environment, even if the harm is negligible compared to the fire prevention benefits bestowed by brush clearance. The state should consider new ways of effecting the goals of the current brush clearance policy, including allowing a mixture of remedies (brush clearance, Firesafe exterior building design, fire-resistant interior building design and material, etc.) rather than relying on brush control alone. Better policy will decrease losses, and accordingly, decrease taxpayer subsidies for F.A.I.R. Plan policyholders. The state should propose additional incentives for wildfire readiness and prevention. F.A.I.R. policies allow deductions in fees if brush clearance regulations are enforced. This simple carrot is not enough. Financial incentives for Firesafe design standards and specified wildland fire preventative measures should be expanded outside of the F.A.I.R. Plan to ordinary homeowner's policies. Homeowners should be rewarded for taking time-consuming and costly measures to protect their homes from wildland fire. This, too, would decrease overall fire losses, further lessening the burden on other homeowners. iez Telephone interview with Sheldon Richman, July 10, 2003. 102 Chapter IV CHECKERBOAD GOVERNANCE: THE FOOTHILL COMMUNITIES The Problem: Fragmented Government From the first days of the last century, California's local government agencies have been invested with great power under a concept known as home rule. Based on the principle that those closest to the people govern best, home mle grants wide authority to cities, counties and a variety of special districts to perform tasks ranging from treating sewage to providing public transportation. This has resulted in govemment that is responsive to local concerns, necessary in a state as large and diverse as Califomia. But it has also resulted in fragmented government, with cities, counties and other levels of govemment pursuing conflicted goals. "Califomia is a confederation of communities," said Mark Pisano, executive director of the Southern Califomia Association of Governments, which prepares plans for transportation, growth management and other regional concerns for the area covering Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, Ventura and Imperial Cotinties.~bJ Home rule has its strong defenders, including the League of California Cities, which has successfully opposed every attempt in the legislature to weaken it. "The system works. It is cumbersome but it works," said Larry Calemine, executive officer of the Los Angeles Local Agencies Formation Commission, which must approve formation of new cities, annexations and other changes in Local government boundaries.164 But decisions of city officials, made as though their municipalities were alone in the world, have widespread and often adverse impacts throughout a region. This study concentrates on the San Gabriel Valley in the eastern portion of Los Angeles County. However, the issues raised in the valley are endemic to suburban and urban California. As the Public Policy Institute of Califomia put it, "Political authority in California is divided among thousands of jurisdictions: A typical household may find itself simultaneously governed by a county, a city, a school district and numerous special districts that levy assessments or charge fees to provide services or build community facilities."I65 inr Interview with Mark Pisano, June I0, 2003. 163 Interview with Larry Calemine, July 7, 2003. ies From Home Rule to Fiscal Rule: TaM'ng a measure of Local Government Finance in California edited by David W. Lyon, PPIC 2000. 103 Scholar Stephanie Pincetl pinpointed the extent of the fragmentation by examining the membership of the Southern California Association of Governments. She found that the membership includes 184 cities, six counties and more than 900 special districts. As a result, she said, "Home rule and local decisions over local land use create a situation where there is no mechanism for regional cooperation and coordination, no forum for public discussion about how and where growth ought to occur. Each jurisdiction treats growth as its own, none takes into account the cumulative effects of hundreds of small decisions.i166 Examination of records and interviews with public officials reveal many examples of how local decisions impact areas far from the city halls where they are made. They impact safety, from fire and flood, water quality, environmental quality, protection of native species and availability of recreation. The fires that raged through the foothills and mountains of San Bernardino, San Diego and Los Angeles counties in October 2003, destroying hundreds of suburban homes in the foothills, point up the danger of housing developments in areas that have been approved by . cities without regard to their impact on an entire region. The storm flooding that followed the fire showed, authorities said, regional impact of local development that covers ground that once absorbed runoff water. This report is, of course, not the first to recognize the problem. For the past 40 years, political leaders and scholars have been trying to Find a way to preserve home rule while creating government structures to oversee economic and population growth in an urban area characterized by "sprawl." Governors and legislators have tackled the issue without success. In the meantime, population growth has exploded. Once, the conventional answer was to just let California grow. But as residential subdivisions have crept into forest and farm lands, the regional impact of such growth has become clear from the foothills of the Sierra Nevada to the suburbs of San Diego, from the San Francisco Bay Area to agricultural land of the Central Valley. As USC's Southern California Studies Center put it in its 2002 report, After Sprawl: Action Plans for Metropolitan Los Angeles, "As existing areas become denser, we will no longer rely on our traditional assumptions about how we use land, transportation facilities and the other raw material that makes up the hardware of urban life."tb~ Concern has been expressed from the grassroots up to the office of Governor Arnold Schwartzenegger. Even before taking office, he proposed a plan to limit uncontrolled sprawl by offering incentives for developtnent in urban areas and removing barriers that slow redevelopment inside of cities. The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works has undertaken studies on the local and regional impact of development on water that runs off from rainstorms. "We know in general...this type of development has at least a physical ~~ Pincetl, Stephanie. Living On the Edge: Bringing Nature Into the City, 2000. At the time, Pince[I was associate professor of geography, coordinator of the Sustainable Cities Program, University of Southern Califomia. 16' After Sorawl~ Action Plans for Metropolitan Los Aneeles Southem Califomia Studies Center, University of Southem Califomia.2003. 104 impact," said Bill DePoto, watershed manager for the Public Works Department. "What we are trying to do is quantify those impacts."~bs Consequences of Home Rule in Action There is no better example of this than the San Gabriel Valley and foothills, divided among 30 cities and at least 15 special districts with jurisdiction over transportation, air quality, waste management, water quality and water supply. Such a fragmented system of government has a powerful regional impact. And what is happening in the San Gabriel Mountain foothills probably will occur in other areas of the state where wilderness meets burgeoning residential development: the Sierra Nevada foothills, central coastal ranges, Inland Empire and San Diego County. In the San Gabriel Valley, the impacts include: • Continued construction of homes in hillside areas near the Angeles National Forest dwellings that are subject to the region's periodic fierce fires and floods; • Storm water runoff, with possible pollution, from land covered with homes, asphalt and concrete, reducing natural water absorption and increasing the amount and speed of runoff, endangering those downstream; • Damage or elimination of native species of wildlife and fauna; • Intense competition between cities for residential developments to attract affluent taxpayers; and • Regional land issues shaped by alternately intense and lackadaisical local politics. At the same time, the cities are also competing for retail developments that will increase sales tax revenue, the main source of municipal income since the passage of Proposition l3, which limited the property tax. An Example: Gentrifying Azusa Azusa is one of the poorest of the San Gabriel Mountains foothills communities, and it sees development as a route to greater prosperity-but not just any kind of development. City voters voted down the proposed 1,600-home Rosedale subdivision in 1998. "In City Council, there is a lot of discussion about the preservation of open space," said Assistant City Manager Robert Person. "But for the most part, approvals have been for development.i169 In May 2004, city voters will consider a downsized version of the Rosedale development, calling for some 1,250 homes on the former site of the Monrovia Nursery, along with retail and 150 hillside acres donated to the city for open space. The project has been controversial ~6tl Interview with Bill DePoto, June 26, 2003. 169 Interview with Robert Person, October 20, 2003. 705 from the start, but City Manager Rick Cole, a believer in the "new urbanism" idea of mixed use, worked hard to build community support. The city held five town meetings on Saturdays to discuss projects, including the Monrovia Nursery. The city hired facilitators and translators and even provided child care. Construction of another project, the 330-home Mountain Cove development, with its $400,000-plus homes, is nearly complete. Its physical location is unusual. It is surrounded on three sides by thousand-foot rock faces, with a trickling stream flowing along one side. This is where the San Gabriel River enters the Los Angeles Basin, but five dams built along its S- mile run tv the sea have forever altered the river. Mountain Cove "is sitting in the middle of a flood plain," conceded Persons, who acknowledged that the last flood there was in 1938, four years after completion of Morris Dam, just above the present-day, location of Mountain Cove. (Another upstream dam above Morris, the upper San Gabriel River dam #I, was completed later in 1938.)170 More than half the homes are on lots surveyed as above the floodplain, but the rest were inside the 100-year flood zone map. In response, the developer moved in tons of dirt to build up the walls of the San Gabriel River, and now all the homes are considered officially above the floodplain, if only by inches. Azusa's neighbor to the north, the United States Forest Service (USFS), asked the City Council to reduce the quantity of homes allowable at Mountain Cove before the city began the final approval process for the development. "The Forest Service does not have jurisdiction over the project site, but as a natural resource manager of adjacent property, I'm concerned about the density of the proposed development," said Raine Fulton, who was the USFS district ranger for the San Gabriel River. "We prefer development of much lesser density."ICI The city did not accede to his wishes. Dave Carr, USFS fire management officer, also attended the Azusa City Council meeting and added that the 1,200 residents Mountain Cove expects to house will increase overall fire danger and taxpayer costs. "This development places my firefighters at greater risk, places a greater tax burden on the taxpayers of the United States, and also draws down the resources of the Los Angeles County Fire Department and the level of protection for the rest of the city.i172 The county fire department did not offer testimony at this meeting. During this meeting, Azusa staff reported an expected small yearly cash flow resulting from Mountain Cove. Afrer the development was approved, however, the city struck a deal with the Mountain Cove developer, Standard Pacific Homes, to fund infrastructure costs (roads, sewer, etc.) through aMello-Roos Community Facilities District. Voters inside a proposed facilities district must approve creation of it, but the city held the election before Mountain Cove was officially subdivided-making Standard Pacific the only legal voter. The election ~'0 AIIRefer Gazetteer. See http://reference.allrefer.com/gazetteer/S/503239-san-gabriel-river.html. ~~~ From taped recording of the January 18, 2000 meeting of [he Azusa City Council. °2 From taped recording of the January 18, 2000 meeting of the Azusa Ciry Council. 106 was I to zero, but now 327 homeowners are on the hook for the next 30 years to repay $9 million in bonds authorized by the election, $100,000 per homeowner in some cases.173 CGS supports use of community facilities districts to support infrastructure costs for new development, but Azusa's handling of Mountain Cove leaves something to be desired. Though legal, a vote of one to zero is not a transparent way to pass authorization of $9 ' million in bonds, because documentation of such is easily lost in the myriad documents home purchasers must sign before entering escrow. The burden should be on the city to better publicize such actions. The Monrovia Nursery and Mountain Cove developments will make Azusa a more affluent community, changing a pattern that, beginning with gravel mines within its boundaries, made it undesirable. The city was thriving in the 1940s, with a downtown business district and attractive, if modest, homes.,"In the `60s, cheap housing came in and politics and governance wasn't the best," Person said: The city went through six city managers in 12 years until the hiring of Cole, who has lasted five years (and who now is departing to become city manager of Ventura). "Azusa is on its way to becoming something." How Local Decisions Have Regional Impact To understand how this fractured system impacts the region, it is necessary to study an issue with region-wide implications. Water pollution is such an issue. The San Gabriel River watershed receives drainage from a 689-square mile area of eastern Los Angeles County. The headwaters of the river are high in the San Gabriel Mountains, with the East, West and North Forks combining into a main channel that extends 58 miles to Long Beach. The extent of how development in the hillside can cause water pollution downstream is shown by the Mountain Cove development in Azusa, located on 285 acres bordered by the Angeles National Forest and the San Gabriel River. Portions of the development are located in a 100-year flood zone, an area defined by federal officials as an area susceptible to the worst flooding expected over a period of 100 years. To protect against flooding from the river, the banks have been lined with concrete. The environmental impact report on the project, required by the California Environmental Quality Act, said the concrete lining of the river will increase the velocity of the river flow while reducing the river depth. In addition, the environmental impact report said, construction of homes, streets, driveways, patios and other parts of the development will increase the amount of "impervious surfaces" in the project, reducing the ability of the former agricultural land to absorb storm water "As a result of that action, the quantity of surface flows will increase and the quality of those storm waters will decrease," the environmental impact report said.174 While engineering in the development will carry storm water from. the development, the river, heading downstream, could be fumed into a powerful ~~~ Love, Marianne "Azusa OKs Tax on Cove;' Son Gabriel Vol/ey Tribune, August 5, 2003. ~~~ Mountain Cove Residential Development Project DEIR, October 1999, City of Azusa. 107 torrent in the event of a large storm carrying huge amounts of water and sediment through the foothills to Santa Fe Dam in the flatlands. Azusa Mayor Cristina Cruz-Madrid, who opposed Mountain Cove, said she fears the project will affect portions of the flood plain below the development. "I would have preferred less housing," she said.~~s Belinda V. Faustinos, executive officer of the San Gabriel & Lower Los Angeles Rivers and Mountains Conservancy, which purchases land to preserve open space, expressed similar concerns. She said the project will impact the flood plain down to Santa Fe Dam, in the San Gabriel Valley flatlands. "In terms of water issues, it will have much impact," she said.~~b Southern California-based water offcials said the issue is worth study. They are investigating whether such hillside developments cause pollution. "Ground is a great filter," said Xavier Swamikannu, who heads the storm water program for the state Regional Water Quality Control Board-Los Angeles Region. "But when you put concrete over it, the value is lost." to Bill DePoto, watershed manager for the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works, said, "All we know right now is that [downstream pollution] can happen, by the overall science of what we know about how nature reacts [to covering the ground with impervious surfaces]... When you pave you expect more runoff at a higher rate... When you install concrete, pipes, pave over with driveways and streets, less [water] soaks through. This is expected in hydrological science. It would differ area by area, and depending on the steepness but in general that is what happens."I~s There is enough evidence pointing to the possibility of downstream pollution to prompt the county public works department to begin a study of potential pollution in the San Gabriel Valley. This is being done under the requirements of the federal Clean Water Act, which aims to control storm water pollution as well as that from industry and sewage treatment plants. From the Santa Fe Dam facility, the river is forced into a.concrete lined channel, flowing through the cities of Industry, Montebello, Pico Rivera, Downey, Santa Fe Springs, Norwalk, Bellflower, Cemtos, Lakewood, and Long Beach. It is not known whether increased velocity due to the concreting of the San Gabriel River and contaminants from Mountain Cove construction and occupation will have a significant impact below Santa Fe Dam. That will have to be determined by the county study. But other studies show that any pollution of the river has widespread regional impact. its Interview with Christina Cruz-Madrid and Belinda Faustinos, September 30, 2003. nn Id. to Interview with Xavier Swamikannu, September 15, 2003. ivs Interview with Bill DePoto, June 26, 2003. 108 As the river flows toward Long Beach, some of the water is used to replenish the San Gabriel River's underground water supply. These ground water storage areas are polluted. The Environmental Protection Agency said in a report last year that "over 30 square miles of groundwater under the valley may be contaminated" from industrial pollution in an area where fruit groves were rapidly replaced by residential subdivisions and huge industrial plants after World War II. The area now contains four Superfund cleanup sites.179 The pollution has affected the river, according to a study by Cal Poly graduate landscape architecture students. "Industrialization and the petroleum indtistry... has produced a number of contaminated sites.... These toxins, along with pollutants from homes and streets, contribute to the degradation of water quality in the San Gabriel channel.s180 The pollution reaches to Long Beach wetlands, beaches and the harbor. "The urbanization of Los Angeles has resulted in a significant amount of pavement or buildings that now preclude the infiltration of water into the ground," said a report of the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers Watershed Council. "This has both reduced recharge to the groundwater basins and has increased flow, especially peak flow during storms, in the river systems."~ s ~ "Decades of sprawling development in eastern Los Angeles County and a very complicated web ofjurisdictions have taken a toll on the ecological function of the San Gabriel River watershed," said a report by American Society of Landscape Architects. "Lack of coordination and overt competition among jurisdictions resulted in intrusive flood protection measures, the paving of important groundwater recharge areas..."lsz A report by a University of Washington scientist shows the regional impact. The study, by Dr. Barbara Hickey and her staff, said "the `mighty' San Gabriel River becomes a raging torrent after heavy winter rains, and can then transport a variety of undesirable invisible and visible contaminates to the coastal area at Long Beach and Seal Beach. Specifically, the contaminants include lead, copper, zinc, oil, and grease. These contaminants can then become entrapped within the normal sediment load deposited on the ocean floor. Here, there is the possibility that the contaminants can become incorporated into the tissues of organisms that.live on or within the sediment, and then on to the rest of the food web within the ocean."I $; When she discussed the water pollution question, Azusa Mayor Cruz-Madrid said "there are no regional agencies to consider these questions.s184 The comment could extend to other issues. ~~ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Aegion 9 update, May 2003. See '°" Rum, Heather T. Beneficial Uses of the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers Watershed Council, 2002. isi Id. isz Thomas, Rick. Watershed Plan for the San Gabriel River, 2000. 18J See http://scis.natsci.csulb.edu/boerrv/scbweb/ooland.htm. 1e1 Interview with Christina Cruz-Madrid and Belinda Faustinos, September 30, 2003 109 Trials and Tribulations of Regional Agencies Over the years, there have been several efforts for a more regional governmental approach to solving Southern Califomia regional problems, all weakened or defeated by the legislature's dedication to home rule. Several bodies have been created, some with considerable power. They tend, however, to be single-purpose agencies, not working together to encompass related issues such as fires and floods, or transportation and air pollution. And members on their governing boards are appointed in complex ways not understood by the public. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the mayor of Los Angeles and the 88 cities in the county, for example, each appoint some of the l3 members of the board of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. This complex appointment procedure makes these boards remote from the citizenry. An early effort to deal with regional problems was the legislature's creation of the Southern California Association of Governments, known as SCAG. Formed in the early 1960s, SCAG is a voluntary association of locally elected city and county officials that have only advisory power and is financed with federal and local funds. Similar organizations exist in the San Francisco Bay Area, Sacramento and San Diego. Once envisioned as organizations with power, they were made voluntary as they moved through a legislature strongly influenced by city and county home rule advocates represented by two powerful advocacy groups, League of California Cities and County Supervisors Association. As a result, scholar Stephanie Pincetl says, when these bodies "address regional policy questions, home rule ideology usually prevails with each jurisdiction jealously protecting its turf. This makes regional consensus about metropolitan planning and coordination elusive at best."iss Still, SCAG has some power to influence regional policy making, largely in the transportation area. When a project such as a highway or a new commuter rail is proposed, like the Metropolitan Transportation Gold Line into the San Gabriel Valley, it must be part of the SCAG transportation plan to receive state and federal funds. To be included in the plan, the project must meet SCAG standards of air quality and fuel costs and have the effect of creating livable communities. SCAG is also a clearing house for information about projects in one community that affect other communities. But SCAG's Executive Director, Mark Pisano, said the program has languished because of a shortage of resources. There are other regional agencies of particular importance to the San Gabriel Valley and the foothills, each serving a single purpose. Among the most important: • South Coast Air Quality Management District is in charge of controlling air pollution in Los Angeles, Orange and parts of Riverside and San Bernardino counties, a vast area encompassing 12,000 square miles with 14 million people, the second most populous urban area in the United States. ies Pincetl, Stephanie. Living On the Edge: Bringing Noture Into the City 2000. At the time, Pincetl was associate professor of geography, coordinator of the Sustainable Cities Program, University of Southern Califomia. 110 • Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority operates buses and trains throughout the Greater Los Angeles area. Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board, a state agency, is in charge of protecting surface and ground water quality in the Los Angeles region, including the vast coastal watersheds of Los Angeles and Ventura counties and a small portion of Kern and Santa Barbara counties. Los Angeles County Local Agency Formation Commission, "LAFCO," has the authority to approve or disapprove any petition for incorporation, special district formation or dissolution and annexation of cities or districts. Each county has one such agency, consisting of five commissioners: two county supervisors, two commissioners representing local cities and the fifth member chosen from the public by the other four members. San Gabriel and Lower Los Angeles Rivers and Mountains Conservancy attempts to preserve and increase open space for recreation and environmental protection in an area covering 56 cities in Los Angeles County and 10 in Orange county, including the entire San Gabriel Valley. It is a state agency, one of seven conservancies under the State Resources Agency. The others are Baldwin Hills, Tahoe, Coachella Mountains, San Joaquin River, Santa Monica Mountains and Coastal. Rivers and Mountains Conservancy The San Gabriel and Lower Los Angeles Rivers and Mountains Conservancy reveals much about the difficulty of coming up with regional solutions in an area where there are so many cities dedicated to home rule. In creating the agency in 1999, the legislature denied it the power of eminent domain, which would have permitted it to condemn land it wanted for open space. By contrast, the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, invested with this power, has used it to obtain huge amounts of land in the mountains. The San Gabriel conservancy also was denied another crucial power given to the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, the right to override local zoning laws. The impact of such a denial of authority is revealed in the San Gabriel conservancy's effort to create a wildlife and recreation area on 57 acres of a former duck farm on the San Gabriel River in the flatlands below the foothills at Whittier Narrows. Using a private nonprofit (The Trust for Public Lands) as an intermediary, the conservancy purchased the land from the owners for $4.17 million. The money came from funds raised by a $60 million state parks bond measure and a state $20 million water bond. Part of the duck farm, however, is within the boundaries of the City of Industry, a city of few residents but many businesses and industries. It was created to provide a business friendly municipal environment in the San Gabriel Valley. Industry wants to build a water quality control plant on the duck farm property to serve business expansion. Since Industry controls ut the zoning of the land, the San Gabriel conservancy, which objects to the location of the proposed plant, must engage in long negotiations with the city. Can't We All Get Along? Some of the regional agencies, especially those dealing with pollution and transportation, have considerable power. But they do not work together. All pursue their single purposes independently. These are the products of well intentioned state policy that was scaled back in scope due to the objections of proponents of home rule, chiefly the League of California Cities and the California Association of Counties. There are other factors that block a regional approach. One is social. If cities gave up any of their power to plan and zone, a regional agency might force them to include lower cost housing in their plans. "Home rule creates disparities, segregation,"-said Azusa Mayor Crnz- Madrid. Bradbury, the San Gabriel Mountain foothills' most extreme example, is zoned to . permit only construction of 10-acre estates, a far cry from working class Azusa and its dense development. Bradbury's restrictions make growth even more likely to occur in already dense cities. "Home rule continues to ghettoize communities like ours," said the mayor. Another factor is fiscal. Proposition l3 has forced local governments to shape land use policies around the need for sales tax revenue, the so-called battle for big-box retail developments and auto malls. As Stephanie Pincetl put it in her book Transforming California, there is "growth warfare throughout California, with a proliferation of initiatives (and elections) that created asee-saw effect where public officials were caught between developer persuasion (and the need to raise revenues) and voter backlash, resulting in rival forces winning control of city councils in alternate elections." Nick Bollman, Chair of the Speaker's Commission on Regionalism, has said the state legislature has displayed a penchant since passage of Proposition 13 for raiding local governments' property tax coffers to balance state books in times of fiscal strain.~sb Since then, local governments have had to scramble for sales tax revenues because their share of property tax revenues is small and the cost of providing services keeps rising. That can cause communities to expend time and taxpayer money seeking to lure new "big box" stores and auto malls, which are seen as sales tax cash cows for local governments. However, local taxpayers may ultimately pay twice for large new retail developments: through incentive packages to attract prospective developers, and through life style changes including increased traffic and smog. In past legislative sessions, Democratic Assemblyman Darrell Steinberg of Sacramento introduced legislation which proposed to distribute increases in sales tax revenues in three ways: one-third based on the location of the sale, one-third by population and one-third to counties complying with new low-income housing and homeless care standards. The plan would have only applied to the six-county Sacramento area but was widely considered to be precedent for the rest of suburban and urban California. 1tl6 Governor Schwarzenegger proposed a budget in 2004 detailing another such raid from local government. 112 Steinberg is just the latest of a number of frustrated legislators and governors who have tried to handle regional issues in a regional manner. In 1959, with concern over uncontrolled growth beginning, the legislature created a State planning office. This still exists, with advisory but no real power. At the same time, a state Coordinating Council on Urban Policy began atwo- year study that recommended creation of amulti-purpose regional district in each of the state's metropolitan areas to be responsible for planning, transportation and other regional matters. These districts would be elected by majority vote in the metro areas. The League of California Cities and the County Supervisors Association objected. The result was the formation of Local Agency Formation Commissions. Despite years of failure, the problems presented by this report are so pressing that they demand another try at a solution. In a state as diverse as California, communities must determine their future. Eureka, in the far northwestern comer of the state, has little in common with San Diego near the Mexican border. The San Gabriel Valley foothill community of Glendora, populated by people who wanted to get away from Los Angeles, does not want its future determined by the big city. But the wildfires of 2003, destroying homes built in defiance of danger, are evidence of the need for communities and governments to find a better way. Snapshot of Home Rule: Glendora While CGS has assessed effects of wildfire and flood policies in the San Gabriel Mountains communities as a whole, walking the streets of individual cities and talking to residents is another important perspective. CGS staff entered Glendora in 2002 and discovered a recall election afoot. Three sitting city council members faced recall, and allegations were flying that the election was actually over hillside development rather than individual council members. The following section tests that allegation and reveals problems larger than any one election can solve. Pride of the Foothills On aesthetics alone, the city motto of Glendora ("Pride of the Foothills") is well founded. Oak-dotted, grassy hills rise mostly undeveloped in northern and eastern Glendora. The city's numerous open spaces include the 200-acre South Hills and the 600-acre Glendora Wilderness parks. A private conservancy owns and maintains a 300-acre reserve for the official city flower, the Brodiaea. It is the rare kind of place where you could imagine yourself in the countryside, gawking at a hawk aloft with a spitting rattlesnake in its talons (as one resident reported) and then driving a few minutes down the street to shop at Wal- Mart-all within city limits. Glendora, a city of 50,000, exemplifies the charm and desirability of the San Gabriel Mountain foothills-and the obstacles that the foothill cities present to any plan to solve regional problems with regional solutions. The city reaches from the San Gabriel Valley flatlands to the mountaintops, with residential neighborhoods ranging from modest in the southern part df the city, a community formerly known as Alosta, to luxurious in the foothil Is. 113 Like other cities in the San Gabriel Mountain foothills, Glendora offers access to jobs in the San Gabriel Valley and the Inland Empire, to the east; Orange County to the south and Pasadena and Los Angeles to the south and west. Freeways provide transportation, supplemented by commuter busses and eventually the eastern extension of Los Angeles County's light rail system. (The Metro Gold Line now reaches Sierra Madre; with more federal funds, service will extend eastward using tracks bisecting the Foothill [210] Freewa} towards Claremont and beyond.) To Glendora residents we interviewed, their city is a fortunate island, removed from the tensions of life in urban Los Angeles, a small city that can shape its own future. We found, however, a city with tensions of its own, a beehive of local politics that impact cities miles away. To outsiders these disputes may be arcane. The same is true for political disputes in other small cities. Yet an understanding of these disputes is necessary for policy makers who deal with regional issues, such as those involved in this study of the San Gabriel Mountain foothills. Such an understanding brings theoretical concepts down to reality. Glendora Politics The issues dividing Glendora surfaced in a recall election in 2002, providing a chance to . study the political forces at work through the city's excellent campaign contribution reporting system and interviews with participants on both sides. We recommend the process to anyone concerned with regional governance. It is easy enough to discuss the big picture from the intellectual safety of a seminar. It is much more difficult, and enlightening, to interview angry residents on their home turf. Glendora has ageneral-law government with afive-member, part-time city council, a form of government common to smaller cities in California. Day-to-day administration is in the hands of a professional city manager, who leads the city staff. A political career in Glendora is seen more as humble service to a cherished community than a stepping stone to higher office. Councilmembers typically begin as a community booster, serving on the local chamber of commerce and perhaps advancing to a planning board. Only a chosen few, including descendants of land-rich early Glendorans, were likely to land on the city council, where radical upheaval was frowned upon and unopposed elections were commonplace. This changed with the election of John Harrold and Richard Jacobs in 1999. Harrold, whose wife was a longtime Glendoran, made himself known through attendance at public meetings and outspoken criticism of the city's environmental stewardship. Jacobs conducted a successful door-to-door campaign on similar issues. Combined, the two candidates in 1999 polled only 30% of the vote but the seven other candidates split the remainder, according to Doug Tessitor, a recall organizer and current councilmember. "Now we strategize on how not to split the vote,"tg~ Tessitor said in an is~ Interview with Doug Tessitor, January 23,.2002. 114 interview held before the March, 2002 recall. (Tessitor won election in the regular municipal election held in March 2003.) Harrold and Jacobs were supported by a union, Local 1428 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, which represents grocery workers. In 1999, the local was gearing up to oppose construction of a Wal-Mart store in a proposed Glendora shopping complex near the Foothill (210) Freeway, called Glendora Marketplace. Glendora found itself caught up in a dispute that extended far beyond its borders. Local 1428's opposition was part of a nationwide campaign by the union against the non-union retail chain. In 2003, the union struck three Southern California market chains when management proposed reducing health benefits and salaries offered new workers on the grounds that they could not compete with Wal-Mart and its lower salaries and benefits. In seeking the Wal-Mart store, city officials were following a pattern of other small cities in California that encouraged large retailers and auto dealers to establish businesses to increase municipal sales tax revenues. It was an example of the "fiscalization of land use": whatever makes the city the most money is often the land use vision that is implemented. Jacobs and Harrold were elected They voted against the Wal-Mart store and Glendora Marketplace development, arguing that the site posed environmental concerns. The resulting 2-2 vote (one council member abstained because of a conflict of interest) stopped the project While environmentalism matters in Glendora, the Marketplace project's location next to a freeway diluted many citizens' concerns. Return of Wal-Mart The next year, 2000, the issue was put before the voters and the council's denial of the project was overturned by a vote 63''/o to 37%. With sales tax receipts from large retail centers vital to the economic wellbeing of small cities like Glendora, coupled with the specter of those same stores located in neighboring cities, denying Wal-mart was a risky move. In 2001, Paul "Sonny" Marshall campaigned for office in a joint effort with Mike Conway. The two shared resources and letterhead, but when they both won office, the two found themselves on opposing sides of votes. After the March 2001 municipal election, a new power troika emerged with Jacobs, Harrold and Marshall voting together and the tatter's erstwhile ally, Conway, joining veteran councilmember Marshall Mouw in the dissenting minority. Almost concurrent with the 2001 election were plans for a recall, according to organizers. Appetites had been whetted by the successful referendum on Glendora Marketplace. Interest was stoked when the new council majority set about to remake the face of local government. As sometimes occurs during "housecleaning" actions following shifts in political power, the Harrold/Jacobs/Marshall majority voted to fire veteran commissioners on various city panels, including the socially prestigious planning commission. ~u The removed commissioners were encouraged to reapply, once they signed a code of ethics barring spots on city commissions to vendors with business before the city. Such codes are typical at higher levels of government, but in Glendora the roles of business owner and local politics are often intermixed. Among various other alleged misdeeds, the threesome was faulted for depletion of cash. reserves on pet projects, letting water and sewer infrastructure needs languish, mishandling legal cases and settlements, firing a popular city manager and rushing the hiring of a city attomey. Supporters of the three said the charges were overblown and based on hurt feelings. Marshall was also accused of trying to steer city business to his construction firm in the form of a contract for construction of athletic fields on city land. Marshall admitted plans for athletic fields were drawn up but has denied wrongdoing. 188 And so, for the first time in its 91'-year history, Glendora was roiled by preparations for the first city council recall election. Three men without deep ties to Glendora history-a developer (Marshall), an assistant district attomey (Harrold) and a retired professor (Jacobs)-became the most polarizing figures in the city. Political mailers compared them to Olympic ice-skating judges and Enron executives. Triple Recall CGS gathered campaign finance documents, election information and interviews from Glendorans and others in order to glean insight into local politics and to discover, to whatever extent, the recall election was a proxy fight over hillside development, as recall opponents have alleged. CGS found, to the contrary, that the Glendora recall election was a referendum on personality and a lingering echo of disappointment over Glendora Marketplace. Hillside development in Glendora is heavily constrained by land use laws, periodically toughened by passage of new ordinances but exempted from time to time-through the use of variances and specific plans-to allow development of hillside parcels. At times there has been the appearance of favoritism. In a court fight over a single lot, Glendora has paid out $800,000 to a homeowner whose neighbor received preferential ruling on a zoning matter for a new house. The city currently faces another lawsuit alleging it does not follow its own codes when vetting building projects of friendly Glendorans, but throws the book in essence at outsider developers. The two major warring factions were, on one side, established city business leaders and political newbies awakened from decades of civic apathy into outrage and action. On the other side was a smaller coterie surrounding the three elected council members: John Harrold, Richard Jacobs and Paul "Sonny Marshall. All three council members, however, ixa Interview with Paul Marshall, April 25, 2002. 116 were recalled by narrow margins.189 Turnout among Glendora's 29,140 registered voters was 40 percent. Using California disclosure data provided by four political action committees, CGS developed the graphs on the following pages: Where Do Recall Contributions Originate? zso ~ r ~ ._ ~~ t '~ - ~ ~. 225 4aa ~ {i' " i+T,. iwti -a i ,tT' ..~ .~ ~ ., k .. ti~ 200 ~ ~ .n . ~~~ "` 1 r 175 . .. .r .. ~ ' t. { .. 150 '.-. ~ ; ' A~ ~ ~:a _. s. M 125 ..:.;r w. .M, -.tr . _ r r•, 4 t3'~i1,YTy~' ....' w~c'.X.3-:r~m. ~ '.~w~„`-- '~n`~. •'. ~ °° 100 75 »,:: .tea ~~ _ ~ $~ 2 J3.:. ~ .. a ~ ; 0 w .r . Gle ndora Citizens for Citizens for the Committee for Friends of the Responsible Preservation of Fbnest Glendora Foothills--OPPOSE Government-- Glendora--OPPOSE Governance--OPPOSE RECALL SUPPORr RECALL RECALL R~ALL ^91741 Zlp Code ^91740 Zlp Code pother Zip Codes Fig. 27. The 91741 ZIP includes northern Glendora and most affluent development. The 91740 ZIP comprises less affluent southern Glendora, including the neighborhood formerly known as Alosta. ies Councilmember Richard Jacobs was ousted, 6,028 to 5,609 votes (51.8 percent to 48.2 percent); Gary Clifford won the race to succeed him. Councilmember Paul Marshall was ousted, 5,854 to 5,760 votes (50.4 percent to 49.6 percent); Cliff Hamlow won the race to succeed him. Mayor John Harrold was ousted, 5,953 [0 5,733 votes (50.94 percent to 49.06 percent); Ken Herman won the race to succeed him. 117 Gle ndora Citize ns for Responsible Government (In support of recall) Total Raised: E2E6, 532.88 $127,839 50% r $127,692, OMajorponor: Art/SarahLudwick ^otherdonors Fig. 28. This committee also made $3,361.53 in independent expenditures to support the campaigns of Ken Herman, Cliff Hamlow and Gary CliHOrtl. Art and Sarah Ludwick's contributions include a $50,000 loan to he repaid at 6 percent interest, but campaign finance documents do not indicate this amount has been repaid. Citizens for the Preservation of dendora (oppose recall) Total Raised: $9,432.18 $700 7% p Major Donor: $8.732 Alosta Frestone g3% ^ other donors Friends of the Foothills (oppose recall) Total Raised: $7,829.00 13% p Major Donor: Jane Ngo $6,829 ^ other donors 87% Committee for Honest Glendora Governance (oppose recall) Total Raised: $27,240.00 44% I .. 56% p Major Donor: PauWirginia Marsha0 ^other donors Fig. 29. Totals raised. 118 Election Night Interviews On the night of the election, March 5, 2003, the following comments were recorded as voters exited a polling station in Glendora. Voters were not asked their names. • "I think the recall campaign used underhanded tactics...I might have [voted in favor of it] otherwise." • _ "Many voters are apathetic. If you asked them one way or the other, they would probably say yes. But they won't vote. The `no recall' people are passionate about their candidates." • "I had heard just before the election, it was 2:1 against the recall." • "This is my second vote ever and I don't really know the issues. I'm a recent U.S. Citizen. From the ballot language, I voted yes. I think we should give new people a chance." • "There needs to be due process in hiring and also in dismissing commissioners. This is not a dictatorship and it shouldn't be a dictatorship. That's not the way business is done in this town." • "This is about property and land development, about people like John Gordon [a former councilmember and landowner whose family arrived in Glendora in 1895]. My family's been here five generations but we didn't have property. I think they want to stick more $500,000 houses on smaller lots." • "We're upset that we had to came back to vote. We wanted our first vote to count. Why should we pay the cost of an election and suffer the signs and the public discord?" Interviews with Recall Opponents CGS was able to access Glendora campaign finance information via the Internet, a rarity among California cities and with no equal among the 13 other municipalities reviewed for this report. CGS also conducted several interviews with recall campaign contributors as well as others identifying themselves as recall opponents. CGS contacted as many names as possible from a list posted on a Web site owned by councilmember Marshall, htto://www.sonnvmarshalLcom. The list, entitled "Hidden Agendas," listed major contributions for the recall effort (it has since been removed). A preface to the list read in part, "Developers who want to build in the foothills back the recall effort. They want to get rid of some new council members who will not approve their projects. Many of those behind the recall are sore losers who are upset about losing their majority on the city council in the last election. In addition, the recall effort is about `the 119 good old boys' that have been in power at city hall for decades, wanting to get back in power after losing in the last two elections."19° Kristin Parisi, a Glendora resident and onlooker to local politics, was an employee at Councilmember Marshall's construction firm during the time of the recall. She helped coordinate recall opposition efforts. In an interview before the recall election occurred, she said Glendora politics was less insular under a council controlled by Harrold, Jacobs and Marshall. "Harrold and Jacobs were elected on quality of life issues. There is a lack of regional planning here, and all the cities making individual decisions. Dick Jacobs led the charge here that we need to plan regionally and work with neighboring cities."191 Parisi said Harrold and Jacobs' opposition to the Glendora Marketplace was based on environmental impacts, and also that the recall opponents faced moneyed foes representing the "same mix: developers, car dealers and property owners who have future designs for their ProPertY „ Former Mayor John Harrold refused several requests for interviews. CGS interviewed former Councilmember Jacobs two weeks before the recall election. "The recall might very well be successful," he predicted. "The way it's organized, for people with vast financial resources, the system works to their advantage." Former Councilmember Richard Jacobs, retired from his job at the Center for Regenerative Studies at Cal Poly Pomona, said quality of life in Foothills communities was threatened by piecemeal development. "You can'[ see the boundary line between them, but each city is isolated in trying to cope with developer interests. Monrovia got a proposition passed to fund the purchase of land, but the same thing was defeated in Duarte. What this whole thing begs for is some kind of consortium attempt to maximize the leverage of the foothills communities to preserve the greatest amount of land."192 CGS was able to contact and interview seven of the 32 individuals identified on the "Hidden Agendas" list. One of them was furious at Councilmember Marshall but asked not to be quoted. Another refused to be interviewed. Others we were unable to reach. Almost all . expressed pride at their inclusion on the list, arguing it was a sign of civic pride. "It's incredible," said Dr. Tim Ferguson, a physician named on the list. "Seven past citizens of the year were on the list. Every living citizen of the year gave money in favor of the recall."193 Doctor's Diagnosis Dr. Ferguson took umbrage at the council majority's firing of Gary Napper, the former Glendora city manager (now employed by the City of Clayton, CA). "They withheld his severance package until six weeks after his firing, until after he signed a letter saying he ~~ The "Hidden Agendas" document no longer appears on h_ttp://wwwsonnvmarshall.com. For an original copy, contact CGS. roi April 30, 2002 interview with Kristin Parisi, Monrovia, Calif. in February 22, 2002 interview with Richard Jacobs. ivr Interview with Tim Ferguson, April 22, 2002. 120 resigned. They knew if [Napper] sued, he would never get hired as a city manages [call that extortion and an unethical way to do business. It was after I found out about that that I contributed."194 Dr. Ferguson and his relatives, descendants of post-Gold Rush bee farmers, control several hundred acres of Glendora's remaining open space. "I've been on this piece of land for 50 years and I have no intention of subdividing," he said during a CGS visit on April 22, 2002. Despite its 4,600 square feet, Ferguson's squat home sits camouflaged on a hilltop behind miles of single-lane driveways and security gates. Rock aggregate siding stanchions the home against gusting winds, and wild grasses grow on his rooftop, absorbing heat and insulating the interior. "I have no trust in what man does,"195 he explained during a spectacular tour. _ ~ , y r.,' Fig. 31. Dr. Ferguson and his rooftop view of Glendora and environs. i9° Id. ivs Id. 121 Fig. 3g. Dr. Tim Ferguson's house viewed from hillsides above downtown Glendora. With a view of it all, Dr. Ferguson has seen hillside development creep slowly up the hills toward his landholdings. He is critical ofwhite-columned, Tudor-style mansions either recently built or under construction below him. He said laws governing "pads," where graders leveled natural ground in preparation for a building foundation, encourage too-tall homes. "Glendora's hillside ordinance encourages Tudor mansions, which as a Scotsman I hate especially," Ferguson said. "A house can only be 20 percent of [the size of a] drilling pad. So you get big pads and little houses which invariably need two stories to cut it for homeowners. When those homeowners get older and their kids leave, they're going to get disgusted with those homes....l'd prefer to see condos clustered around open space.i19fi Fig. 32. Building pads in the hills above Glendora await new home construction. Other Interviews with Recall Proponents Art Ludwick is a 38-year resident and owner of sprinkler manufacturer Rainbird Corp., which has its headquarters in Glendora. At a total exceeding $127,000, Ludwick and his wife Sarah contributed far more in money and resources in support of the recall than any other single donor. (The next biggest donor was ex-Councilman Marshall and his wife Virginia, who together contributed more than $15,000 in opposition to the recall.) ~~ ld. izz . "Other than one school election, I've never contributed before." Ludwick said. "Then came the recall. I believe the councilmen involved were destroying the city because of how they treated people who really cared about the community...this was more about attitude than political posture.s197 "This was not about hillside development," Ludwick added. "A lot of people were confused. They thought [voting against the recall] was the only way to have hillside preservation. But the three people [elected to the council following the successful recall] are every bit as committed to preserving the hillsides. Nobody in this town wants it to look like Glendale."19B Another longtime resident contributing in support of the recall was Art Cook, a Glendora public works director and the city manager before Gary Napper. Cook blamed the recall on what he perceived as the majority's "arrogance," "insults," "abuse of power," and "total disregard for the law" (a reference to an alleged Brown Act open-meeting violation regarding the hiring of a city attomey).199 Bob Kuhn, a former Glendora planning commissioner, city councilman and mayor, said the "recall happened because [the council majority] made some mistakes and lost a couple of 30- second sound bites." "They didn't do anything illegal to incite the recall," Kuhn said. zoo Hillside development in Glendora, Kuhn said, is a "function of money." "Land rich but cash poor" landowners find it hard to make a profit developing their own lands, he said, which leads them to sell to developers like NJD, which now seeks to develop the Canyon Oaks community in the eastern Glendora hillsides. 'At 20 homes, a lawsuit is cheaper' Canyon Oaks is a proposed 400-acre development with 200 acres in Glendora and 200 in San Dimas. Landowner NJD Corpora4ion, which acquired part of the property from a longtime Glendoran, has encountered resistance from both cities for its plan to build homes. NJD first wanted to build 145 homes but also has proposed 110 and 76, which was most recently turned down by the Glendora City Council. Staff at the city say their codes only allow 20 homes-one every 10 acres. NJD representative Richard Jemison says, "At 20 homes, a lawsuit is cheaper."201 Claiming that city has promoted its stricter hillside ordinance over its General Plan, resulting in economic loss of NJD's property, separate litigation is proceeding against both Glendora and San Dimas. The cities have won in Superior Court, where judges have upheld the cities' right to implement stricter development ordinances in the periods between ] 0-year revisions of a city's General Plan. The California Supreme Court in 1990 ruled that zoning in conflict with ~" Interview with Art Ludwick, May 7, 2002. 198 Ibid. iw Interview with Art Cook, April 26, 2002. r0° Interview with Bob Kuhn, April 22, 2002. '01 Interview with Rick Jemison, May I, 2002. 123 the General Plan is invalid. Jemison said the judges were loath to restrain the cities from passing tough ordinances. But the housing market is hot, and Canyon Oaks won't go away so easily. Jemison said the city's history of writing ever-tougher laws but allowing overly permissive exemptions to those laws bolster another legal case NJD has filed against the city. He cites recent development in Easley Canyon, where homes are located in canyon bottoms-a violation of the city's hillside ordiance, he says. "That ordinance forces us to build on ridgelines, instead of in canyons where it could do less harm," 202 Jemison said. Gary Napper, the former city manager for Glendora who was deposed by the Harrold-Jacobs- Marshall majority, remembered Easley Canyon as a "Oh no! What's under that rock?" moment early into his tenure in Glendora. Napper had been surprised by the developer of Easley Canyon, who showed up. at his office demanding roughly $200,000 in compensation for a water tank built to support new housing development in Easley Canyon. The water tank was oversized and other city residents would benefit from its use. It turned out former city manager Art Cook had struck a verbal deal with the developer but had not informed Napper. "There was no documentation, nothing had been taken to council. My staff would kind of chuckle and shake their heads," Napper said. The payment was made. Get Out of My Town Another former Glendoran to butt heads with city leaders was reached for an interview in Mississippi. The City of Glendora paid Robert Gagne $800,000 to settle a dispute that arose after Gagne's neighbor purchased a nearby piece of property "leftover from a major developer," Gagne said. The neighbor began to build a home on the land, which Gagne argued to the planning board and city council was in violation of city ordinances, restricting development in that area to lots no smaller than Five acres. "It proceeded with no logical discussion. The council muffled [forrner Councilmember Christine] DeGrassi, who was the only dissenting vote when they made their decision. She was treated like a pariah. So there was a lawsuit. It was the classic case of local government trying to railroad its way, a classic case of truth in politics and truth in government."zo3 Gagne said he received threatening calls and his home was vandalized with paint. He said he found something resembling a pipe bomb on his doorstep. "I left because of the atmosphere,"204 said Gagne. zoz [d. z01 Interview with Robert Gagne, April I5, 2002. zoa Id. 124 Recommendations for Glendora Glendora planning commissioners should not reap economic benefits from new development projects they vet as off cial representatives of the city, as has occurred in the past. The ethics code passed by the now-removed council majority should be retained. .,, Glendora's struggles over development pale in compazison with communities battling high rates of crime and poverty orjoblessness. Still, Glendora must underscore its clean-cut image with planning and development decisions that are free from conflicts of interest. The enthusiastic response to the recall should prove, at least, that many citizens in Glendora care about their city. They should be tapped to fill spots on volunteer city commissions, rather than being dominated by members of the development community. izs Appendix CAPSULE REPORTS ON 14 FOOTH 1 LLS COMMUNITIES CGS conducted scores of interviews in 14 Foothills communities over atwo-year period beginning in 2002. Speaking to planners and officials in individual cities, we received a general impression of a region concerned with orderly growth, mindful of environmental concerns and protective of a small-town ethos. Motorists driving the Foothill (210) Freeway, however, may not notice where one town ends and another begins. Some cities have densely packed housing perched on terraced rows, such as in Glendale, while cities like Glendora, San Dimas and Claremont have largely preserved the green hills surrounding their cities. Many of the interviews are encapsulated below as part of our survey of attitudes toward hillside development. While the reports are not comprehensive, the aim of this appendix is to offer meaningful examples of l4 manifestations of home rule in California. La Canada Flinuidge La Canada Flintridge is asemi-rural, family-oriented suburb of 8.6 square miles. Marred couples comprise nearly three-quarters of households and the schools rank in the country's top 5% nationwide.205 The population in the 2000 census was 20,318; it has grown minimally, by 0.8% in the last twenty years. The city's citizens are predominantly wealthy: La Canada's median household income is $109,989, and its median home price of $837,500 ranked as the state's eighth highest in 2003.206 A restricted-entry NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory employing 6,000 workers is located on 175 acres in.La Canada. An estimated 95% of all city land has been developed in La Canada, and most of this development occurred before the town's incorporation in 1976. Since then, city leaders tried to limit growth drastically through stricter zoning codes. A development that originally proposed l7 lots on 47 acres of foothill land is currently under consideration by the planning department. Officials have already determined through a public environmental review process that the number of units is too high due to environmental constraints, so "it will probably turn out to be 10 units," according to Senior Planner Fred Buss 207 If approved, this will be the largest development in La Canada in the last two decades. zos City Almanac. San Gabriel Valley Newspaper Group, p. 34. Z06 California Association of Realtors, August 2003 data. hctp://www.car.orp~index.php?id=Mz[IND1= z0' Interview with Fred Buss, October 16, 2003. 727 Since most town land has been developed, currently development most often occurs in La Canada when people buy older homes to knock them down and build larger houses. However, most city officials are against development and "mansionization," the tearing down of smaller houses to build large homes on small plots of land. "If you want to be elected, you have to be anti-mansionization, according to Buss. "The city wants to preserve its rural-suburban character."zos Altadena Altadena is an unincorporated territory within Los Angeles County bordered by the Angeles National Forest to the north. The area has few sidewalks or apartment buildings; instead the town's many horse ranches and trails give Altadena a country feel. The racially diverse population of 42,610 has only grown 5% since 1960. Altadena's median home price in 2003 is $411,000, and the median household income is $60,549. Altadena has had a town council for almost 25 years despite its status as a county temtory. The council is a volunteer organization that is selected by Altadena citizens who choose to vote in special elections. "We relay local issues to the County Supervisor's office and to our state assemblyperson," said Jacqtiie Fennessy, Altadena Town Council member. "If we make a recommendation, they certainly look into it. If there is a local problem or issue, they listen to us."209 The County Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich sends a deputy to the monthly council meetings. "We rely on the [town council] for their input, but they have no decision-making authority or legal mandate,"210 stated Frank Meneses, Los Angeles County Acting Administrator for the Current Planning Division. The largest development in Altadena in recent decades has been the controversial La Vina. The nearly completed development includes 272 single-family homes, a 10- acre school site and 108 acres reserved as open space. La Vina had been the subject of protests, lawsuits, and disagreement even before the LA County Board of Supervisors approved the project in 1992. A citizen's group, Friends of La Vina, sued the county, and the case went all the way to the state Supreme Court in the early 1990s. "People in the community were adamant that they did not want La Vina," 21 ~ according to Fennessy. "Friends of La Vina disapproved of the traffic impacts and visual impacts that La Vina would have,"212 stated Meneses. Part of the La Vina site had been previously occupied by a hospital, but the majority of the hillside had been untouched prior to development, and the majority of Altadenans enjoyed the natural hillside views and horse trails on the property. Citizens "felt that it was too much to bear,"zl3 according to Meneses. The La Vina developers significantly graded the hillside and surrounded the community with gates, which was unpopular with Altadena citizens. "Today", stated Fennessy, "people in Altadena are very disinterested in having any more development in the hills. They are interested in maintaining the hillsides."zla zoa [d. 209 Interview with Jacqueline Fennessy, October 3, 2003. 210 Interview with Frank Meneses, October 1, 2003. 21 ~ Interview with Jacqueline Fennessy, October 3, 2003. ziz Interview with Frank Meneses, October I, 2003. zu Id. 310 Interview with Iacqueline Fennessy, October 3, 2003. 128 Controversy continues to surround La Vina. An active group of residents who live in La Vina along with other Altadena community members have questioned whether the La Vina developers have met the conditions set forth in the county-approved plans. Developers should have preserved trails on the La Vina property, but they have apparently not done so, to the chagrin of many vocal Altadena equestrians. Some infrastmcture was also not provided. According to Fennessy, "The county has admitted it themselves that they didn't account for everything" 715 during the development process. Now county officials are performing an inquiry into the matter. Sierra Madre Sierra Madre is aself-titled "village" of 10,578 residents nestled in three square miles of foothill land. The village is slightly shrinking; it lost over 250 residents in the last twenty years. Sierra Madre has a safe, small-town feel; in fact, Nancy Schollenberger, the city clerk, frequently keeps city records at her home. Sierra Madre has the lowest crime rate of any non-gated municipality in Southern California.716 The civic-minded village is the only foothill municipality in this study to have its own volunteer fire department, comprising an estimated 65 members of the community. Sierra Madre is currently being sued by representatives of Maranatha Christian School for turning down their proposal to construct a high school on 64 acres of foothill land in conjunction with Glendale developer Dom-Platz and Company. The village did not grant project approval because the school "would be in the middle of a residential area, and so did not seem compatible" due to the additional traffic the school would produce, according to Kurt Christiansen, Director of Development Services. Christiansen added, "When Maranatha bought the land, they were told that it would be an uphill battle to develop a school there, but they bought it anyway." 217 However Maranatha is suing based on a national law, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which states that a municipality cannot tum down development on the basis of religious use. Additionally, in order to recoup their investment, Maranatha and Dorn-Platz are now proposing a 30-unit residential development on the property, which is under review by Sierra Madre Development Services. In what could be deemed a conflict of interest, one of the planning commissioners is also an architect on the project. A citizen's group called Residents for the Preservation of Sierra Madre has been organized to stop any development on the site. "Citizens certainly don't want to see growth in the mountains or foothills-this is a universal idea with the majority of our residents,"218 stated Christiansen. "People say `we don't want to be another Glendale'." Thus, since the mid- 1990's, [he village has been aggressively purchasing foothill land with Proposition A funds from LA County. Two hundred acres of bought or donated hillside land is currently in Sierra Madre's possession. 315 Interview with Jacqueline Fennessy, October 3, 2003. n6 City Almanac. San Gabriel Valley Newspaper Group, p. 58. $1r Interview with Kurt Christiansen, September 26, 2003. zie Id. 129 Arcadia Arcadia is a diverse city of 1 l.2 square miles and S3,OS4 citizens that surrounds tiny Sierra Madre on two sides. People of Asian ancestry comprise 4S% of Arcadia's population, including 34°/u of Chinese origin, and Hispanics make up another ]0%.'`19 The median home price in 2003 was SS68,000, and the median household income is $56,100. Although Arcadia is consttvctin~ new retail space, offices and hotels, the majority of citizens still work outside the city limtts. '`0 Whispering Pines, a development on steep hillside land of roughly 45 homes on SO acres, was started in the mid-1980s and continues today. It was controversial since the developer "cut off the tops of hillsides and filled in canyons to create building pads,"zzI stated Associate Planner Joe Lambert. Citizens of neighboring Monrovia were also concerned, since the development is located on Monrovia's borders. It appears that the city may turn down a recent proposal by Nevis Homes fora 6-unit development, since it would be located on very steep slopes of over 20%. This is equivalent to a rise of more than l foot for every S feet in a horizontal direction.Z"` Arcadia normally does not allow development on such steep hillside land. "Generally people are fairly `live and let live'," according to Lambert. "They are sensitive to development usually when it's in their neighborhood. People are not concerned with citywide issues here; it's just the mentality of residents. The city is not solidly opposed to or in favor of really anything." Lambert emphasized the difference from neighboring Sierra Madre. "We have folks who have lived here forever and people who have~ust moved in. We are not like Sierra Madre, where they want to keep things as they are." zJ Monrovia The former home of muckraker Upton Sinclair, Monrovia is a 13.7 square mile city of tree- lined streets and older houses. In the middle-class city of 36,929 citizens, the median household income in Monrovia is S4S,37S, and the current median home price of $363,500, up by 28% in the last year.2`4 Similar to neighboring cities, Monrovia borders the Angeles National Forest on the city's north side. Due to this close forest contact, Monrovians often sight black bears in their parks and neighborhoods.zzs On July 1 I, 2000, the Monrovia population voted for Measure B to buy property in the foothills to preserve it as open space. Monrovia is the only San Gabriel foothill community to vote for such a tax. Citizens approved a tax on themselves to raise $10 million to buy roughly 600 acres of hillside property. Part of the funds went to buy 50 acres that had been approved in the late 1990s for a development that was fairly controversial in the city. At 319 See htro'//www ciN-data.cortJciri/Arcadia-Califomia.html. 330 City of Arcadia Website; Also see htro~//www wemweb com/travcler/towns/33arcadi/historv html ~~~ Interview with Joe Lambert, September 21, 2003. ~~~ See htro~//eeoloey isu edWeeostac/Field Ezercisc/tooomaos/sl°oe calch[m. Zv Interview with Joe Lambert, September 21, 2003. zza California Association of Realtors, August 2003 data. See htro://www.car.ore/indez.oho?id=Mzl l MiU=. ~~' Geoff Kelly, "Monrovia is Rooted in Nature and in Family", LA Times article, June 22, 2003. 130 present, most of the Measure B funds have already been spent acquiring land, but citizens continue to advocate for the town to buy many more hillside parcels. As the town has sought to buy up land, developers continue to find opportunities in Monrovia. "Lots that developers wouldn't have looked at a few years ago do pencil out now," stated Monrovia Associate Planner Barbara Lynch. However, "the people in Monrovia are anti-hillside building."zzb Thus, the city government finds itself in the middle. Groups of citizens voicing opposition to hillside development attend all public meetings on new developments, and the city attempts to address their concerns in the environmental impact reviews of the proposed properties. "The city council is reasonable -they understand property rights, but they also love Monrovia and our hillsides," affirmed Lynch. "It turns into a balancing act."zz~ Bradbury "If you have to ask how much it costs, you can't afford to live here,"22B according to City Planner David Breyer. Bradbury is a tiny, wealthy 1.9 square mile town of 855 residents and 311 homes. The community is completely residential and is often described as a large homeowners' association; absolutely no stores or businesses may locate in Bradbury. Instead, the town is predominantly comprised ofmultimillion-dollar mansions and horse farms, and most homes are located within two gated communities. The town was incorporated in 1957 to preserve its exclusive, rural atmosphere of sprawling estates and mountain trails. It has had almost no growth since 1970. The median household income is $100,454 and the median home price of $1,067,500 only trails three other California cities: Malibu, Laguna Beach, and Palos Verdes Estates.zz9 The only so-called affordable housing in town consists of $400,000+ guesthouses on the property of large estates, emphasized Breyer.230 Contested elections are rare in Bradbury. Only about 300 acres of undeveloped land remains in Bradbury's foothills. This land would be difficult to develop within the regulations of the town's stringent Hillside Ordinance because of its steep slopes, ridgelines, and riparian habitat. Bradbury also has a strict zoning code to safeguard its estate character, which calls for one unit per ten acres in almost all undeveloped hillside territory. Bodkin and Kissick, the owners of 200 of the remaining foothill acres in Bradbury, wish to develop their land. However, even if they were able to find a way around its environmental constraints, they could only develop a maximum of twenty custom homes. "The infrastructure they would have to provide to develop the site would not make development a financially successful venture," asserted Breyer. "But if the property had been in a neighboring city, it would likely have already been developed."Z31 Neighboring towns do not have the same zoning laws restricting density, and the surrounding hillside has indeed been zxa Interview with Barbara Lynch, September 2l, 2003. zn Id. ''~ Interview with David Breyer, October 12, 2003. zzv California Association of Realtors, August 2003 data. See ht~i ://www.car.ore/index.nho?id=MzIIND[=. zJ0 Interview with David Breyer, October 12, 2003. ni Id. 131 developed more densely in Monrovia and Duarte. Even the moderate hillside in Bradbury is zoned for one unit per five acres, making subdivision nearly impossible since most land has already been developed to this maximum. The only development in the last decade in Bradbury has been eight units on five acres each of moderate hillside land. Duarte Duarte is an ethnically diverse, 6.8 square mile foothill town of 21,486 residents that incorporated in 1957. In Duarte, the median home price is $252,000 and the median household income is $50,744. The city is home to aworld-famous cancer research institute, the City of Hope Medical Center. The city has a Hillside Ordinance to regulate development in the foothills because in the 1970s and 80s, "developers leveled whole hills and filled in canyons to build 300 units,"z32 according to Duarte Associate Planner Jason Golding. Developers are still interested in the. hillsides, but the city now has more stringent policies regulating them. For example, over the past five years a 39-acre property, Attalla Ranch, has been under review. The number of units has been reduced from 50 units to 15 over the years, and now the owner will donate 28 of the acres to the city as open space. A citizens group, "Save the Foothills" opposed Attalla ranch originally, but now that the density has been reduced, the group is less active. Duarte city officials worry that fuming down development may land the city in court, as it has in surrounding hillside communities. "The city might have to pay half a million for rejecting development," stated Golding. "If the city has to pay a bi~ lawsuit, it affects everyone because the community has limited financial resources." 2 3 Community members attempted to pass a measure supporting a city tax similar to Monrovia to buy up and preserve hillside land, but the citizens voted it down. At present, 53% of town square footage is not developed because it is government parkland or is steep hillside terrain. However, the steep foothill land could be developed in the future. Currently the city is attempting to gain state funding to buy 320 acres of hillside land that had been approved for the development of 48 homes by Pacific Communities, but the funding is uncertain. /~ZUSa Azusa is the poorest and one of the most diverse communities in the San Gabriel foothills. The working-class city is over half Hispanic, and only 12% have obtained degrees from fou;- year universities. The median household income is $39,191 and the median home price is currently 5234,500. Large industrial cavities in the Azusa mountainside, caused by the sand, gravel and cement mining industry over the last half-century, have created eyesores in portions of the city. Cheap housing built in the 1960s also contributes to the comparatively shabby look. However, the San Gabriel Palley Tribune recently characterized Azusa as "the most improved city in the San Gabriel Valley,"234 as the city's median home prices have '''~ Interview with Jason Golding, October 5, 2003. ~~~ Id. $J0 California Association of Realtors estimates, taken from City of Azusa website November 2003. 132 doubled since 1999 and [he city's population of 44,712 has increased by 8% in the last decade. The city is in the process of revising its general plan and development codes for four years and has shown unusual initiative to gain public participation in its revision process for a town of its size and income level. In order to obtain public input, it held multiple Saturday town meetings and hired facilitators, translators and childcare providers. An average of 175 citizens came to each meeting, and $1.8 million was budgeted to revise the general plan and zoning codes. Most property that is available within city limits has been developed. The city council has supported and approved two recent hillside projects that will likely change Azusa's demographics: Mountain Cove and Monrovia Nursery. Mountain Cove is a partially completed, 327 home development built against the mountainside with values of $400,000 and above. The proposed mixed-use Monrovia Nursery development includes up to 1,250 residential units, an elementary school, and 50,000 square feet of commercial space. Additionally, the majority of the hillside land on this property, 150 acres, will be donated as open space to the city. Citizens voted down a prior development proposal for this land (the Rosedale plan for 1,700 units) in a 1999 referendum, so with the help of the City Manager's Office, the Monrovia Nursery property owner incorporated a number of citizens' meetings in the planning process and held a nationwide architecture contest to come up with the best, most acceptable design for the property. However, despite the conciliatory actions by the builder, this project is currently on hold since a citizen's group that disapproves of Monrovia Nursery is suing the city for not permitting a referendum election on the matter. Another referendum may follow.z~s Azusa has no plans to raise money through city taxes to buy up its hillside land. According to Assistant City Manager Robert Person, "This is too poor of acommunity-our residents would not tax themselves for that lofty of an ideal. They are just trying to work their two jobs and put food on the table."z3e However, Azusa did buy 1.8 acres in the hillside with nearly half of a $1 million grant from the San Gabriel Rivers and Mountains Conservancy. The City Manager's Office hopes to buy up 100 acres around that initial site in order to create a park and will continue to apply for more grant funds. Glendora The attractive streets of Glendora, a 19 square mile city, are lined with trees and a mixture of cottages and estates. Somewhat less ethnically diverse than its neighbors, Glendora's population of 49,415 is 68% white. The median home price is $353,000 and the median household income is $60,0 l3. Open space comprises 54% of the total land area in the city, including 600-acre Glendora Wilderness Park. In the early 1970s, Glendora received matching funds from the Legacy of Parks fund through the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare to buy 250 acres of zrs Love, Marianne. "Fate of Monrovia Nursery Project May Go to Voters;' San Gabrief Va!!ey Tribune, March 22, 2003. zrs Interview with Robert Person, October 20, 2003. 133 hillside land for preservation. Because Proposition l3 had not yet been passed, the city was able to raise its half of the funds through temporarily raising the city's tax rate. Since then, the Glendora Hillside Conservancy has acquired or received through donations several different foothills parcels, so the town and conservancy together now own over 1000 acres of foothill land preserve. Recently, Glendora received partial funding of 52.5 million to buy 42 acres of hillside property through Proposition 40 money directed through the San Gabriel Rivers and Mountains Conservancy, and the city is attempting to raise the other half of the funding from the State Wildlife Conservation Board. The city regulations on foothill development are not as rigorous as those in nearby cities such as San Dimas or La Verne.'"37 For example, fire provisions, grading information, drainage and flora and fauna preservation are not well specified or are not addressed at all in their regulations.2J8 "In general there is a lot of concern about the foothills,"239 stated Deputy City Manager Culver Heaton, Jr. Thps, in 2002 a 20 member Ad Hoc Comtnittee for the Preservation of the Foothills was formed to commission a study. The resulting recommendations "plug a lot of the loopholes on hillside development," 240 said Heaton. They will likely be incorporated into the city's new general plan. The city had pending a legal challenge to its hillside regulations recently by NJD, Ltd., a developer whose request to build Canyon Oaks, a 145 luxury home development in the foothills, was denied because it did not abide by city restrictions on density. "Our regulations would only allow 24 units on the property," stated Heaton.241 NJD sued the city and lost on July 30, 2003. According to Wayne Leech, Glendora city attorney, "NJD's proposed development project would have caused substantial and irreparable environmental damage" and "disrupted hillside stability on certain steep parcels due to excessive grading." 242 NJD has proposed a revised plan that is now under review. San Dimas San Dimas, a city of 34,980 people and 15.5 square miles, has a quaint, western-themed downtown area. The median home price is $370,000 and the median household income is $62,885. The city general plan designates 42% of land in San Dimas as open space, including parkland to the north and south of the town center. In 1999, San Dimas adopted a strict plan to regulate development on its northern foothills to conform to its general plan goal of preserving the hillsides. The plan outlined specific "feasibility zones" on its foothills where more dense development is permitted. Within feasibility zones on slopes between 0-25%, density for development is zoned for 1 unit per_ acres, whereas outside these zones, density is 1 unit per 20 acres. This very low allowable density hinders development of areas outside the feasibility zones. The developments in the 3J° Vacca, Joe. Thesis: Hillside Developmen7 in the Foothills ojthe San Gabriel Mounmins: /n the Citier of Glendora, San Dimas, La Verne, and Claremont. California State University, Northridge, CA. 2002. p.178. ns Id, on pp.128-178. ''" Interview with Culver Heaton, October 12, 2003. zao Id. zai Id. zaz Ciry of Glendora Press Release: h[Ip://vnvw.ci.glendom.ca.us/judge_foothill.html. 134 foothills are required to conform to the contours of the hillsides. According to Associate Planner Joe Vacca, In San Dimas, "although individual property rights within the foothills must be recognized, the priority between development and natural resource values is given to protecting the resource.' as Citizens support these measures. "Overall the town and citizens support large lots with single family homes, if any," said Vacca. "They are anti-high density and want the town to remain ruraLiz;~ Along-with Glendora, San Dimas was also sued by NJD, Ltd., the developer of Canyon Oaks. In early 2003 San Dimas won the lawsuit, but NJD has appealed to the State Supreme Court. NJD wanted to build the Canyon Oaks development over more than 40 acres of land adjacent to their proposed site in Glendora, at a higher housing density than city regulations allow. The developer sued San Dimas for rejecting their plan, citing that the state-mandated environmental planning process was not followed correctly. La Veme In May of 1887, brass marching bands on the streets of Los Angeles and San Bernardino announced free train rides to the new town of"Lordsburg," later known as La Verne. The trains, sponsored by entrepreneurial town founder Isaac Lord, brought La Verne its first residents. La Verne, incorporated in 1906, is now home to 31,638 residents, 18 parks and the regionally-known University of La Verne. Town property and open space comprise 35% of land in La Veme, and the median household income is $b 1,326.'-4$ The median home price of $359,000 has been increasing steadily. "Two years ago a family could purchase a town home for $100,000," stated Associate Planner Eric Scherer. "We don't want to shut any groin out, but younger families trying to relocate here now have problems buying homes." 24 Amain reason house prices are quickly increasing is because very little land is left to build on in La Verne. "Developers continue to look at our hillsides, thinking about developing the last remaining parcels," 2 ~ stated Scherer. However, La Verne has special foothill zoning in its strict Hillside Overlay Plan of 1992, which calls for a density of one unit per five acres in the northern hillsides. This makes development less profitable than in areas zoned for higher density. A fair amount of development has occurred in La Verne in the last two decades; over 500 homes were built in La Verne's hillsides during this time. Currently, a proposal for the Live Oak Trails development of 10 to 20 homes on hillside land has drawn citizen protest. A conservancy group is trying to protect the open space there; however, the land is zoned for development so the city is going forward with the project. 24J Vacca, Joe. Thesis, p.103. 2°° Interview with Joe Vacca, September 28, 2003. _ - 2i5 Vacca, Joe. Thesis, p.66; http://www.ciry-data.com/city/La-Veme-Califomia.html. z~ Interview with Eric Scherer, September 29, 2003. ~" Id. 135 The town has also had legal challenges regarding hillside building from Lewis Homes in the early 1990s. Lewis Homes proposed the Marshall Canyon Estates and La Verne Heights developments at the same time as La Verne's Hillside Overlay Plan was developed, and it sued the city over the new restrictions on density. The town compromised with Lewis Homes and allowed them to build at a higher density than the new regulations allowed. Claremont The striking tree-lined streets, ivy-covered buildings and student population give Claremont the appearance of a New England college town. Due to the influence of town founders who were originally from New England, the local government was originally based on the town meeting format. Within the town's 14.14 square miles resides a population of 33,998, which has grown minimally in the last decade. Citizens from Claremont are moderately wealthy and well educated: the town's median household income is 570,647 and the median home price is 5376,613'-48. Home of the seven Claremont colleges, more than 52% of the population holds at least afour-year college degree. In the late 1970's, Claremont created one of the most innovative hillside development regulation plans in the San Gabriel Valley. No other cities bordering the San Gabriel Mountains have this type of plan. In this plan, city planners outlined a few areas of moderately sloped land for development, while forbidding any development on the great majority of hillside land. Ninety percent of Claremont's hillsides, 2,600 acres, are protected in this system. However, Claremont officials understood that the owners of the newly protected land were entitled to compensation. In order for these landowners to obtain the value for their land, they may sell "credits" from their property to the owners of developable hillside land. _ By obtaining credits, owners of developable land may build higher densities of housing than the normal Claremont hillside regulations allow. Credits on a property are designated through a formula that accounts for the slope of the land and the property acreage. After an owner sells his credits, the city may buy the land at a discount from him since it no longer holds value for development. According to Claremont Principal Planner Belle Newman, this credit system was developed after ahigh-density hillside development, Claraboya, was built on formerly picturesque hillsides by "cutting off ridges, filling in valleys, and massively scarring the steep terrain. Claraboya was an eye-opener for the city council and for residents.s249 They did not want future developments to further destroy their foothills. The first development to occur since the hillside regulations were created is Village Walk: l25 homes on 125 acres that was approved in 1992. The developer bought credits from surrounding hillside land in order to build at relatively high density, resulting in 1200 acres being sold to the city for 51.2 million to remain forever as open space. Although Claremont residents were initially pleased with the ~ain in preserved hillside land, "over the last ten years some people have become upset"Z ° at the development of the 125 acres. Community '°s California Association of Realtors, August 2003 data. htrp://www.cacorg/index.php?id=Mzl INDI=. ~a9 Interview with Belle Newman, September 22, 2003. xso Id. 136 members formed an organization, the Claremont Wildlands Conservancy, to preserve all the remaining hillsides from development. Currently the city owns 1,500 acres of hillside land, and is in the process of acquiring 240 acres through a Proposition 40 gran[ of $1.3 million. "We are also trying to pursue another 400 acres of grant money through the Department of Fish and Game Wildlife Conservation Board, but at this point the funding looks unlikely for us," 2st stated the Assistant City Manager Jim Lewis. Grant money from the Wildlife Conservation Board was largely spent a week before the October 2003 recall vote when former Governor Gray Davis rushed to approve Iwo hefty land conservation deals for over $275 million, including the acquisition of Ahmanson Ranch in eastern Ventura County and part of the Ballona Wetlands in West Los Angeles.'`51 Little funding remained afrer approving these large grants for other conservation projects in Southern Califomia.zs3 "If it does fall through, the Claremont Wildlands Conservancy will likely try to find other funding sources,"ZS"r affirmed Lewis. Upland Upland's population of 68,393 has grown moderately in the last decade. The majority of citizens are white, but 28% are Hispanic. The median home price has increased by 28% in the last year to $340,000 by August 2003. The city is relatively flat in relation to its neighbors. "Upland does not really have any foothills", according to Senior Planner John Atwater, "so we do not have any guidelines or zoning specifically for hillsides."255 All the hillside land is above Upland, in San Bernardino County territory. Much of this land is already developed, as the county typically has less stringent development guidelines than those of the local municipalities in the San Gabriel foothills. Atwater describes the city government, including the city council and the planning commission, as pro-development. In fact, developers and others involved in real estate have contributed substantial donations to recent successful Upland city council campaigns. In September 2002, the council approved the Colonies, a 450-tract development on flat land surrounding an abandoned sand and gravel operation. Part of the area had been used by the county as a flood control basin via a 1929 easement, but in late August 2003, the Colonies won in court to require the county to spend as much as $200 million to make improvements to the flood basin in order to increase its capability of handling large amounts of storm runoff. This dispute is extremely important to Upland as the flood control basin in its current state of disrepair could to lead to flooding in the lower sections of the city during heavy rains. zsi Interview with Jim Lewis, September 27, 2003 zsz Bustillo, Miguel. "Davis Scrambles to Sign Land Deals," Los Angeles Times. September 2Q 2003. zv Id. zsa Interview with Jim Lewis, September 27, 2003. zss Interview with John Atwater, October 3, 2003 137 Rancho Cucamonga Rancho Cucamonga, a 38 square mile city populated by 146,700 people, is named for the Kucamongan Native Americans who lived in the area since 1200AD.'S6 Rancho Cucamonga is much larger in size and population than the other foothill cities and it is growing rapidly: the population increased by 45% between 1990 and 2003. The city's median household income is $65,582 and the median home price is $305,000. The Rancho Cucamonga City Council is generally supportive of development, and therefore the city currently has a large amount of construction inside city limits. In fact, Council races are funded in large part by businesses and individuals involved in development. Due to Rancho Cucamonga's favorable policies for developers, a number of owners of hillside property in county land above the city boundaries have annexed their properties into the city over the past decades, in order to expedite development on their land. In 1992 the city adopted a specific plan for the county area from which most land is annexed, called the Etiwanda Fan, since they needed common regulations for development there. However, these regulations are not always followed; negotiations favoring the developer can take place if he has already started the development process with the county. In recent years, roughly 2,500 units have been approved and built in the Etiwanda Fan annexation area, according to Larry Henderson, principal city planner. No land in the city is zoned for open space except natural drainage features, according to Alan Warren, Rancho Cucamonga Associate Planner, and the city has no plans to raise money or apply for grants to preserve land in the foothills. "People here don't have a great love of open space-they like the open space next to them," stated Henderson. Instead, land in Rancho Cucamonga is mainly preserved due to state and federal laws protecting endangered species and their habitat, such as the horny toad, the kangaroo rate, and the gnatcatcher. To abide by these laws, the city has a system whereby developers wishing to develop land that is home to these endangered species buy a required amount of land with similar species in another area of the city and donate it as open space. xee See ham://www.ci.rancho-wcamonea.ca.us/index res.htm. 138 Publications and Projects Reports Political Reform That Works: Public On the Brink of Clean: Launching San Campaign Financing Blooms in Tucson Francisco's New Campaign Finance (CGS 2003). Reform (CGS 2002). Public Financing of Elections: Where To Get The Money? (CGS 2003). Public Financing Laws in Local Jurisdictions (CGS 2003). ', Electronic Filing and Disclosure Update (CGS 2002). Eleven Years of Reform: Many Successes, More to Be Done: Campaign Finance Reform in the City of Los Angeles (CGS 2001). Access Delayed Is Access Denied: Electronic Reporting ojCampaign Finance Activities (CGS 2000). A Statute of Liberty; How New York City's Campaign Finance Law Is Changing the Face of Local Elections (CGS 2002). Alluvial Amnesia: How Government Plays Down Flood Risks in the Push for Development (CGS 2002). Dead on Arrival? Breathing Life /nto Suffolk County's. New Campaign Finance Reforms (CGS 2002). Investing in Democracy: Creating Public Financing of Elections In Your Community (CGS 2003). Affordable Health Care for Low Income Californians: Report and Recommendations of the California Citizens Budget Commission (CGS 2000). Campaign Money on the Information Superhighway: Electronic Filing and Disclosure of Campaign Finance Reports, CGS/National Resource Center for State and Local Campaign Finance Reform (CGS 1996-1999). Promises to Keep and Miles to Go: A Summary of the Joint Meeting of the California Citizens Commission on Higher Education and the California Education Roundtable (CGS 1997) Books Century, Recommendations of the California Citizens Commission on Higher Education (CGS 1999). A lh` Century Budget Process for California: Recommendations of the California Citizens Budget Commission (CGS 1998). Toward a State of Learning: California Higher Education for the Twenty-First A State of Learning: California and the Dreain ojHigher Education in the Twenty-First Century, Califomia Citizens Commission on Higher Education (CGS 1998). Opportunity Through Technology: Conference Report on New Communication Technology and Low-Income Communities (CGS/Connect LA 1997). A Shared Vision: A Practical Guide to the Design and Implementation of a Performance-Based Budget Model for California State Health Services, Califomia Citizens Budget Commission (CGS 1997). The Price of Justice: A Los Angeles Area Case Study in Judicial Campaign Financing, California Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1995). Reforming California's Budget Process: Preliminary Report and Recommendations, Califomia Citizens Budget Commission (CGS 1995). California at the Crossroads: Choices for Health Care Reform, Lucien Wulsin, Jr. (CGS 1994). Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California's Fourth Branch of Government, California Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1992). To Govern Ourselves: Ballot Initiatives in the Los Angeles Area, California Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1992). Money and Politics in the Golden State: Financing California's Local Elections, California Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1989). Money and Politics in Local Elections: The Las Angeles Area, California Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1989). The California Channel: A New Public Affairs Television Network for the State, Tracy Westen and Beth Givens (CGS 1989). Update to the New Gold Rush, California Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1987). The New Gold Rush: Financing California's Legislative Campaigns, Califomia Commission on Campaign Financing (CGS 1985). Media Projects Connect LA: A bi-lingual, web-based The Democracy Network: An interactive system of information and services for web-based system of political low-income users and communities of information for elections in California color (CGS 1998-present) and other states (CGS 1996-2000) (www. ConnectLA. ore). (www. duet. ore). Video Voter: A new system of interactive video information on candidates in federal, state and local elections (CGS 2001-present) (see www.ces.ore; www.videovotecor¢1 The Democracy Network: An interactive video-on-demand system of candidate information on Time-Warner's Full Service Network in Orlando, Florida (CGS 1996). Digital Democracy: An email-based system of communication between citizens and elected officials on public policy issues (CGS 2002-present) (see www.cHS.or¢). PolicyArchive.Net: Anew web-based archive of public policy research (CGS 2002-present). City Access: Report on the Design of a New Interactive System of Local Government (CGS 1995). The California Channel: Asatellite-fed, cable television network providing over six million California homes with gavel- to-gavel coverage of the state legislature (CGS 1989-1993) (www.Ca lChannel. com). _ ,-, _ re '~1 _ . iS y Y - ; Y It ~` ' 4 ' = 1 t d ' ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ LJ S ~ ~ ~ G f~ ~l: U ~ i3 ~ ~ $~~ y t i ~i ~. ~ ~ , E ~ µ Y `' i J `~ X? 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